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Preface
If this dissertation were in Dutch, I would call this preface “Verantwoording”. But
since I lack the skills to ascertain whether any of the dictionary translations of this
word (Responsibility/Justification/Amenability) is an apt one, I stick to the more
traditional “Preface”. On the other hand, the Dutch meaning of the phrase also ap-
pears to be suffering some damage. Nowadays, when some big chief makes a mess
he can just take responsibility (verantwoording afleggen) by quiting his job with
a bonus pay check, leaving everybody else with the mess. It is not my intention
to leave the reader with a mess though, and thus I aim to give a “verantwoord-
ing” in a more traditional sense. So what follows (among other things) is a short
explanation/defense of why this dissertation is the way it is, and not something else.
It is commonplace that a dissertation is the culmination of scientific work per-
formed over the period of four years that comprise the ‘promotion’. This dissertation
is not of this kind. Such a culmination may already be found in the papers I pub-
lished in the past four years. Instead of stapling those papers together, I took the
opportunity to try to write a story that ties together some of these papers, even
though at first sight they may look somewhat disjoint. I simply think it is nicer if a
dissertation at least tries to be a book with a story. A peculiar consequence is that
the overarching topic of this dissertation (quantum probability) isn’t the specific
topic of any of the papers that present the ‘main research results’. Nonetheless,
this topic has been in the back of my mind a lot during much of the research I did.
Perhaps it is because it was a course on quantum probability that I followed as a
master student that triggered my interest in the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics in the first place. It could also be because officially my research topic was the
philosophy of probability. Either way, I took this dissertation as a chance to put
some of those background ideas to the front.
The plan to write a dissertation that makes up a single coherent story even
though the papers upon which it is based are not directly linked to one another
has both positive and negative consequences. Let me start with some of the nega-
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tive ones. First, this dissertation most likely does not answer to the expectations
one might have for a dissertation on the philosophy of quantum probability. For
example, there is no discussion of the literature on generalized probability spaces.
Second, I wasn’t able to incorporate all aspects of all my papers in this dissertation.
But the upside is that this dissertation provides both a look at quantum probability
from a refreshing angle, as well as a new perspective on the papers I wrote. A fortu-
nate consequence is that this new framing itself has amounted to some interesting
thoughts, which is why part I of this dissertation is not directly related to any of
the papers I have written. It may be considered to be the icing on the cake.
Apart from giving a “verantwoording” for the content of this dissertation, its
style also deserves to be mentioned. Although this is a philosophy dissertation, and I
am now allowed to call myself a philosopher, I have been trained as a mathematician.
This is reflected in my writing style, in particular when adopting the “definition-
theorem-proof” format. As a consequence, on some occasions, my arguments can
be concise and dense to the point of becoming opaque or more formal than strictly
necessary. Over the past few years I have tried to learn to expand my arguments.
But the problem is that I have a short attention span. When an argument becomes
long I loose track and get confused, even when I am myself making the argument.
So the mathematical style is a way to reduce the amount of nonsense. I was hoping
to compensate by writing only a short (less than a hundred pages) dissertation. The
idea would be that readers would then have enough time to read the compact stuff
twice. I apologize for not having been able to reach this goal.
Ronnie Hermens
Groningen, August 2015
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1
Introduction
Why philosophy of quantum probability? As this question is likely to be in the
top ten of questions first asked when someone picks up this dissertation, it seems a
good idea to break the tension and come up with an answer. Quantum probability
theory, like classical1 probability theory, is a subfield of mathematics. It is the study
of quantum probability spaces conceived as abstract mathematical objects. But
like classical probability theory, it falls under the header of applied mathematics.
The main applications are of course quantum mechanics and derived sciences like
quantum computation. But there are also attempts to apply it within other fields
such as decision theory and cognitive science (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Pothos
and Busemeyer, 2009) and biology (Aerts et al., 2014). The topic of this dissertation,
then, lies at the intersection of philosophy of probability and philosophy of quantum
mechanics. Although these two field have influenced each other, the overlap itself
hasn’t been studied that much. This dissertation, then, is an attempt to fill up this
lacunae.
A more elaborate answer to the why of philosophy of quantum quantum prob-
ability is obtained by delving into the question “what is philosophy of quantum
probability?”. In the remainder of this introduction I work towards an answer of
this question. By doing so, I motivate both the specific topic on which I focus in this
dissertation, as well as the methodology I adopt to investigate it. But in short, this
dissertation is an investigation of the formalism of quantum probability in the light
of its empirical role in quantum mechanics. What this program holds in more detail
is spelled out in the next two sections. First, by adopting a perspective from the
philosophy of probability, and then by adopting a perspective from the philosophy
of quantum mechanics. Finally, in section 1.3, an outline of the remainder of this
dissertation is presented.
1I use the term ‘classical’ to indicate non-quantum probability. In most occasions this refers to
probability theory as based upon the axioms of Kolmogorov (1933). But sometimes it may also
refer to something broader, such as the axioms of Kolmogorov minus the assumption of σ-additivity.
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1.1 Philosophy of probability
A useful starting point is to try to think of philosophy of quantum probability as a
subfield of philosophy of probability. Within this field Lyon (2010) distinguishes two
central questions. The first concerns the interpretation of probability and the second
the formalism of probability. The interpretation of probability has spawned a lot of
philosophical debate (Ha´jek, 2012a), revolving around several central questions. Are
there probabilities ‘out there in the world’ independent of any observers, that is, are
there probabilities (often called chances) that are ontological? Or can one only make
sense of the concept in the context of a form of ignorance about the actual state
of affairs, that is, are probabilities only epistemic? Or perhaps probabilities may
be something in between (Lyon, 2011; Myrvold, 2012). Furthermore, answers to
these questions may differ from case to case: there need not be a unique universally
applicable interpretation of probability.
As an example consider probabilities for coin flips. These have a tendency to
generate stable relative frequencies for the outcomes. This stability is then often
taken to suggest a connection between these relative frequencies and some objective
notion of probability. A further connection between these frequencies and sym-
metrical properties of the coin and the stability of the physical properties of the
coin over time then suggests that there may be something ontological about these
probabilities as well. Although it is a non-trivial matter to make these ideas pre-
cise, they suffice to argue that probabilities for coin tosses may be of a different
kind than, for example, the probabilities at a race track. Two horses participat-
ing in a race certainly show less resemblance to each other than the two sides of
a coin. Furthermore, the physical conditions of a horse change significantly over
time, and the relative frequency for it winning a race is not very stable. Somewhat
intuitively, then, probabilities for coin tosses appear ‘more ontological’ than those
adopted at the race track.2 But making such intuitions precise, or showing that
they are misleading or just flat out wrong, has proven to be a difficult endeavor.
The question of interpretation doesn’t change much when shifting attention from
classical probability to quantum probability. The answer may differ of course, but
at first glance, not much is changed by adding the adjective ‘quantum’. Quite the
opposite is the case though when turning to the second central question posed by
Lyon (2010): that of the (correct) formalism of probability. The prime example of
a formalism for probability are the axioms of Kolmogorov (1933). But, as noted
2One may also have intuitions yielding precisely the opposite conclusion. There are deterministic
models for coin tosses (Keller, 1986; Strza lko et al., 2008) which may even be exploited to create
biases in the outcomes of tosses (Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery, 2007). This then can be
taken to suggest that an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation for these probabilities is more apt.
Horses, on the other hand, are considerably more complex systems, and possibly there is no way
their behavior can be accurately described in a deterministic way, making the probabilities in some
sense irreducible.
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above, quantum mechanics introduces a different formalism. In fact, apart from
these two examples, many other formalisms are possible and may even be preferable
depending on how one conceives of probability. For example, von Mises (1931)
builds his formalism entirely from a frequentist interpretation of probability relying
on the notion of so-called Kollektivs. The difference between the formalisms of
Kolmogorov and von Mises may be explained in the light of background intuitions
about the interpretation of probability (Van Lambalgen, 1996). In the case of
quantum probability, however, the formalism arises more or less by accident as part
of the axiomatization of quantum mechanics.
This ‘accidental’ character of the formalism of quantum probability may be seen
as a consequence of the fact that ‘probability’ occurs as a primitive concept in quan-
tum mechanics: the axiomatization of this theory isn’t guided by strong intuitions
on the nature of probability. Furthermore, the use of probabilities even seems to
be an indispensable and fundamental aspect of the theory. This suggests the (com-
mon) view that the theory describes a world of which probability is an intrinsic
aspect. In fact, quantum mechanics has sometimes even served as a motivation
for developing theories of objective chance. For example, Loewer (2004) opens his
paper on objective chance with the statement that “The most important theories
in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objec-
tive probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement
about what it is.” Also, the phenomenon of radioactive decay has served as the
paradigm example of an inherently ‘chancy’ event in the philosophical literature.3
However, as intuitive as the introduction of objective chance in quantum mechanics
may seem, and despite the considerable support of physicists for this idea, there is
nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics that appears to force this notion of
chance to be a part of the theory. Moreover, since Loewer is correct about the little
agreement concerning the meaning of objective chance, a different interpretation of
quantum probability, if it fits the theory, may even be preferable.
Now while a theory of objective chance may not be necessary to make sense
of probability in quantum mechanics, such a theory may well be useful. However,
this requires that at some point this theory has to be connected to the formalism
of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, this isn’t done very often. As a telling
historical example one can consider the work of Popper on probability in quantum
mechanics. In his 1957 paper “The propensity interpretation of the calculus of
probability, and the quantum theory” he proposes an interpretation that “takes
the mystery out of quantum theory, while leaving probability and indeterminism
in it” (p. 68). However, Popper nowhere recognizes that the classical calculus of
probability, which he is interpreting, is manifestly distinct from the way probability
3See for example (Skyrms, 1977; Lewis, 1981; Pollock, 1984; Hall, 1994; Noordhof, 1999; Kment,
2012).
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occurs in quantum mechanics. Without bridging this gap it is inevitably unclear
how an interpretation of the former can play any role in resolving conceptual issues
in the latter. Presumably, Popper’s interpretation was supposed to fit one of his
own axiomatic frameworks (Popper, 1938; Popper, 1959, Appendix *iv). But this
is even less helpful as they seem far removed from the quantum formalism.4
Now at this point one may have several worries. First, one may try to argue for
the requirement of objective chance in quantum mechanics not on the basis of the
formalism of quantum mechanics alone, but also on the basis of no-go theorems for
hidden variables like the Kochen-Specker theorem or Bell’s theorem. Connections
between such theorems and the role of probability are not uncommon in the liter-
ature, especially in popular science. For example, Wolchover (2014) writes: “An
experimentally tested theorem by the Northern Irish physicist John Bell says there
is no “true” state of the particle; the probabilities are the only reality that can be
ascribed to it.” Second, one may wonder how important the emphasis I put on
formalism really is: can’t a well-developed interpretation of probability just work
for any decent formalism of probability? This last point can be dealt with directly.
If an interpretation of probability is as flexible as suggested, then the connection
with the formalism must be very weak. However, without a solid connection, it is
not clear if the given interpretation is actually an interpretation of probability as it
is used, or of something else entirely.
The first point relies on a misrepresentation of what no-go theorems actually
prove. The setup of such theorems is that, first, certain plausible assumptions for
physical theories are formulated. Then, it is shown that no theory that satisfies
these assumptions can reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics. Conse-
quently, if quantum mechanics is taken to provide the correct predictions, one of
the assumptions has to be rejected. However, these assumptions do not incorporate
restrictions on the interpretation of probability. Consequently, simply positing the
existence of objective chance cannot provide an explanation of these theorems. On
the other hand, the quantum mechanical predictions that play a role in no-go theo-
rems do rely on the use of the formalism of quantum probability. This suggests that
an explanation of the formalism can help in explaining these theorems. It is for this
reason that in this dissertation the focus is on the formalism of quantum probability,
rather than its interpretation. The adopted method for this investigation is best
explained from the perspective of the philosophy of quantum mechanics, to which
I turn now.
4Bub (1975) provides a more extensive critique of Popper’s alleged resolution of the foundational
problems in quantum mechanics. Although I agree with his critique, I also think it should be
recognized that when Popper introduced his ideas, formal results against their success such as
Gleason’s theorem (1957) and the Kochen-Specker theorem (1967) were just fresh on the market,
or yet to be discovered.
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1.2 Philosophy of quantum mechanics
In comparison to preceding theories in physics, quantum mechanics is odd, in the
following way. Newtonian mechanics is a theory about forces acting between rigid
bodies, and their influence on how these bodies move. Maxwell’s theory of elec-
tromagnetism is about electromagnetic fields and their influence on the movement
of bodies with electrical charge. Thermodynamics is about thermal properties of
all physical processes, as well as the behavior of particular substances in processes.
What these theories have in common, is that they are about something. Of course,
there is the question of the nature of the relationship between the abstract things
in the theory, and things that actually exist in the world. But they sketch a meta-
physical picture of the world that is at least clear enough for the student of physics
to be able to understand the theory, and to apply it.
In contrast to the theories just mentioned, quantum mechanics does not pose a
clear candidate for a metaphysical picture of the world. Or, as argued by Maudlin
(2014), the theory cannot be taken literally. In its minimalist form, quantum me-
chanics is about measurements on physical systems and their possible outcomes.
But it is obnoxiously silent about what may be going on when no measurement is
performed, or what precisely constitutes a physical system. To try to fill in these
gaps, or even contemplating whether they can be filled at all, is to delve into the
philosophy of quantum mechanics. To be sure, there is a natural candidate in the
theory for spelling out what may be going on: the quantum state a.k.a. the wave
function. However, this state appears to behave differently depending on whether
or not a measurement is performed. This leads one to question how or why mea-
surements are physical processes to be distinguished from other physical processes.
But as measurements themselves dictate in part how the state evolves, there is little
hope of explaining what kind of physical processes measurements are in terms of
evolutions of the quantum state. In short, for a theory that is almost solely about
measurements, it gives very little indication of what measurements are. As Bell
(1981, p. 117) noted: “The concept of ‘measurement’ becomes so fuzzy on reflec-
tion that it is quite surprising to have it appearing in physical theory at the most
fundamental level.”
What I am stumbling upon is, of course, the notorious measurement problem.
This problem is so deeply woven into the theory, that there isn’t even agreement
about what the problem is.5 But one useful way to think about it is in terms of a
question. Although quantum mechanics is about measurements and their outcomes,
in general, given a specified measurement, the theory does not prescribe which
outcome will occur. On the other hand, actual measurements are usually seen
to have a single relatively well-defined outcome. How can one account for the
5For example, Maudlin (1995) distinguishes three measurement problems, while both Pitowsky
(2006) and Griffiths (2013) distinguish two. All of these problems differ from each other.
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occurrence of definite measurement outcomes when the theory only gives sets of
possible outcomes? Where do definite outcomes come from? The measurement
problem can then be thought of as the culmination of all possible problems one
encounters when trying to answer these questions.
But although the measurement problem may be the biggest problem in the
philosophy of quantum mechanics, it certainly isn’t the only one. Here I want to
consider a problem that occurs right at the same level when looking at the theory.
Apart from providing the possible outcomes for measurements, quantum mechanics
also attaches probabilities to these possible outcomes. Like the notion of ‘measure-
ment’, the notion of ‘probability’ can also be used in practical situations. Scientists
usually have a good idea of what kind of processes to count as measurements, and
similarly, they are good in adopting a working definition of probability as reflecting
the relative frequencies of outcomes of a long series of similar experiments. But as
is well known, frequentist interpretations of probability are fraught with problems
(Ha´jek, 1996 ; 2009). More generally, as seen above, the interpretation of probabil-
ity is a difficult topic. The following paraphrasing of Bell then seems apt: “The
concept of ‘probability’ becomes so fuzzy on reflection that it is quite surprising to
have it appearing in physical theory at the most fundamental level.”
The philosophy of probability in quantum mechanics (and also in other fields
of physics) has regained interest over the past twenty years or so. Thus in the
relatively recent book edited by Beisbart and Hartmann (2011) one reads in the
introduction that it “is the first to provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the
status of probabilities in all of physics.” What is typical of these investigations of
the status of quantum probability, is that they are often performed with respect to
a certain interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is obviously useful research.
Indeed, adopting an interpretation of quantum mechanics is an intuitive method to
explain the formalism of quantum probability. Once one goes beyond the minimalist
version of the theory and starts sketching what the theory is actually about, one
may also find ways to get a grip on quantum probability.
Historically, finding a solution to the measurement problem has been a priority
in the development of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. As a consequence,
one now finds a plethora of interpretations. Apart from the Copenhagen-like inter-
pretations as developed mainly by Bohr and Heisenberg (Faye, 2014), one also has
(among others) Bohmian mechanics (Bohm, 1952; Du¨rr, Goldstein, and Zangh`ı,
2013), spontaneous collapse theories (Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber, 1985 ; 1986;
Pearle, 1989), many-worlds interpretations (Everett III, 1957; Wallace, 2012), modal
interpretations (Van Fraassen, 1972; Dieks and Vermaas, 1998) and consistent his-
tories (Omne`s, 1999; Griffiths, 2003). When the minimal statistical interpretation
of Born is abandoned and probabilities are assumed to play a less primitive role, the
question arises how these probabilities precisely emerge from the postulated ontol-
ogy, and why they numerically coincide with the values given by the Born postulate.
6
Philosophy of quantum mechanics 1.2
Thus one finds results, for example, on how Born probabilities arise in Bohmian me-
chanics (Callender, 2007), in the many worlds interpretation (Wallace, 2012, Ch.
4-6), or in quantum Bayesianism (QBism) (Fuchs and Schack, 2013). A particularly
friendly paper on probability in several realist interpretations of quantum mechanics
is (Timpson, 2011).
Evaluating quantum probability against the background of the adopted inter-
pretation may be considered to be a bottom-up approach. First one establishes the
ontology, and from there one reconsiders the specific aspects of quantum mechan-
ics. To complement these kinds of investigations, I aim to provide a more top-down
approach: what constraints does quantum probability impose on a possible ontol-
ogy? For such an approach a more abstract investigation of quantum probability
is required, in which the measurement problem is (at least temporarily) set aside.
The hope, then, is that by using a top-down approach the results obtained in this
dissertation are in a sense independent of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This can only be achieved by adopting a sort of ignorance concerning the ontology
of quantum mechanics, and instead focusing on the empirical content of the theory.
Roughly, it means that I will act as an operationalist concerning the concept of
measurement, but not concerning the concept of probability.
A sharp distinction between empirical and ontological content of a theory is of
course not to be expected. Instead, I will do my best to highlight whenever a partic-
ular assumption is being made and whether it relies on an ontological or empirical
intuition. This is by no means trivial. As an example of such assumptions, consider
what Bub and Pitowsky (2010) call the “two dogmas about quantum mechanics”.
The first of these is the idea that measurement is not allowed to play a fundamental
role in the theory. That is, the theory should be able to provide (in principle) a
dynamical account of measurement processes as regular physical processes. The
second is the view that the quantum state provides a (possibly incomplete) repre-
sentation of some aspect of physical reality. The information-theoretical approach
to quantum mechanics of Bub and Pitowsky6 relies on the rejection of these two
dogmas. The methodology I adopt, on the other hand, requires the recognition of
these dogmas and adopting a strict agnosticism about their truth. The truth or
falsity of these assumptions is, after all, an aspect of an interpretation of quantum
mechanics and is not determined directly by the empirical content of the theory.
Possibly, the sketched mathematical empiricist methodology still sounds sketchy.
However, it lies in the nature of methodologies that they are best understood by
seeing them being applied. Particular illustrative applications found in this disserta-
tion are the discussion of the postulates of quantum mechanics, the Kochen-Specker
theorem and its finite precision loophole, and the development of an empiricist quan-
tum logic. As a final note, I wish to emphasize that my adoption of an empiricist
6See also (Pitowsky, 2006; Bub, 2011b).
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methodology is not intended as an endorsement of an empiricist interpretation of
quantum mechanics. On the other hand, the explicit agnosticism adopted does
often reflect my own cluelessness concerning what quantum mechanics is about.
1.3 Outline
This outline is mainly intended as a guide for the reader who only wishes to read at
most a few parts of this dissertation. It gives a quick sketch of what can be found
where, in a slightly more comprehensive way than in the table of contents. Most
chapters are not self-contained. On the other hand, the reader wishing to skip to
a specific chapter most likely already knows a lot of the relevant background that
may have been covered in preceding chapters. If, however, one does find a concept
that sounds unfamiliar, try the index, which may guide directly to the relevant
page. Finally, most of the mathematical concepts used are concisely introduced in
the appendix.
1.3.1 Part I
The first part of this dissertation is mainly concerned with preliminary considera-
tions. To quote Peres (2003, p. 459): “As it often happens in science, these things
were well known to those who know things well.” If you are one of those readers
well familiar with both the foundations of quantum mechanics and the mathematics
of quantum probability, you will not find a lot of surprises here. But I suspect many
readers will not fall in this category. Furthermore, while the topics discussed in part
I are well-known to some people, I do not know of any texts that neatly link them all
together. The value of part I, then, is to make a short and smooth connection from
the foundations of quantum mechanics to the mathematics of quantum probability,
highlighting the philosophical aspects of the steps made along the way.
In chapter 2, I give a short historical introduction of how the notion of proba-
bility in quantum mechanics was received in the early days of quantum mechanics
(1925–1935) and continued to shape the ideas of people like Born, Einstein and Bohr
well into the period 1935–1950. Opposing views on the role of probability in quan-
tum mechanics that emerge from this discussion are then linked to the programs
in parts II and III. The postulates of quantum mechanics in the style of von Neu-
mann are presented in chapter 3. These are analyzed for their empirical relevance,
and this analysis at the same time will be useful for distilling the Hilbert space
formalism of quantum probability from the axioms of quantum mechanics, which is
done in chapter 4. In the same chapter, the more general algebraic formulation of
quantum probability is also introduced. A comparison between the two formalisms,
as well as with classical probability is made. The upshot is that classical probability
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can be conceived as a special case of algebraic quantum probability, restricted to
commutative algebras.
1.3.2 Part II
The fact that classical probability can be represented as a special case of quantum
probability does not in itself imply that quantum probability is more general than
classical probability. Generality can be a matter of perspective. Possibly, quantum
probability spaces can also be represented as classical probability spaces. If so, the
philosophy of the formalism of quantum probability may be a red herring, since
there may be nothing new beyond classical probability. This possibility is studied
in part II of this dissertation.
The possibility of classical representations of quantum probability spaces is tech-
nically the same question as the possibility of hidden variable interpretations of
quantum mechanics. Conceptually, though, there is a difference. For example, hid-
den variables may be required to be physically explanatory, or to be constrained by
further metaphysical assumptions. A classical representation of a quantum prob-
ability space, in turn, may be required to be mathematically explanatory. For ex-
ample, such a representation may be required to capture all relevant aspects of the
quantum formulation, i.e., a classical representation may be required to be faithful.
In chapter 5 these considerations are spelled out in more detail.
The remainder of part II is devoted to evaluating the theorem of Kochen and
Specker and its implications for both the possibility of hidden variables and classi-
cal representations. In chapter 6 the Kochen-Specker theorem is discussed, together
with the well-known possibility of dropping the assumption of non-contextuality. A
less well-known possibility of circumventing the Kochen-Specker theorem, which
goes by the name of the finite precision loophole, is investigated in chapter 7. For-
mally, both these loopholes may be exploited to construct classical representations
of quantum probability. However, none of the classical representations are found to
be entirely faithful in the sense of providing a clear uncontroversial reformulation of
quantum probability. This motivates the more direct investigation of the formalism
of quantum probability in part III.
1.3.3 Part III
In chapter 8, I explain how the formalism of quantum probability is tightly con-
nected to that of orthodox quantum logic.7 An investigation of the latter is therefore
useful for understanding the former. However, I reach the conclusion that a direct
interpretation of orthodox quantum logic (specifically in terms of natural language)
7I use the adjective “orthodox” to refer to the quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann
(1936) specifically, thereby allowing a broader reading of the term “quantum logic”.
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is next to impossible. This then is taken as a motivation to try to reformulate
quantum logic in a way such that it helps explaining orthodox quantum logic and
quantum probability.
A first attempt is made in chapter 9. The method applied here relies on the work
of Coecke (2002), which suggests a direct expansion of the orthodox quantum logic.
However, as the method used relies on an abstract construction, the interpretation
of the obtained structure is not immediately clear. Some interesting properties
are discussed, including the idea that as a logic of propositions about quantum
states it is more appropriate than orthodox quantum logic. In the end, though, the
conclusion is that for the interpretation of the formalism of quantum probability a
different route may be more fruitful.
In chapter 10, a new quantum logic is constructed from scratch. The starting
point is the introduction of a set of elementary experimental propositions that are
considered to be indispensable for the formulation of quantum probability in terms
of natural language. The emphasis on natural language is adopted to prevent the
difficulties encountered with the interpretation of the quantum logics discussed ear-
lier. Logical connections between these propositions are then made based upon the
empirical non-probabilistic content of quantum mechanics. These constructions lead
first to the introduction of an intuitionistic quantum logic, i.e., a Heyting algebra of
experimental propositions is constructed. This logic is then further expanded to ob-
tain a Boolean algebra. In short, on the basis of empirical considerations concerning
quantum measurements, a classical quantum logic is constructed.
In chapter 11, the possibility of introducing probability functions on the Boolean
algebra of chapter 10 is investigated. It is shown that every quantum probability
function can indeed be represented as a probability function on this new lattice.
Thus quantum probability functions can then be understood as functions assigning
probabilities to experimental propositions in a classical logic. It is shown that the
reformulation of quantum probability also allows probability functions that do not
obey the trace-rule that is typical of quantum probability. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 are
devoted to investigating the possibility of characterizing the probability functions
that do satisfy the trace-rule. In section 11.3, it is shown that these probability
functions can be identified with those that may be called non-contextual. A short
investigation is made of how non-contextuality can be understood as a natural crite-
rion for probability functions by looking at three interpretations in which contextual
probability functions are (in principle) also a possibility, to wit: Everettian quantum
mechanics, Bub and Pitowsky’s information-theoretical interpretation, and QBism.
In section 11.4 I investigate two other possibilities to characterize the non-contextual
probability functions. The first focuses on the possible role for a continuity assump-
tion, and the second focuses on a link with the quantum logic that was obtained in
chapter 9. The chapter ends with a short evaluation of the results of part III.
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Probability in the early quantum theory
In this chapter I sketch a short history of how probability was introduced into
quantum mechanics, and how this introduction was received at the time. It is not
my aim to trace a full historical development. For extensive works on the history
of quantum mechanics I refer the reader to the books of Jammer (1966) and Mehra
and Rechenberg (1982). Instead, the aim is to show that, using a historical context
as a method, quantum mechanics does not dictate how one should think of the
probabilities in the theory. Although it is still commonly heard that quantum
mechanics dictates the existence of objective chances or indeterminism, this is quite
far from the truth. There is a lot of room for differing views on probability in
quantum mechanics, and this was already apparent in the days when probabilities
got first introduced into the theory. Different views on probability in quantum
mechanics may pull into opposite directions for how one wishes to (re)formulate
quantum probability. The chapter ends with a section that links the possible views
on quantum probability that emerged in this chapter to two separate programs for
reformulating quantum probability. These programs in turn are studied in parts II
and III of this dissertation.
2.1 Probability in early quantum mechanics
The pioneering period of quantum mechanics (circa 1900-1925) is often referred to
as “the old quantum theory” (Ter Haar, 1967). It encompasses seminal results such
as Planck’s law for black body radiation (1900), Einstein’s description of the pho-
toelectric effect (1905), and Bohr’s model of the atom (1913). The following decade
saw the culmination of these and other results into a single theory, starting with
the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg (1925) and the wave mechanics of Schro¨dinger
(1926), and leading to the formalization of quantum mechanics by Dirac (1930) and
von Neumann (1932). It is within this period that Born introduced his probability
interpretation, and the early philosophy of quantum mechanics developed.
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Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics was not heartily welcomed by everyone. As one
of the first theories of atomic particles, it was quite radical in eliminating the classi-
cal concept of particle trajectories from the physical picture of the world. This was
accompanied by a philosophy (often called the Copenhagen interpretation,1 mainly
developed by Bohr and Heisenberg) that supported the idea that this elimination
was somehow necessary. What remained notoriously vague, however, was what
physical picture was to replace the old one, if any. A direct reading of the state-
ment, ascribed to Bohr,2 that “there is no quantum world”, would suggest that a
purely instrumentalist point of view underlies the Copenhagen interpretation. But
things aren’t that simple, and Folse (1985) for example, attributes a more realist
interpretation to Bohr. A balanced discussion is given by Landsman (2006 ; 2007).
Half a year later, Schro¨dinger (1926) presented his wave mechanics as a rival the-
ory. In contrast to matrix mechanics, this theory allegedly did provide an ontology
which would ground the empirical aspects. Not long before, de Broglie (1924) had
introduced the wave aspect of particles: trajectories of particles were supposed to be
constrained by waves. Schro¨dinger took the wave picture a step further by letting
the waves represent the distribution of matter in space itself. He further demon-
strated that his theory was empirically equivalent with Heisenberg’s, thus saving
all the merits of that theory while getting rid of the accompanying philosophy he
disliked.
However, wave mechanics and its intended interpretation were not without prob-
lems either. One problem is that dynamically the waves do not typically evolve into
peaked Gaussian-like functions that would represent the localization of a particle.
The way matter is described by the theory then is rather different from how it is
usually observed in experimental settings.3 Another problem is that, for n-particle
systems, these waves live in 3n-dimensional space and thus do not obviously de-
scribe the distribution of anything in the 3-dimensional space we experience around
us. So even if the waves in wave mechanics could provide an ontology, their relation
to observed phenomena is not clear.
It deserves to be noted that the earlier mentioned empirical equivalence of the
two theories also isn’t entirely without problems. Both theories require reformula-
tions and modifications to be put on a level in which they can be compared formally.
For a discussion of the details see (Muller, 1997a,b). However, it appeared to be
commonly accepted at the time that both theories were aiming towards the same
1There are many, not necessarily compatible, philosophical ideas that go under the header of
‘Copenhagen interpretation’. This makes it, generally, a dangerous term to use without further
elaboration of what is meant (Howard, 2004). Here, I use it as a place holder for the common
ground between the views of Heisenberg and Bohr.
2See for example (Petersen, 1963, p. 12).
3This may be considered a preliminary version of the measurement problem. And a recent
attempt at solving the measurement problem by Landsman and Reuvers (2013) starts precisely
with this older issue.
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new theory that was to be developed. Thus the physical pictures illustrated by
Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger shifted from being independent theories, to being pos-
sible interpretations of the same theory.
Both the interpretation of Heisenberg and that of Schro¨dinger faced difficulties.
Born noted these difficulties and proposed a solution: “Neither of these two views
seem satisfactory to me. I would like to try to give a third interpretation here, and
to test its applicability to collisions.”4 (1926b, p. 803). The solution was to keep the
wave functions of Schro¨dinger, but to replace their interpretation as matter densities
with probability densities.5 Thus the probabilistic, or statistical, interpretation of
quantum mechanics was born. In its minimalist form, it coincides with a common
popular science account of quantum mechanics in which the probabilities themselves
are the only elements of reality.
Not everybody was persuaded by this view. And even though Born’s rule for
calculating probabilities became part of the axioms of quantum mechanics, there was
(and still is) neither consensus on the correct interpretation of these probabilities,
nor on the question whether these probabilities reflect all that the theory has to
say about nature. The probabilistic interpretation was most famously opposed by
Einstein. However, the famous relevant quote has too often been misrepresented,
and in an effort to do my part on countering this misrepresentation I give here the
relevant passage from Einstein’s letter to Born in full.
Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me
that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not
bring us any closer to the secret of the ‘old one’. I, at any rate, am
convinced He is not playing at dice. Waves in 3-dimensional space,
whose velocity is regulated by potential energy (for example, rubber
bands). . . I am working very hard at deducing the equations of motion of
material points regarded as singularities, given the differential equation
of general relativity. (Einstein 1926, published in (Einstein, Born, and
Born, 1971, p. 91))
Now surely Einstein rejects Born’s interpretation here. The reason, however, doesn’t
seem to be that this interpretation implies indeterminism. Rather, it seems that
Einstein is expressing doubt about whether the shift to a probabilistic reading
of quantum waves takes away the main interpretational problems of the theory.
4My translation; original: “Keine dieser beiden Auffassungen scheint mir befriedigend. Ich
mo¨chte versuchen, hier eine dritte Interpretation zu geben und ihre Brauchbarkeit an den
Stoßvorga¨ngen zu erproben.”
5Actually, instead of directly taking the wave function to represent a probability density, one
has to take the square of its absolute value. This was something Born had to correct twice. First
as a footnote in (Born, 1926a) in which the function was replaced by its square, and then again
(recognizing that wave functions are complex valued) by the square of its absolute value in (Born,
1926b).
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Simultaneously, he appears to be expressing doubt about whether Schro¨dinger’s
approach makes sense. This last point is clearer when noting that the phrase ‘3-
dimensional space’ has been wrongly translated from the original ‘3n-dimensionalen
Raum’ (Einstein, Born, and Born, 1969, p. 98). Instead, Einstein seems to hold the
view that a new theory has to replace quantum mechanics before one can understand
what the objects in the quantum formalism represent. His own theory of general
relativity seemed a good starting point to him.
It has been stressed many times in the literature that Einstein’s main objection
to quantum mechanics was not that it was probabilistic or indeterministic. The
most famous defense of this reading of Einstein is perhaps found in the letter of
Pauli to Born.
Einstein gave me your manuscript to read; he was not at all annoyed
with you, but only said you were a person who will not listen. This
agrees with the impression I have formed myself insofar as I was un-
able to recognise Einstein whenever you talked about him in either your
letter or your manuscript. It seemed to me as if you had erected some
dummy Einstein for yourself, which you then knocked down with great
pomp. In particular, Einstein does not consider the concept of ‘deter-
minism’ to be as fundamental as it is frequently held to be (as he told
me emphatically many times) [. . . ] Einstein’s point of departure is ‘re-
alistic’ rather than ‘deterministic’, which means that his philosophical
prejudice is a different one. (Pauli 1954, published in (Einstein, Born,
and Born, 1971, p. 221))
The misinterpretation of Einstein’s criticisms is not surprising when noting (using
Pauli’s terminology) how intertwined the two departures ‘realistic’ and ‘determinis-
tic’ become within the context of quantum mechanics. This twining has to be taken
into careful consideration when doing philosophy of probability. A first aid for the
required unraveling comes from a look at the status of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle.
2.2 Probabilities in the uncertainty principle
One of the first criticisms against matrix mechanics (which still applies to quantum
mechanics), is that there are no states in the theory that simultaneously assign
a definite value to both the position and momentum of a particle. In fact, most
states assign a definite value to neither. If one supposes that these values in fact
do exist, one can only conclude that the formalism of Heisenberg is incomplete.
However, for Heisenberg, the view was that particles only have a definite position
or momentum if these properties are actually observed/measured. Since in these
cases the formalism can give these definite values, it seems perfectly complete.
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Nevertheless, matrix mechanics was found to be difficult to interpret, and its
abstractness seemed ill-motivated. Moreover, it was unclear why certain properties
(like position and momentum) were never ascribed a definite value simultaneously.
The uncertainty principle was meant to shed light on these matters. That is, the
principle is used to defend a certain interpretation of matrix mechanics.6
The original uncertainty principle (Heisenberg, 1927) demonstrates that, for
particular experimental setups, there is a bound on the accuracy with which pairs
of conjugate variables (such as position and momentum) can be measured. The
most famous example concerns the determination of the position of an electron
using a microscope. This determination requires that the electron at least interacts
with a photon. The accuracy of the measurement is then limited by the wave length
of the light. However, the shorter the wave length, the more energetic the photon
is. Consequently, the interaction will establish a disturbance in the momentum of
the electron proportional to the inverse of the wave length.
These setups are then considered to be generic, thereby suggesting that the
obtained bounds are empirically universally valid. A special trait of these consid-
erations is that they are independent of the formalism of matrix mechanics. Thus
the uncertainty principle in this approach has a flavor similar to that of empiri-
cal principles such as they appear in thermodynamics (the impossibility of certain
kinds of perpetual motion). However, the step from the inaccessibility of values
of certain quantities to the claim that therefore these definite values should play
no role in a theory is not straightforward, and requires an additional philosophical
principle. Born, when reflecting in his Nobel lecture on the development of quantum
mechanics, phrased it as follows:
The principle asserts that concepts and pictures that do not correspond
to physically observable facts should not be used in theoretical descrip-
tion. When Einstein, in setting up his theory of relativity, eliminated
the concepts of the absolute velocity of a body and of the absolute si-
multaneity of two events at different places, he was making use of the
same principle. Heisenberg banished the picture of electron orbits with
definite radii and periods of rotation, because these quantities are not
observable; he demanded that the theory should be built up by means
of quadratic arrays of the kind suggested in a preceding paragraph. In-
stead of describing the motion by giving a coordinate as a function of
time x(t), one ought to determine an array of transition probabilities
xmn. (Born, 1955, p. 676)
A similar idea can be found in the following quote of Heisenberg in which he recol-
lects a conversation with Einstein:
6Or, more closer to the original debate at the time, to show that the theory is in a sense
‘anschaulich’. For more details see (Hilgevoord and Uffink, 2014).
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“[. . . ] since a good theory must be based on directly observable magni-
tudes, I thought it more fitting to restrict myself to these [. . . ]” “But
you don’t seriously believe,” Einstein protested, “that none but observ-
able magnitudes must go into a physical theory?” “Isn’t that precisely
what you have done with relativity?” I asked in some surprise. [. . . ]
“Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning,” Einstein admitted, “but it
is nonsense all the same. [. . . ] on principle, it is quite wrong to try
founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very
opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe.
[. . . ]” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 63)
The analogy between Einstein’s disposal of absolute simultaneity and Heisen-
berg’s disposal of definite positions and momenta is certainly interesting. If the
analogy is indeed apt, it is understandable why Born thought Einstein’s objections
had to be directed against indeterminism rather than against the lack of realism;
from the realistic point of view quantum mechanics is not more eliminative than
special relativity. In both cases, concepts were disposed that lacked direct empirical
access, which need not harm a realist point of view. There are however important
distinctions. The notion of simultaneity plays no role in the application of spe-
cial relativity to describing the relevant phenomena. The notions of position and
momentum, on the other hand, play an indispensable role in the application of
quantum mechanics. (In fact, this is even part of Bohr’s correspondence principle.)
The dis-analogy with the use of Born’s principle in special relativity reveals that
there appears to be some double standard at play when applying the principle to
quantum mechanics. In deriving the uncertainty principle, Heisenberg (1927) ex-
plicitly refers to both the value of the position and the momentum of the electron, as
if these concepts are simultaneously applicable: “At the instant when the position
is determined [. . . ] the electron undergoes a discontinuous change in momentum.”
The uncertainty principle appears to hold because the definite values for position
and momentum are disturbed by the act of measurement in an uncontrollable way.
Then, the motivation to remove simultaneous definite values for position and mo-
mentum from the theory, seems to presuppose the existence of these simultaneous
definite values. This is a peculiarity that requires an explanation. This explanation
may be sought in the philosophy of Bohr, to which I will turn now.
2.3 Uncertainty and complementarity
Bohr explicitly rejected the idea that measurements could be seen as disturbing
certain definite properties of the system. Instead of viewing the uncertainty principle
as reflecting an uncontrollable aspect of the measurement process, he saw it as
expressing a limit to the definability of concepts such as position and momentum:
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the uncertainty in question is not simply a consequence of a discontinu-
ous change of energy and momentum say during an interaction between
radiation and material particles employed in measuring the space-time
coordinates of the individuals [. . . ] the question is rather that of the
impossibility of defining rigorously such a change when the space-time
coordination of the individuals is also considered. (Bohr, 1985, p. 93)
The background of this view rests on yet another principle, namely, that of com-
plementarity. According to this principle, ‘position of a particle’ and ‘momentum
of a particle’ refer to mutually incompatible modes of description of a system. Fur-
thermore, neither mode of description provides an exhaustive description: both are
needed to obtain a full characterization of the system.
The fact that Bohr was not entirely satisfied with Heisenberg’s exposition of the
uncertainty principle was brought to Heisenberg’s attention just before his paper
was published. The clash resulted in a small “addition in proof” in the paper. In
this addition it is not entirely clear what Heisenberg’s position on Bohr’s complaint
was, but in a later work he reflects on the period between finishing his paper and
publishing it as one in which they reached agreement:
After several weeks of discussion, which were not devoid of stress, we
soon concluded, not least thanks to Oskar Klein’s participation, that
we really meant the same, and that the uncertainty relations were just
a special case of the more general complementarity principle. Thus, I
sent my improved paper to the printer and Bohr prepared a detailed
publication on complementarity. (Heisenberg, 1967, p. 105)
It is, however, not entirely clear how the uncertainty principle can be viewed as
a special case of the complementarity principle. After all, the uncertainty principle
links two mutually exclusive modes of description into a single relation. The com-
plementarity principle, if taken seriously, should preclude a meaningful reading of
this relation. Such a view can indeed be found in the work of Bohr (1949, p. 211):
“It must here be remembered that even in the indeterminacy relation we are dealing
with an implication of the formalism which defies unambiguous expression in words
suited to describe classical pictures.” On this reading, the uncertainty principle
only makes sense in the limit cases where either position (∆x = 0) or momentum
(∆p = 0) is well-defined.
This view is often rejected though, and the uncertainty relation is asserted to be
a meaningful mathematical expression. The reason for this may possibly be traced
back to the idea, upheld by many physicists, that the wave function or quantum
state expresses something real. For example, Born writes
We regard waves on a lake as real, though they are nothing material but
only a certain shape of the surface of the water. The justification is that
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they can be characterized by certain invariant quantities, like frequency
and wavelength, or a spectrum of these. Now the same holds for light
waves; why then should we withhold the epithet ‘real’, even if the waves
represent in quantum theory only a distribution of probability? (Born,
1953, p. 149)
To see why this view on quantum waves is relevant, it needs to be noted that
the uncertainty principle not only occurs as an empirical principle, but also comes
in a version that is a theorem of quantum mechanics itself. In fact, this version
of the principle (due to Kennard (1927)) is more widely known, and discussed in
any textbook. Instead of considering possible experimental setups of position and
momentum measurements, this principle is directly derived from the theory. To be
precise, it states that for every quantum state ψ the variances in position X and
momentum P satisfy the inequality
Varψ(X)Varψ(P ) ≥ ~/2. (2.1)
Here X and P are now operators on a Hilbert space, ~ denotes Planck’s constant,
and the variance is given by the Born rule.
Besides the shift from a pretheoretical principle to a theorem of a theory, there
is another important distinction between this relation and the one obtained by
Heisenberg. In Heisenberg’s relation the uncertainties refer to the precision of actual
measurements. The inequality (2.1), on the other hand, uses Born’s interpretation
of the wave function and identifies the uncertainties with spreads in the probability
distributions associated with ψ. If this wave function is real in some sense, then it
seems at least plausible that the associated probability distributions are also real.
The uncertainty principle then is not only meaningful in the limit cases, but also
expresses a definite feature of the world in any other case. This is, of course, in
strong contrast with the view on the quantum formalism held by Bohr:7
The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving pre-
dictions, of definite or statistical character, as regards information ob-
tainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms [. . . ]
These symbols themselves [. . . ] are not susceptible to pictorial interpre-
tation; and even derived real functions like densities and currents are
only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of
individual events observable under well-defined experimental conditions.
(Bohr, 1948, p. 314)
7It deserves to be noted though that Born himself at many points also sided with Bohr’s phi-
losophy. Even though for him the quantum state was perfectly real, the associated probability
distributions only have meaning with respect to an experimental setup: “The prediction made by
the theory [. . . ] has a meaning only in relation to the whole experimental arrangement” (Born,
1953, p. 146).
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There are several things that may be taken away from these considerations.
First, Born’s rule for calculating probabilities from the quantum state was widely
accepted. But second, there wasn’t much consensus on the ontological status of
these states or their associated probabilities. With Born one sees the strongest ten-
dency to view quantum probabilities as inherent aspects of reality. In the writing
of Bohr one finds a more modest interpretation, associating quantum probabilities
with descriptions of experiments rather than that they define the mechanisms be-
hind these experiments. And finally, in the writing of Einstein, one finds the view
that quantum mechanics is at best a preliminary theory. The ontological status of
quantum probabilities can then only be understood after a more complete theory
has been devised.
2.4 Reflection
The early history of probability in quantum mechanics given in this chapter illus-
trates that, although the introduction of probabilities by Born was welcomed as part
of the theory, there was no consensus on the foundational role of these probabilities.
This situation still holds today, and this may be seen to be reflected in the way in
which probability appears in the theory (see also chapter 3). Born’s rule for calcu-
lating probabilities has an operationalist flavor. This may be alleviated by giving
a reformulation of quantum probability so as to give a clearer view on its physical
role, which is the topic of this dissertation. This may seem a bit odd at first since
there is a well established mathematical formalism of quantum probability. This
formalism is, of course, adequate for the application of quantum mechanics. But it
may not be the most adequate formalism for illustrating the role of probability in
quantum mechanics.
The investigations in this dissertation are divided into two parts (parts II and
III). In the light of the discussion in this chapter, part II may be seen to latch on
to Einstein’s view, while part III is closer connected to Bohr’s views. This claim
deserves some elaboration. The mainstream view on quantum probability is that,
although the theory provides probabilities for particular measurement outcomes,
these outcomes themselves do not relate to any meaningful properties of the system
outside the context of the measurement. This idea is reflected in the formalism of
quantum probability by the fact that there is no set of which the elements determine
outcomes for all possible measurements. This should be contrasted to classical
probability in which the probability space can be understood as representing all
possibilities.
Einstein’s plea for a completion of quantum mechanics can now loosely be
thought of as a plea for returning to classical probability.8 After all, if one can recast
8This is a somewhat a-historic way of thinking about it. The axiomatization of classical prob-
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quantum probability into the language of classical probability, then the points in
the classical probability space associated with a quantum system are natural candi-
dates for more complete descriptions of the system than the quantum states. The
question of whether quantum probability can be recast into the language of classical
probability thus parallels the question of the possibility of a hidden variable theory.
It is for this reason that part II is to a large extent devoted to the discussion of a
particular no-go theorem for hidden variables, namely, the Kochen-Specker theorem.
This theorem is re-interpreted as one posing constraints on possible representations
of quantum probability within classical probability.
It is not too surprising that the shift to a theory that completes quantum me-
chanics would demand a reformulation of quantum probability. But also if one
remains agnostic concerning the completeness of quantum mechanics, or even ac-
cepts its completeness, there is good reason to ask for a reformulation of quantum
probability. I will argue for this in more detail in part III, but a short motivation can
already be given at this stage. The quantum state (as a possibly complete descrip-
tion) gives rise to a probability function. But being a function implies that there
are two additional ingredients: the range and the domain. In quantum probability
the range is the familiar interval [0, 1] just like in classical probability. The domain
is a bit more complicated. Mathematically, it is well-defined as the set of projec-
tion operators on a Hilbert space. But now consider, for example, the perspective
of Bohr. On his view elements in the domain of the probability function should
be “individual events observable under well-defined experimental conditions.” The
link between individual events and projection operators is not trivial (see chapter
8). A reformulation of quantum probability then can help to clarify what this link
is.
It deserves to be noted that I do not believe that a philosophical investigation
of the formalism of quantum probability can magically lead to a solution of the
foundational problems in quantum mechanics. The interest in doing philosophy of
quantum probability is more basic. It finds its roots in the recognition that the
framework of probability that naturally arises in quantum mechanics, is manifestly
distinct from the classical formalism of probability. To evaluate the significance
of this change in formalism both for the foundations of quantum mechanics and
for the foundations of probability theory, a philosophical investigation of quantum
probability itself is helpful and perhaps even necessary. This of course requires first
to have a firm grip on this formalism and its relation to quantum mechanics. The
next two chapters are devoted to obtaining this grip.
ability was only given by Kolmogorov in 1933.
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the formalism of quantum mechanics.
For this introduction I make use of a set of postulates that go back to the work of
von Neumann (1932). Although they don’t appear literally in this form in his book,
it is generally accepted that these postulates form the backbone of his formalization
of quantum mechanics. The particular approach of axiomatizing a physical theory
adopted by von Neumann is not uncontroversial though. It mainly consists of
providing a mathematical framework together with a manual of how to apply this
formalism to obtain experimental predictions. Isham (1995) for example, refers
to the framework as providing the rules of quantum mechanics rather than the
postulates. This gives it a somewhat instrumentalist flavor. The precise physical
meaning of the mathematical symbols in the theory, as well as that of basic terms
in the manual such as ‘measurement’ or ‘system’, remain largely unexplained.
One may then argue, as for example Bell (1987) did, that the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics given by von Neumann does not deliver what is to be expected of
a serious physical theory. To obtain an interpretation of the theory then, one has
to build on, or even adjust the postulates to obtain a new and enriched formal-
ism (Muller, 2014). However, here I am not concerned with the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Instead, the aim is to focus on the empirical aspects of the
theory, so as to get a grip on necessary constraints for a reformulation of quantum
probability. An axiomatic skeleton, then, is a convenient starting point.
Now one may suspect that if one is just interested in the empirical content
of the theory, the formalism of von Neumann is just fine. However, this is not
the case either. The empirical content and mathematical formalism are tightly
intertwined. This implies that, obeying the constraint that possible reformulations
of quantum probability respect the quantum mechanical predictions, is not entirely
trivial. Therefore, the empirical value of each of the postulates presented in this
chapter will be discussed. Possibly this sounds somewhat vague now, but hopefully
a clearer picture emerges once discussing these postulates. Before going on there is
a final remark though. The postulates presented here do not capture the entirety of
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quantum mechanics, nor are all postulates generally accepted. Still, they provide a
solid ground for now, and further postulates will be introduced in this dissertation
when the discussion requires it.
3.1 States and observables
The first postulate sets the mathematical stage for quantum mechanics:
StaP (State Postulate) Every physical system S is associated with a Hilbert
space H. The state of this system is given by a non-zero vector ψ ∈ H (pure
state) or a density operator ρ acting on H (mixed state). When two systems
S1 and S2 are associated with the Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 respectively,
then the joint system is associated with the Hilbert space H1 ⊗H2.
Often, when two vectors ψ1, ψ2 give rise to the same projection operator Pψ1 = Pψ2
they are considered to represent the same pure state. In this case the pure states
form a proper subset of the set of mixed states. The term mixed state is then
usually reserved for density operators that are not projection operators.
Although this first postulate provides much structure, it is still quite silent on
what the role of this structure will be for experimental statements. Indeed, it does
not state what it means that “ψ is the state of the system”, or what it entails.
Part of this will be cleared up by further postulates, but a definite answer to these
questions is lacking in the formalism. So the answer is open to philosophical debate.
Main themes in this debate are the question whether the state provides a com-
plete characterization of the system, or merely a partial description. And the un-
packing of this distinction often involves taking a stance on the question whether
the state pertains to a definite property of the system, or concerns merely an epis-
temic description of the system. In recent years this has become known as the
ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinction (Leifer, 2014). The relevance of this distinction to
the question of completeness lies in the two senses in which a characterization may
be complete. An ontologically complete characterization is something from which
all the facts pertaining to a system may be derived, whereas an epistemologically
complete characterization is something from which everything that can be known
about the system may be derived. Then there are also people who believe that this
is the wrong way of framing the debate, as they understand “state of a system” as a
short-hand for “a description of an ensemble of identically prepared systems”. Ac-
cording to this view, the state ψ does not give a characterization of a single system
at all.
These observations serve to show that a reserved attitude towards the notion of
states in quantum mechanics is advisable. Furthermore, it will become clear later
on that taking a stance on their status is tightly connected with one’s views on the
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meaning of probability in quantum mechanics. And reservation with respect to the
latter is precisely what I adopt here as part of the methodology for investigating
the formalism of quantum probability.
Besides the primitive use of the notion of a state, it is also noteworthy that StaP
does not state how the association of a Hilbert space with a physical system works.
It is left to the user of quantum mechanics to find the appropriate Hilbert space for
describing the system at hand. There are of course widely accepted conventions. For
example, a single particle in three-dimensional space is associated with the Hilbert
space L2(R3) of Lebesgue-square integrable functions. The explicit examples that
play a role in this dissertation though will usually be simpler. In particular, the
prime examples are the Hilbert spaces C2 associated with a spin-12 particle, and C
3
associated with a spin-1 particle, both endowed with the standard inner product.
More generally, I shall mostly be concerned with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces
in this dissertation.
The association of a system with a Hilbert space is of course quite hollow if no
further connection is made between possible experiments on the system and the
associated Hilbert spaces. The second postulate is a first step towards making this
connection.
OP (Observable Postulate) Every observable A for the system S is associated
with a self-adjoint operator A acting on H. If the observable A for a system S
is associated with the operator A and the system is coupled to another system
S′, then the operator associated with A for the joint system is A⊗ 1, where 1
is the unit operator on the Hilbert space H′ associated with S′.
Like “state”, the term “observable” occurs as a primitive concept in the theory.
The intended reading is that an observable signifies something that is measurable.
But how the observable is discerned from the unobservable, or what process leads to
something being a measurement is not determined by the theory. Neither does the
theory dictate explicitly which operator is to be associated with a certain measure-
ment procedure. However, in practice, physicists are very well capable of envisaging
experimental procedures and relating them to self-adjoint operators. There are also
several (heuristic) rules for making these relations dating back to the work of Dirac
(1925).
In this dissertation I will take the existence of such rules for granted. To be
specific, OP will be understood in the following way. For any system there is a set
of observables Obs . For each A ∈ Obs it is assumed that there is an experimental
procedure that can be understood as a measurement of A. There further is a
rule f : Obs → Osa which assigns to each observable A a self-adjoint operator
A. It is assumed that this rule is in some sense known. In short, the problems
mentioned above play no role in this dissertation. In the case of concrete examples
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this approach is also legitimate, for then it is well-established what the relevant
observables are, and with which operators they are to be associated. Two of such
examples are the following.
Example 3.1. For a spin-12 particle the operators associated with spin measure-
ments along the z, y and x axis are
σz :=
1
2
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, σy :=
1
2
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σx :=
1
2
(
0 1
1 0
)
. (3.1)
If r = (sinφ cos θ, sinφ sin θ, cosφ) is an arbitrary axis, then the observable associ-
ated with the spin measurement along that axis is given by
σr :=
1
2
(
cosφ e−iθ sinφ
eiθ sinφ − cosφ
)
. (3.2)
4
Example 3.2. For the case of spin-1 particles a similar set of observables is relevant.
Here the spin operators are given by
Sz :=
1 0 00 0 0
0 0 −1
 , Sy := 1√
2
0 −i 0i 0 −i
0 i 0
 , Sx := 1√
2
0 1 01 0 1
0 1 0
 . (3.3)
These are again associated with spin measurements along the z, y and x axis re-
spectively. And similarly one has for an arbitrary axis r that
Sr :=

cosφ e
−iθ sinφ√
2
0
eiθ sinφ√
2
0 e
−iθ sinφ√
2
0 e
iθ sinφ√
2
− cosφ
 . (3.4)
4
The association of observables with self-adjoint operators only goes in one di-
rection. Let OObssa denote the set of all self-adjoint operators for which there is an
observable with which they are associated, i.e., OObssa = f(Obs). It is not inconceivable
that this will be a proper subset of all the self-adjoint operators Osa. Specifically,
what may be questioned is the general validity of the following principle:
IP (Identification Principle) For every self-adjoint operator A there exists an
observable A such that A is associated with A via OP.
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Although IP is often implicitly assumed, it has also been recognized that at
best this assumption should be qualified as an idealization.1 As phrased by Wigner
(1963, p. 14): “For some observables, in fact for the majority of them (such as
xypz), nobody seriously believes that a measuring apparatus exists”.
2 Now, as
unlikely as it may be that IP is true, it is even more unlikely that one would find a
definite precise way to determine what the set OObssa actually should be. How could
one ever declare the definite impossibility of finding an observable to be associated
with a certain self-adjoint operator?
There are, however, constructive ways to downsize the set OObssa . One way is by
the introduction of so-called superselection rules. These rules were first introduced
by Wick, Wightman, and Wigner (1952) following an address presented by Wigner
in 1951. The idea is, roughly, that the set of self-adjoint operators associated with
observables is trimmed down by simultaneously trimming down the set of vectors
in the Hilbert space that can be associated with a state. Superselection rules will
be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Wigner seemed to have been quite concerned with the validity of IP. Besides
the two contributions mentioned above, he expressed a third critique in (Wigner,
1952) (translation available as (Wigner, 2010)). In this paper the compatibility
of IP with von Neumann’s theory of measurement processes (von Neumann, 1932,
Ch. 6) was investigated. To measure an observable A on a system S, the system
has to be coupled to a measurement apparatus M . The joint system is associated
with the Hilbert space HS ⊗ HM , and the operator on this space associated with
measuring the observable A on S is A ⊗ 1. Taking into account the dynamics of
the measurement process, it was proven (see also Araki and Yanase, 1960) that a
precise measurement of the operator A⊗ 1 is only possible if it commutes with the
conserved quantities for the total system S +M .
These considerations later led to the introduction of a generalized notion of
observables in terms of positive operator valued measures (POVMs). The math-
ematical background of POVMs dates back to (Naimark, 1943), but the earliest
application to quantum mechanics I found is by Holevo (1982). POVMs will play
no significant role in this dissertation. My claim is that the restriction to self-adjoint
operators is not conceptually damaging, but does keep some things simpler. In some
possibly confusing cases qualifying remarks will be made though.
1The assumption is well known, although I have not found a name for it in the literature. I
started calling it IP in (Hermens, 2011) for lack of a better name.
2Here xypz denotes the ‘observable’ which would correspond to measuring the x and y coordi-
nates of the position of a particle and the z component of its momentum. Classically, one would
just make a joint measurement of the position and momentum in this case. But in quantum me-
chanics, because of the uncertainty relations, this is not possible. It is unclear what other kind of
experimental setup then would establish a measurement of this ‘observable’.
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3.2 Measurement outcomes and their probabilities
The postulates introduced in the previous section determine the mathematical struc-
ture of quantum mechanics. But although the concepts of states and observables
have also been introduced, no connection with empirical statements has been made
thus far. The two postulates introduced in this section make this connection.
VaP (Value Postulate) For an observable A associated with the self-adjoint op-
erator A via OP, the set of values of possible measurement outcomes is given
by the spectrum σ(A) of A.
Example 3.3. For the observables in examples 3.1 and 3.2 one may show that
the possible measurement outcomes for spin measurements for spin-12 and spin-1
particles are given by
σ(σr) = {−12 , 12}, σ(Sr) = {−1, 0, 1}. (3.5)
Further, the possible outcomes for projection operators are
σ(P ) = {0, 1}, (3.6)
with exception of the trivial cases P = 0 or P = 1 where σ(0) = {0} and σ(1) =
{1}. 4
VaP only gives the possible outcomes of a measurement, but does not state which
of these outcomes will occur. Famously, quantum mechanics only posits probabili-
ties for these outcomes, and these are given by the Born rule. The formulation of
this rule makes use of the spectral theorem. This theorem associates with every
self-adjoint operator A a unique projection valued measure (PVM) µA. That is,
a map that takes measurable subsets of σ(A) to projection operators on H such
that µA(σ(A)) = 1 and µA(
⋃
n∈N ∆n) =
∑
n∈N µA(∆n) for any sequence of pairwise
disjoint subsets.
BoP (Born Postulate) If the observable A is associated with the self-adjoint
operator A, and ψ is the state of the system, then the probability to find a
value in ∆ ⊂ σ(A) upon a measurement of A is given by the Born rule3
Pψ(A ∈ ∆) = 〈ψ, µA(∆)ψ〉〈ψ,ψ〉 = Tr (PψµA(∆)) . (3.7)
Alternatively, if the state is given by the density operator ρ, the probability
is given by
Pρ(A ∈ ∆) = Tr (ρµA(∆)) . (3.8)
3Here, Tr denotes the trace operation.
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For two jointly measurable observables A1 and A2, corresponding to commut-
ing operators A1 and A2, the probability of finding values in ∆1 ×∆2 for a
joint measurement is given by
Pρ(A1 ∈ ∆1,A2 ∈ ∆2) = Tr (ρµA1(∆1)µA2(∆2)) . (3.9)
It may be noted that BoP implies a probabilistic version of VaP: the outcome of
a measurement will lie within the spectrum with probability one. Therefore, VaP is
often not stated as a separate postulate. For the investigations in this dissertation
however, it is useful to keep them separated. VaP is a non-probabilistic postulate,
and therefore characterizes aspects of quantum mechanics that are independent of
how probability in quantum mechanics is conceived. The constraints it imposes
are to be taken seriously, and the non-triviality of this will become apparent, for
example, from its role in the Kochen-Specker theorem in chapter 6, and in the
development of an empiricist quantum logic in chapter 10. There is also a somewhat
historical justification for separating the two postulates. The reproduction of the
Rydberg formula by Bohr’s atomic model (1913) can be seen as an instantiation of
VaP. But BoP played no part in this model and had to wait for more than ten more
years before being introduced.
The only role of the quantum state introduced by StaP is the determination
of the probabilities in BoP. Without any further role for the quantum state, BoP
posits Born’s interpretation of the state (sections 2.1–2.3) as a postulate. That is,
the quantum state is nothing but a probability function. This then also introduces
an equivalence relation on the set of states.
Definition 3.1. Two states ψ1 and ψ2 are said to be statistically equivalent (with
respect to the set of observables Obs) if
Tr (Pψ1µA(∆)) = Tr (Pψ2µA(∆)) (3.10)
for all A ∈ OObssa and all measurable subsets ∆ ⊂ σ(A).
In the case that IP holds, or even if OObssa is only a finite set of operators short of
coinciding with Osa, statistical equivalence is determined by the equivalence relation
ψ1 ∼ ψ2 iff ∃λ ∈ C s.t. ψ1 = λψ2 (3.11)
on H\{0}. The equivalence class generated by ψ is the line spanned by ψ:
[ψ] = {λψ ; λ ∈ C, λ 6= 0} (3.12)
also called a ray. The set of all rays is called the ray space and is denoted R(H).
This construction suggests that when OObssa becomes smaller, classes of statisti-
cally equivalent states become larger. It is in this sense that superselection rules
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both deny IP and the idea that every vector corresponds to a pure state. How-
ever, this is done in an indirect way, namely, by imposing a certain property on
the relation of statistical equivalence. The remainder of this section is devoted to
explaining this in more detail. The reason for doing this is twofold. First, it gives
an explicit example of how IP may be relaxed. Second, it introduces the language
of algebras of operators which will be used throughout this dissertation.
Definition 3.2. An orthogonal resolution of the identity is a finite or countable set
{Pk | k ∈ K} of pairwise orthogonal projection operators such that
∑
k∈K Pk = 1.
An orthogonal resolution of the identity is said to be a superselection rule if for all
ψ1, ψ2 ∈ H, ψ1 and ψ2 are statistically equivalent if and only if there exist numbers
ϕk ∈ [0, 2pi) and λ ∈ C\{0} such that
Pkψ1 = e
iϕkλPkψ2 ∀k ∈ K. (3.13)
The vectors ψ1 and ψ2 are said to differ by a relative phase (with respect to
{Pk | k ∈ K}). The subspaces PkH = {Pkψ | ψ ∈ H} are called superselection sec-
tors.
The trivial superselection rule is given by the resolution {1}. This corresponds to
the ordinary case where two states ψ1 and ψ2 are statistically equivalent if and only
if [ψ1] = [ψ2]. In this case it is clear that one can take OObssa = Osa. In other cases a
superselection rule only implicitly defines what OObssa is. A useful characterization is
available in terms of algebras of operators. For the sake of definiteness, it is useful
to first give a fully worked out concrete example.
Example 3.4. Consider the Hilbert spaceH = C2. The set of self-adjoint operators
is given by
Osa =
{(
a c+ di
c− di b
) ∣∣∣∣ a, b, c, d ∈ R} . (3.14)
Let {P+, P−} be the orthogonal resolution of the identity with P+ the projection
on ( 10 ) and P− the projection on ( 01 ). Then, for any ψ ∈ C2, the class of vectors
that are statistically equivalent to ψ is given by
[ψ] = {λψϕ | λ ∈ C\{0}, ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi)} , ψϕ := P+ψ + eiϕP−ψ. (3.15)
Indeed, the vectors of the form ψϕ are precisely those that only differ by a relative
phase from ψ.
Now, for A ∈ Osa to be an observable (with respect to the given superselection
rule), it should satisfy
〈ψ,Aψ〉 = 〈ψϕ, Aψϕ〉 , ∀ψ ∈ H, ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi). (3.16)
30
Measurement outcomes and their probabilities 3.2
Writing ψ = (x, y), this amounts to the constraint
cRe(xy) + dIm(xy) = cRe(e−iϕxy) + dIm(e−iϕxy), ∀x, y, ϕ, (3.17)
which only holds if c = d = 0. Then, the biggest possible set of self-adjoint operators
associated with observables is
OObssa =
{(
a 0
0 b
) ∣∣∣∣ a, b ∈ R} . (3.18)
4
In the above example the set of observables corresponds with the set of all
self-adjoint operators in the algebra generated by the projections in the orthogonal
resolution of the identity. Specifically, one has
Alg(P+, P−) =
{(
a 0
0 b
) ∣∣∣∣ a, b ∈ C} and OObssa = Osa ∩ Alg(P+, P−). (3.19)
This is always the case when all the projections in the superselection rule are 1-
dimensional. More generally, for a superselection rule {Pk | k ∈ K}, the set of self-
adjoint operators corresponding to observables is determined by the commutant of
the set of projections as follows:
OObssa = Osa ∩ {Pk | k ∈ K}′ = {A ∈ Osa | [Pk, A] = 0 ∀k ∈ K} . (3.20)
Thus a superselection rule reduces the set of ‘relevant’ operators on a Hilbert space
to {Pk | k ∈ K}′ which generally is a proper sub-*-algebra of all operators.
Thus far I have discussed superselection rules as restrictions on the set of ob-
servables. But as noted before, another common way of introducing them is not as
constraints on the observables, but as constraints on the states, or as a constraint
on the superposition principle4. At first sight this seems to hint at a totally dif-
ferent construction because in the above approach every state still gives rise to a
legitimate probability function. As it turns out, though, the two notions are mathe-
matically equivalent (although the one given above is more interpretation neutral).
This deserves some clarification.
Let {Pk | k ∈ K} be an orthogonal resolution of the identity. Then a superse-
lection rule (for states) for this resolution is the restriction that an element of H is
a state if and only if it is an element of one of the superselection sectors. Thus, the
only pure states are those from the set
Hstates =
⋃
k∈K
PkH. (3.21)
4This is the principle that states that for every pair of (pure) states any linear combination of
the two is again a (pure) state.
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This will generally be a proper subset of the entire Hilbert spaceH. So what justifies
getting rid of all the other states? The answer is that one still allows mixed states of
the states in Hstates, and these are able to generate all the probability distributions
that can be given by the pure states that are thrown out.
An explicit construction elucidates this point. Let ψ ∈ H be an arbitrary unit
vector and set ψk := Pkψ. One can associate ψ with the density operator
ρψ :=
∑
k∈K
‖ψk‖2Pψk . (3.22)
One may now show that ψ ∈ H\Hstates if and only if for every A ∈ OObssa (with the
set of observables given by (3.20)) and for every measurable set ∆ ⊂ σ(A)
Tr(PψµA(∆)) = Tr(ρψµA(∆)). (3.23)
Thus the observables cannot be used to distinguish between pure and mixed states.
In other words, ψ and ρψ are statistically equivalent (stretching up Definition 3.1
here to also include mixed states).
By allowing mixed states, the set of probability functions remains the same,
and from this probabilistic perspective the set of states is not really made smaller
by the superselection rule. The accompanying view though, is that all the mixed
states of the form ρψ are given an ignorance interpretation, and that the ‘actual’
pure state is an element of Hstates. It is this interpretation of mixed states that
fits best with this view on superselection rules. However, I shall not adopt it here
as it complicates matters. It requires that pure states are the kinds of objects for
which it makes sense to assign probabilities to. But the pure states themselves
in turn are also associated with probability distributions. Adopting an epistemic
interpretation with respect to the first kind of probability then suggests a more
ontological interpretation of probability of the second kind.
This view is not forced upon us. In fact, BoP does not state what is meant
with probability in quantum mechanics. Thus the ontological status of both quan-
tum probability and the quantum state is still open for debate. Which position
one adopts in this debate is tightly related to how one conceives of the postulates
introduced in the next section.
3.3 The status of states
Often the occurrence of probability as a primitive concept in a theory is taken to
suggest that it should be given an objective or ontological status. This suggestion
at least was strong enough for Popper (1957) to develop a new interpretation of
probability. But as seen in chapter 2, the conclusion was not that straightforward
for the physicists who worked on the theory at the time. As de Broglie (1960, p. 29)
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reflects: “The more the formalism of employing the Ψ wave became apparent, the
more it appeared as a kind of formal and subjective representation making possible
the evaluation of the probabilities of certain results of measurement.” Traits of
this epistemic view5 were present in the writing of both endorsers and opponents
of the Copenhagen school (Shimony, 1983). This is not entirely unsurprising, as
an epistemic stance helps in understanding why traditionally there have been two
postulates to describe the dynamics of quantum systems:
Schro¨P (Schro¨dinger Postulate) When no measurement is performed between
time points t1 and t2 the state evolves unitarily, that is,
ψ(t) = Ut−t1ψ(t1), t ∈ [t1, t2] (3.24)
for some (strongly continuous) group homomorphism t 7→ Ut from the
reals to the unitary operators on H.6
ProP (Projection Postulate) When a measurement of A is performed and the
result is maximally specified by the set ∆ ⊂ σ(A), then the state changes
discontinuously following the rule
ψ 7→ µA(∆)ψ. (3.25)
If the state is given by the density operator ρ, then the state changes dis-
continuously following the rule
ρ 7→ µA(∆)ρµA(∆)
Tr(ρµA(∆))
. (3.26)
Adopting an epistemic reading of the quantum state, Schro¨P can be seen to take
into account that the system changes over time, while ProP takes into account that
one should update (collapse) the state in accordance with newly obtained informa-
tion. But the epistemic view of quantum states is not endorsed by everyone. One
argument against the view is that on this view it is not clear what the information
is about, other than measurements and their outcomes. If one aspires a realist in-
terpretation, this situation may be unsettling. On the other hand, on an ontological
view of quantum states there is at least something that is physical within the the-
ory (other than measurements and outcomes). However, on this view the existence
5I take it that where de Broglie uses ‘subjective’ this should be understood as ‘epistemic’. On
other occasions he speaks of Ψ as representing a state of knowledge. The interchangeable use of
the epistemic/ontological distinction and the subjective/objective distinction is ubiquitous in the
philosophy of physics and probability. Every now and then this leads to confusion, as noted for
example by Jaynes (1985).
6By Stone’s theorem (Stone, 1930 ; 1932), this statement is equivalent to the statement that
ψ(t) is a solution to the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation.
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of two dynamical postulates is quite mysterious. It introduces a sharp distinction
between physical processes worthy of the name ‘measurement’ and ‘ordinary’ pro-
cesses. An ontological view then often goes hand in hand with a rejection of ProP.
These are the so-called no-collapse interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics and
Everettian quantum mechanics. A notable exception is the proposal of Wigner
(1961) who adopts Cartesian dualism and suggests that the discontinuous change
in ProP is caused by the interaction of matter with the mind. Another option is
to replace both postulates with a single time-evolution such as in the approach of
Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1985 ; 1986).
The growing number of interpretations of quantum mechanics in which epis-
temic readings of quantum states are rejected in itself does not explain the growing
support for this rejection. From a philosophical point of view, much support may be
drawn from the work of Bell (1987), who pressed the importance of coming up with
solutions to the measurement problem and introducing an ontology for quantum
mechanics. From the physical point of view, the rise of quantum cosmology can be
seen as an important influence to the growing unease with epistemic interpretations
(Wheeler, 1977). After all, an epistemic reading of quantum states requires the sep-
aration between subject and object: something which is not easily done when the
object is to be the entire universe. Both Bohmian mechanics and Everettian quan-
tum mechanics, on the other hand, have no problem with the notion of a quantum
state of the universe.
More recently, the distinction between epistemic and ontological interpretations
of quantum states has become the topic of formal investigations. In the important
work by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2012) it is shown that “any model in which
a quantum state represents mere information about an underlying physical state of
the system, and in which systems that are prepared independently have independent
physical states, must make predictions that contradict those of quantum theory.”
And, as is tradition, experimental tests are found to be in line with quantum predic-
tions (Nigg et al., 2012). The paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph has spawned a
lot of follow-up research, as well as philosophical debate.7 Noteworthy contributions
are the works of Colbeck and Renner (2011 ; 2012a), Hardy (2013), Barrett et al.
(2014), and the overview paper by Leifer (2014). But it should be noted that none
of the results thus far entirely rule out epistemic interpretations of quantum states.
Nor could they. An interpretation alone cannot alter the predictions of a theory,
and auxiliary assumptions will always be needed.
It is tempting to think that an ontological view of quantum states goes hand
in hand with an interpretation of quantum probability as objective chance. This
could be argued for by using Born’s identification of quantum states with probability
7On April 16th 2015 Google scholar listed 240 entries citing the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and
Rudolph (2012).
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functions. This identification, however, is not maintained in all interpretations of
quantum mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics, for example, the state also plays a role
in determining the path of the particles.8 Also, in some approaches to the Everett
interpretation, the Born rule does not explicate what quantum states are, but rather
is a normative rule for how rational agents should set their credences provided they
know the state.9 In both these examples an epistemic interpretation of quantum
states is rejected while an epistemic interpretation of quantum probabilities may
still be tenable.
As seen, what counts as the postulates of quantum mechanics may depend on
one’s interpretation of quantum states and probabilities. An empiricist interpreta-
tion-neutral investigation of quantum probability based solely on the formalism of
quantum mechanics then may seem hopeless, as the formalism itself is not neutral.
However, in this dissertation the focus is on the static aspect of quantum mechan-
ics, as presented in the first two sections. This helps in maintaining neutrality
concerning the ontological status of quantum states. Furthermore, like with classi-
cal probability, many aspects of quantum probability can be investigated without
delving into the dynamics of the system under investigation. There is, however,
room for discussing dynamics for probability functions like classical conditional-
ization and its relation to ProP. But in these cases judgment is suspended about
whether the change in the probability function corresponds to a physical process.
Now then let us turn to this formalism of quantum probability.
8This role has often been taken to suggest that the quantum state should have the status of a
physical field. This view has grown somewhat out of fashion among proponents of the interpreta-
tion, and the quantum state is now often given a nomological status (Esfeld et al., 2013). At any
rate, it is being deprived of its purely epistemic status.
9The status of probability in Everettian quantum mechanics is a subtle matter and cannot be
portrayed justly in one sentence. For details see (Wallace, 2012) and references therein, and for a
critical assessment see (Kent, 2010).
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Classical probability theory can be thought of as a field in mathematics, sometimes
characterized as “measure theory + independence”. One can work through a course
on measure-theoretic probability without ever having to think about probability as
a notion that corresponds to something outside the realm of mathematics. And
the same holds true for quantum probability. The aim of this chapter is to give
a short introduction to the mathematical formalism of quantum probability. For
thorough introductions into the field of quantum probability the reader may consult
(Parthasarathy, 1992), (Meyer, 1993), and (Cuculescu and Oprea, 1994). A compact
introduction is provided by Maassen (2010).
Instead of just starting with the formal definition of a quantum probability space,
I take some time to distill it from the postulates presented in the previous chapter
so as to make the relation to quantum mechanics more apparent. In section 4.1 a
definition of quantum probability spaces is given that focuses on the use of classical
probability spaces in quantum mechanics. Despite the importance of the use of
classical probability in quantum mechanics, the two notions of classical and quantum
probability are quite distinct. This is explained by means of an example based on the
violation of Bell-type inequalities in quantum mechanics. A definition of quantum
probability spaces that is more common, and that highlights the formal analogy
between classical and quantum probability, is given in section 4.2. It is shown
that the two definitions are equivalent. In this section Gleason’s theorem, which
provides a relation between quantum states and quantum probability functions, is
discussed as well. Finally, in section 4.3, a more general definition of quantum
probability spaces is given that makes use of the language of algebras. The upshot
of this generalization is that both classical and (Hilbert space) quantum probability
can be viewed as special instances of this more general formalism. A theorem
that establishes this embedding of classical probability into quantum probability is
presented and discussed.
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4.1 Classical and quantum probability
A good introduction to the formalism of quantum probability is not possible with-
out some background in classical probability. This is because classical probability
spaces play an important role in the characterization of quantum probability spaces.
Instead then of directly giving the definition of a quantum probability space, I start
with an elaboration that is helpful for understanding why quantum probability
spaces are defined in a particular way. The methodology adopted is one that is
standard in mathematics. I start with a few intuitive properties one can plausible
desire to hold for a quantum probability space, and then take these properties as the
definition. Thus, for the sake of definiteness, I start with the definition of classical
probability spaces and random variables.
Definition 4.1. A (classical) probability space is a triple (Ω,F ,P) with Ω a set, F
a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω called the set of events, and P : F → [0, 1] a probability
measure, i.e., a function such that P(Ω) = 1 and
P
(⋃
n∈N
∆n
)
=
∑
n∈N
P (∆n) (4.1)
for every countable sequence (∆n)n∈N of pairwise disjoint sets in F . If (ΩX ,FX) is
a measurable space and X : Ω→ ΩX is a measurable function, then X is called an
(classical) ΩX-valued random variable.
The formalism of quantum mechanics gives rise to classical classical probability
spaces in a natural way. Let A be a self-adjoint operator. With this operator one
can associate the measurable space (ΩA,FA) with ΩA := σ(A) the spectrum of A,
and FA the Borel σ-algebra of subsets of ΩA. Now every quantum state ρ gives rise
to a probability measure PAρ on (ΩA,FA) via the rule
PAρ (∆) := Tr(ρµA(∆)). (4.2)
There is a sense in which one can think of a self-adjoint operator as somehow rep-
resenting a quantum version of a random variable. The analogy becomes more apt
when noting that a classical random variable X : Ω→ ΩX can also be characterized
by the function X−1 : FX → F , where X−1(∆) := {ω ∈ Ω |X(ω) ∈ ∆}. Similarly,
the self-adjoint operator A can be characterized by the PVM µA : FA → L(H).
This suggests that L(H) may be taken as the domain of what is to be a quantum
probability function.
A second motivation for this particular domain is drawn from the following
observation. The numerical value of the probability of a measurement outcome
assigned by the Born rule depends only on the projection operator µA(∆), and
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doesn’t further depend on the observable A or the specific numbers in the spectrum
σ(A). Specifically, if A is an observable associated with a self-adjoint operator A
with spectrum σ(A) and f : σ(A)→ R is an injective function, then an observable
A ′ associated with the self-adjoint operator A′ := f(A) has the same probability
distribution associated with it as A:
Pρ(A ∈ ∆) = Pρ(A ′ ∈ f(∆)) ∀ρ, ∀∆ ⊂ σ(A). (4.3)
Thus the numerical values of probabilities only depend on the projection operators
Pρ and µA(∆), i.e.,
Pρ(A ∈ ∆) = Tr(PρµA(∆)). (4.4)
These considerations suggest that a quantum probability function is to be a function
on L(H) that provides a classical probability space for every self-adjoint operator
on H. This is indeed the definition I shall work with for now. Later on, I shall show
that it is equivalent to a definition that is more common in the literature.
Definition 4.2. A quantum probability space is a triple (H, L(H),P) with H a
Hilbert space, L(H) the set of projection operators on H, called the set of events,
and P : L(H) → [0, 1] a function such that for every self-adjoint operator A the
function
PA(∆) := P(µA(∆)) (4.5)
turns (ΩA,FA,PA) into a classical probability space. An ΩX-valued quantum ran-
dom variable on a quantum probability space (H, L(H),P) is a measurable space
(ΩX ,FX) together with a PVM µX : FX → L(H).
Note that for every quantum state ρ the map Pρ : L(H)→ [0, 1], given by
Pρ(P ) := Tr(ρP ), (4.6)
indeed turns (H, L(H)) into a quantum probability space. The analogy between
classical and quantum probability thus far can be summed up by the following
table:
Events Probability function Random variable States
Classical F P : F → [0, 1] X−1 : FX → F Ω
Quantum L(H) P : L(H)→ [0, 1] µX : FX → L(H) ?
The analogy breaks down when trying to point out a quantum version of the set
Ω. The candidate for a quantum analog would of course be the Hilbert space
H. However, there is no function X : H → Ω of which the PVM µX can be
considered to be the inverse. This is because quantum states do not determine the
values of observables. In this sense a quantum probability space is like a classical
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probability space without a set of points Ω (or without a “set of possible worlds”).
The omission of such a set in the formalism of course doesn’t imply the impossibility
of introducing such a set. Constraints on such possibilities are considered in part
II of this dissertation. But for now it is useful to consider one particular example
that illustrates that the question of the existence of such a set is not trivial.1 First
consider the following theorem in classical probability.
Theorem 4.1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space and A1, A2, B1, B2 be four 0,1-
valued random variables. Then every probability measure P satisfies the Bell-type
inequality
P(A1 = B1) ≤ P(A1 = B2) + P(A2 = B1) + P(A2 = B2). (4.7)
Proof. Although the proof can be done easily by writing out, it is insightful to
take a pictorial approach. The probabilities for the four random variables for any
probability function can be characterized using the Karnaugh map2
A2
A1
B1
B2
p1 p2 p3 p4
p5 p6 p7 p8
p9 p10 p11 p12
p13 p14 p15 p16
(4.8)
with pi ≥ 0 for all i and
∑
i pi = 1. Every square fixes the values of all the random
variables and the value of pi denotes the probability of these variables having these
values. For example
p3 = P(B1 = A2 = 1, A1 = B2 = 0). (4.9)
1The example is a mathematical view on the violation of Bell inequalities in quantum mechanics.
This analysis is based on (Ku¨mmerer and Maassen, 1998), but the pictorial proof of Theorem 4.1
is my own.
2These graphical tools were first introduced by Karnaugh (1953) for their convenience with
studying logic circuits. The key difference with Venn diagrams is that while the latter focuses
on atomic propositions, Karnaugh maps put more emphasis on the atoms in the Boolean lattice
of propositions (i.e., the ‘maximal’ conjunctions). The advantage of using Karnaugh maps in
connection with probability theory, is that a specification of the probabilities of all the atoms
(corresponding to the 16 smallest squares in (4.8)) fully determines the probability function on the
Boolean lattice, whereas the same does not hold for a specification of the probabilities of all atomic
propositions (corresponding to the 4 rectangles specified by A1, A2, B1, B2 in (4.8)).
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The events Ai = Bj can then be identified with colorings of the Karnaugh map,
where their probabilities correspond to the sum of all the colored pi’s. The inequality
(4.7) is then rewritten as
A2
A1
B1
B2
p1 p2 p3 p4
p5 p6 p7 p8
p9 p10 p11 p12
p13 p14 p15 p16
≤
A2
A1
B1
B2
p1 p2 p3 p4
p5 p6 p7 p8
p9 p10 p11 p12
p13 p14 p15 p16
+
A2
A1
B1
B2
p1 p2 p3 p4
p5 p6 p7 p8
p9 p10 p11 p12
p13 p14 p15 p16
+
A2
A1
B1
B2
p1 p2 p3 p4
p5 p6 p7 p8
p9 p10 p11 p12
p13 p14 p15 p16
This shows that the inequality holds because every square that is colored on the
left is at least colored once on the right.
The crux is that for random variables on a quantum probability space the in-
equality (4.7) need not hold. The following example shows this.
Example 4.1. Consider the Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2. Four 0,1-valued random
variables are introduced based on the projection operators
Pϕ :=
(
cos2 ϕ cosϕ sinϕ
cosϕ sinϕ sin2 ϕ
)
(4.10)
on C2 with ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi). Define the projection operators
A1 := Pα1 ⊗ 1, A2 := Pα2 ⊗ 1, B1 := 1⊗Pβ1 , B2 := 1⊗Pβ2 , (4.11)
where 1 denotes the unit operator on C2. For any pair i, j, the pair of operators
Ai, Bj commute and so BoP defines a joint probability distribution for them. Now
consider the quantum state
ψ :=
1
2
√
2
((
1
0
)
⊗
(
0
1
)
−
(
0
1
)
⊗
(
1
0
))
. (4.12)
One then finds that
Pψ(Ai = Bj)
=
〈
ψ, (Pαi ⊗ Pβj )ψ
〉
+
〈
ψ,
(
(1−Pαi)⊗ (1−Pβj )
)
ψ
〉
=
1
2
(
cos2 αi sin
2 βj + sin
2 αi cos
2 βj − 2 cosαi sinαi cosβj sinβj
)
+
1
2
(
cos2 αi sin
2 βj + sin
2 αi cos
2 βj − 2 cosαi sinαi cosβj sinβj
)
= (cosαi sinβj − sinαi cosβj)2 = sin2(αi − βj).
(4.13)
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When setting α1 = 0, α2 =
1
3pi, β1 =
1
2pi, β2 =
1
6pi one obtains
Pψ(A1 = B1) = 1, Pψ(A1 = B2) = Pψ(A2 = B1) = Pψ(A2 = B2) =
1
4
. (4.14)
This establishes a contradiction with (4.7). 4
The discrepancy between classical and quantum probability can be seen to be
a consequence of the existence of the space Ω in the classical case. The existence
of this set implies that the joint probabilities for each pair Ai, Bj are marginals
of a distribution over the possible values for A1, A2, B1, B2. In the quantum case
only the joint probabilities for commuting pairs are defined. The violation of Bell-
type inequalities can be associated with the non-existence of a total probability
function (Fine, 1982b,a), which in turn can be associated with the non-existence of
an underlying space Ω for quantum probability.
It should be noted that this example does not really demonstrate the incom-
patibility of classical probability with quantum probability. For example, the non-
existence of a joint distribution for the three variables A1, A2, B1 may be seen as
evidence that it is a wrong-headed idea that B1 should be modeled with the same
classical random variable when taken in consideration together with A1 as when
taken in consideration together with A2. Indeed, if one uses eight classical random
variables
A111 , A
12
1 , A
21
2 , A
22
2 , B
11
1 , B
21
1 , B
12
2 , B
22
2 , (4.15)
with the pair (Aiji , B
ij
j ) as the classical representation of the quantum pair (Ai, Bj),
one can violate (4.7). The possibility of classical representations will be investigated
more deeply in part II. But before that it is good to first delve a bit deeper into the
formalism of quantum probability.
4.2 Quantum probability and Gleason’s theorem
As noted in the previous section, Definition 4.2 is a non-standard definition of
quantum probability. In this section it is shown to be equivalent to a more common
definition such as found, for example, in (Gudder, 1979; Parthasarathy, 1992). This
more common definition is also the one that will be used the most throughout this
dissertation. It has the benefit that it shows a strong structural resemblance to
the definition of a classical probability space. On the other hand, in comparison to
Definition 4.2, its connection with actual classical probability spaces is less clear.
The benefit of having both definitions, and establishing their equivalence, is that it
helps to get a firmer grip on the topic. The theorem by Gleason, presented in this
section as well, of course also aids in getting a firmer grip on the topic. But this
fact alone does not do justice to its importance. As noted in the previous section,
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(H, L(H),P) is a quantum probability space whenever P is given by (4.6) for some
density operator ρ. Gleason’s theorem establishes that this is the generic case.3 But
first the theorem that relates Definition 4.2 to the standard conception of quantum
probability spaces.
Theorem 4.2. A triple (H, L(H),P) is a quantum probability space if and only if
P : L(H)→ [0, 1] satisfies
(i) P(1) = 1.
(ii) P(P1 +P2 + . . .) = P(P1) +P(P2) + . . . for any countable sequence of pairwise
orthogonal projection operators.
Proof. Suppose (H, L(H),P) is a quantum probability space. I shall first show that
it satisfies criterion (ii), and then derive that (i) also holds. Let P1, P2, . . . be a
countable sequence of pairwise orthogonal projections. Define P0 := 1−(P1 + P2 +
. . .) and let
A :=
∞∑
n=0
1
n+ 1
Pn. (4.16)
Then A is a self-adjoint operator with
σ(A) =
{
1
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣ n ∈ N} (4.17)
and the PVM µA given by
µA(∆) =
∑
{
n∈N
∣∣∣ 1n+1∈∆}
Pn. (4.18)
Let ∆0 := σ(A)\{1}. Then
P(P1 + P2 + . . .) = P(µA(∆0)) = P
A(∆0)
=
∞∑
n=1
PA({ 1n+1}) =
∞∑
n=1
P(µA({ 1n+1}) =
∞∑
n=1
P(Pn).
(4.19)
Finally,
P(1) = P(P0 + P1 + . . .) = P(µA(σ(A))) = P
A(σ(A)) = 1. (4.20)
For the converse, suppose P satisfies (i) and (ii). Let A be any self-adjoint
operator with spectrum ΩA := σ(A) and associated PVM µA. Then P
A satisfies
PA(ΩA) = P(µA(σ(A))) = P(1) = 1. (4.21)
3There is a peculiar exception for the case when H is 2-dimensional.
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For any countable sequence (∆n)n∈N of mutually disjoint measurable sets, one has
PA
( ∞⋃
n=0
∆n
)
= P
(
µA
( ∞⋃
n=0
∆n
))
= P
( ∞∑
n=0
µA (∆n)
)
=
∞∑
n=0
P (µA (∆n)) =
∞∑
n=0
PA(∆n).
(4.22)
Hence (ΩA,FA,PA) is a classical probability space.
This formulation of a quantum probability space shows a resemblance with the
classical Definition 4.1. It may also be used to give a characterization of all quantum
probability spaces in terms of so-called frame functions. This is useful, as frame
functions will also play a significant role in later chapters. So without further ado,
here’s the definition.
Definition 4.3. Let H be a Hilbert space and let L1(H) denote the set of one-
dimensional projection operators. A frame is a sequence (Pi) of pairwise orthogonal
projections in L1(H) with
∑
i Pi = 1. A frame function is a function λ : L1(H)→ R
such that4 ∑
i
λ(Pi) = 1, (4.23)
for every frame (Pi).
Equivalently, a frame function can be taken to be a function on the unit vectors
of a Hilbert space such that its value sums to 1 for every orthonormal basis. It is
clear that every quantum probability function P determines a non-negative frame
function simply by restricting P to L1(H). The converse is true as well, although
this is less trivial. When the dimension of the Hilbert space is 1 or 2 this is easy to
see. If dim(H) = 1, then L1(H) = {1} and hence there is only one frame function,
and only one probability function. In the two-dimensional case L1(H) coincides
with L(H) except for the elements 0 and 1, i.e., L(H) = L1(H) ∪ {0, 1}. For a
frame function λ, the probability function is then given by
Pλ(0) := 0, Pλ(1) := 1 and Pλ(P ) := λ(P ) otherwise. (4.24)
In other cases the proof is non-trivial and relies on the following lemma by Gleason
(1957).
4Often, this is called a frame function of weight 1. More generally one can speak of frame
functions of weight W with W ∈ R. These are defined to have the property that every sum in
(4.23) adds up to W .
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Lemma 4.1 (Gleason 1957). Let H be a Hilbert space with dimH > 2. Then for
every non-negative frame function λ there exists a density operator ρλ such that
λ(P ) = Tr (ρλP ) ∀P ∈ L1(H). (4.25)
From this lemma it is clear that every non-negative frame function λ gives rise
to a function Pλ on L(H) by
Pλ(P ) := Tr (ρλP ) . (4.26)
The fact that this defines a quantum probability function then follows from the ad-
ditivity of the trace. The culmination of these considerations5 is Gleason’s theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Gleason 1957). Let H be a Hilbert space with dimension unequal to
2. Then (H, L(H),P) is a quantum probability space if and only if there exists a
density operator ρ such that
P(P ) = Tr(ρP ) ∀P ∈ L(H). (4.27)
Two formal remarks are in order. First, this theorem only holds when the
Hilbert space is either finite-dimensional or separable. A generalization of Gleason’s
theorem that applies to non-separable Hilbert spaces was given by Eilers and Horst
(1975). In this approach the notion of a quantum probability space is further
constrained by replacing (ii) in Theorem 4.2 by a condition that also allows arbitrary
(non-denumerable) sums. Second, as noted in section 3.1, the notion of PVMs
can be generalized to POVMs. If done so, quantum probability functions are also
generalized to stretch their domain to incorporate a class of positive operators known
as effects.6 A version of Gleason’s theorem for this case has been given by Busch
(2003). The upshot of that result for present purposes is that the class of quantum
probability spaces remains the same, i.e., they are still characterized by density
operators. A version of the theorem that holds for arbitrary von Neumann algebras
is presented in the next section.
Now let me shortly recapitulate what has been shown thus far in this section. It
follows from Theorem 4.2 that every quantum probability function P gives rise to
a frame function λ. Conversely, Lemma 4.1 establishes that, if dim(H) > 2, every
frame function gives rise to a quantum probability function through the introduction
of a density operator. Theorem 4.3 shows that this correspondence is bijective. It
is not hard to find counter examples for the case that dim(H) = 2. As noted above,
every frame function determines a probability function by (4.24). In particular, λ
5Together with some details such as the fact that two quantum probability functions are identical
when they give rise to the same frame function.
6An effect is a positive operator E with σ(E) ⊂ [0, 1].
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need not be continuous.7 However, every frame function induced by a probability
function of the form (4.27) is continuous. So the discontinuity of λ is a sufficient
condition for Pλ to be a counter example to Gleason’s theorem.
Because the representation of quantum probability functions by density opera-
tors only fails for the case that H = C2, one also often finds quantum probability
spaces simply defined through Gleason’s theorem. That is, P is considered to be a
quantum probability function if and only if there exists a density operator ρ such
that P is of the form of (4.27). This redefinition atomically takes place when one
switches to the algebraic formulation (see section 4.3). I will implicitly follow this
convention. There are several justifications for this. First, the probability functions
excluded in this way do not play a role in quantum mechanics. As such, particu-
lar properties of these functions have no direct implications for the foundations of
quantum mechanics. And second, when turning to POVMs, Gleason’s theorem also
holds in the two-dimensional case (Busch, 2003).
Like the set of all probability measures on a measurable space, the set of all
density operators on a Hilbert space is convex. That is, for any pair of density
operators ρ1, ρ2 and λ ∈ [0, 1] the operator ρ = λρ1 + (1 − λ)ρ2 is again a density
operator. The extreme points of this convex set are precisely the one-dimensional
projections. This explains the terminology that one-dimensional projections are
called pure states and the density operators mixed states. This can be compared to
the classical case where the extreme points coincide with Dirac measures on (Ω,F).
These extreme points can be identified with the points of the space Ω. Often then,
these are interpreted as denoting the actual state of affairs. For example, Ω may be
the set of possible worlds, one of which corresponds to the actual world. Any non-
extreme point in the set of probability distributions can then be seen as expressing
a form of ignorance concerning what the actual world is.
A similar reading is sometimes found with respect to the density operators in
quantum mechanics. The density operator then expresses an uncertainty concerning
the state of the system. In fact, this is, more or less, the view von Neumann
(1932) adopted when introducing density operators. But such a view is not entirely
unproblematic. One technical issue is that, unlike in the classical case, there are
many distinct convex combinations of pure states that give rise to the same mixed
state. Thus, while in the classical case the mixed state dictates the set of pure
states of which it is a mixture, the same cannot be done in quantum mechanics.
Consequently, there are distinct situations in which uncertainty about the pure state
is represented by the same mixed state. This in itself is not an unsurmountable
problem, but it is still peculiar, as is the following conceptual issue.
Adopting an uncertainty interpretation of density operators suggests that there
7A natural metric on L1(H) for defining continuity of frame functions is the one induced by the
operator norm.
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is an actual state (the ‘true’ state of the system) to be uncertain about. But since
pure states themselves are (generators of) probability functions, these probabilities
are then implicitly attributed an ontological status as well. This is not typically
quantum, since attributing probabilities to probability functions also happens for
example in Bayesian statistics, where similar conundrums arise (see for example
Uffink (2011, p.33–34)). But it does show that taking a stance on the nature of the
distinction between pure and mixed states has interpretative consequences for what
quantum probabilities are. Therefore, a reserved stance towards the distinction is
adopted in this dissertation.
Thus far I have introduced the Hilbert space formulation of quantum probability
and drawn some analogies between classical and quantum probability spaces. But
much more can be done to compare the two. The next step is the reformulation of
quantum probability theory in terms of *-algebras in the next two sections. The
upshot of this reformulation is that both quantum and classical probability spaces
can be viewed as instances of these (algebraic) quantum probability spaces.
4.3 Algebraic formulation
There is a peculiar tension between BoP and the definition of a quantum probability
space. The Born rule takes as arguments observables and sets of possible measure-
ment outcomes, while a quantum probability function in turn takes as arguments
projection operators. There is a good reason for this discrepancy: observables give
rise to self-adjoint operators (OP) which in turn give rise to projection operators
through their associated PVMs. However, this association goes only in one direc-
tion and, as discussed in section 3.2, the converse association (embodied by IP) need
not be universally valid. In that same section it was demonstrated that one can
constructively make the set of self-adjoint operators that correspond to observables
smaller by introducing superselection rules. Such smaller sets were characterized as
corresponding to sub-algebras of operators on the Hilbert space. This abstraction
effectively allows one to ‘forget’ about the Hilbert space, and take a purely algebraic
approach instead. To prepare for the abstractness of this step it is useful to first
consider a classical analogy.
In classical probability theory, probability measures can be generalized to ex-
pectation value functions. Every probability measure P : F → [0, 1] gives rise to
such a functional by the definition
E : L1(Ω,P)→ R, E(X) :=
∫
Ω
X(ω)dP(ω), (4.28)
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with8
L1(Ω,P) :=
{
X : Ω→ R
∣∣∣∣ ∫
Ω
|X(ω)|dP(ω) <∞
}
. (4.29)
Then the probability of a set is recovered by taking the expectation value of the
characteristic function of that set, i.e.,
P(∆) = E(1∆), 1∆(ω) :=
{
1 ω ∈ ∆,
0 ω /∈ ∆. (4.30)
Thus instead of probability being defined as a function on events, it is now a
functional defined on random variables.
One point on which the analogy breaks down, is that in the quantum case,
instead of considering the set of self-adjoint operators (representing random vari-
ables), one considers an entire algebra of operators of which the relevant self-adjoint
operators are a subset. Explicitly, the construction of an algebraic quantum prob-
ability space from an ‘ordinary’ quantum probability space goes as follows. Let
(H, L(H),P) be a quantum probability space. Let B(H) denote the algebra of
bounded operators on H. Now assume, using Gleason’s theorem, that P is charac-
terized by the density operator ρ. Then P gives rise to a functional φρ on B(H) via
the definition
φρ : B(H)→ C, φρ(A) := Tr(ρA). (4.31)
The restriction to bounded operators ensures that the trace is well-defined. This
may be compared to the classical restriction to integrable functions in (4.28).
When restricting φρ to the self-adjoint operators in B(H), one indeed obtains
the expectation value with respect to the probability measure on the spectrum of
A:
φρ(A) =
∫
σ(A)
adPAρ (a) = EAρ (idσ(A)), (4.32)
with idσ(A) : σ(A) → σ(A) the classical random variable given by idσ(A)(a) = a.
Note further that φρ is an extension of P since L(H) ⊂ B(H). For projection
operators, (4.32) is the quantum version of (4.30). The functional φρ is a state in
the algebraic sense (see Definition A.21) and B(H) is a *-algebra. These features
then are taken as construing the definition of an algebraic quantum probability
space (see (Meyer, 1993)).
Definition 4.4. An (algebraic) quantum probability space is a pair (C, φ) with C a
*-algebra and φ : C → C a state.
8Formally, L1(Ω,P) is the set of equivalence classes of functions, where two functions X1, X2
are considered to be equivalent if and only if
∫
Ω
|X1(ω)−X2(ω)|dP(ω) = 0.
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This definition is much more general than what is needed in this dissertation.
But also in mathematical practice one often imposes further restrictions. For ex-
ample, one may require that C is a C*-algebra or a von Neumann algebra. Another
noteworthy feature is that a state need only be finitely additive. The prototypical
state φρ from (4.31) on the other hand is countably additive. When restricting
to von Neumann algebras, this feature is captured by the notion of normality (see
Definition A.22). The following theorem ties these idea together with the existence
of appropriate density operators.9
Theorem 4.4. Let H be a Hilbert space and φ : C → C a state on a von Neumann
algebra C ⊂ B(H), then the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) φ is normal;
(b) there exists a density operator ρ on H such that φ(A) = Tr(ρA) for all A ∈ C;
(c) for every set {Pi}i∈I of pairwise orthogonal projections
∑
i∈I
φ(Pi) = φ
(∑
i∈I
Pi
)
. (4.33)
In section 3.2 it was shown that von Neumann algebras arise in a natural way
when superselection rules are introduced. These rules can be interpreted as a re-
striction on the set of observables (by a rejection of IP). For such a smaller set of
observables, an algebraic quantum probability space may then be found to be more
fitting. After all, it allows one to ignore the self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert
space that do not correspond to observables. But more interesting for the present
discussion, is that the algebraic formulation can be used to view classical probability
spaces as a special case of quantum probability spaces. Specifically, every classical
probability space can be represented using an algebraic quantum probability space.
The construction is not entirely trivial though, and to make the general structure
clear it is useful to first consider the special case of finite classical probability spaces
as an example.
Example 4.2. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space with #Ω < ∞ and F = P(Ω).
With the set Ω one can associate the set of all complex-valued functions on Ω
C(Ω) := {f : Ω→ C}. (4.34)
9A proof for this theorem can be obtained by taking together Theorem 3.6.4 in (Pedersen, 1979)
and Theorem 7.1.12 in (Kadison and Ringrose, 1986). Also, it deserves to be noted that for the
validity of the theorem H need not be separable.
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This is turned into a *-algebra by introducing the rules
(λ1f1 + λ2f2)(ω) := λ1f1(ω) + λ2f2(ω),
(f1f2)(ω) := f1(ω)f2(ω),
f∗(ω) := f(ω),
(4.35)
where f, f1, f2 ∈ C(Ω), λ1, λ2 ∈ C and λ 7→ λ denotes complex conjugation on C.
A norm is introduced with the definition
‖f‖∞ := max
ω∈Ω
|f(ω)|. (4.36)
This turns C(Ω) into a C*-algebra. The self-adjoint elements of C(Ω) are the real-
valued functions and the projections are precisely the characteristic functions 1∆
for ∆ ⊂ Ω.
Every probability measure P on (Ω,F) gives rise to a state φP on C(Ω) defined
as
φP : C(Ω)→ C, φP(f) :=
∑
ω∈Ω
f(ω)P({ω}). (4.37)
The classical probabilities are regained by the action of the state on the projections:
φP(1∆) = P(∆). (4.38)
Conversely, every state φ on C(Ω) can be used to define a probability measure given
by
Pφ : F → [0, 1], Pφ(∆) := φ(1∆). (4.39)
4
The example establishes a bijective correspondence between probability mea-
sures on a finite measurable space and states on the associated C*-algebra. What
deserves further special attention is that C(Ω) is an Abelian algebra. This is an
aspect which is typical for the connection with classical probability space. For ex-
ample, if (A, φ) is a quantum probability space with A a finite-dimensional Abelian
*-algebra, then one may show that it is isomorphic to a space of the form (C(Ω), φP)
derived from a classical probability space. In the case that Ω is infinite things be-
come slightly more complicated, but the main idea remains the same. To highlight
these main ideas, I only provide a sketch of the proof for the following theorem.10
Theorem 4.5. For every classical probability space (Ω,F ,P) there exists a quantum
probability space (A, φ) with A an Abelian von Neumann algebra that represents the
10Proofs of the relevant details can be found in (Douglas, 1998) (in particular Propositions 4.50
and 4.51) and section 1 in (Maassen, 2003).
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classical probability space. Specifically, there is a surjective PVM µ : F → L(A)
from the measurable sets to the set of projections in A, such that
φ(µ(∆)) = P(∆) ∀∆ ∈ F . (4.40)
Proof sketch. Like in the finite case an algebraic structure is introduced by taking
a particular set of complex-valued functions on Ω. Let M(Ω) denote the set of all
measurable complex-valued functions. Scalar multiplication, addition, multiplica-
tion and a *-operation are then introduced by the rules in (4.35). These rules turn
M(Ω) into a *-algebra. Note that every subset of M(Ω) that is closed under the
operations (4.35) is automatically also a *-algebra. The aim is to have a subset that
is both big enough and is mathematically well-behaved.
To say that the sub-algebra ofM(Ω) is big enough, is to say that it can at least
model the measurable sets in F . So what is needed, at least, is that the projections
are included. These again correspond to the elements 1∆ with ∆ any measurable
subset of Ω. The candidate for a PVM µ : F → L(A) is then µ(∆) = 1∆. This sets
the inspiration drawn from the finite case, and this is where one bumps into some
technicalities.
The technical details come in the form of several desiderata. First, the algebra
of all complex-valued functions does not have a norm to turn it into a C*-algebra.
Furthermore, for the algebra to be a von Neumann algebra, it has to be embedded
into the algebra of bounded operators on some Hilbert space H, and be shown to
be equal to its double commutant. Finally, one has to find a state on the algebra
with the desired properties. Let’s start with this problem. A first constraint for a
state is that
φP(1∆) = P(∆) =
∫
Ω
1∆(ω)dP(ω), ∀∆ ∈ F . (4.41)
A natural extension then is that for other functions
φP(f) =
∫
Ω
f(ω)dP(ω). (4.42)
This requires restricting attention to the P-measurable functions for which the
integral converges, i.e., the elements of L1(Ω,P).
However, L1(Ω,P) is not an algebra as it is not closed under the operations from
(4.35). For example, one may have that f ∈ L1(Ω,P) while f2 /∈ L1(Ω,P). As one
can take arbitrary many powers of functions, one should switch to the set L∞(Ω,P)
which is the set of complex-valued functions for which the essential supremum of
the absolute value is finite, i.e.,
L∞(Ω,P) := {f ∈M(Ω) | ess sup |f | <∞} ,
ess sup |f | := inf {x ∈ R | P ({ω ∈ Ω | |f(ω)| > x}) = 0} . (4.43)
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The essential supremum is the proper generalization of the supremum in a measure-
theoretic context. Roughly, it selects the supremum of a function while neglecting
the values the function may have on some set of measure zero.
Thus far L∞(Ω,P) is an Abelian *-algebra, and φP(f) is now defined for every
f ∈ L∞(Ω,P) by (4.42). However, a norm is still missing. The natural candidate
is
‖f‖∞ := ess sup |f |. (4.44)
However, this is not a norm since ‖f1 − f2‖∞ = 0 does not imply f1 = f2 because
the two functions may differ on a set of P-measure zero. This is solved by instead
looking at equivalence classes of functions, and one switches to the set L∞(Ω,P).
This is indeed a C*-algebra with the norm given by (4.44) and φP as given by (4.42)
defines a state on it. It can be viewed as a subalgebra of the bounded operators
on the Hilbert space L2(Ω,P). Indeed, every f ∈ L∞(Ω,P) gives rise to a bounded
operator Mf : L
2(Ω,P)→ L2(Ω,P) via
(Mfψ)(ω) := f(ω)ψ(ω). (4.45)
One may show that in this context L∞(Ω,P) is indeed a von Neumann algebra. 
Theorem 4.5 establishes a firm argument for the view that classical probability
is a special case of quantum probability. There are, however, two small caveats that
deserve to be mentioned. A peculiar difference between the construction in Example
4.2 and that in Theorem 4.5, is that in the first case, the algebra C(Ω) depends
only on the measurable space (Ω,F), while in the second case the algebra L∞(Ω,P)
also depends on the measure. This suggests that there may be difficulties with
modeling the dynamics of classical probability functions in the quantum framework:
a change in the measure P may require one to not only change the state φP, but also
its domain. The second caveat is that measurable subsets of Ω are not uniquely
represented in the quantum model: when the difference between two sets is of
measure zero, they are identified with the same projection in L∞(Ω,P). Thus
measure zero sets have no place in the quantum formalism.
The situation isn’t very grim though. The usual dynamics of probability, given
by conditionalization, is easily modeled in the quantum case and doesn’t require
updating the algebra. Specifically, let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and let P∆
denote the measure obtained after conditionalizing P on the set ∆ ∈ F . Then there
is a state φP∆ on L
∞(Ω,P) that represents P∆, namely,
φP∆(f) :=
1
P(∆)
∫
1∆(ω)f(ω)dP(ω). (4.46)
More generally, any probability measure P′ can be modeled on L∞(Ω,P) as long
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as P′  P.11 In that case, it follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem, together
with the observation that L∞(Ω,P) ⊂ L∞(Ω,P′), that
φP′(f) :=
∫
f(ω)
dP′(ω)
dP(ω)
dP(ω) (4.47)
is well-defined and equals
∫
f(ω)dP′(ω).
In cases where P′ assigns a positive probability to a set ∆ of P-measure zero
the situation is more difficult. In fact, here the first caveat and the second come
together. The problem is that L∞(Ω,P) does not recognize ∆ as a viable possi-
bility. The significance of this fact is perhaps best understood within the setting
of a concrete example. Consider the Hilbert space L2(R) used to describe a single
particle in one spatial dimension. The event of finding the particle in one particular
region ∆ is represented by the projection 1∆ viewed as a multiplication operator
using (4.45).
In the case that ∆ has measure zero, the corresponding operator 1∆ is identified
with the zero operator. This is in particular the case for all singleton sets {x} with
x ∈ R. The foundational significance of this peculiarity is debatable. Arntzenius
(2003) takes this aspect of quantum probability as support for the idea that space
itself has no points. But I think it is worth recognizing two possibly underlying
assumptions to this claim. The first is that it is impossible to recover the points of
a space within the quantum formalism. The second is the idea that this formalism
is in some sense necessarily the correct one for describing these matters. Both these
assumptions may be questioned. Doing so does of course not imply that one can’t
make a case for going ‘pointless’, but it does indicate that the support from quantum
probability for such a metaphysical claim is limited.
A counter example to the first assumption can be found in the paper by Halvor-
son (2001). He defends the idea that there are (non-normal) states in quantum
probability which can be thought of as representing a definite value for the position
of a particle. To this end the following definition is introduced. A state φ on the
algebra B(L2(R)) is said to converge to the point x ∈ R if φ (M1∆) = 1 for every
open set ∆ containing x. Such states exist for every x ∈ R and may be interpreted
as expressing that the particle is indeed in the point x. A counter example to the
second assumption is provided by Bohmian mechanics. In this theory, all particles
have a definite position at all times. The fact that probabilities for position mea-
surements cannot distinguish regions that differ a set of measure zero then expresses
a form of empirical indistinguishability. The situation then isn’t that different from
the one in classical probability. Thus constructions like that of Halvorson (ibid.) or
in Bohmian mechanics help smoothing the discrepancies surrounding Theorem 4.5.
11A measure µ is said to be absolutely continuous with respect to another measure ν (denoted
µ ν) if for every measurable set ∆, if ν(∆) = 0, then µ(∆) = 0. In other words, the set of sets
with ν-measure zero is a subset of the set of sets with µ-measure zero.
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The emerging view is that quantum probability is a proper generalization of
classical probability. However, this embedding of classical probability is not entirely
trivial. One may then wonder if, as indicated in the discussion around Theorem
4.1, one can’t conversely embed quantum probability within the classical framework
with a bit of creativity. This question, then, is the topic of the next part of this
dissertation.
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Hidden variables and classical
representations
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5
Introduction
5.1 Defining the question of classical representations
The formalism of quantum probability was introduced in chapter 4, and it was
shown there that classical probability can be viewed as a special case of this formal-
ism (Theorem 4.5). To my knowledge, this result is the strongest defense for the
idea that quantum probability is a proper generalization of classical probability.1
However, Theorem 4.5 does not show that the generalization is in fact proper. That
is, while the theorem shows that it is possible to represent every classical probabil-
ity space as a quantum probability space, it is silent about whether the converse
isn’t true as well: can a quantum probability space be represented as a classical
probability space? This, roughly, is the topic of this part of the dissertation.
The question is by no means trivial, as it goes hand in hand with evaluating
what counts as a positive answer. Apart from being able to represent quantum
probability functions in a classical way, it is also desirable that the representation
is in some sense faithful. That is, if a classical representation is to be helpful for the
philosophy of quantum probability, it also has to be explanatory. A solid definition
of faithfulness will not be given, nor do I think that aspiring for such a definition
is very useful. Rather, I take it to be more fruitful to reevaluate the question of
what counts as a satisfactory representation along the way, while discussing formal
results concerning the (im)possibility of these representations. But to get a feeling
of what is hinted at when I use the notion of faithfulness, a metaphorical example
may be useful.
1Another, and perhaps more popular argument, is that classical probability is unable to pro-
duce certain correlations typical for quantum probability, as demonstrated by the violation of Bell
inequalities (see Theorem 4.1). However, derivations of such inequalities require more ingredients
than just ‘classical probability’, which are typically of a physical/philosophical nature (e.g. local-
ity). These assumptions are used to argue that random variables like A111 and A
12
1 in (4.15) should
actually be identified with each other. As such, from a mathematical perspective, they do not
evidently show quantum probability is more general than classical probability.
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It has long been believed that trajectories of celestial bodies should in some
sense be harmonious and perfect. Circular motion is the most natural candidate
for such a view. However, even a shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric model
of the planetary motions in our solar system turned out to have discrepancies with
observations. There always remained the need to introduce epicycles to the circular
motions. That is, until Kepler abandoned the idea of using circles, and replaced
them with ellipses.
Now one can think of circular motion being analogous to classical probability,
and elliptical motion as being analogous to quantum probability. It is clear that
elliptical motions form a generalizations of circular motions. However, it is also
possible to account for elliptical motions by only making use of circles. By adding
enough epicycles, circular motions can approach elliptical motions up to any desired
degree of precision. So it is possible to represent ellipses by circles. But the rep-
resentation would not be considered faithful by anyone. It is a result from Fourier
analysis that any periodic orbit can be approximated with the use of epicycles. An
illustrative internet movie by Ginnobili (2008) establishes with the use of epicycles
an orbit that draws Homer Simpson (   ). This example shows that, although circles
can be used to describe ellipses, this description fosters no insight in the importance
of ellipses. In fact, ellipses are rather arbitrary motions from the epicycle point of
view.
To bring the metaphor back to the topic of this dissertation: if a classical rep-
resentation of quantum probability is like the epicycles, the representation would
not be considered to be faithful. But this only sketches the question of classical
representations. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to further charting the
contours of the possibilities and impossibilities of classical representations. In sec-
tion 5.2 a comparison is made between the formalisms of classical and quantum
probability that highlights the main distinctions that would have to be overcome
for classical representations. In section 5.3 the connection is made with the ques-
tion of hidden variable interpretations of quantum mechanics. The contours for a
definition of classical representations are illustrated in section 5.4 by means of two
theorems. First, a possibility theorem is taken to determine an outer boundary for
the definition. After that, an impossibility theorem (based on von Neumann’s no-go
theorem for hidden variables) is taken to determine an inner boundary. Finally, in
section 5.5, an outline is given for part II of this dissertation.
5.2 Formalisms of probability
The main topic of this part of the dissertation is the distinction between Kol-
mogorov’s axiomatization of probability and the quantum formalism. The primary
interest in an investigation of the differences between the two is relatively straight-
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forward. The classical formulation of probability has been the topic of many philo-
sophical studies. A particularly interesting part of these studies has been the jus-
tification of a specific axiomatization of probability, namely, that of Kolmogorov
or a slight variation thereof (Eells, 1983). It is somewhat peculiar then to realize
that scientific investigations lead to a formulation of probability that is manifestly
distinct from this classical structure. Have philosophers then been trying to find
justifications for the wrong formalism?
The situation is not that grim of course. The classical formalism may be ade-
quate for most, if not all, of the use of probability outside quantum mechanics. This
idea is only strengthened by the philosophical justifications for the formalism. But
for the case where the quantum structure is applicable a new investigation seems
required. That is, unless the distinction is not proper at all. If every quantum prob-
ability space can be represented on a classical probability space, then one may take
the justification for the classical structure as indirectly providing a justification for
the quantum formalism. However, it will probably come as no surprise to the reader
that in this part of the dissertation I work towards the conclusion that satisfactory
classical representations of quantum probability are not to be had. After all, after
part II comes part III, and that part is still on quantum probability, and not on
classical probability.
An appropriate way to start is with a coarse comparison of the two formalisms
of probability. This then gives a first suggestion of what is required of a classical
representation, as well as what is at stake if such a representation does not suc-
ceed. For the sake of definiteness, consider the two definitions of probability spaces
alongside each other.
Definition 5.1.
A classical probability space is a triplet
(Ω,F ,P) such that
A quantum probability space is a triplet
(H, L(H),P) such that
1. Ω is a set, 1. H is a Hilbert space,
2. F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω con-
taining Ω,
2. L(H) is the collection of all projec-
tion operators on H,
3. P is a function from F to the inter-
val [0, 1],
3. P is a function from L(H) to the in-
terval [0, 1],
4. P(Ω) = 1, 4. P(1) = 1,
5. P(
⋃
n ∆n) =
∑
nP(∆n) for any
countable sequence of mutually dis-
joint sets.
5. P(
∑
n Pn) =
∑
nP(Pn) for any
countable sequence of mutually or-
thogonal projections.
I choose to work here with the definition from Theorem 4.2 as it resembles the
classical axiomatization as much as possible. It is also sufficiently general to stick to
the Hilbert space formalism. One reason is that every C*-algebra can be represented
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as a sub-algebra of B(H) for some Hilbert space.2 But more importantly, it is
because the theorems discussed in this part of the dissertation place all philosophical
considerations within the framework of finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
When it comes to formalizing probability it is useful to separate three specific
ingredients. Namely, probability is thought of as a function with (a) a domain and
(b) a range and that (c) satisfies certain calculus rules. When comparing classi-
cal and quantum probability, the most important distinction is in the structure
of the domain as indicated by points 1 and 2 in Definition 5.1. Aside from these
differences concerning the domain, quantum probabilities are quite similar to their
classical counterparts. The items 3, 4 and 5 for quantum probabilities only differ
from the classical axioms to the extent that the domain in the quantum case has a
different structure. In other words, given the domain L(H), the range of the quan-
tum probability function P and the rules it satisfies are as similar to the classical
case as possible.
This observation is quite intriguing in light of the literature on the philosophy
of probability. There is a (tacit) consensus that the domain specified by the axioms
of Kolmogorov is roughly correct. The focus is instead on the ingredients (b) and
(c). Dutch book arguments, for example, pertain to the rules for the calculus.
Rationality requires an agent to set her degrees of belief to satisfy P(A) +P(¬A) =
1, while taking for granted that A can be represented as a set. There is also
some discussion on the range of probability functions. One may ask whether real
numbers are either too fine-grained (can one have epistemic access to non-rational
numbers?) or too coarse-grained (should one introduce hyperreals to be able to
separate impossible from improbable events?). To be sure, there is also discussion
on the domain of probability functions. Twined with the discussion of whether P
should be σ-additive is the discussion whether F should be closed under countable
unions. A possibly more popular issue is whether probability should be a single-
placed function, such that conditional probabilities are derived from unconditional
probabilities, or a two-placed function, taking conditional probability as primitive.
But what remains the same in these considerations is the assumption that the
arguments of the probability function are taken from some (Boolean) algebra of
subsets.
The set-theoretic approach is relatively uncontroversial and applied widely (for
example, it is the cornerstone of possible world semantics). Therefore it deserves
to be emphasized that it is precisely this kind of structure that is absent in the
formalism of quantum probability. Thus it is worthwhile to investigate under which
conditions this structure can be recovered. But the question is also interesting
from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics, as it relates to the question of hidden
2This is done using the construction of Gelfand, Naimark and Segal (Kadison and Ringrose,
1986, Theorem 4.5.2).
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variables. I turn to this relation in the next section.
5.3 Hidden variables
From the viewpoint of philosophy of quantum mechanics, the question of classical
representations of quantum probability touches on the subject of hidden variable
interpretations of quantum mechanics. The question of hidden variables is as old as
quantum mechanics itself (see also chapter 2). It ties in with the issue of whether
the quantum state provides a complete description of a system, or only a partial
description. The idea that the description may be only partial is an intuitive one.
Quantum mechanics postulates the existence of many observables, gives lists of pos-
sible measurement outcomes for these observables, but refuses to commit itself to
the idea that the actual measurement outcomes can be attributed to these observ-
ables independently of the act of measurement. This reluctance points to an idea
often found in the more popular accounts of this theory, namely, that acts of mea-
surement create the outcome of a measurement instead of revealing it. A hidden
variable account of quantum mechanics may seek to alleviate this confusing state of
affairs in the most obvious way. That is, a hidden variable state can be thought of
as a function that assigns values to observables, which are to be the values revealed
upon measurement. Specifically, the following definition is an appropriate working
definition to start with:
Definition 5.2. A hidden variable state for a physical system S associated with a
Hilbert space H is a function λ : Obs → R such that λ(A) ∈ σ(A) for every A ∈ Obs ,
where A is the self-adjoint operator acting on H associated with A.
Here Obs denotes the set of all observables and A is the self-adjoint operator quantum
mechanics associates with the observable A.
A connection between the existence of hidden variable states and classical rep-
resentations of quantum probability spaces can now be made in the following way.
In a classical probability space, every ω ∈ Ω determines the value of every random
variable. That is, if RV denotes the set of (real-valued) random variables on Ω,
then every ω ∈ Ω determines a functional
ωˆ : RV → R, ωˆ(F ) := F (ω). (5.1)
Now it is a reasonable demand that, for a classical representation (Ω,F) of a quan-
tum probability space (H, L(H)), it is possible to associate a classical random vari-
able on Ω with every quantum random variable. In particular, for every self-adjoint
operator A there should be a random variable FA : Ω→ σ(A). Consequently, every
ω ∈ Ω gives rise to a hidden variable state λω by the rule
λω(A) := ωˆ(FA), (5.2)
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where A is the self-adjoint operator associated with A.
Thus every classical representation implies the existence of hidden variable
states. It is then tempting to conclude that every no-go theorem for hidden variables
provides a no-go theorem for classical representations. But this is where the ques-
tions of classical representations and hidden variables come apart. No-go theorems
for hidden variable theories rely on assumptions that may not be directly relevant
for the question of classical representations. This is because hidden variables come
equipped with metaphysical connotations. As such, additional constraints (such as
locality) that may be relevant for the question of hidden variables, may be less inter-
esting from the formal perspective of classical representations. It is for this reason
that this part of the dissertation is almost solely devoted to the Kochen-Specker the-
orem, while discussions of Bell inequalities are omitted entirely. What is left open is
the question of what constraints are interesting for a classical representation. The
next section is devoted to answering this question.
5.4 What is a classical representation?
Let (H, L(H),P) be a quantum probability space and suppose (ΩH,FH,PH) is a
classical probability space that represents it. What could one reasonably expect this
to mean? A definite answer to this question will not be given here. In fact, the main
message to take away from this section is that the answer depends on how faithful
one wants the representation to be. Which aspects of the quantum formalism should
be reproduced in the classical representation? This is a philosophical question and,
as such, it is susceptible to multiple defensible answers.
Every possible answer has to make up a balance with on the one side the explana-
tory merit a classical representation can give, and on the other side the elegance and
constraints posited by the quantum formulation. To clarify this idea, this section
is devoted to explaining two formal results on the (im)possibility of classical rep-
resentations that pull in opposite directions. The first result is a positive one, and
assumes a very liberal reading of classical representations. The second is a negative
one. It assumes a very restrictive reading, and requires the classical representation
to adopt so much of the quantum structure, that one can show that such a repre-
sentation does not exist. The gain of considering these two results, is that the first
may be seen as giving a minimal requirement for a classical representation, while the
second shows that it is a non-trivial matter to investigate what more requirements
can be added. As such, they set the boundaries for the discussion in the remainder
of this part.
A natural minimal requirement for a classical representation is that it is able
to reproduce the empirical content of quantum probability. Tracking this empirical
content is of course not a trivial matter. In fact, precisely assessing what empirical
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ingredients underly the Kochen-Specker theorem is one of the points on which my
presentation of the Kochen-Specker theorem differs from common presentations.
Whatever empirical content probability theory has, it is channeled through ran-
dom variables. After all, these represent the possible experiments as well as their
corresponding outcomes. Thus a minimal requirement is that for every quantum
random variable there is a classical random variable that represents it. I restrict
attention to the quantum random variables that are given by self-adjoint operators.
The following theorem shows that it is possible to identify each one of them with a
random variable on a single classical probability space.
Theorem 5.1. Let H be a Hilbert space and Osa the set of self-adjoint operators
acting on it. Then there is a measurable space (ΩH,FH) together with a collection of
random variables {FA |A ∈ Osa} such that for every quantum probability function
P : L(H)→ [0, 1] there is a probability measure PH on (ΩH,FH) that satisfies
P(µA(∆)) = PH(F−1A (∆)) (5.3)
for all measurable subsets ∆ ⊂ σ(A), where µA denotes the PVM associated with
A.
Proof. For every self-adjoint operator the associated measurable space (ΩA,FA) is
given by the spectrum of A and the algebra of Borel subsets. The idea of the proof
is to heap all the measurable spaces (ΩA,FA) into a single big one. The probability
measure PH is then constructed as the product measure of probability measures on
the spaces (ΩA,FA).
The set ΩH is constructed as the Cartesian product of all the ΩA:
ΩH := {ω : Osa → R | ω(A) ∈ σ(A)} '
∏
A∈Osa(H)
ΩA. (5.4)
The σ-algebra FH will be the one generated by the cylinder sets. That is, FH is
defined as the smallest σ-algebra containing the subsets
C(A1,∆1),...,(An,∆n) := {ω ∈ ΩH | ω(Ai) ∈ ∆i, i = 1, . . . , n} (5.5)
for any finite sequence (A1,∆1), . . . , (An,∆n) with Ai ∈ Osa and ∆i ∈ FAi for all i.
For each self-adjoint operator A the random variable FA is defined as
FA(ω) := ω(A). (5.6)
One may check that this is indeed a measurable function. Now let P be a quantum
probability function. The corresponding probability measure PH is now defined by
first specifying its action on the cylinder sets:
PH
(
C(A1,∆1),...,(An,∆n)
)
:=
n∏
i=1
P(µAi(∆i)). (5.7)
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This already warrants that (5.3) holds. The only puzzle left is to show that this
function can be extended to a measure on the whole of FH. For this result, I refer
to the short proof by Saeki (1996), which moreover shows that the extension is
unique.
On a liberal reading of what classical representations are to be, the above the-
orem establishes the possibility of such representations. Every quantum random
variable is identified with a classical random variable on the measurable space, and
for every quantum probability function there is a probability measure that repro-
duces the distributions for all quantum random variables. But there are two ways
in which this representation may be found to be unsatisfactory or unfaithful. The
first problem is similar to the one with the epicycle representation of elliptical orbits
discussed in section 5.1. The probability measures on (ΩH,FH) that derive from
quantum probability functions are a rather special subset of all the probability mea-
sures. Indeed, these measures may be seen to satisfy a form of non-contextuality.
Namely, for any pair of operators A1, A2 and sets ∆1,∆2 the conditional
µA1(∆1) = µA2(∆2)⇒ PH(FA1 ∈ ∆1) = PH(FA2 ∈ ∆2) (5.8)
holds, and it is easy to see that it need not hold for arbitrary probability measures
on (ΩH,FH). Without at least an additional explanation of why (5.8) should hold,
the classical representation of Theorem 5.1 is of little explanatory value when it
comes to quantum probability.
The second problem is that the classical representation does not respect the al-
gebraic structure of quantum probability. Then, whenever this structure is relevant
for the application of quantum probability theory, the classical representation will
not be adequate. Let me first explain by example what is formally the problem.
In the quantum formalism, for any two self-adjoint operators A1 and A2, their sum
is again a self adjoint operator. And whenever the two operators commute, their
product is also again a self-adjoint operator. But this structure is not respected by
the associated random variables FA1 , FA2 , FA1+A2 and FA1A2 . In fact, by the con-
struction of the product measure (5.7), these random variables are all stochastically
independent. Now, if the algebraic structure is respected in actual measurements,
then the classical representation is no longer adequate. For example, if the outcomes
a1, a2, a3 of a joint measurement of A1, A2, A3 = A1 +A2 always satisfy the relation
a3 = a1 + a2, then the variables FA1 , FA2 and FA1+A2 should not be stochastically
independent.
Quantum probability itself suggests that the algebraic structure actually is rel-
evant. For every quantum probability function and for all pairs of self-adjoint
operators A1, A2 the expectation values satisfy the relation
E(A1 +A2) = E(A1) + E(A2). (5.9)
64
What is a classical representation? 5.4
Von Neumann (1932) took this to suggest that for a classical representation this
relation should hold for all probability measures. In particular, it should hold for
the Dirac measures Pω for all ω. This boils down to the assumption that
FA1+A2 = FA1 + FA2 (5.10)
for all A1, A2 ∈ Osa. However, this assumption is one that cannot hold, as is shown
by the following simplified version of von Neumann’s argument against hidden vari-
ables (ibid., §IV.2).
Theorem 5.2. Let (H, L(H),P) be a quantum probability space. Then there is no
classical representation (Ω,F ,P) such that for every self-adjoint operator A there
is a random variable FA : Ω → σ(A) and (5.10) holds for all pairs of self-adjoint
operators A1 and A2.
Let me start on a positive note by pointing out that the theorem establishes
that not all of the algebraic structure of quantum probability can be recovered in a
classical representation. However, it is not clear why all this structure is something
that should be preserved. As a definite argument against the possibility of hidden
variables the above result is quite poor, and it has been criticized for having been
presented as such by von Neumann. In particular, the constraint (5.10) has become
known as von Neumann’s “silly assumption” (Bell, 1988; Mermin, 1993).
The argument against the constraint runs as follows. The range of the function
FA1 +FA2 is given by the set {a1 + a2 | a1 ∈ σ(A1), a2 ∈ σ(A2)}. But in general this
does not coincide with the spectrum of A1 + A2. In fact, these two sets can even
be disjoint. Then, by assuming (5.10), values could be attributed to the observable
corresponding to A1 + A2 that are not even among the possible measurement out-
comes, and these possible outcomes in turn are not available as possible values for
the observables. Incidentally, this gives a proof of Theorem 5.2 as well as a proof
of the fact that the empirical motivation for the constraint given just above (5.9) is
flawed.
It is clear from this analysis that von Neumann’s theorem proved something
what was deemed irrelevant by Bell and his followers. It is not immediately clear
from this though, that his proof is thereby silly. This depends more on what von
Neumann aimed to prove, rather than on what others expected from it. A com-
pelling defense for the thesis that the theorem is indeed significant is given by Bub
(2011a). For the present discussion this issue is slightly less relevant and would
also require going into the details of the original theorem instead of focusing on
the simplified version given here. What is relevant to note, is that it follows that a
notion of classical representation that adopts (5.10) as a constraint is not only one
that cannot be realized, but would also deliver more than needed. The question of
the definition and possibility of faithful representations thus remains open at this
65
5 Introduction
point. But the contours have been sketched, and it is now clear that the possi-
bility of classical representations ties in with the precise relevance of the algebraic
structure of quantum probability spaces for the application of quantum probability
theory. This highlights the main topic of study in the remainder of this part of the
dissertation.
5.5 Outline
As noted in section 5.3, the remainder of this part of the dissertation solely focuses
on the Kochen-Specker theorem. The theorem is first presented, proven, and inves-
tigated in chapter 6. In more detail, sections 6.1 and 6.2 work towards a formulation
of the theorem that highlights and disentangles the philosophical and technical as-
sumptions that underlie it. In the first of these two sections a more or less traditional
formulation is presented, while in the second a more modern formulation is given
that has some of my own ingredients.
Although the theorem presents severe constraints on the possibility of classical
representation, it also relies on two assumptions that are good candidates for rejec-
tion: non-contextuality (NC) and the identification principle (IP). Sections 6.3 and
6.4 are dedicated to the possibilities of classical representations and hidden vari-
ables when NC is rejected. The rejection of IP is more involved and controversial,
and requires a chapter on its own. In chapter 7 the possibility of non-contextual
classical representations and hidden variables is discussed by means of a discussion
of the models of Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC). First, in section 7.2 a proof of the
Kochen-Specker theorem is presented that is close to the original proof, and that
allows a significant weakening of IP. Section 7.3 is dedicated to investigating the
possibility and justification of rejecting IP. Specifically, the so-called finite precision
loophole which allows the rejection of IP is explained. In section 7.4 the possibility
for reproducing quantum probabilities is discussed, and in section 7.5 some peculiar
aspects of the MKC models are highlighted. A short review of the results is then
given in section 7.6.
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6.1 The Kochen-Specker theorem
In their own words, Kochen and Specker state that their theorem aims “to give a
proof of the nonexistense of hidden variables”, and they continue by noting that
“This requires that we give at least a precise necessary condition for their existence.”
The accepted existence of hidden variable theories proves that the necessary con-
dition posed by Kochen and Specker can be contested. On the other hand, there
is some consensus that the condition is not obviously too restrictive. The theorem
hasn’t met the same kind of criticism as von Neumann’s theorem did. In short, the
theorem provides valuable insight in the kind of constraints that play a role in the
possibility of hidden variables and classical representations.
The import of the Kochen-Specker theorem is often phrased with the credo that
it excludes the possibility of so-called non-contextual hidden variables. Some have
even gone as far as to conclude from the result that nature itself is contextual.
These are claims that deserve to be made more precise. But I will not yet go deeply
into the impact of the theorem in this section. That is reserved for the later sections
and chapter 7. Instead, this section is devoted to picking out problematic aspects
of the classical representation introduced by Theorem 5.1, and to use the Kochen-
Specker theorem as a way to demonstrate that there is no easy way to patch up
these problems.
Now let’s pick up on the issue I discussed in section 5.4. Which algebraic struc-
tures of quantum probability should be respected by a classical representation in
order for the representation to be called faithful? A definite answer is not given
here, but a minimal requirement is that a structure should be respected when it
is reflected in empirical predictions. As noted in section 5.4, such a reflection is
possible within the setting of joint measurements. Whenever algebraic relations are
reflected in outcomes of joint measurements, this introduces statistical correlations
among the observables. A probability measure in a classical representation should
of course be able to account for such correlations.
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The formalism of quantum mechanics as presented in chapter 3 mostly dealt
with single measurements at a time. However, it is quite generally accepted that
(at least as an idealization) certain joint measurements are also possible. More
precisely, the following postulate is often (implicitly) accepted.
CoP (Comeasurability Postulate) If {A1, . . . ,An} is a finite set of observables
and {A1, . . . , An} is a corresponding set of self-adjoint operators that satisfies
[Ai, Aj ] = 0 for all i, j, then it is possible to perform a joint measurement of
A1, . . . ,An.
This postulate in itself poses no direct empirical content, but in conjunction with
the Born Postulate (BoP) it does. Quantum mechanics also adopts joint proba-
bilities for observables whose corresponding operators commute. For these joint
probabilities, these observables need not be stochastically independent. This poses
possible difficulties for the classical probability space of Theorem 5.1, for which all
variables are independent by construction.
One may envision that in light of these possible correlations, one can still be able
to represent quantum probability functions on the space (ΩH,FH) constructed in
the proof of Theorem 5.1. After all, the constructed probability measures from (5.7)
need not be the only probability functions that reproduce the quantum statistics
for single measurements. There are others that do allow for correlations. However,
the Kochen-Specker theorem poses difficulties for this view, not by showing that
the set of probability measures on (ΩH,FH) is too small to account for all quantum
probability functions (when joint measurements are also considered), but by showing
that the set ΩH itself is unable to account for the predictions of quantum mechanics.
As a bonus, one does not have to go into the precise empirical aspects of stochastic
dependence to investigate the import of the theorem. What is needed now is a
further postulate that poses relations between measurement outcomes in the case
of joint measurements. The following one is commonly accepted.
EFR (Experimental Functional Relations) For every finite set of observables
{A1, . . . ,An} for which a joint measurement is possible, and for every real-
valued Borel function f that satisfies f(A1, . . . , An) = 1 (where A1, . . . , An
are the corresponding self-adjoint operators), the outcomes a1, . . . , an of a
joint measurement satisfy f(a1, . . . , an) = 1.
Example 6.1. Consider a single observable A corresponding to the operator A and
consider the characteristic function 1σ(A). Then 1σ(A)(A) = 1, and so EFR implies
the value postulate (VaP), i.e., the outcome of the measurement of A should lie in
the spectrum of A. 4
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Example 6.2. Consider again the spin operators for a spin-1 particle from Example
3.2. If one takes the squares of these operators, then one can show that for any
triplet of orthogonal axes r1, r2, r3
[S2ri , S
2
rj ] = 0. (6.1)
Thus, according to CoP, it is possible to make a joint measurement of S2r1 , S
2
r2 , S
2
r3 .
Furthermore, it follows from EFR that the outcome should be one of the triplets
(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 1) because
σ
(
S2ri
)
= {0, 1} and 1
2
S2r1 +
1
2
S2r2 +
1
2
S2r3 = 1 . (6.2)
4
Example 6.3. For any self-adjoint operator A and real-valued Borel function f
the operator f(A) is well-defined (see equation (A.49)) and is again self-adjoint.
Furthermore, [A, f(A)] = 0. If A1 and A2 are two observables associated with the
operators A and f(A) respectively, then it follows from CoP that they are jointly
measurable and from EFR that the measurement outcomes for a joint measurement
satisfy
a2 = f(a1). (6.3)
4
The first of these examples shows that VaP is a consequence of EFR. In fact,
like VaP, EFR may be seen to be a non-probabilistic version of a consequence of
BoP for joint measurements. Indeed, this postulate implies that for measurement
outcomes a1, . . . , an of a joint measurement, the relation f(a1, . . . , an) = 1 will hold
with probability one for all quantum states.
The classical representation of Theorem 5.1 is not in accordance with the two
assumptions CoP and EFR. This can be demonstrating by making use of the last
example. The relation
Ff(A)(ω) = f (FA(ω)) (6.4)
does not hold for all ω ∈ ΩH whenever f is not the identity. Therefore, a joint
measurement of observables associated with the operators A and f(A) cannot be
taken to reveal the values of FA and Ff(A). It is worthwhile to delve a bit more
into the tension at hand. For single measurements, the statistics of the classical
representation do obey the functional relationships such as those in Example 6.3.
Specifically, if A2 = f(A1) then for every measurable set ∆
PH
(
F−1A1 (∆)
)
= PH
(
F−1A2 (f(∆))
)
. (6.5)
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However, the joint probability distribution does not adhere to the functional relation
since
PH
(
F−1A1 (∆) ∩
(
F−1A2 (f(∆))
)c)
= PH
(
F−1A1 (∆)
)
PH
((
F−1A2 (f(∆))
)c)
, (6.6)
while EFR on the other hand requires that
PH
(
F−1A1 (∆) ∩
(
F−1A2 (f(∆))
)c)
= 0. (6.7)
It is tempting to try to accommodate for EFR in the classical representation by
adjusting the probability measure PH such that stochastic variables corresponding
to commuting observables are no longer independent. The idea would be that for
every A ∈ Osa and function f the set{
ω ∈ ΩH
∣∣ Ff(A)(ω) 6= f (FA(ω))} (6.8)
would get probability zero. However, it will be a consequence of the Kochen-Specker
theorem that this is not possible.
Possibly the most intuitive way to incorporate the assumptions CoP and EFR
as constraints for a classical representation, is to demand that relations between
commuting operators are reflected in relations between their corresponding random
variables. This is precisely the key assumption adopted by Kochen and Specker.
Using the terminology of Redhead (1987), the assumption is
FUNC (Functional Composition Principle) For every self-adjoint operator
A and real-valued Borel function f , the classical random variables FA and
Ff(A) (associated with the operators A and f(A)) should satisfy the relation
Ff(A) = f ◦ FA. (6.9)
Note that, within the context of hidden variables, FUNC is indeed a sufficient
(though not necessary) condition to ensure that EFR holds. This follows because
for any finite set of commuting self-adjoint operators A1, . . . , An there is an operator
A0 together with functions f1, . . . , fn such that Ai = fi(A0) for each i. Then for
any function f that satisfies f(A1, . . . , An) = 1 one can introduce the function
hf (x) := f(f1(x), . . . , fn(x)). It follows that hf (A0) = 1 and from FUNC it then
follows that
f(a1, . . . , an) = f(f1(a0), . . . , fn(a0)) = h(a0) = 1. (6.10)
It also deserves to be noted that a particular consequence of FUNC is that
FA1+A2 = FA1 + FA2 (6.11)
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whenever A1 and A2 commute. The equation need not hold when the operators do
not commute, and in this sense it weakens the constraint (5.10) used for Theorem
5.2.
The relation between FUNC and the above attempt to fix the classical represen-
tation of Theorem 5.1 by tweaking the probability functions, is that the admissible
probability functions would assign probability zero to the set of ω that don’t satisfy
FUNC (6.8). This implies assigning probability 1 to all the ω that do satisfy FUNC.
The Kochen-Specker theorem now shows that this cannot be done because this set
is in fact empty.
Theorem 6.1 (Kochen-Specker 1967). For any Hilbert space H with dimension
greater than 2 there is no non-empty set Ω such that for every self-adjoint operator
A on H there is a function FA : Ω→ σ(A) and such that FUNC is satisfied.
Proof. Suppose Ω is not empty. Every ω ∈ Ω determines a function λω : Osa → R
through
λω(A) := FA(ω). (6.12)
This defines a frame function by restricting to the set of 1-dimensional projections.
I prove this here for finite-dimensional H only.
Let (Pk)
n
k=1 be a frame and define A :=
∑
k kPk. Then for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
the function
fj(x) :=
∏
k 6=j
x− k
j − k (6.13)
satisfies fj(A) =
∑
k fj(k)Pk = Pj . Using FUNC it follows that∑
k
λω(Pk) =
∑
k
FPk(ω) =
∑
k
Ffk(A)(ω) =
∑
k
fk (FA(ω)) . (6.14)
Because fk(j) = δjk for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and FA(ω) is one of these integers, it
follows that ∑
k
λω(Pk) = 1. (6.15)
Furthermore, since λω(P ) ∈ {0, 1} for every P ∈ L1(H) it is a positive frame
function. Because both values 0 and 1 must be obtained and none of the values
in between, λω must be discontinuous. The existence of such a frame function,
however, is excluded by Gleason’s theorem whenever dim(H) > 2, because P 7→
Tr(ρP ) is continuous for every density operator ρ.
The proof for infinite-dimensional H goes along similar lines, though it requires
some more care in choosing A and the fk in such a way that they are well defined.
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It is worth noting that it is only with the addition of CoP and EFR that the
classical representation of Theorem 5.1 is found to be inadequate. Although these
assumptions are taken to be a part of quantum mechanics, it is not entirely evident
that they should hold in all possible applications of quantum probability. This
indicates a possible separation between quantum probability as a formal framework
and its use in quantum mechanics. Admittedly, this is quite a technical point, and
CoP and EFR seem plausible candidates for any application of quantum probability.
Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 6.1 establishes that EFR may also be weakened
to hold only for polynomial functions.1 The point made here then isn’t that these
assumptions are somehow of deep significance. Rather, the point is simply that it
does matter whether such assumptions are taken to hold or not and recognizing
such assumptions is a non-trivial enterprise.
More interesting assumptions will be uncovered in the next section. Some of
them relate to something I passed over with a bit of hand-waving. Namely, FUNC
was shown here to be a sufficient condition to incorporate EFR, but not a necessary
one. Then, there may be some wiggle room between EFR and FUNC. The first is
an empirical constraint, while the latter is a formal one, and even though FUNC
has the appearance of innocence, it turns out to have tremendous consequences.
This gives me the opportunity to let Bell (1966, p. 451) make the bridge to the
next section: “That so much follows from such apparently innocent assumptions
leads us to question their innocence.”
6.2 Reformulating the Kochen-Specker theorem
Although the Kochen-Specker theorem purports to make a contribution to the phi-
losophy of quantum mechanics, its precise importance is not immediately clear.
This is a necessary consequence for any formal proof in philosophy; at some point
philosophical intuitions have to be translated into mathematically well-defined as-
sumptions, and derived consequences then have to be translated back. These trans-
lations are always somewhat muddy. However, in the present situation there is
room for improvement. In the previous section it was not always clear where the
philosophy stopped and the mathematics began. In this section I will make the
separation more precise.
Since the mathematics is the easiest part I start there. Specifically, I start with a
purely mathematical reformulation of the theorem. The mathematical assumptions
are then scrutinized and motivated/derived from more conceptual/philosophical as-
sumptions. This then allows the reformulation of the theorem in a more conceptual
1Actually, in the finite-dimensional case every function can be shown to behave like a polynomial.
That is, for every function f and every self-adjoint operator A, there is a polynomial pf,A such
that f(A) = pf,A(A).
72
Reformulating the Kochen-Specker theorem 6.2
language. In further sections then, the conceptual assumptions are subjected to
a more intensive investigation. Without further ado, here is the Kochen-Specker
theorem (again).
Theorem 6.2. Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, and let Osa be the
set of self-adjoint operators on H. Then there is no function λ : Osa → R such that
λ(A) ∈ σ(A), (6.16a)
λ(f(A)) = f(λ(A)) (6.16b)
for every A ∈ Osa and real-valued Borel function f .
This presentation of the theorem can be understood as a corollary of Gleason’s
theorem, which implies the non-existence of 0-1 valued quantum probability func-
tions. On the other hand, any λ satisfying the constraints (6.16) gives rise to a 0-1
valued probability function by restriction to the projection operators. The impor-
tant distinction is conceptual in nature.2 Gleason proved his theorem as part of
a purely mathematical investigation (i.e., the classification of all probability func-
tions). Kochen and Specker, on the other hand, intended their theorem to be
philosophically relevant by relating it to the question of the possibility of hidden
variables. Such relevance can only be had by establishing relations between the
Hilbert space structure, the empirical content of quantum mechanics, and further
philosophical desiderata. So let’s draw some relations.
In Theorem 6.2 the function λ is intended to represent a hidden variable state.
The interest in the existence of such states comes from a desire to find a description
of quantum mechanics that is more complete than the standard formalism. The
standard formalism is silent about the origin of measurement outcomes; it is not
clear whether they can be thought of as revelations of quantities existing indepen-
dent of the performance of a measurement. Hidden variables are supposed to fill in
this gap.3 Formally, postulating their existence can be seen to be embodied by the
conjunction of the following two assumptions.
VD (Value Definiteness) Every observable possesses a unique definite value at
all times.
FM (Faithful Measurement) Given VD, a measurement of an observable reveals
the value it possesses at the time of the measurement.
2To be fair, the original Kochen-Specker theorem is not a corollary of Gleason’s theorem as
they do not assume that λ(A) is defined for all A ∈ Osa. So apart from the conceptual distinction
between the two theorems there is also a mathematical one, which is discussed in chapter 7.
However, to clarify the conceptual distinction the formulation in Theorem 6.2 suffices.
3There may be other reasons for wishing to look for hidden variable formulations of quantum
mechanics, such as a desire for determinism. Here I intend to make their motivation more modest.
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One may note a discrepancy between these assumptions and the role of the
function λ in Theorem 6.2. VD and FM refer to a notion of hidden variable states
as given by Definition 5.2. Such a hidden variable state acts on the set of observables.
The function λ on the other hand is defined on the set of self-adjoint operators. The
connection between the two is made by the observable postulate.
OP (Observable Postulate) Every observable A for the system S is associated
with a self-adjoint operator A acting on H.
While it is clear that every function λ satisfying (6.16) induces a hidden variable
state by assigning to each observable A the value λ(A) (where A is the operator
associated with A by OP), it does not follow from this same postulate that every
hidden variable state should be of this form. It would follow if one could take the
set of observables to be identical to the set of self-adjoint operators. Two further
assumptions can be recognized that together establish this.
NC (Non-Contexuality) Every self-adjoint operator is associated with at most
one observable.
IP (Identification Principle) For every self-adjoint operator A there exists an
observable A such that A is associated with A via OP.
To illustrate how these assumptions all tie together, note that OP implies the
existence of a function f : Obs → Osa that assigns to each observable a self-adjoint
operator. NC then states that f is injective, and IP states that it is surjective.
Consequently, any hidden variable state κ : Obs → R can be translated to a function
λ : Osa → R without loss of generality.
Thus far I have only discussed the domain of hidden variable states, but not their
range or possible constraints they should satisfy. The first of the two constraints
(6.16a) (together with the earlier assumptions) ensures that λ is a hidden variable
state as in Definition 5.2. But the motivation for this constraint comes of course
from quantum mechanics itself. In fact, it can be seen to follow from FM and EFR
by making use of Example 6.1.
The second constraint (6.16b) is the FUNC rule from the previous section. The
empirical motivation for this constraint derives from EFR. But EFR cannot do any
work without a further assumption on the comeasurability of observables. CoP
suffices to make this final step, but a slightly weaker version also works. Although
weakening assumptions is often a good idea to obtain stronger results, the concep-
tual motivation for this particular weakening is lacking at this point. The explana-
tion will be given in the next section, where it turns out to be the case that this
slight alteration is quite crucial.
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WCoP (Weak Comeasurability Postulate) For every finite set of observ-
ables {A1, . . . ,An} with corresponding self-adjoint operators A1, . . . , An, if
[Ai, Aj ] = 0 for all i, j, then there exists a set of observables {A ′1, . . . ,A ′n},
corresponding to the same operators, such that it is possible to perform a
joint measurement of A ′1, . . . ,A ′n.
The FUNC rule can now be seen to follow from WCoP and EFR together with
the other assumptions. This establishes a solid empirical underpinning of one of the
more technical ingredients of the Kochen-Specker theorem. To sum up, the theorem
can be formulated as follows.
Theorem 6.3. For any system described by a Hilbert space with dimension greater
than 2 the assumptions OP, WCoP, EFR, VD, FM, IP and NC taken together lead
to a contradiction.
The implications of the theorem are straightforward: at least one of the as-
sumptions has to be rejected.4 The assumptions OP, WCoP, EFR are all com-
monly accepted facets of quantum mechanics and are to be kept in place to keep
the discussion on track.5 For further exposition, it is then useful to define
QMKS := OP ∧WCoP ∧ EFR (6.17)
as the part of quantum mechanics used in the Kochen-Specker theorem. VD and
FM are reasonable assumptions for a hidden variable theory, and it is likewise useful
to set
HV := VD ∧ FM. (6.18)
Also, these are requirements for the possibility of constructing a classical probability
space for quantum mechanics (see section 5.2). Theorem 6.3 can then be formulated
as the formula
QMKS ∧HV ∧ IP ∧NC⇒ ⊥. (6.19)
In this formulation it is clear that the Kochen-Specker theorem relies on two as-
sumptions that lack a good motivation: IP and NC. When adopting a purely formal
stance with respect to the question of classical representations of quantum probabil-
ity these assumptions have a certain natural appeal. Rejecting IP would imply that
not every quantum random variable (self-adjoint operator) will be represented by
at least one classical random variable. Not all facets of quantum probability would
then be captured by the classical representation. Rejecting NC would imply that
the quantum random variables do not fully take into account all relevant random
variables, as some of them refer to multiple distinct classical random variables. If
4Unless one is willing to resort to paraconsistent logic.
5Remember that, in particular, EFR can be understood as a consequence of BoP.
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this is the case, it raises the question of how the quantum formalism was found to
be adequate in the first place. One would expect that in some way a distinction
between random variables is able to represent itself. These considerations of course
do not pose a definitive argument against the view that quantum probability cannot
have a satisfactory classical representation. However, they do indicate that there
are difficulties for a ‘natural’ classical representation.
For the question of hidden variables the costs of rejecting either IP or NC may
appear to be less high. This would especially be the case when the rewards can
be as big as solving the measurement problem. But there are benefits closer to
home. Rejecting NC may be quite an attractive option. The incompleteness of
the quantum formalism implied by denying it (Osa does not adequately describe all
observables) can even be seen as a bonus. Indeed, the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics was the main motivation for going into the question of hidden variables
in the first place. The Kochen-Specker theorem then only confirms the idea that
something is missing.
Rejecting IP is more complicated. To be sure, there are good reasons to reject
its validity. A nice example is given by Nielsen (1997) who constructs a self-adjoint
operator that contradicts the Church-Turing thesis if it were to correspond to an
observable. And as noted in chapter 3 there are many operators for which it is hard
to imagine any experimental setup that would correspond to it. But it is difficult to
find a satisfactory argument to ban a specific set of operators from the observables,
and to show that by doing so the Kochen-Specker theorem can be circumvented.
This is particularly difficult when realizing that the original proof of Kochen and
Specker uses a much weaker version of IP, requiring only that a particular finite
set of operators correspond to observables. In short, trying to circumvent their
theorem by wiggling with IP is quite non-trivial and thus deserves to be discussed
in a separate chapter.
Here I have only summed up some intuitions one may have considering the
implications of the Kochen-Specker theorem. But real insight can only be gained
by having a closer look at the assumptions IP and NC. The rejection of NC is
discussed in the next section and the rejection of IP is the topic of chapter 7.
6.3 The role of non-contextuality
Traditionally, the Kochen-Specker theorem is interpreted as establishing the impos-
sibility of non-contextual hidden variable theories. In other words, the rejection of
NC is the commonly accepted response for saving hidden variables. Notably, this
option was suggested by Bell (1966) even before the theorem had actually been
proven. In a review of Gleason’s theorem and its consequences for the hidden vari-
ables program he states that (p. 451) “[i]t was tacitly assumed that measurement
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of an observable must yield the same value independently of what other measure-
ments may be made simultaneously.” This refers to the fact that although condition
(4.23) in the definition of a frame function only presents a constraint for commuting
projection operators, it also has consequences for incompatible measurements. This
is because frame functions assign values to 1-dimensional projections independently
of the orthonormal basis they are associated with.
As an example, consider two non-commuting self-adjoint operators A1, A2 and
two possible measurement outcomes a1, a2 such that µA1({a1}) = µA2({a2}). Then,
if A1 gets assigned the value a1 by a hidden variable state, then necessarily A2 gets
the value a2. Thus the values attributed to one observable can have consequences
for the possible values to be attributed to another observable even if the two cannot
be measured together. As Bell remarks earlier on (p. 447), such assumptions6 “are
seen to be quite unreasonable when one remembers with Bohr “the impossibility of
any sharp distinction between the behavior of atomic objects and the interaction
with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which
the phenomena appear.””
On a historical note it deserves to be said that the assumption called out by
Bell was hardly a tacit one in Gleason’s paper. In fact, as a mathematician he was
quite explicit about his assumptions. Furthermore, the assumption is not unrea-
sonable when put in the context of Gleason’s investigation, namely to “Determine
all measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space” (Hooker, 1975, p. 123).
In terms of the assumptions formulated in the previous section, Bell’s objection
can be read as the rejection of NC: although one may associate the same self-adjoint
operator to a particular measurement irrespective of what other measurements are
performed simultaneously, the observable associated with the measurement may be
distinct in these cases. Thus there may be many distinct observables associated with
the same self-adjoint operator, and it is not clear why it is a reasonable assumption
that these observables should be attributed the same value by a hidden variable
state. A second way of reading Bell is as a rejection of VD. An observable may
then be attributed a multitude of definite values, namely, one for every possible
measuring context in which the observable can be measured.
To a certain extent the distinction between these two options is a matter of
semantics. On the first view, a hidden variable state is a function κ : Obs → R
where at least in some cases κ(A1) 6= κ(A2) even though A1 and A2 are associated
with the same operator. On the second reading, a hidden variable state is a (partial)
function λ : Osa(H)×C→ R where C symbolizes the set of all possible measurement
contexts, and λ(A,C) denotes the value of A in the context C. The reason for
assuming that λ is only a partial function, is that it only needs to assign a value to
(A,C) if C denotes a context in which A can be measured. The two kinds of states
6Here Bell cites Bohr (1949).
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can be translated into one another. Given a λ one can define a κ by taking
Obs := {(A,C) ∈ Osa(H)× C |A can be measured in context C} , (6.20)
and setting κ = λ. Conversely, for every κ one can define a λ by taking C = Obs and
setting λ(A,A) equal to κ(A) if A is the operator associated with A, and leaving
it undefined otherwise. Thus for convenience I consider both constructions to be
versions of contextual hidden variables.
The clarity of Bell’s criticism leads one to wonder how the assumption of non-
contextuality crept into Kochen and Specker’s argument. In fact, the assumption
NC never explicitly enters into their paper: it is only used implicitly. It is not
trivial to tease out how NC arises in the original Kochen-Specker paper. Naturally,
it enters into any argument when no sharp distinction is made between observables
and self-adjoint operators. Now, even though in their words Kochen and Specker
make the distinction with care, no notation is developed to make the distinction
sharp. NC then creeps into the argument because a single operator is (implicitly)
associated with two possibly distinct observables. This, in turn, is a consequence of
conflation of an assumption of comeasurability and a definition of comeasurability,
which I will now explain.
The first assumption that enters the original proof is the following. For any
observable A and function f one can define the observable f(A) as the observable
consisting of a measurement of A and then applying f to the outcome. The as-
sumption is then that if A is the operator associated with A, the observable f(A) is
associated with the operator f(A). Next, two observables A1 and A2 are said to be
comeasurable if there is an observable A3 and functions f1, f2 such that A1 = f1(A3)
and A2 = f(A3). Note that this is used by Kochen and Specker as the definition
of comeasurability. The intended reading, however, is that comeasurability implies
that A1 and A2 can be measured simultaneously. Furthermore, it is not entirely
evident what the role of A3 is here. But it turns out that implicitly there is the
assumption that a joint measurement of A1 and A2 is the same as a single measure-
ment of A3. More specifically, they implicitly assume that in this case A1 = f1(A3),
where now the left-hand side and the right-hand side refer to observables that have
been introduced independently. Indeed, the observable f1(A3) has been defined ear-
lier on as the measurement of A3 with f1 applied to the outcome. It is however not
evident that this is the same as a measurement of A1, even though both observables
are associated with the same operator A1 = f1(A3).
The line of reasoning adopted by Kochen and Specker can be made more trans-
parent using the terminology introduced in the previous sections. Their definition
of comeasurability can be seen to allude to CoP. This is because the existence of the
operator A3 and functions f1, f2 is equivalent to the condition that [A1, A2] = 0.
The equality A1 = f1(A3) can then be further motivated by using EFR within the
context of hidden variables. In first instance A1 and f1(A3) may be two distinct
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observables corresponding to the same operator. But it follows from CoP that they
can be jointly measured, and EFR implies that in that case the measurement out-
comes are identical. This in turn implies that the hidden variable state κ must
assign the same value to both observables. More generally, κ(A1) = κ(A2) whenever
the two observables A1,A2 are identified with the same operator. In short, one has7
HV ∧ CoP ∧ EFR⇒ NC. (6.21)
Note that on the other hand one has
WCoP ∧NC⇒ CoP (6.22)
and
HV ∧WCoP ∧ EFR 6⇒ NC. (6.23)
In other words, CoP itself is almost a non-contextuality assumption. Its initial
reasonableness presumably stems from the fact that NC holds in orthodox presen-
tations of quantum mechanics. But when NC is contested, it is necessary to resort
to something weaker like WCoP. A related point is that, in the context of HV,
the assumption CoP makes EFR act like FUNC. Thus FUNC may be viewed as a
non-contextual version of EFR.
Whether NC is adopted as a primitive assumption or derived from other as-
sumptions, without it the Kochen-Specker theorem does not work. This, however,
leaves open the question of whether rejecting it is sufficient to allow the construc-
tion of hidden variable theories. The question can be answered positively by way
of giving an example: Bohmian mechanics is not only the prime example of a hid-
den variable theory, but also of a contextual hidden variable theory. However, this
theory is formulated in a way that does not explicitly adopt a rejection of NC. For
this reason it is not a useful example for gaining general insight in the nature of
this assumption. Instead, I illustrate in the next section what a contextual hidden
variable theory may look like, and I provide an example of a contextual classical
representation of quantum probability.
6.4 A contextual classical representation
Although it is commonly believed that it is possible to make formal constructions
of contextual hidden variables, explicit examples of such constructions are not so
common. The earliest such construction is likely due to Gudder (1970). A possible
reason for their unpopularity is that they are not very illuminating physically (Shi-
mony, 1984). Here, however, I am interested in the formal comparison of quantum
7For convenience I assume here that, if two observables have the same value for all hidden
variable states, then they are the same observable.
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and classical probability. For such a program a formal construction of contextual
hidden variables is useful.
Setting up a contextual theory requires the introduction of contexts. The quote
from Bell suggests that the specification of a context may depend on the totality of
observables that are to be measured or can be measured using the envisaged exper-
imental setup. Thus specifying only the operator associated with the observable is
insufficient for defining a context, but specifying the set of all operators associated
with observables that can be measured using the experimental setup may well be
enough. In fact, this is the notion of a context I adopt here, and I will show that it
suffices for the construction of a contextual hidden variables theory.
It is natural to stipulate that the set of operators that specifies a context forms
a von Neumann algebra. The rationale behind this is borrowed from Kochen and
Specker. Suppose that A1, . . . ,An are observables that can be measured within a
certain context. Then there is also an observable f(A1, . . . ,An) associated with
applying the function f to the outcomes of the joint measurement of A1, . . . ,An.
It is natural to associate this observable with the operator f(A1, . . . , An).
8 When
adding these operators to the set {A1, . . . , An} for every real-valued Borel function
f , one obtains a von Neumann algebra of operators (assuming the operators are
bounded). To sum up, if A1, . . . ,An is a collection of observables associated with a
context, then Alg(A1, . . . , An) is the algebra that will be used to specify the context.
It is natural to suppose that the algebra Alg(A1, . . . , An) is Abelian. However,
this does not immediately follow from the above considerations, but in fact requires
a further assumption.
CCoP (Converse Comeasurability Postulate) For every finite set of observ-
ables {A1, . . . ,An}, if it is possible to perform a joint measurement of
A1, . . . ,An, then their corresponding self-adjoint operators A1, . . . , An com-
mute.
With this assumption it follows that with every context one can associate an Abelian
von Neumann algebra. This will be taken as the complete characterization of a con-
text. This means that, for example, whenever two sets of observables {A1, . . . ,An}
and {A ′1, . . .A ′m} satisfy Alg(A1, . . . , An) = Alg(A′1, . . . , A′m), then they specify the
same context. Now let A denote the set of all Abelian von Neumann algebras, then,
using the notation from (6.20), the set of observables is given by
Obs := {(A,A) ∈ Osa × A |A ∈ A} . (6.24)
I will now show that this set of observables is rich enough to allow the formulation
of a hidden variable theory, or classical representation for quantum probability. I
8Note that, unlike in the argument of Kochen and Specker, this association is not problematic,
since now NC is rejected and there is no worry that the operator f(A1, . . . , An) may have to be
reserved for another observable.
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restrict attention to the cases where H is finite-dimensional to avoid technicalities
that may blur the discussion.
The assumptions QMKS and HV together require the existence of a function
λ : Obs → R such that
λ(A,A) ∈ σ(A),
λ(f(A),A) = f(λ(A,A)) (6.25)
for all (A,A) ∈ Obs and real-valued Borel functions f . To demonstrate the existence
of such functions I first give a sufficient criterion for their existence, and then show
that this criterion can be met.
For every context A ∈ A let Osa(A) denote the set of self-adjoint operators in
it. Now, if for every A there exists a function λA : Osa(A)→ R that satisfies
λA(A) ∈ σ(A),
λA(f(A)) = f(λA(A)),
(6.26)
for all A and f , then the function
λ : Obs → R, λ(A,A) := λA(A) (6.27)
satisfies (6.25). So all that has to be shown now is that for every A there exist
functions of the type λA that satisfy (6.26).
Let A ∈ A and let L(A) = A∩L(H) denote the set of projection operators in A.
This set is big enough to generate the algebra it derives from, i.e., A = Alg(L(A)).
Many subsets of L(A) share this property, and one of particular interest is the set
La(A) defined as9
La(A) :=
{
P ∈ L(A) ∣∣ P 6= 0, PP ′ ∈ {0, P}∀P ′ ∈ L(A)} . (6.28)
To see that this set indeed generates the algebra, it suffices to note that it recovers
L(A). This is the case since for every P ′ ∈ L(A)
P ′ =
∑
P∈La(A)
PP ′. (6.29)
For every P ∈ La(A) one can now define
λ(A,P ) : Osa(A)→ R, λ(A,P )(A) :=
Tr(AP )
Tr(P )
. (6.30)
9Using the language of lattice theory, one may show that La(A) corresponds to the set of atoms
in L(A) with the lattice structure given by the partial order P1 ≤ P2 if and only if P1P2 = P1 and
the meet and join are P1 ∧P2 = P1P2 and P1 ∨P2 = P1 +P2 −P1P2 respectively (see also chapter
8). One may also note that at this point it is used that the Hilbert space is finite-dimensional. In
the infinite-dimensional case one need not have that A = Alg(La(A)).
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It is a consequence of the spectral theorem that λ(A,P )(A) ∈ σ(A). Specifically,
λ(A,P ) picks out the eigenvalue of A corresponding to the eigenstates in the space
PH. The second condition of (6.26) follows by making use of the Borel functional
calculus (see (A.50)).
This construction establishes that QMKS and HV can be satisfied. By con-
struction of Obs it also satisfies IP. Thus it has been shown that rejecting NC is
sufficient to circumvent the Kochen-Specker theorem. However, the existence of
hidden variable states alone is not a sufficient condition for a classical representa-
tion of quantum probability. There also need to be enough states such that the
quantum probability distributions can in fact be modeled. I now show that the
above construction is rich enough to allow this.
It will be useful to introduce the following set that will be used to characterize
the hidden variable states:
Ω := {ω : A→ L(H) | ω(A) ∈ La(A)} '
∏
A∈A
La(A). (6.31)
Each of the sets La(A) in the product can be viewed as a state space for the context
A, which are then all glued together to form the set Ω. The set Ω determines the
set of hidden variable states through the definition
Λ := {λω | ω ∈ Ω} , λω(A,A) := λ(A,ω(A))(A) =
Tr(Aω(A))
Tr(ω(A))
. (6.32)
One may even show that all functions that satisfy (6.25) are of this form.10
The construction of a σ-algebra and probability measures that simulate the
quantum probabilities is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 5.1. It is convenient
to define both within the language of the set Ω. Specifically, F is the σ-algebra
generated by the cylinder sets
C(A1,D1),...,(An,Dn) := {ω ∈ Ω | ω(Ai) ∈ Di, i = 1, . . . , n} , (6.33)
where (A1,D1), . . . , (An,Dn) can be any finite sequence of pairs (Ai,Di), where Ai
is an Abelian von Neumann algebra and Di ⊂ La(Ai). For every context A ∈ A
and for every self-adjoint operator A ∈ A the observable (A,A) is identified with
the measurable function
F(A,A)(ω) :=
Tr(Aω(A))
Tr(ω(A)) = λω(A,A). (6.34)
10A proof can be given by using that A =
{
Alg(A)
∣∣A ∈ Osa}, i.e., every Abelian von Neu-
mann algebra can be generated by a single self-adjoint operator. For a given λ one then defines
ωλ(Alg(A)) := µA({λ(A,Alg(A))}). One then only has to check that this definition is independent
of the choice of the operator A that generates the algebra Alg(A).
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This just takes the observable to the value assigned to it by the hidden variable
state λω.
Now let ρ be a density operator that specifies a quantum probability function.
A corresponding probability measure Pρ on (Ω,F) is defined by its action on the
cylinder sets.
Pρ
(
C(A1,D1),...,(An,Dn)
)
:=
n∏
i=1
∑
P∈Di
Tr(ρP ). (6.35)
For every observable (A,A) this probability measure reproduces the Born rule. To
see this let ∆ ⊂ σ(A) and associate with it the set D∆ ⊂ La(A) given by
D∆ := {P ∈ La(A) | PµA(∆) = P} . (6.36)
Then
Pρ
(
F(A,A) ∈ ∆
)
= Pρ
(
C(A,D∆)
)
=
∑
P∈D∆
Tr(ρP )
=
∑
a∈∆
Tr (ρµA({a})) = Tr (ρµA(∆)) .
(6.37)
This construction reproduces the Born rule for every possible measurement con-
text, and then sort of glues them together. This provides a nice way of thinking
about quantum probability: a patchwork of classical probability spaces with every
patch corresponding to a possible measurement context. Furthermore, within every
context this model satisfies the functional relationships of EFR because the states
satisfy (6.25). It thus respects the algebraic structure of quantum probability when
it matters. In this sense it is a huge improvement on the classical representation
constructed in Theorem 5.1. But be that as it may, there are also some aspects to
the construction that can be used to argue that this representation doesn’t deserve
the label of being faithful.
Like the construction of Theorem 5.1, the measurable space (Ω,F) allows many
more probability measures than those given by the Born rule. From the point of
view of the contextual hidden variables, the probability functions that are quantum
form a somewhat peculiar subset of all the probability measures. The functions Pρ
may be seen to satisfy a non-contextuality property. Specifically, consider a self-
adjoint operator A together with to distinct contexts A1,A2 such that A ∈ A1∩A2.
Then for every set ∆ ⊂ σ(A) and every Pρ it holds that
Pρ
(
F(A1,A) ∈ ∆
)
= Pρ
(
F(A2,A) ∈ ∆
)
. (6.38)
This is of course a direct consequence of the Born rule. According to quantum
mechanical predictions, there is no way to discern the observables (A1, A) and
(A2, A). The peculiarity is that the contextual hidden variable model on the other
83
6 The Kochen-Specker theorem
hand explicitly requires that these observables are distinct, which causes a tension.
While there have to be cases where
F(A1,A)(ω) 6= F(A2,A)(ω), (6.39)
when it comes to the quantum probability functions, the models are not allowed
to display this contextuality. Thus, although adopting a contextual point of view
allows one to construct a classical representation, this point of view itself seems to be
lacking support with the special role played by the quantum mechanical probability
functions. Then there is little hope that the key assumption alone (rejecting NC)
can provide an explanation of the structure of quantum probability.
The specific sense in which quantum probability functions are non-contextual is
a topic I return to in chapter 11. This turns out to be an aspect that is lacking an
explanation even outside the framework of (contextual) hidden variables. Within
the framework, there are of course attempts to explain the Born rule. Bohmian
mechanics in particular, as the main contender for a hidden variable interpretation
of quantum mechanics, has to be able to account for the special role of quantum me-
chanical probability functions. The common solution, developed first by Valentini
(1991), is the adoption of a dynamical approach. The quantum probability func-
tions are taken to be equilibrium distributions that arise due to the evolution of
the hidden variable states governed by the Schro¨dinger and guiding equations. The
approach is reminiscent of Boltzmann’s H-theorem explanation of the special role
of the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution in statistical mechanics (Brown, Myrvold,
and Uffink, 2009). Unsurprisingly, it shares similar difficulties (Callender, 2007;
Timpson, 2011).
Going deeper into the understanding of probability in Bohmian mechanics takes
us too far adrift, because this theory does not easily relate to the formalism of quan-
tum probability as it is studied here. For example, although Bohmian mechanics is
considered a contextual hidden variable theory, it does not share the set of observ-
ables as defined in (6.24). To the extent that these observables play a role in the
theory, they are translated to position measurements in a non-trivial way. Instead, it
is time to move forward and to investigate in what way classical representations can
be constructed when relaxing the other ingredient of the Kochen-Specker theorem:
IP.
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7.1 Introduction
From a logical perspective, Theorem 6.3 (see also (6.19)) provides a very tight result:
the assumptions NC and IP appear as natural constraints considering the formalism
of quantum probability. But from an empiricist perspective, these assumptions are
less satisfactory. In section 6.3, NC was criticized for setting constraints that are
empirically counterfactual. After all, the defining property of incompatible measure-
ment contexts is that properties pertaining to these contexts cannot be investigated
simultaneously. It is therefore unreasonable to assume that observables that occur
in more than one context should be attributed the same value independent of this
context.
Finding a critique of IP that can be used to circumvent the theorem is a lot
harder. On the other hand, it is plausible that the assumption is unsatisfactory.
For one, the assumption postulates an uncountable infinity of observables. Now
such an amount of observables is not uncommon in scientific theories, but usually
it is obtained in a rather trivial way. In classical mechanics, for example, length
can be measured in meters, or in inches, or in any other of the uncountably many
rescalings of the standard unit of length. As soon as one accepts that any observable
can be rescaled by any real number, one obtains uncountably many observables. But
the uncountable set postulated by IP is not of this form: there is an uncountable
subset of Osa such that neither pair of observables in it is related by a scaling or
other transformation. For some of the elements it is even completely unclear what
a corresponding measurement procedure could be (see also the discussion in section
3.1).
This situation is unsettling. On the one hand the assumption IP just seems
absurd, as it is inconceivable that it would be possible even in principle to construct
a measurement procedure for every self-adjoint operator. But on the other hand,
denying IP constructively is also problematic. It requires pointing out specific self-
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adjoint operators which are to be denied the status of observable. The situation
would improve much if either the assumption IP can be relaxed to a more compelling
one, or if one could find a constructive way to deny IP and provide a classical
representation that exploits this. This representation would of course be required
to be non-trivial, in the sense that the rejection of IP should not result in singling out
a single specific Abelian algebra of operators (i.e., measurement context), making
the probability space effectively classical. Such a result would be unsatisfactory
since, for example, position and momentum are both considered observables and
they correspond to non-commuting operators.
The peculiarity of the situation has it that one can actually improve in both
ways. It is possible to weaken IP to a more satisfactory assumption, and it is possible
to construct non-trivial hidden variable models that reject IP and are nonetheless
empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. The envisioned weakening of IP was
already provided by Kochen and Specker themselves. Instead of requiring that every
self-adjoint operator corresponds to an observable, it suffices to select a specific finite
subset of Osa. This alternative proof to the Kochen-Specker theorem is explained
in section 7.2.
In section 7.3 an argument is explained that establishes that even the weakened
version of IP can be rejected while respecting the empirical predictions of quantum
mechanics. Roughly speaking, the argument rests on the idea that, due to the finite
precision of measurements, elements of Osa that are close to each other cannot be
distinguished empirically. This is then used to deny certain operators the status of
observable. This is the so-called finite precision loophole for the Kochen-Specker
theorem. In section 7.4 it is shown that this loophole can be exploited to reconstruct
the quantum probability functions on a space that respects NC.
The classical representations are further investigated in section 7.5 where a pos-
itive and a negative aspect are highlighted. The positive aspect is that one can
establish a formal argument that recovers the Born rule in these classical represen-
tations. The negative aspect is a tension within the models themselves reminiscent
of the tension found in the models that reject NC. As discussed in section 6.4,
these latter models require a simultaneous acceptance and rejection of contextu-
ality: acceptance on the level of the hidden variables, but rejection on the level
of probability distributions. The models that reject IP in turn require a similar
simultaneous acceptance and rejection of a particular kind of continuity. Finally, in
section 7.6, a short evaluation is given concerning the results obtained on classical
representations.
7.2 Weakening the identification principle
The role of IP in the proof of Theorem 6.1 is to allow the application of Gleason’s
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theorem. It ensures that the hidden variable state λω in (6.12) defines a frame
function on L1(H). Thus weakening IP requires a new proof that is independent
of Gleason’s theorem. Such a proof was given by Kochen and Specker, who also
recognized the unsatisfactory nature of IP. Instead of proving the non-existence of
classical random variables for all self-adjoint operators, they focused on a specific
finite set of self-adjoint operators.
Although the proof of Kochen and Specker applies to all Hilbert spaces with
dim(H) > 2, I focus here on the three-dimensional case. The entire philosophical
discussion can be held within this context without loss of generality. The Hilbert
space C3 is the space used to describe spin-1 particles, and it suffices to restrict
attention to the operators associated with the squared spin of spin-1 particles (see
Example 3.2). For these operators it is uncontroversial that they correspond to
observables.
As noted in Example 6.2, for any triple of orthogonal axes r1, r2, r3 in R3 the
corresponding squared spin operators S2r1 , S
2
r2 , S
2
r3 sum up to 2 1. Accordingly, the
values assigned to the corresponding observables by a hidden variable state should
also sum up to two. In their original proof, Kochen and Specker constructed a set
of 117 axes for which such an assignment is not possible. Here I make use of the
set constructed by Peres (2002, p. 198) which only requires 33 axes, namely, those
given by the vectors in Table 7.1. But the reader may keep in mind that which
specific set one uses is not relevant for the philosophical argument though, as long
as it is a finite subset of Osa of which the elements can be thought of as observables.
What it boils down to, is that the assumption IP in Theorem 6.3 can be replaced
by the following weaker assumption.
IPKS (Kochen-Specker Identification Principle) For every self-adjoint oper-
ator A in a specific finite subset OKS ⊂ Osa there exists an observable A such
that A is associated with A via OP.
Theorem 7.1 (Kochen-Specker 1967). For a system described by a Hilbert space
of at least dimension 3, the assumptions QMKS, HV, IPKS, NC taken together lead
to a contradiction.
The proof presented here is restricted to the 3-dimensional case where
OKS =
{
S2r
∣∣ r ∈ DKS} (7.1)
with DKS given by Table 7.1. The proof further relies on the following definition
and lemma.
Definition 7.1. Let S2 denote the 2-sphere, i.e., the set of unit vectors in R3. A
function c : D ⊂ S2 → {0, 1} is called a coloring function if
1. c(a) = c(−a) whenever a,−a ∈ D,
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2. c(a1) + c(a2) + c(a3) = 2 whenever (Pai)
3
i=1 is a frame and a1, a2, a3 ∈ D,
3. c(a1) + c(a2) ≥ 1 whenever a1⊥a2 and a1, a2 ∈ D.
Table 7.1: The 33 vectors of the set DKS.
e1 =
10
0
 e2 =
01
0
 e3 =
00
1

f11 =
01
1
 , f21 =
 0−1
1
 f12 =
10
1
 , f22 =
−10
1
 f13 =
11
0
 , f23 =
 1−1
0

g11 =
 01√
2
 , g21 =
 0−√2
1
 g12 =
√20
1
 , g22 =
 10
−√2
 g13 =
 1√2
0
 , g23 =
−√21
0

g31 =
 0√2
1
 , g41 =
 0−1√
2
 g32 =
 10√
2
 , g42 =
√20
−1
 g33 =
√21
0
 , g43 =
−1√2
0

h11 =
√2−1
1
 , h21 =
√21
−1
 h12 =
 1√2
−1
 , h22 =
−1√2
1
 h13 =
−11√
2
 , h23 =
 1−1√
2

h31 =
√2−1
−1
 , h41 =
√21
1
 h32 =
−1√2
−1
 , h42 =
 1√2
1
 h33 =
−1−1√
2
 , h43 =
 11√
2

Lemma 7.1. Let DKS ⊂ S2 be given by
DKS =
{
r
‖r‖
∣∣∣ r ∈ DKS} (7.2)
where DKS is given by table 7.1. Then there is no coloring function c : DKS → {0, 1}.
Proof. The impossibility of a coloring function c : DKS → {0, 1} is demonstrated
with the use of the graph in Figure 7.1.1 In this graph the nodes represent the
elements of DKS and a line connecting two nodes indicates that the corresponding
vectors are orthogonal. A coloring function c has to assign exactly two nodes of
every triangle the value 1, and of every pair of nodes connected with a line at least
one has to be assigned the value 1.
Since (e1, e2, e3) forms a triangle, one of the nodes gets the value 0. Because
of the symmetry of the diagram, one may assume that c(e3) = 0 without loss of
generality. Consequently, e1 is assigned 1. Now note that (e1, g
2
1, g
4
1) and (e1, g
3
1, g
1
1)
both form a triangle. This gives rise to several options. Either both g11 and g
4
1 are
1Each of the three large triangles in this graph is an example of the 13 rays used by Yu and
Oh (2012) in their derivation of a Kochen-Specker inequality. In (Blanchfield, 2012) one finds the
graph that pastes the three triangles together upon which the graph used here is based.
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assigned 0, or at least one of them is assigned the value 1. In this last case, at least
one of g21 or g
3
1 is assigned 0. Each of these three options will be shown to lead to
a contradiction.
e1
e3e2
g22
h11
f11 h
2
1 h
3
1 f
2
1
h41
g43
g32 g
1
3
g23 h
1
2 f
1
2
h22
h32
f22
h42
g41
g11
g33
g21
h13
f13
h23
h33
f23 h
4
3 g
4
2
g31
g12
Figure 7.1: Graph demonstrating the orthogonality relations between the axes in DKS.
Suppose c(g11) = c(g
4
1) = 0. Then h
1
2, h
2
2, h
3
2 and h
4
2 are assigned the value
1. Consequently, f12 and f
2
2 are assigned 0, which leads to a contradiction because
they form a triangle together with e2. Thus there is no coloring function with
c(e3) = c(g
1
1) = c(g
4
1) = 0.
Suppose c(g21) = 0. Then h
1
3 and h
4
3 become 1. Also, because c(e3) = 0, one
has c(f13 ) = c(f
2
3 ) = 1. This together implies that both h
2
3 and h
3
3 are assigned 0.
The first implies that c(g42) = 1 and the second that c(g
1
2) = 1. Note that these
occur in the triangles (e2, g
1
2, g
3
2) and (e2, g
2
2, g
4
2). Because c(e2) = 1, both g
2
2 and
g32 are assigned 0. This implies h
1
1, h
2
1, h
3
1 and h
4
1 are all assigned the value 1.
Consequently, c(f11 ) = c(f
2
1 ) = 0, showing there is no coloring function with both
c(e3) = 0 and c(g
2
1) = 0.
The assumption c(g31) = 0 leads to a contradiction in an analogous way. This
completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 7.1. The idea of the proof is to show that the assumptions QMKS,
HV, IPKS, NC together imply the existence of a coloring function on DKS. A
contradiction is then obtained by invoking Lemma 7.1.
Because of NC and IPKS, every operator in the set
{
S2r
∣∣ r ∈ DKS} corresponds
to precisely one observable. HV requires that each of these observables is assigned a
definite value, and because of QMKS this value has to lie in {0, 1}. Taken together,
this implies the existence of a function c : DKS → {0, 1} via
c
(
r
‖r‖
)
= λ(S2r ). (7.3)
It follows from QMKS that c satisfies the further properties of a coloring function.
This proves the theorem.
This result shows that Kochen and Specker took great care to weaken IP enough
to make its use plausibly legitimate. A rejection of IPKS now requires an argument
to deny that one of the operators S2r for r ∈ DKS may be attributed the status of
observable. Such an argument (to be explained in the next section) was first given
by Meyer (1999) accompanied with the construction of a non-contextual hidden
variable model for spin-1 particles that led him to conclude the ‘nullification’ of the
theorem. This result caused some controversy, and discussions on what the Kochen-
Specker theorem ‘actually’ proves followed (Appleby, 2000 ; 2001 ; 2002 ; 2005; Bar-
rett and Kent, 2004; Cabello, 1999 ; 2002; Mermin, 1999). To some extent this
controversy also seemed to revolve around the meaning and use of the term ‘nul-
lification’. This latter controversy seems to me resolvable without much fuzz, the
former deserves its own section though.
If ‘nullifying’ is taken to mean ‘to strip it of all its foundational importance’, then
the phrasing seems just wrong. This follows from the discussions in the previous
sections which show that, although rejecting IP is a logical option, doing so is
no trivial matter. A more modest reading of ‘nullifying’ I think is ‘to show that
it doesn’t prove what it intended to prove’. On this reading my take would be
that if the Kochen-Specker theorem was supposed to prove the “nonexistence of
hidden variables”, as claimed by the authors themselves, then its nullification was
already proven by Bohm’s hidden variable theory in 1952, and the explanation for
this nullification was provided by Bell (1966). But the most interesting reading
of Meyer’s claim I think is that it would show that the received interpretation of
the theorem is flawed. Namely, the theorem does not show the impossibility of
non-contextual hidden variable theories. Logically this is a truism. What has been
established in this section is that the conditional (6.19) can be replaced by
QMKS ∧HV ∧ IPKS ∧NC⇒ ⊥. (7.4)
But from this one cannot infer the conditional
QMKS ∧HV⇒ ¬NC. (7.5)
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But similarly, it neither follows that the negation of the conditional (7.5) is true.
More work is to be done for that, which I provide in the next section using the formal
argument known as the finite precision argument. An explicit model, based on the
work of Clifton and Kent (2001), in which QMKS, HV and NC hold is presented.
As such, the received view of the theorem is ‘nullified’, but only by replacing it with
a deeper understanding of the theorem.
7.3 The finite-precision argument
The MKC models are a specific kind of attempt to demonstrate the logical possibility
of non-contextual hidden variable theories. Noticeable other attempts are the work
of Pitowsky (1983 ; 1985) and La Cour (2009). The first one will not be discussed
here because it adopts a peculiar kind of non-classical probability in which, for
example, the conjunction of two probability-1 events can have probability zero. Such
a model can hardly be considered a classical representation. The second manages
to uphold both NC and IP by rejecting FM. Violations with quantum mechanical
predictions (such as EFR) are circumvented by adopting a peculiar dynamics. This
departure from static considerations takes us too far adrift from the discussion of
classical representations and the theory will therefore not be discussed.
Before going into the finite precision argument, it is good to briefly recapitulate
what is formally at stake. The assumptions NC and IP both concern the relation
between operators and observables. Both presuppose the validity of the observ-
able postulate (OP) of quantum mechanics, which states that observables can be
associated with operators. Specifically, it postulates the existence of a function
f : Obs → Osa. This function establishes that formal proofs concerning operators
can have conceptual implications. However, the postulate does not specify what the
function is, and this provides a gap for evaluating the philosophical implications of
the formal proofs.
Formal proofs have conceptual implications only to the extent that they also
apply to the relevant subset f(Obs) ⊂ Osa. The difficulty of this construction is
that there is no definite way to determine precisely what this subset is and thus one
requires further assumptions. Kochen and Specker showed that there is a specific
finite set OKS ⊂ Osa such that if the function f satisfies
OKS ⊂ f(Obs) ⊂ Osa, (7.6)
then at least one of the assumptions QMKS, HV, or NC has to fail. Many results
have been presented since the original proof that aim to make OKS as small as
possible.2 What is left open in this competition is the converse question. How big
2Depending on the exact notion of ‘small’ there are several contests running on this topic. The
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can a set of operators OMKC be such that if f satisfies
f(Obs) ⊂ OMKC ⊂ Osa, (7.7)
then QMKS, HV and NC can be satisfied? This is the question Meyer (1999), Kent
(1999) and Clifton and Kent (2001) (MKC) focused on, and it turns out that, at
least for finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, this set can be surprisingly big.3
From a purely logical perspective one seems to arrive at a stalemate here. If
f satisfies OKS ⊂ f(Obs), then non-contextual hidden variables are not possible,
as shown by the Kochen-Specker theorem. But if on the other hand f satisfies
f(Obs) ⊂ OMKC, then they are possible, as shown by MKC. The tie-breaker is
provided by the finite precision argument, which favors the second option. Before
explaining this argument in its general form, I first return to the spin-1 particles
that figure prominently in the Kochen-Specker theorem.
It is useful to think of measurements of spin-1 particles as being analogous to
measurements of spin-12 particles.
4 A measurement of σr (see Example 3.1) is usually
done with a Stern-Gerlach device which is then aligned to the axis r. The idea that
every operator in the set
{
σr
∣∣ r ∈ R3, ‖r‖ = 1} corresponds to an observable is
thus motivated by the idea that a macroscopic measurement device can be oriented
in all possible ways in space. The same view may be used to motivate that all the
operators in the set
Ospin :=
{
S2r
∣∣ r ∈ R3, ‖r‖ = 1} (7.8)
correspond to observables. Then any finite subset, like OKS in (7.1), does so as well.
The finite precision argument counters this conclusion. To determine whether
one measures the squared spin along some axis r1 or r2, one has to determine
whether some macroscopic device is aligned along either axis. But this direction
can, of course, only be determined up to some finite precision. Thus for any direction
r there is always some  > 0 for which one cannot determine which of the directions
size also depends on the dimension of the Hilbert space under investigation. In three dimensions
Conway and Kochen hold the record for the smallest number of vectors (31) (Peres, 2002, p. 114).
The constructions of Peres (ibid., p. 198) and Bub (1996) both use 33 vectors of which the latter
requires the least number of frames of all these results. If instead of vectors the number of frames
is to be minimized, then the record is held by Lisoneˇk et al. (2014) using only 7 frames for the
Hilbert space C6 . For more discussion on comparing sizes of Kochen-Specker sets see (Bengtsson,
2012; Pavicˇic´ et al., 2005) and references therein.
3It deserves to be noted that this question was also investigated by Bub and Clifton (1996),
albeit from a different perspective.
4The reason for this little side-track is that I do not know of any actual experiments on spin-
1 particles. Actual spin-1 particles such as the W and Z bosons or Higgs bosons are hard to
manipulate, and experiments on similarly behaving systems (e.g. qutrits composed of photon pairs
such as in (Lanyon et al., 2008)) also have a long way to go in comparison to the manipulation of
qubit systems. On the other hand, the analogy with spin- 1
2
measurements may be quite apt (Swift
and Wright, 1980).
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r′ with ‖r − r′‖ <  actually applies to the observable under investigation. The
recognition of the practical underdetermination of directions was vividly exploited
by Meyer (1999), who showed that it is possible to assign definite values to the
operators in the set
O′spin :=
{
S2r
∣∣ r ∈ Q3, ‖r‖ = 1} (7.9)
in a non-contextual way. Then, to determine whether a certain observable S2r corre-
sponds to an operator in O′spin or in Ospin\O′spin requires empirically distinguishing
rational numbers from irrational numbers. As this is generally considered to be im-
possible, there is no empirical reason to assert that there are operators inOspin\O′spin
that do correspond to observables. The finite precision argument then is that, be-
cause one cannot determine with infinite precision which operator precisely should
correspond to the observable (experimental setup) under investigation, one may as
well assume that the operator is an element of a particular dense subset (O′spin) of
all the operator candidates (Ospin).
The argument may come off as being contrived. The idea that R3 is a good (ap-
proximate) model of our spatial surroundings is deeply entrenched in our scientific
thinking. To replace it with Q3 then seems a desperate step just to save NC. There
are several ways to respond to this. The most neutral one is that we are interested
here in logical possibilities that need not be physically attractive. But somewhat
more boldly, one can argue that holding on to R3 is itself a desperate step to save
the standard reading of the Kochen-Specker theorem. And finally, one can deny the
step going from the idea that R3 correctly models space, to the conclusion that the
squared spin along the axis r is an observable for every spatial direction. Perhaps
macroscopic measurement devices make an infinitesimal shift in alignment just to
line up with some direction in Q3 in the case of a measurement.
The finite precision argument as it is used here works for spin observables specifi-
cally. In this argument the fact is used that the observables S2r1 and S
2
r2 will resemble
each other when r1 and r2 start to approach each other. That is, whenever the oper-
ators S2r1 and S
2
r2 are close to each other, it is used that the experimental setups used
to measure S2r1 and S
2
r2 are also close to each other in some sense. What is required
to make the finite precision argument work in arbitrary cases, is that something
similar applies in general. That is, the metric on Obs defined by5
d(A1,A2) := ‖A1 −A2‖ (7.10)
has to be relevant in the following way:
CoO (Continuity of Observables) For any observable A ∈ Obs and sequence of
observables A1,A2, . . ., if d(An,A) tends to zero as n → ∞, then there is a
5There is nothing stringent concerning the choice of this particular metric because the finite
precision argument itself rests on fuzzy terms concerning the resemblance of experimental setups.
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sense in which the sequence of experimental setups associated with the An
will resemble an experimental setup suitable for the measurement of A as
n→∞.
The assumption is one that I think is tacitly accepted in quantum mechanics.
It is part of the application of OP to select/construct the function f : Obs → Osa
in such a way that CoO comes out true. A closely related fact is that in quantum
mechanics, when one tries to pinpoint the exact operator to be identified with a
particular observable, there is some wiggle room due to the finite precision with
which experimental setups can be specified. This is a consequence of the fact that,
for two operators A1, A2 that are close to each other, the quantum mechanical
predictions also resemble each other. For example, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 7.2. Let A be a self-adjoint operator acting on a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space, and let (An)n∈N be a sequence of self-adjoint operators such that
σ(A) = σ(An) for all n and limn→∞ ‖A− An‖ = 0. Then for every ∆ ⊂ σ(A) and
density operator ρ one has
lim
n→∞ |Tr(ρµA(∆))− Tr(ρµAn(∆))| = 0. (7.11)
Proof. Because
|Tr(ρµA(∆))− Tr(ρµAn(∆)| ≤
∑
a∈∆
|Tr(ρµA({a}))− Tr(ρµAn({a})| , (7.12)
it suffices to show that (7.11) holds for singleton sets. By making use of Lemma
A.5, it follows that
|Tr(ρµA({a}))− Tr(ρµAn({a})| = |Tr (ρ(µA({a})− µAn({a})))|
≤ Tr(|ρ|)‖µA({a})− µAn({a})‖
= ‖µA({a})− µAn({a})‖.
(7.13)
Now for every a ∈ σ(A) define the polynomial
pa(x) :=
∏
a′∈σ(A)
a′ 6=a
x− a′
a− a′ . (7.14)
Restricted to σ(A), this function acts as a Kronecker delta function: pa(a
′) = δaa′ .
Therefore
‖µA({a})− µAn({a})‖ = ‖pa(A)− pa(An)‖. (7.15)
It now follows from Lemma A.6 that (7.11) holds. This completes the proof.
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The restriction that σ(A) = σ(An) for all n is a bit severe, and it is possible to
weaken it. However, doing so makes the theorem a lot messier6 and the formulation
given here suffices for the present discussion. The problem at hand is that, given
an experimental procedure, one has to select a corresponding self-adjoint operator.
Since the set of possible outcomes is determined by the experimental procedure, the
choice is effectively between operators with the same spectrum. Now one may object
that, because of the finite precision of measurements, one is not able to determine
exactly what this spectrum should be. This is true of course, but this can be viewed
as part of a separate selection process, where one can choose between different
scalings of the spectrum on a collection of operators with the same spectrum. The
selection of an operator is then split into the selection of a spectrum, and of a set
of projection operators. This splitting can be justified by noting that scaling the
spectrum does not alter the relevant probabilities (see also the discussion on page
38).
To make the finite precision argument work one has to show that for every
observable A and every possible candidate A ∈ Osa for representing A, there exists
an operator A′ ∈ OMKC that is just as good a candidate as A given the finite
precision with which the properties of A can be measured. Here OMKC is the set
of operators corresponding to observables that can be assigned definite values by a
hidden variable state in a non-contextual way. That is, for every possible function
f : Obs → Osa there should be a function f ′ : Obs → OMKC such that ‖f(A)−f ′(A)‖
is small for all A ∈ Obs . It is a corollary of a theorem by Kent (1999) that such a
set can indeed be constructed. Specifically, the following was shown.7
Theorem 7.3. For every finite-dimensional Hilbert space there exists a countable
set of frames FMKC := {(Pni ) | n ∈ N} that is dense in the set of all frames, i.e., for
every frame (Pi) and every  > 0, there exists an n ∈ N such that
max
i
min
j
‖Pi − Pnj ‖ < . (7.16)
Furthermore, there exist functions
λ : LMKC1 (H)→ {0, 1} (7.17)
that satisfy ∑
i
λ(Pni ) = 1 ∀n ∈ N, (7.18)
6For example, it requires introducing a sequence of maps that link subsets of σ(A) to subsets of
σ(An) and adjust (7.11) accordingly. Without such an adjustment the theorem would no longer hold
as one can construct sequences (An)n∈N such that limn→∞ ‖A−An‖ = 0 while σ(A) ∩ σ(An) = 0
for all n.
7Although it is implicitly assumed here that measurements can be represented by PVMs (as
a consequence of OP), nothing hinges on this assumption. A similar theorem can be proven for
POVMs.
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where LMKC1 (H) is the set of all 1-dimensional projections that occur in one of the
frames in FMKC.
Corollary 7.1. For every finite-dimensional Hilbert space there is a set of self-
adjoint operators OMKC ⊂ Osa such that
(i) OMKC is closed under functional operations: for every real-valued Borel func-
tion f , if A ∈ OMKC, then f(A) ∈ OMKC,
(ii) OMKC is dense in Osa: for every  > 0 and every A′ ∈ Osa there is an
A ∈ OMKC such that ‖A−A′‖ < ,
and there exist functions λ : OMKC → R such that
λ(A) ∈ σ(A),
λ(f(A)) = f(λ(A))
(7.19)
for every A ∈ OMKC and real-valued Borel function f .
Proof. Let {(Pni ) | n ∈ N} be a set frames as in Theorem 7.3. For every n ∈ N let
An be the Abelian von Neumann algebra generated by the frame (Pni ). Now define
OMKC :=
⋃
n∈N
(Osa ∩ An) . (7.20)
It immediately follows that criterion (i) is satisfied because the algebras are closed
under the functional operations.
Now suppose A′ ∈ Osa and  > 0 are given. Let (Pi) be a frame such that
A′ =
∑
i a
′
iPi. Now choose a frame (P
n
i ) such that ‖Pi−Pni ‖ < d‖A‖ for all i, where
d is the dimension of the Hilbert space, and define A := a′iP
n
i . It follows that
‖A−A′‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
a′i(P
n
i − Pi)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤∑
i
|a′i|‖Pni − Pi‖ < . (7.21)
This establishes that (ii) holds.
Finally, every function λ that satisfies the criteria in Theorem 7.3 can be ex-
tended to a function λ on OMKC that satisfies (7.19). To see this note that for every
A ∈ OMKC there exists a frame (Pni ) such that A =
∑
i aiP
n
i , with ai ∈ σ(A). Now
define
λ(A) :=
∑
i
aiλ(P
n
i ). (7.22)
Then (7.19) follows from the spectral theorem together with the Borel functional
calculus.
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The finite precision argument, together with the above theorem and corollary,
motivate the following weakening of IP.
IPMKC (Meyer-Kent-Clifton Identification Principle) For every self-adjoint
operator A ∈ OMKC there exists an observable A such that A is associated
with A via OP.
It follows from Corollary 7.1 that QMKS, HV, NC and IPMKC can be jointly satisfied.
In short, the result explicitly disproves the credo that the Kochen-Specker theorem
establishes the impossibility of non-contextual hidden variable theories. On the
more cautious side though, what has been established thus far is the possibility
of non-contextual hidden variable states. What is still an open question at this
point, is whether these states can be used to construct a classical representation of
quantum probability. The answer is yes, but showing this requires a bit more work.
7.4 Recovering probabilities
The question at hand is if every quantum probability function (represented by a
density operator ρ) can be modeled by a classical probability function Pρ on the
set
ΛMKC :=
{
λ : OMKC → R
∣∣∣ ∀f,A : λ(A)∈σ(A),λ(f(A))=f(λ(A))} . (7.23)
That is, if for every ρ there exists a Pρ such that
Pρ (FA ∈ ∆) = Tr (ρµA(∆)) , (7.24)
for all A ∈ OMKC and ∆ ⊂ σ(A) where FA is the random variable defined as
FA(λ) := λ(A). (7.25)
Clifton and Kent (2001) showed that the answer to this question is yes. But much
more interesting than the answer itself, is the way the answer is obtained. After
all, it is only then that one can evaluate the classical representation of quantum
probability provided in this approach.
The way quantum probabilities can be reproduced in MKC models is best under-
stood by backing away from the Kochen-Specker theorem, and focusing attention
to the general idea of reconstructing quantum probabilities. Let H be a finite-
dimensional Hilbert space and let P := {P1, . . . , Pn} be a frame and Osa(P) be the
set of self-adjoint operators that commute with every element of P. This means
that Osa(P) is the set of self-adjoint operators in the Abelian von Neumann algebra
generated by P. There is a straightforward way of finding a classical representation
of any quantum probability function for this set of operators. In this case one can
set
ΛP :=
{
λ : Osa(P)→ R
∣∣∣ ∀f,A : λ(A)∈σ(A),λ(f(A))=f(λ(A))} . (7.26)
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This set contains exactly n = dim(H) elements, namely, one for each Pi:
λPi(A) := Tr(APi). (7.27)
A density operator ρ now gives rise to a probability distribution over ΛP by setting
Pρ(λPi) := Tr(ρPi). The reader may check that this probability distribution satisfies
(7.24) for the operators in Osa(P).
The next step is to consider two frames P1 := {P1,1, . . . , P1,n} and P2 :=
{P2,1, . . . , P2,n} with the property that [P1,i, P2,j ] 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Such
frames are called totally incompatible. It follows that the only elements that Osa(P1)
and Osa(P2) have in common are those of the form c1 for c ∈ R. Consequently,
any pair (λP1,i , λP2,j ) in ΛP1 × ΛP2 unambiguously defines an element λP1,i,P2,j of
ΛP1,P2 :=
{
λ : Osa(P1) ∪ Osa(P2)→ R
∣∣∣ ∀f,A : λ(A)∈σ(A),λ(f(A))=f(λ(A))} (7.28)
with the rule
λP1,i,P2,j (A) :=
{
λP1,i(A) A ∈ Osa(P1),
λP2,j (A) A ∈ Osa(P2).
(7.29)
Conversely, every element of ΛP1,P2 may be shown to be of this form and thus one
has
ΛP1,P2 ' ΛP1 × ΛP2 . (7.30)
A probability distribution is now obtained by taking the product measure, resulting
in
Pρ
(
λP1,i,P2,j
)
= Tr(ρP1,i) Tr(ρP2,j). (7.31)
For a countable sequence (Pi) of totally incompatible frames the same procedure
can be followed. The set of hidden variables can be taken to be
Λ(Pi) :=
{
λ :
⋃
i
Osa(Pi)→ R
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀f,A : λ(A)∈σ(A),λ(f(A))=f(λ(A))
}
, (7.32)
and the probability measure that reproduces the quantum probability rule is again
the product measure.
The upshot is that for any countable sequence of totally incompatible frames,
the assumptions QMKS, HV and NC can be jointly satisfied, provided that the
set of operators associated with an observable is a subset of
⋃
iOsa(Pi). What
Clifton and Kent showed is that a sequence of totally incompatible frames can be
selected that satisfies the constraints from Theorem 7.3. Consequently, the set of
operators
⋃
iOsa(Pi) satisfies the constraints of Corollary 7.1. That is, for every
finite-dimensional Hilbert space, there is a countable sequence of totally incompat-
ible frames such that
⋃
iOsa(Pi) is a dense subset of Osa. With the adoption of
98
The role of continuity 7.5
CoO, then, this set is big enough to accommodate any observable in quantum me-
chanics, and the above construction shows that every quantum probability function
has a classical representation on the set Λ(Pi). In short, the MKC models both pro-
vide an example of a non-contextual hidden variable theory, as well as a classical
representation of quantum probability.
7.5 The role of continuity
Let me start this section with saying that the MKC models are highly artificial.
As a candidate for an interpretation of quantum mechanics or a route to ‘new
physics’, they perform a terrible job. Their value lies purely in their capacity to
provide insight in the notion of contextuality in quantum mechanics, and the relation
between quantum and classical probability. It is not my intention here to perform
a re-hash of the pros and cons of these models, nor on the precise metaphysical
meaning of contextuality in quantum mechanics. For this I refer the reader to
the discussions in (Barrett and Kent, 2004; Appleby, 2005; Hermens, 2011) and
references therein. Instead, I focus on some particular aspects of the way they
perform as classical representations of quantum probability.
The finite precision argument may be seen to rest on two ingredients. The first
is the uncontroversial idea that it is impossible to determine with infinite precision
the parameters that fix the experimental setup associated with an observable. In-
deed, if this were possible, the MKC models would not be empirically equivalent to
quantum mechanics. One could ‘just’ check for any particular direction r if there
is an observable corresponding to S2r . The scare quotes around ‘just’ indicate how
implausible such a test is, making the finite precision assumption a very plausible
one.
The second ingredient relates to the central theme of this section: continuity. To
make the finite precision argument precise one needs a metric (or at least a topology)
to specify when two experimental setups resemble each other. The assumption CoO
states that this should be done by adopting the metric on the set of self-adjoint
operators. This metric is plausible for spin-measurements: the two operators S2r1
and S2r1 are close to each other just in case the axes spanned by r1 and r2 are near
each other. But in other situations its relevance may be less clear. For example,
the metric also provides a distance between position and momentum measurements,
and it is not clear how this relates to the experimental setups. However, this need
not pose a difficulty. For CoO the distance between the position and momentum
operator is only relevant when adopting the further assumption that there is a whole
range of observables in between. It is this further assumption that is troublesome,
rather than CoO itself. In fact, CoO is a relatively innocent assumption because it
is formulated as a conditional.
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But also when the finite precision assumption and CoO are accepted, there are
reasons to reject the MKC models as faithful classical representations. I discuss
here two reasons. The first is the by now familiar complaint that not all probability
functions on Λ(P)i are of the form Pρ. However, in this case there is a formal
argument available that selects the quantum probability functions as a natural
subset of all probability functions. After giving this argument below I discuss the
second reason, which explains why CoO is an unsatisfactory assumption from the
point of view of the MKC models themselves. Thus the MKC models undermine
the very assumption that allows their construction.
7.5.1 Deriving the Born rule
The introduction of CoO was motivated by the idea that a similar claim tends
to hold in quantum mechanics itself. This was illustrated by Theorem 7.2. The
explanation of the special role of quantum probability functions in the MKC models
given in this section uses the converse fact that, if probability functions satisfy a
certain continuity assumption, they satisfy the Born rule. Thus, roughly speaking,
probability functions in the MKC models satisfy the Born rule if and only if they
are continuous. This statement will be made more precise below, after giving a
possible defense for singling out continuous probability functions.
A particular way to motivate a continuity assumption for probability functions
is by adopting an epistemic interpretation of probability.8 That is not to say that
such an interpretation is necessary here, but at least it provides a useful way to
think about the formal side of the story. On an epistemic reading, probabilities
are thought of as epistemic judgments of a rational agent concerning outcomes of
particular measurements. However, when considering the outcomes of a particular
actual measurement the agent not only has to reflect on the uncertainty pertaining
to the outcome of the measurement, but also (due to the finite precision argument)
on the uncertainty pertaining to which measurement is actually being performed.
For example, consider the measurement of an observable corresponding to S2r . The
agent is required to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes 0 and 1 for every
possible value of r. But apart from the uncertainty about the outcome, the agent is
also necessarily uncertain about the value of r. In order for this notion of probability
to be made operational, the probabilities assigned to the possible outcomes 0 and
1 have to vary continuously with r. For example, when thinking of probabilities
as betting ratios, one has to be able to agree on what the payoff will be after a
measurement of S2r without requiring that one determines with infinite precision
8Inspiration for this kind of motivation for a continuity assumption is drawn from the work of
Malament and Zabell (1980) in statistical mechanics.
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what the value of r is. Thus one has that
lim
r′→r
P
(
FS2
r′
= 1
)
= P
(
FS2r = 1
)
. (7.33)
When taking into account CoO, this leads to the demand that P should be contin-
uous with respect to the metric on the self-adjoint operators. Here I propose the
following definition to make this precise.
Definition 7.2. A probability measure P on ΛMKC is said to respect CoO, if for
every A ∈ OMKC and every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for all A′ ∈ OMKC
with σ(A′) = σ(A),
‖A−A′‖ < δ ⇒ |P(FA = a)− P(FA′ = a)| <  (7.34)
for all a ∈ σ(A).
One can now show that the Born rule precisely singles out these continuous
probability distributions. Conversely, from the perspective of the MKC models, the
Born rule can be seen as a consequence of the continuity assumption. Note that al-
though this continuity assumption may be justified with an epistemic interpretation
of probability, the formal result is independent of the interpretation of probability.
Theorem 7.4. A probability measure P on ΛMKC respects CoO if and only if there
is a density operator ρ such that
P (FA ∈ ∆) = Tr (ρµA(∆)) (7.35)
for all A ∈ OMKC and ∆ ⊂ σ(A).
Proof. Note that if P is given by a density operator ρ, then it follows from Theorem
7.2 that CoO is respected. It thus only has to be shown that, if P respects CoO,
then there exists a density operator ρ such that (7.35) holds. Let P be a probability
function that respects CoO. This function can be used to define a function λP :
L(H)→ [0, 1] in the following way. Let P ∈ L(H). According to Theorem 7.3 there
is a sequence (Pi) in L(H) ∩ OMKC such that Pi → P as i→∞. Now define
λP(P ) := lim
i→∞
P (FPi = 1) . (7.36)
Because P respects CoO this value is independent of the choice of the sequence.
Thus the function λP is well-defined. Further, again because of CoO, this function
satisfies λP
(∑
i∈N Pi
)
=
∑
i∈N λP(Pi) for every countable sequence of pairwise or-
thogonal projection operators. Since it is also the case that λP(1) = 1 this defines a
quantum probability function (see Definition 5.1). Finally, it follows from Gleason’s
theorem that (7.35) holds.
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It deserves to be emphasized that Theorem 7.4 is quite a remarkable result. It
establishes success on a point where previous classical representations have failed:
to derive the Born rule from within the classical model. Moreover, it strengthens
a recurring idea in results on reconstructing quantum mechanics such as (Hardy,
2001), namely, that continuity is an essential ingredient. But the result also puts
additional weight on the role of the assumption CoO, and it deserves to be investi-
gated how well this assumption fits with the construction of the MKC models. The
conclusion will be that it isn’t a very attractive assumption.
7.5.2 The incompatibility with continuity
CoO establishes that the metric on Osa also plays a role on the set of observables
OMKC of the MKC models. This adds additional structure of the Hilbert space
formalism to the MKC models, on top of the functional relationships EFR. But
from the point of view of the MKC models, this additional structure on the set
is somewhat alienating. In the construction of Λ(Pi) all relations between frames
are placed on an equal footing. A state λ is blind to the distance between two
observables whenever their corresponding operators do not commute. To put it
another way, the MKC states do naturally reproduce EFR, but there is nothing in
the MKC models that could even lead to the formulation of CoO.
The tension would be relieved if the metric could in some way be reflected
within the properties of the MKC states. This would be the case if, typically, for
observables that are close to each other, the values assigned to them are close to
each other as well. The provisional ‘typically’ is to indicate that a too stringent
demand is doomed to fail from the start. For example, in the 3-dimensional case,
when restricting an MKC state λ to the squared spin observables S2r , this function
cannot be a continuous function of r. This is because the range of the function is
the discrete set {0, 1}, and both values have to be attained. Some discontinuities
are therefore necessary. But there is still the possibility that these can be ‘special’
and that ‘generally’ the value of λ(S2r ) is a good indication of the values of λ(S
2
r′)
for r′ close to r. It was shown by Appleby (2005) however, that this is not possible:
there have to be wild discontinuities for every MKC state.
The theorem proven by Appleby is formulated in terms of coloring functions.
Let S2 denote the 2-sphere whose points represent the squared spin observables.
Now set
S2MKC :=
{
r ∈ S2 ∣∣ S2r ∈ OMKC} . (7.37)
This is a dense colorable subset of S2. In fact, every λ ∈ ΛMKC provides a coloring
function cλ via
cλ(r) := λ(S
2
r ). (7.38)
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Theorem 7.5 (Appleby 2005). Let OMKC be an MKC set of observables for the
Hilbert space C3. Then for every λ ∈ ΛMKC there exists an open set U ⊂ S2 such
that cλ is discontinuous at every point of U ∩ S2MKC.
Although the theorem pertains to spin-1 systems specifically, it is likely to be
generalizable to higher dimensional systems. For Appleby, the importance of this
result lies in the implication that, in general, measuring some observable A doesn’t
provide any information about the state λ of the system. It doesn’t do so in prin-
ciple, whenever the measurement is of an observable A in a region in which λ is
densely discontinuous. But also doesn’t do so pragmatically, since there is no way
to have empirical access to the question whether A is in such a region or not. The
broader lesson Appleby draws from the (Bell-)Kochen-Specker theorem then is not
so much on the (im)possibility of certain kinds of hidden variables. Rather, the
theorem poses a limit on the extent to which such hidden variables are empirically
accessible. Thus Appleby reads in the Kochen-Specker theorem an early version
of what more recently Colbeck and Renner (2012b) aimed to show: that quantum
mechanics is ‘maximally informative’. Here though I am more interested in the
implications of Theorem 7.5 for the MKC models and the classical representations
based on them.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the MKC models are unsatis-
factory candidates for a physical theory. One peculiarity about them is that the
observables do not form a continuum. This is a big break with scientific theories of
the past and present. In particular, there is a tension with the common conception
of space being adequately modeled by R3. This in itself need not be a reason to
be discontent with the models. A departure from this conception already occurs of
course in general relativity, and in quantum gravity one may even move to a discrete
conception of space. But it is problematic that the departure is ill-motivated. The
set of operators OMKC used in section 7.4 is selected in an ad hoc way, and there
is no unique way to construct it. Consequently, the departure from a continuum is
not as simple and clear as going from R3 to Q3.9 But what is most disturbing is
that Theorem 7.5 shows that this departure causes a particular tension within the
models themselves. The finite precision argument requires that observables appear
to form a continuum by CoO. But this apparent continuity is nowhere coded into
the theory: it is neither there at the level of the random variables OMKC, nor at the
level of the MKC states Λ(Pi). Theorem 7.5 shows this is necessarily so.
This tension in the MKC models (i.e., requiring a continuity assumption while
at the same time not being able to respect this assumption) is not just a moot point.
The assumption CoO is not only used in the finite precision argument, but also in
9This is in contrast with the paper of Meyer (1999) in which spin-directions are associated
with directions in Q3. Strictly speaking though, this does not give an MKC model, as the hidden
variables in this case cannot be used to reproduce the quantum statistics (Cabello, 2002).
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the derivation of the Born rule in Theorem 7.4. While this result is interesting, the
fact that Λ(Pi) does not respect CoO indicates that the theorem is not as important
as it pretends. Difficulties arise, in particular, when one considers update rules
for probability functions in the MKC models. Suppose one measures A and finds
the result a. The usual way to update the probability function is by conditioning
on the set of all λ with FA(λ) = a. Now, because FA is independent of FA′ for
every A′ with [A,A′] 6= 0, this update has a negligible impact on the probability
distribution. It only changes the probability distribution for one of the countably
many frames that make up ΛMKC (see (7.32)). This may be seen as a vindication
of Appleby’s objection that one can’t learn anything about the hidden variables
from a measurement. On top of that, one may note that the probability function
one obtains by conditionalization is radically different from what one would get by
using the projection postulate.
There are also some other problems with conditionalization as an update rule.
For one, even if one started with a probability function that respects CoO (and
thus is quantum like), after conditionalization it no longer respects CoO. Namely,
for all the A′ with [A,A′] 6= 0, the updated probability function still satisfies the
trace rule, while for A the probability is now peaked around the value a. Another
problem is that, due to the finite precision argument, one cannot know exactly
for which A to perform the update. A naive solution could be to say that, since
one knows roughly which A has been measured, and one knows that a repeated
measurement of A would yield the same result (assuming λ wasn’t influenced too
much by the measurement), one should assign high probability to the set of all λ with
FA′(λ) = a for all A
′ close to A. Effectively, this would mean applying (something
very much resembling) the projection postulate. But although one could hope that
this process saves the Born rule, the proposed update is completely unwarranted
from the perspective of the MKC models. In general, the value of λ(A′) need not
resemble λ(A), and the existence of densely discontinuous regions indicates that
changing the values of λ(A′) will often lead to false predictions.
In brief, the statistical predictions for the MKC models for consecutive mea-
surements are problematic to define and possibly contradict quantum mechanical
predictions. This is not to say it is impossible to define such measurements without
contradictions. In (Hermens, 2011) I proposed the following artificial solution to
the problem. Take the MKC states to specify the state of the system at any point
in time, but let these states evolve stochastically in time. Specifically, at any in-
stant the MKC state is selected in accordance with the Born rule, and the quantum
state guiding this stochastic process evolves according to the dynamics of quantum
mechanics. On this approach, the Born rule is applied as a postulate, rather than
being derived from the assumption CoO. In essence, this MKC model is just or-
thodox quantum mechanics with some decorative fluff that is neither attractive nor
explanatory. This works fine for showing the logical possibility of non-contextual
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hidden variables. However, as a classical representation of quantum probability, the
models recover the old difficulty of being incapable of explaining the special role of
the probability functions that satisfy the Born rule.
7.6 Taking stock
Let me take the time to briefly recapitulate the results of part II before moving
on. Two complementary programs have been running alongside each other. One
concerns the possibility of understanding quantum probability from a classical per-
spective by means of a classical representation of a quantum probability space. The
other concerns the possibility of understanding quantum mechanics from a hidden
variable perspective. The main difficulty encountered is that neither is possible in
such a way that all relevant aspects of the quantum are captured in a faithful way.
The Kochen-Specker theorem provides a compact description of the problem:
classical representations or hidden variables are impossible when one holds on to
both NC and IP. Giving up either of these two assumptions was shown to be suf-
ficient to turn the impossibility into a possibility. A striking aspect of these possi-
bilities is that for the constructed measurable space the probability functions that
obey the Born rule form a special subset of all admissible probability functions. So
while one of the important messages of section 4.3 was that classical probability is
a special case of quantum probability, here the opposite message prevails: quantum
probability is a special case of classical probability. These are not two contradictory
messages, nor does their simultaneous truth establish that classical and quantum
probability are one and the same thing. The fact that every classical probability
space can be represented by a quantum probability space and vice versa rather may
be seen to be analogous to the claim that every circle can be fitted within a square
and vice versa. This claim is obviously true, but it is also clear that its truth does
not imply that circles are squares.10
From the hidden variable perspective the situation is not entirely surprising.
One of the reasons for introducing hidden variables in the first place was to correct
for the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. The hidden variables describe
putative states of affairs that aren’t accounted for by the quantum state. Necessarily
then, probability functions that are peaked around these states cannot be described
10It deserves to be noted that a similar situation is well-known within the literature on Bell
inequalities (Cirel’son, 1980; Popescu and Rohrlich, 1994; Brunner et al., 2014). Although under
certain conditions these inequalities cannot be violated within a classical representation, relieving
these conditions allows for stronger violations than that can be obtained with quantum probabil-
ities. The tension there is often framed by a contrast between signaling interactions and general
non-local interaction. Such a contrast however cannot explain the general mismatch between
quantum probability spaces and their classical representatives. After all, as seen in this part, this
mismatch already occurs for single particle systems.
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by a quantum probability function. However, one still has to explain why in practice
these non-quantum probability functions play no role. This is best understood by
way of an example. Consider again Bohmian mechanics. As noted earlier, this
theory does not neatly conform to the formalism of a contextual hidden variable
theory as illustrated in section 6.3. Instead, the hidden variables have a physical
story to tell, and this story is helpful in explaining the Born rule: it is used to show
that this rule arises as an equilibrium distribution. Importantly, then, the Born
rule is not fundamental in Bohmian mechanics. Other probability functions are not
prohibited, but are just ‘atypical’, and this even allows, in principle, for empirical
discrepancies with quantum mechanics (Valentini, 2010).
When it comes to understanding the formalism of quantum probability on its
own, the hidden variable perspective doesn’t suffice. Putting it somewhat boldly,
it ‘explains’ the formalism of quantum probability by stating that it is essentially
incorrect, or at least incomplete. What I am hinting at is an important distinc-
tion between the quantum representation of classical probability and the classical
representation of quantum probability. In the first case there is a criterion that sin-
gles out the classical from the quantum: classical probability corresponds, roughly
speaking, to commutative probability. But conversely it isn’t easy to understand
from a classical perspective, either formally or conceptually, what the special role
of the quantum probability functions is. Without such an understanding it isn’t
entirely satisfactory to speak of a faithful representation. This is not to say that
faithful representations are an impossibility. But a more direct investigation of
quantum probability may be more worth our time, and this is what I do in part III
of this dissertation.
Worries about the possibility of deriving the Born rule within hidden variable
theories seldom play a role in discussions on the pros and cons of hidden variables.
As noted above, there are good reasons for this: the Born rule may just be a con-
tingent rule. More common are the objections that “the introduction of hidden
variables does not lead to new experimentally testable predictions”, or that “hid-
den variable theories cannot be generalized to incorporate quantum field theories”.
But the most traditional objection is of course that “hidden variable theories are
necessarily non-local”. Correspondingly, there are also generic replies to these ob-
jections. The first objection misses the point: the aim of hidden variables is to
solve the measurement problem, or, more modestly, to simply give an interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, not to necessarily lead to new physics. The second is
an undecided issue, and in the third one may be applying a double standard: it
is not evident that a rejection of hidden variables automatically gives you a local
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
It is not my aim here to take sides by scrutinizing these objections and replies.
The main point is rather that there are more stringent objections against hidden
variables than those given by the Kochen-Specker theorem. However, when it comes
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to the more formal questions of classical representations of quantum probability,
the Kochen-Specker theorem already provides enough restrictions to be pessimistic.
The general aspect of all ways to circumvent the theorem, is that the formalism
of quantum probability is no longer fundamental. Now while this is of course a
logical possibility, its denial is a logical possibility as well. In that case, letting go
of classical probability, and instead focusing directly on quantum probability, is the
road towards a physical understanding of quantum probability. This then is the
project in the next part.
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Quantum logic and quantum
probability
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Orthodox quantum logic
8.1 Introduction
The central theme of this dissertation is the investigation of quantum probability in
order to obtain a better understanding of its mathematical formalism. Thus far, the
investigation focused on a comparison with classical probability. In chapter 4 a first
purely mathematical comparison of the two formalisms was made. In part II the
comparison focused on the (im)possibility of embedding quantum probability within
the classical framework. Both these investigations led to useful insights. In chapter
4 the view emerged that classical probability can be viewed as a special case of
quantum probability. In part II, on the other hand, the opposite view emerged. For
any classical representation of quantum probability it was found that the quantum
probability functions form a strict subset of the classical probability functions.1
These two opposing views are complementary rather than contradictory: they
highlight different aspects of quantum probability. On the first view classical prob-
ability identifies with the commutative side of quantum probability. The richer
structure of non-commutative probability is an essential ingredient of the advan-
tages of quantum computation over classical computation (Nielsen and Chuang,
2010). On the second view the quantum probability functions can be understood
as incomplete specifications of the actual (hidden variable) state. The total set of
probability functions then also contains complete specifications of the states.
In this part of the dissertation I undertake a more direct investigation of quan-
tum probability. The aim is to obtain a reformulation of the formalism in which
the mathematical symbols have a clear physical interpretation. In the remainder of
this section I elaborate on what this aim is, but two remarks are already in order.
First, the aim presupposes that in the current formulation of quantum probability
a clear physical interpretation is absent. This is a claim I defend in this chapter.
Second, in the investigation I adopt an empiricist stance. The aim is to obtain a
1Theorem 7.4 is a peculiar exception. However, as discussed, it is not without its own problems.
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formulation of quantum probability that connects smoothly with the way quantum
probability is used to formulate empirical statements. Little or no assumptions are
made concerning the correct metaphysics for quantum probability, and in particular
no attempt is made to provide a solution to the measurement problem.
The program in this part of the dissertation is somewhat unorthodox, and it is
therefore useful to separate it from a program that looks much like it. The summary
above sketches a picture of quantum probability spaces lying in between two classical
probability spaces. A commutative subspace of the quantum probability space
on the inside, and a hidden variable space enveloping the quantum space on the
outside. A similar picture is well-known in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Although quantum mechanics violates Bell inequalities, and thus contains non-
local correlations, these correlations are found to be non-maximal: they satisfy the
so-called Tsirelson bound (Cirel’son, 1980), which may be violated by non-local
hidden variable theories. Quantum mechanics thus occupies a special place within
the space of all possible theories. The quest to understand this particular space was
triggered by Wheeler’s famous question: “How come the quantum?” (1990). In
this program, the aim is to reconstruct the formalism of quantum mechanics from
physical principles.
In this dissertation I aim for something more modest and specialized. Part of
the investigation of quantum probability is to try to reconstruct its formalism. But
in this reconstruction I do not shy from picking (non-probabilistic) ingredients from
quantum mechanics. Thus while in the reconstruction of quantum mechanics one
may seek an underpinning for the use of Hilbert space theory, I take this mathe-
matical structure for granted. Then, given this structure, the aim is to provide a
conceptual reading/reformulation of this structure on which one can introduce a
natural formalism of probability.
To understand the strategy, it is useful to make a final comparison with classical
probability. Consider again the definitions of classical and quantum probability
spaces alongside each other.
Definition 8.1.
A classical probability space is a triplet
(Ω,F ,P) such that
A quantum probability space is a triplet
(H, L(H),P) such that
1. Ω is a set, 1. H is a Hilbert space,
2. F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω con-
taining Ω,
2. L(H) is the collection of all projec-
tion operators on H,
3. P is a function from F to the inter-
val [0, 1],
3. P is a function from L(H) to the in-
terval [0, 1],
4. P(Ω) = 1, 4. P(1) = 1,
5. P(
⋃
n ∆n) =
∑
nP(∆n) for any
countable sequence of mutually dis-
joint sets.
5. P(
∑
n Pn) =
∑
nP(Pn) for any
countable sequence of mutually or-
thogonal projections.
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The most striking difference is in the first two points, which mark the replace-
ment of the familiar set theory with the Hilbert space formalism. This suggests
that once one can determine why it makes sense to adopt a Hilbert space struc-
ture for the appropriate domain of probability functions,2 one is already close to
an understanding of the whole of quantum probability. That is, given a conceptual
underpinning of 1 and 2, it is reasonable to assume that 3, 4 and 5 can be motivated
by appealing to an analogy with classical probability. Thus explaining the role of
L(H) really can be considered the central task.
To get a feeling for what one may be looking for in an explanation of 1 and 2,
it is useful to make a comparison with the classical case. Here, the adoption of 1
and 2 is so ‘trivial’ that it becomes hard to find a direct motivation for it in modern
literature. The use of set theory is deeply entrenched in our mathematical thinking,
and so one has to search for answers to the question of why a set-theoretical structure
is the appropriate domain of probability functions. In most of the math textbooks
on probability, the sets in a σ-algebra are identified with ‘events’, usually taken to
be a primitive term. This is not surprising since, pragmatically, it is easy to work
with this notion. For example, considering the roll of a die, the set of possible
outcomes is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The set {2, 4, 6} can then be identified with the event
of rolling an even number. Thus it is plausible to model the probability of events
with the values assigned to the corresponding sets by a function P.
When accepting the notion of ‘event’ as a primitive concept, a similar under-
standing can be given for the use of projection operators. This link is given by
the Born postulate. The event that the measurement of an observable A yields
an outcome in the set ∆ is identified with the projection operator µA(∆) (with
A the operator associated with A). This primitive use of the notion of ‘event’ is
quite common and, pragmatically, it is of course as natural as it is in the classical
case. But more care is required when this notion starts playing a role in philo-
sophical discussions of quantum probability. A good example of such use is in the
information-theoretical interpretation of Bub and Pitowsky:
On this interpretation, the structure of Hilbert space, i.e., the non-
Boolean algebra of Hilbert space subspaces, defines the structure of a
quantum event space, just as, classically, a Boolean algebra, the subsets
of a set (phase space), defines the structure of a classical event space.
Gleason’s theorem then determines all possible probability measures on
this structure as given by quantum states (pure and mixed) according
to the trace rule, where the probabilities are interpreted as degrees of
2To contrast with the program of reconstructing quantum mechanics: It is not required here
that the use of Hilbert space theory comes out as the necessarily correct formalism. It suffices if it
can be shown to be a possibly correct formalism.
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belief or measures of uncertainty about events in the Bayesian sense.
(Bub, 2007, p. 239)
Here, the quantum event structure is taken for granted and the interpretation
of quantum probability is a story about this formalism, rather than something that
provides an explanation of the formalism. This is problematic because it is not clear
whether the notion of ‘event’ can be unpacked in such a way that it is compatible
with the given interpretation. In fact, there is even cause for serious doubt, as
there are good reasons to believe that events should be modeled by sets rather than
projection operators. An interpretation of quantum probability should thus come
equipped with tools to counter these reasons.
Note that the problem is not specific to the adoption of a Bayesian interpreta-
tion. The same worry also applies for example to the consistent histories approach
of Griffiths (2013), in which the quantum event structure plays a similar primitive
role, but where probabilities are understood as objective chances. But for the sake
of definiteness it is useful to unpack this problem further with an eye on Bayesian
interpretations. According to the Bayesian, probabilities are degrees of belief of
a rational agent. The usual elaboration goes as follows. The formula P(A) = x
is taken to express the idea that a rational agent believes with degree x that the
proposition (represented by) A is true. It is relatively straightforward to relate
events to propositions. The probability of the event that the roll of a die yields an
even number can be understood as the degree of belief that the proposition “the
roll of the die yields an even number” is true. Thus any motivation for a particu-
lar mathematical modeling of propositions also provides a motivation for using the
same model for events.
In philosophy and classical logic, propositions are regularly associated with sets.
This idea at least dates back to the works of Boole and Venn in the 19th cen-
tury. The standard way to make the identification with sets is to construct the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra from some formal language L. If L obeys classical logic
this algebra is Boolean. Stone’s representation theorem then shows that this algebra
can be identified with an algebra of sets. In short, if one accepts that ultimately
probabilities are the kind of things to be assigned to propositions, and that classical
logic is correct, then one ends up with a Boolean algebra of sets as the domain of
probability functions.3 Admittedly, this does not immediately give one the classical
probability framework. The algebras obtained need not be a σ-algebras, and the
sets come equipped with a special topology (i.e., the Stone topology). However,
these are just details in comparison to the mismatch with the quantum framework.
3It seems then that Popper (1959, p. 320) was somewhat reckless when criticizing Kolmogorov’s
framework as being “less ‘formal”’ than his own because “He [Kolmogorov] interprets the arguments
of the probability functor as sets” (emphasis in original) while priding himself for being completely
silent about what kind of mathematical objects are in the domain of his own probability functions.
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One therefore cannot just replace the classical event structure with a non-
Boolean structure and keep the classical interpretations as if nothing has changed.
This of course does not imply that L(H) cannot play the role of an event-set. But it
makes any approach that takes this role as a separate fundamental assumption sus-
pect. The aim then of this part of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding
of L(H). In other words, the focus is on quantum logic.4
I start in this chapter and the next one with a direct approach. That is, I take
the set L(H) as given and investigate the possibility to view this set as an algebraic
structure of propositions. The obvious starting point is a discussion of the orthodox
quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), which is given in section 8.2.
For reasons discussed in section 8.3, this logic is found to be unsatisfactory for
providing a direct conceptual foundation for quantum probability. Consequently,
one has to make a departure from L(H), possibly by expanding it into a larger
set of propositions. The new logic of quantum propositions is then supposed to
better fit with the correct way of reasoning about such propositions. In section
8.4 I motivate why an appeal to intuitionistic logic can be useful in the search for
such an expansion of L(H). This motivation bases itself on a parallel between an
empiricist stance in science and a constructivist stance in mathematics. Chapter
9 is devoted to the study of a particular kind of expansion of L(H) that builds
on the work of Coecke (2002). Although the algebraic structure obtained (a weak
Heyting algebra) provides some useful insights, it remains conceptually vague due
to its mostly mathematically motivated construction.
In chapter 10 the strategy is turned around by adopting a more conceptual ap-
proach. That is, I start with a minimal set of propositions about quantum measure-
ments, and then expand to obtain an algebraic structure that adheres to empirical
constraints posed by quantum mechanics. This first leads to the construction of
the Heyting algebra that has also been derived by Caspers et al. (2009) within a
topos-theoretical approach, but that is now given a conceptual derivation rather
than a mathematical one. The upshot is that the Heyting algebra automatically
has a clear interpretation. The algebra is then further expanded so as to obtain a
Boolean algebra of empirical quantum propositions. That is, an empiricist quantum
logic is derived that is completely classical. Chapter 11 is devoted to investigating
probability functions on this new algebraic structure. It is shown that every quan-
tum probability function can be identified with a conditional probability function
on the Boolean algebra. Thus an empiricist reformulation of quantum probability
is obtained.
4I adopt a relaxed attitude towards the meaning of the term ‘logic’. For me, a logic can be any
algebraic structure that represents some aspect of a set of propositions as well as the way they
hang together.
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8.2 Orthodox quantum logic
In this section the formalism of orthodox quantum logic (OQL) is presented. Usu-
ally, this formalism is introduced by making an analogy with the way classical logic
derives from the state space formalism of classical mechanics (Isham, 1995). Propo-
sitions are then identified with sets of states, and logical connectives are introduced
by suggesting manipulations of these sets. The downside of this approach for the
present discussion is that it starts from the idea that projections can be seen as
propositions, which is the very idea that is being questioned here. Instead, I pro-
vide a short derivation of OQL from the formalism of quantum probability. The
upshot of this approach is that OQL necessarily presents itself to us as part of the
quantum formalism, in that there are no real philosophical choices involved in the
adoption of OQL. Rather, the philosophical work lies in providing an understanding
of the role of this structure. Minimally, it is just a mathematical oddity that has
no conceptual role to play, and maximally it points us towards a reinvestigation of
what kind of reasoning is correct in a world in which quantum mechanics is true.
I take it that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. But before
one can investigate where precisely, one has to know what OQL is.
To understand how one can derive quantum logic from quantum probability it is
useful to consider a classical analogy. In the classical case the probability function
is a map P : F → [0, 1], where F is some σ-algebra. The structural properties of
P are reflections of the the structure of the σ-algebra F . Specifically, as a set of
subsets, F has the natural partial order
∆1 ≤ ∆2 iff ∆1 ⊂ ∆2. (8.1)
This partial order also has another possible characterization.
Proposition 8.1. For a measurable space (Ω,F), for every ∆1,∆2, ∆1 ≤ ∆2 if
and only if P(∆1) ≤ P(∆2) for every probability measure P on (Ω,F).
Proof. Suppose ∆1 ≤ ∆2. Then for every probability measure P it holds that
P(∆1) = P(∆1 ∩∆2) ≤ P(∆1 ∩∆2) + P(∆c1 ∩∆2) = P(∆2). (8.2)
Conversely, suppose ∆1 is not a subset of ∆2. Then ∆3 := ∆1 ∩∆c2 is not empty.
Now choose P such that P(∆3) = 1. Then P(∆1) = 1 6≤ 0 = P(∆2), which is a
contradiction.
The partial order on F may thus also be understood as a structure imposed on
it by the set of all probability functions. In an analogous way a relation may be
introduced on L(H) that turns it into a partial ordered set.
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Theorem 8.1. The relation
P1 ≤ P2 iff ∀P : P(P1) ≤ P(P2) (8.3)
is a partial order on L(H).
Proof. From the properties of probability functions it follows directly that this re-
lation is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive). With a little more effort it can
be seen that it is also antisymmetric. What has to be shown for this is that if
P(P1) = P(P2) for all P, then P1 = P2. The proof relies on the following three
identities.
PPPψ = PPψ, PPP⊥ψ = 0 and ‖Pψ‖ = ‖ψ‖
√
Tr(PPψ)
for every projection operator P and every vector ψ, where
P⊥ := 1−P (8.4)
denotes the orthocomplement of P , and PPψ is the projection onto the line spanned
by Pψ, i.e.,
PPψφ :=
〈Pψ, φ〉
〈Pψ, Pψ〉Pψ. (8.5)
Now suppose for two projections P1, P2 that P(P1) = P(P2) for all P, then
‖P2ψ − P1ψ‖ =‖(P2 − P1)P1ψ + (P2 − P1)P⊥1 ψ‖
≤‖(P2 − P1)P1ψ‖+ ‖(P2 − P1)P⊥1 ψ‖ = ‖P⊥2 P1ψ‖+ ‖P2P⊥1 ψ‖
=‖P1ψ‖
√
Tr(P⊥2 PP1ψ) + ‖P⊥1 ψ‖
√
Tr(P2PP⊥1 ψ
)
=‖P1ψ‖
√
Tr(P⊥1 PP1ψ) + ‖P⊥1 ψ‖
√
Tr(P1PP⊥1 ψ
) = 0,
where in the last line it was used that P 7→ Tr(PPP1ψ) and P 7→ Tr(PPP⊥1 ψ)
are probability functions for all P1 and ψ and that P(P1) = P(P2) if and only if
P(P⊥1 ) = P(P⊥2 ).
This theorem establishes that quantum probability functions introduce a partial
order on L(H) analogous to the way classical probability functions introduce a
partial order on F . The partial order on F is the one associated with the usual
lattice structure: the join of two sets corresponds to the union, and their meet with
the intersection. Note that, given a partially ordered set, the meet and join of two
elements (if they exist) are unique. Thus union and intersection are operations
that derive from the partial order of set-inclusion. Similarly, the meet and join in
the orthodox quantum logic of Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) (see also (von
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Neumann, 1932, §III.5)) derive from the partial order (8.3) on L(H). To see this it
is required to show that indeed every pair of projections has a meet and a join with
respect to the partial order (8.3). This, in turn, is best shown by proving that the
partial order is equivalent to the usual one.
Proposition 8.2. Let (L(H),≤) be the poset with ≤ given by (8.3), then
P1 ≤ P2 iff P1H ⊂ P2H iff P1P2 = P2P1 = P1. (8.6)
Proof. Start with the first left-to-right implication. Suppose P1 ≤ P2 and let ψ ∈
P1H. By making use of the fact that P 7→ Tr(PPψ) is a probability function, it
follows that
‖ψ − P2ψ‖2 =‖P⊥2 ψ‖2 = ‖ψ‖2 Tr(P⊥2 Pψ)
=‖ψ‖2 (1− Tr(P2Pψ)) ≤ ‖ψ‖2 (1− Tr(P1Pψ)) = 0.
(8.7)
Thus P2ψ = ψ and ψ ∈ P2H.
Now consider the second left-to-right implication. Because P2 is idempotent, it
follows directly from P1H ⊂ P2H that P2P1 = P1. The second equation is obtained
by taking adjoints:
P1P2 = ((P1P2)
∗)∗ = (P ∗2P
∗
1 )
∗ = (P2P1)∗ = P ∗1 = P1. (8.8)
The last step closes the loop. Suppose P1P2 = P2P1 = P1, and define P3 :=
P2 − P1. Then P3 is a projection operator:
P ∗3 = (P2 − P1)∗ = P ∗2 − P ∗1 = P2 − P1 = P3,
P 23 = (P2 − P1)(P2 − P1) = P2 − P1P2 − P2P1 + P1 = P2 − P1 = P3.
(8.9)
It also follows directly that P3 and P1 are orthogonal. Finally then, for every
probability function P, one has
P(P1) ≤ P(P1) + P(P3) = P(P1 + P3) = P(P2). (8.10)
Proposition 8.2 shows that the partial order on L(H) can be identified with the
convenient partial order of set inclusion on the set of subsets of H of the form PH
for P ∈ L(H), i.e., there is an isomorphism (L(H),≤) ' (L′(H),⊂) with
L′(H) := {PH | P ∈ L(H)} . (8.11)
The upshot is that meets and joins of projection operators can be understood as
operations on sets provided one restricts attention to the closed linear subspaces.
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So P1∧P2 identifies with the biggest subspace PH that satisfies PH ⊂ P1H∩P2H,
and P1 ∨P2 with the smallest subspace PH that satisfies P1H∪P2H ⊂ PH. What
is needed now is a way to characterize sets of the form PH that helps to see that
these meets and joins indeed exist. This characterization is given by Theorem A.2
which states that a subset of H is of the form PH for some projection P if and only
if it is a closed linear subspace.
Showing the existence of meets and joins for closed linear subspaces is relatively
straightforward. For any two closed linear subspaces K1,K2, the intersection is
again a closed linear subspace. This is also the largest linear subspace that is a
subspace of both K1 and K2. Thus
K1 ∧ K2 = K1 ∩ K2. (8.12)
Similarly, for any pair of closed linear subspaces K1,K2 one can take the linear span
of all the vectors in K1 ∪ K2. Although this gives a linear subspace, in general it
will not be closed. This problem is solved by taking the closure of the set.5 Thus
K1 ∨ K2 = span(K1 ∪ K2). (8.13)
Since L(H) as a partially ordered set is isomorphic to the set of closed linear
subspaces with set inclusion, lattice operations on L(H) can be completely under-
stood in terms of the lattice operations on closed linear subspaces. Specifically, if
PK denotes the projection such that PKH = K, then
P1 ∨ P2 = PP1H∨P2H, P1 ∧ P2 = PP1H∧P2H, (8.14)
where the join and meet for closed linear subspaces are given by (8.13) and (8.12).
Although this shows the existence of joins and meets of projection operators, it
does not give a very insightful formulation of these operations. In some cases, a
clearer formulation can be given purely in terms of projection operators, as seen in
the following example.
Example 8.1. Suppose P1 and P2 are two compatible projection operators. Then
P1 ∧ P2 = P1P2,
P1 ∨ P2 = P1 + P2 − P1P2.
(8.15)
4
Thus far I have shown that quantum probability gives rise to a partial order
on L(H), which in turn introduces a join and meet that turn it into a lattice. In
5If K is a linear subspace, then its closure K consists of all the limits of all converging sequences
in K.
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the classical case the lattice structure on F gives rise to a unique complement. On
(L(H),≤), however, complements are not unique. For example, in C2 every pair
of unequal one-dimensional projection operators are complements of each other.
This is because any two vectors ψ1, ψ2 that aren’t on the same line, together span
the whole Hilbert space (Pψ1 ∨Pψ2 = 1). This non-uniqueness already implies that
(L(H),≤) is not Boolean. But despite this non-uniqueness, there is still a particular
complement singled out by quantum probability.
Theorem 8.2. For every P ∈ L(H) the orthocomplement P⊥ is the unique com-
plement that satisfies
P(P ) + P(P⊥) = 1 (8.16)
for all quantum probability functions P.
Proof. It is easy to check that the orthocomplement is a complement and satisfies
(8.16), so the task is to prove uniqueness. Suppose P ∈ L(H) and P c is a comple-
ment that satisfies (8.16), then it has to be shown that P c = P⊥. If ψ ∈ PH, then
‖P cψ‖2 =〈P cψ, P cψ〉 = 〈ψ, P cψ〉
= Tr(PψP
c) = Pψ(P
c) = 1− Pψ(P ) = 0.
(8.17)
If ψ ∈ P⊥H, then
‖ψ − P cψ‖2 =‖(1−P c)ψ‖2 = 〈(1−P c)ψ, (1−P c)ψ〉 = 〈ψ, (1−P c)ψ〉
= Tr(Pψ(1−P c)) = Tr(Pψ)− Tr(PψP c) = 1− (1− Pψ(P )) = 0.
(8.18)
Thus for arbitrary ψ ∈ H:
P cψ = P cPψ + P cP⊥ψ = 0 + P⊥ψ. (8.19)
This theorem provides the final step to conclude that the formalism of quantum
probability alone has all the ingredients to turn L(H) in a complemented lattice. To
conclude this section, let me state explicitly what is meant by orthodox quantum
logic in the remainder of this dissertation.
Definition 8.2. The orthodox quantum logic for a system described by a Hilbert
space H is the set L(H) of projection operators understood as a complemented
lattice (L(H),≤,∧,∨,⊥) with the lattice structure given by (8.3) and (8.4).
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8.3 The interpretation of orthodox quantum logic
In the previous section it was shown that orthodox quantum logic is part of the
package deal that is quantum probability. Also, in the introduction of this chapter
it was argued that any explanation of why L(H) would be an appropriate domain
for probability functions, is already halfway a conceptual foundation for quantum
probability. The tempting idea then is to put two and two together, and aim for
a physical interpretation of orthodox quantum logic as the basis for a conceptual
foundation for quantum probability. The aim of this section is to argue that a direct
physical interpretation of OQL cannot provide this basis.
There has been a vast amount of research in quantum logic over the past century,
and any evaluation is necessarily selective and incomplete. Most of this research
though isn’t tailored for the question at hand. Often it is purely mathematical
or, when a connection with probability is made, a primitive notion of probability
is presupposed. In other cases one usually adopts a primitive concept of events or
properties when thinking of the elements of L(H). That is of course fine for practical
purposes, but when one aims to interpret quantum probabilities without explaining
what the elements of L(H) are, one just replaces one mystery with another.
Probably the most radical (and possibly most familiar among philosophers)
attempt at interpreting orthodox quantum logic stems from Putnam (1968). In his
proposal the elements of L(H) are understood as expressing possible properties that
a quantum system can have, or, more accurately, as propositions expressing that the
system has a certain property. The projection operator µA(∆) is taken to represent
the proposition expressed by “the observable A has a value in ∆”, usually shortened
with the notation A ∈ ∆. The meet and join of the lattice are further understood as
expressing conjunctions and disjunctions of these propositions. On this reading of
quantum logic, particles always have a position and a momentum, as both X ∈ R3
and P ∈ R3 identify with the top-element of L(H), which is now understood as
expressing a tautology. More generally, every observable has a definite value by the
same argument.
There are several conceptual problems with Putnam’s account of quantum logic.
A very thorough debunking has been given by Dummett (1976).6 Instead of dis-
cussing these conceptual problems I just want to sketch one technical problem for
the view adopted by Putnam (see also (Friedman and Glymour, 1972)). When it
comes to properties, it is common to think that any system either has them or
doesn’t. If this is accepted, then there exists a function f : L(H)→ {0, 1} marking
6Much of the discussion has focused on whether in principle scientific discoveries can lead to a
revision of logic, and what such a revision could possibly mean (see also (Bacciagaluppi, 2009)).
Maudlin (2005) gives an overview of this historical episode marking the birth and death of quantum
logic in this form. But see (Griffiths, 2014) for an attempt to reanimate the view with slight
modifications.
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for every property whether the system has it (value 1), or doesn’t (value 0). Further
assuming that the meets and joins on L(H) express conjunctions and disjunctions,
requires this function to be a lattice homomorphism. But it is a corollary of the
Kochen-Specker theorem that (if dim(H) > 2) no such function exists. So one of
the assumptions has to go. Either there aren’t any truth valuations, or meets and
joins do not (always) express conjunctions and disjunctions. Putnam hoped to keep
both assumptions in place. It is not surprising, then, that he later rejected his own
proposal (Putnam, 1994 ; 2005).
Putnam aimed for much more than what I’m after here. The identification of
elements of L(H) with possible properties of a system puts forward a metaphysical
picture. If the picture were consistent this could point to a solution of the mea-
surement problem when one thinks of measurements as revealing properties of a
system. The quantum probabilities could then just be probabilities about actually
possessed properties. But this approach (if it were to work) presupposes too much
metaphysics and leads towards a narrow conception of quantum probability. I do
not aim to solve the measurement problem though, and neither do I aim to provide
an ontology for quantum mechanics.
A broader conception of quantum logic would be obtained by adopting an em-
piricist approach. In such an approach it is more fitting to try to think of the
elements of L(H) as experimental propositions: propositions about measurements
and their outcomes of the kind one can ascribe probabilities to. This is also closer
to the approach of Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) themselves.7 Unsurprisingly,
their approach is more mathematical than philosophical, but it is nevertheless a
good starting point for philosophical discussion. In good mathematical fashion, one
of the first things one finds in their paper is a definition of experimental propositions.
Definition 8.3. For a set {A1, . . . , An} of commuting observables the observation
space is given by the Cartesian product of their spectra
O(A1, . . . , An) := σ(A1)× · · · × σ(An). (8.20)
A subset8 ∆ ⊂ O(A1, . . . , An) is called an experimental proposition concerning
O(A1, . . . , An).
The notion of an observation space can easily be adjusted to fit other theories
of physics. An experimental proposition is nothing more than a set of possible
7Although von Neumann (1932) smoothly intertwines use of the words “property”, “proposition”
and “event”, indicating that he may not have cared much about their distinctions in meaning, in
his collaboration with Birkhoff (1936) he was conspicuously more careful and consistent.
8In general, this will be a Borel set. In their paper, Birkhoff and von Neumann (ibid.) only
consider operators with discrete spectra, so all their experimental propositions are automatically
measurable sets. For the sake of simplicity and continuity I adopt the same assumption in this
section.
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measurement outcomes. There is nothing typically quantum about that. But an
important distinction noted by Birkhoff and von Neumann is that, in classical the-
ories, the connection between experimental propositions and the phase space (set
of pure states) is direct. In classical mechanics the phase space itself (i.e., the set of
all possible position and momentum configurations) is itself an observation space.
In quantum mechanics the connection between observation spaces and phase spaces
has to be made separately. This is done with another definition.
Definition 8.4. The mathematical representative of an experimental proposition
∆ ⊂ O(A1, . . . , An) is the set of vectors ψ in the Hilbert space for which there exists
an element (a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∆ such that
A1ψ = a1ψ, . . . , Anψ = anψ. (8.21)
For an observation space built from a single observable A and an experimen-
tal proposition ∆ ⊂ σ(A), the mathematical representative is just the subspace
µA(∆)H. More generally, it is the subspace9(∨
a∈∆
n∧
i=1
µAi(ai)
)
H. (8.22)
By the connection between projections and closed linear subspaces, every observa-
tion space selects a proper subspace of L(H) for its mathematical representatives.
When ranging over all possible observation spaces, eventually every element of L(H)
will be a mathematical representative of some experimental proposition. Thus L(H)
exhaustively provides the mathematical representatives of all experimental propo-
sitions.
Even if on rejects Putnam’s idea, one may still hope that orthodox quantum
logic provides a logic of experimental propositions in which the lattice operations
can be understood as logical connectives. In such an approach the elements of L(H)
need not represent properties, but instead refer to experimental propositions.10 The
meets and joins in L(H) could then represent conjunctions and disjunctions for these
properties. One may distinguish two assumptions that would establish such a view.
OQL1 The mathematical representative of an experimental proposition captures
all relevant aspects of this proposition.
OQL2 Disjunctions and conjunctions of experimental propositions are once again
experimental propositions.
9I adopt here the short-hand notation µ(a) = µ({a}) for singleton sets.
10Or one could go one step further and have the elements refer to dispositional properties that
are only instantiated (assigned a truth value) in the event of a measurement.
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The first assumption expresses the idea that, when going from the observation
spaces O(A1, . . . , An) to the set of mathematical representatives L(H), nothing
essential is “lost in translation”. That is, it is meaningful to think of projection op-
erators themselves as expressing experimental propositions. The second assumption
establishes that the disjunction (or conjunction) of two experimental propositions
can again be represented by an element of L(H). Because the disjunction of two
experimental propositions is the strongest proposition that is weaker than both of
the disjuncts, the only available element in L(H) to be associated with it is the join
of the mathematical representatives of the disjuncts. I shall now argue that, given
OQL1, the meet and join cannot both be identified with conjunction and disjunction
respectively. This, then, will be taken to motivate that, to understand L(H), one
has to first go beyond orthodox quantum logic, which is done in the next chapter.
This should not be taken as a defense of the idea that OQL1 is unproblematic. In
fact, in chapter 10 OQL1 is no longer assumed to hold.
Although experimental propositions have been given a sound mathematical rep-
resentative, physically, it is not entirely clear how these representatives should match
to propositions. A demand for a clear physical interpretation may be seen to follow
from Bohr’s doctrine that “all well-defined experimental evidence, even if it cannot
be analyzed in terms of classical physics, must be expressed in ordinary language
making use of common logic” (1948, p. 317). What kind of expression in ordinary
language would fit the experimental propositions of quantum mechanics? To answer
this question, consider first a simple example of the measurement of the spin of a
spin-12 particle in the r-direction. The mathematical representatives of the relevant
experimental propositions satisfy the relations
µSr
(
1
2
) ∨ µSr (−12) = µSr ({−12 , 12}) = 1,
µSr
(
1
2
) ∧ µSr (−12) = µSr (∅) = 0 . (8.23)
Classical intuition suggests adopting Putnam’s proposal and identifying these
experimental propositions with the revelations of properties of the system. But, as
noted above, this runs into problems with the Kochen-Specker theorem (at least
when moving to spin-1 particles). The broader consequence of this theorem is that,
assuming OQL1 and OQL2, there is no consistent way to assign truth values to the
experimental propositions in L(H). Then, if Bohr’s “common logic” is construed
as “classical propositional logic”, we already run into problems. But the common
logic of everyday language is much broader, and allows for constructs for which the
existence of truth values may be contested. The right amount of wiggle room seems
to be available when making use of conditionals.11 Consider the following proposal:
11The idea that conditional sentences may not have truth values at least dates back to the work
of Adams (1975, Ch. 1). Often this view is accompanied with the view that conditionals do not
express propositions. Especially when having a truth value is considered a necessary condition for
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µA(∆)=ˆ“if A is measured, then the outcome lies in ∆”. (8.24)
Two not too controversial rules for conditionals are
(A→ B) ∧ (A→ C) = A→ (B ∧ C),
(A→ B) ∨ (A→ C) = A→ (B ∨ C). (8.25)
If one assumes these rules to hold, and further makes the idealization that a mea-
surement always yields an outcome, then the relations (8.23) come out true under
the reading (8.24).
The natural language translation of experimental propositions given by (8.24)
thus looks promising. Adopting the rules (8.25), orthodox quantum logic is easily
seen to work also for observables A with a richer spectrum. That is, it makes the
relations
n∨
i=1
µA(∆i) = µA
(
n⋃
i=1
∆i
)
,
n∧
i=1
µA(∆i) = µA
(
n⋂
i=1
∆i
) (8.26)
come out true. The Kochen-Specker theorem is furthermore circumvented by reject-
ing the existence of a global truth valuation f : L(H)→ {0, 1}. It is after all unclear
what the truth value of “if A is measured, then the outcome lies in ∆” would be
when in fact A is not measured. However, even on this liberal view on conditionals
as propositions without truth values, there are problems with this interpretation of
OQL.
Consider now the measurements of spin on a spin-12 particle along two distinct
directions r1 and r2. In OQL the following relations hold:
µSr1
(
1
2
) ∨ µSr2 (12) = 1,
µSr1
(
1
2
) ∧ µSr2 (12) = 0 . (8.27)
These relations do not follow from (8.24). On the other hand, they do not directly
violate it either. One of the difficulties of assessing these propositions is that there
are no situations in which the antecedents of the conditionals µSr1 (
1
2) and µSr2 (
1
2)
are both true. In keeping with the earlier line of argument, one would then expect
that conjunctions and disjunctions of these conditionals never have a truth value.
But (8.27) suggest that they should be attributed a truth value. Now, although
the assigned truth values (1 for the disjunction, and 0 for the conjunction) are not
a sentence to express a proposition. Here I permit myself some sloppiness to avoid falling too deep
in the complicated philosophy of conditionals.
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directly in conflict with (8.24), they lack an explanation, if only for why the the two
values are different.
But the real problem comes in when looking at legitimate translations into
natural language. In particular, consider the following false derivation:
µSr1
(
1
2
)
= µSr1
(
1
2
) ∧ (µSr2 (12) ∨ µSr2 (−12)) , (8.28a)
µSr1
(
1
2
) ∧ (µSr2 (12) ∨ µSr2 (−12))
=
(
µSr1
(
1
2
) ∧ µSr2 (12)) ∨ (µSr1 (12) ∧ µSr2 (−12)) , (8.28b)(
µSr1
(
1
2
) ∧ µSr2 (12)) ∨ (µSr1 (12) ∧ µSr2 (−12)) = 0∨0 = 0 . (8.28c)
This derivation is both false in OQL and in the natural language translation given
by (8.24). The problem is that in both cases it fails for different reasons. It fails in
OQL due to the failure of distributivity, i.e., equation (8.28b) is false. On the other
hand, this step seems fine when using the reading (8.24). The use of conditionals
would rather point to the rejection of the third equality (8.28c). That is, while
the conjunction of the antecedents of µSr1 (
1
2) and µSr2 (
1
2) may be a contradiction,
there is no clear reason to believe that the conjunction of the two conditionals should
therefore also be a contradiction. In fact, in natural language one can easily come
up with examples in which the conjunction would seem to be true. For example,
it seems fine to sometimes attribute the truth value 1 to the conjunction “If I were
alone, I would cry. And if I were with you, I’d be home and dry.” (Waters, 1970).
More generally, though, the rejection of the second step (8.28b) just seems wrong
simply because distributivity holds in natural language. This, then, is the main
reason that assumptions OQL1 and OQL2 cannot both be true. Thus the conclusion
is that a direct implementation of OQL as a logic for experimental propositions in
which joins and meets can function as disjunctions and conjunctions is not possible.
But a more positive message is that L(H) need not be too far off for this goal, and
so one may opt to only reject OQL2.
This proposal also seems natural considering how far the introduction of con-
ditionals has brought us. Assuming that this proposal is correct, it points to a
particular failure of OQL2. For example, what seems to be missing are proposi-
tions that allow conjunctions of the form µSr1 (
1
2) ∧ µSr2 (12) that are distinct from
contradictions. But more elementary, the simpler propositions that are used as an-
tecedents and consequents for the conditionals are also missing. Thus assumption
OQL2 has to be rejected in favor of an expansion of the collection of propositions.
This option is investigated in chapter 9. In that chapter (and later ones) I make
liberal use of ideas from intuitionistic logic. As some readers may feel some unease
with such ideas, I end this chapter with a section with a short motivation for ap-
pealing to intuitionistic logic; both for why one could accept the use of this kind of
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non-classical logic in general, and for why it could be useful for quantum mechanics
in particular.
8.4 Motivating intuitionistic logic
In this section I explain why it is useful to have an open mind about intuitionistic
logic when the aim is to find a suitable empiricist logic for quantum mechanics.
What follows is not a defense of the necessity of intuitionistic logic, but rather of
its possibility. The arguments are meant to persuade the reader of the idea that
a change from orthodox quantum logic to intuitionistic quantum logic would be a
step forward instead of just replacing one failure of classical logic (distributivity)
with another one (the law of excluded middle). To start with, I give two examples
of cases where quantum mechanics may be taken to suggest a failure of the law
of excluded middle. After that, I give a more general discussion about the use of
intuitionistic logic in constructive mathematics, and how this use could potentially
be translated to an empiricist stance in physics.
The prime candidate for the role of negation in orthodox quantum logic is the
orthocomplement. Assuming for the moment also that the join expresses disjunction
in orthodox quantum logic, then the law of excluded middle may be seen to hold:
∀P ∈ L(H) : P ∨ P⊥ = 1 . (8.29)
Consequently, for any pair P1, P2 ∈ L(H), P1 is equivalent to P1 ∧ (P2 ∨ P⊥2 ). On
the other hand, there are cases for which both P1 ∧ P2 and P1 ∧ P⊥2 are associated
with a contradiction. An example is given by (8.28). In such a case, the proposition
P1 is seen to be incompatible both with P2 and with P
⊥
2 . It thus presents itself as
a sort of excluded middle. So while orthodox quantum logic adopts a failure of the
law of distributivity to explain that (8.28) is invalid (thus rejecting (8.28b)), the
analysis just given shows that it is more natural to put the blame on a failure of the
law of excluded middle, rejecting (8.28a). And such was the conclusion of Popper:
the kind of change in classical logic which would fit what Birkhoff and
von Neumann suggest [. . . ] would be the rejection of the law of excluded
middle [. . . ], as proposed by Brouwer, but rejected by Birkhoff and von
Neumann (Popper, 1968).
Although Popper presents an interesting idea here, there is more wrong with
his paper than correct (Scheibe, 1974). For the present discussion it is useful to
focus on just one problem. In his argument, Popper appears to presuppose that
orthodox quantum logic was proposed by Birkhoff and von Neumann as a candidate
logic for reasoning within quantum mechanics. That is, he appears to attribute
Putnam’s proposal to their work. By doing this, he doesn’t seem to fully appreciate
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the fact that OQL is derived from quantum mechanics in a natural mathematical
way. There are no substantial philosophical choices involved in this derivation.
What Birkhoff and von Neumann did most of all, was to investigate from a broader
lattice-theoretical perspective the special properties of orthodox quantum logic (as
opposed to just comparing it to Boolean algebras). But they were careful not to
presuppose that the lattice operations identify with traditional logical connectives.
Indeed, their paper ends with the following question:
What experimental meaning can one attach to the meet and join of two
given experimental propositions? (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936)
Thus there is no proposal in their paper that distributivity should be given up as a
logical law to understand quantum mechanics.
What one has to take away from this is that, although Popper provides an
argument for the use of intuitionistic logic, he doesn’t recognize that adopting such
a proposal requires more work. Orthodox quantum logic is given to us as part
of quantum mechanics. If one finds intuitionistic logic conceptually more suitable,
then one has to construct a framework that incorporates this. At the very least,
one needs a Heyting algebra of propositions that in some way relates to the lattice
L(H). Specifically, as the proposal requires that the disjunction of P with P⊥ does
not equal unity, the join in L(H) has to be replaced with something else (say ∨I),
and L(H) as a set has to be extended to make room for the new elements P ∨I P⊥.
A construction like this will in fact be given in the next chapter.12
The above argument for intuitionistic logic is quite mathematical in nature, and
the reader may not yet be convinced that pursuing an intuitionistic quantum logic
is very relevant from a physical point of view. One may suspect that conceptually
there is still not much to be gained by going to intuitionistic logic. So for a second
argument I turn to one of the masters in avoiding unnecessary mathematical jargon.
According to Feynman, the double-slit experiment “has in it the heart of quantum
mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery” (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands,
1963, p. 37-2). He admits that he cannot give a fully physical explanation of the
phenomenon. Instead, he arrives at a Copenhagen-like compromise, concluding
that, if done correctly, quantum mechanics does provide an accurate description of
the phenomenon:
What we must say (to avoid making wrong predictions) is the follow-
ing. If one looks at the holes or, more accurately, if one has a piece
of apparatus which is capable of determining whether the electrons go
through hole 1 or hole 2, then one can say that it goes either through
hole 1 or hole 2. But, when one does not try to tell which way the
electron goes, when there is nothing in the experiment to disturb the
12Although the lattice constructed will not be a Heyting algebra, but a weak Heyting algebra.
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electrons, then one may not say that an electron goes either through
hole 1 or hole 2. If one does say that, and starts to make any deductions
from the statement, he will make errors in the analysis. This is the
logical tightrope on which we must walk if we wish to describe nature
successfully. (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands, 1963, p. 37-9)
Intuitionistic logic may now be seen as a possible attempt to formalize Feynman’s
tightrope. When “going through hole 2” is thought of as the negation of “going
through hole 1”, a rejection of the universal validity of the law of excluded middle
provides a way to avoid making errors in the analysis of the double slit experiment.
Although the two arguments just given point towards the idea that rejecting the
law of excluded middle within the context of quantum mechanics may be natural,
they do not yet indicate what it means to in fact adopt intuitionistic logic within
a scientific theory. It deserves to be stressed that the use of intuitionistic logic
does not help in understanding the physical processes behind phenomena like the
double slit experiment. If anything, it distances us from the metaphysics behind
quantum mechanics. To say that “going through hole 1 or going through hole 2”
isn’t a tautology, while at the same time accepting that the two disjunctions are
each other’s negation, is to admit that one doesn’t know what is really going on.
Instead, it is better to think of intuitionistic logic as a tool for correct reasoning
about physical phenomena in the absence of a metaphysical picture and with an
emphasis on the empirical content. To clarify this viewpoint, it is useful to draw a
parallel with mathematics.
Constructive mathematics13 is (in)famous for denying the truth of certain well-
established theorems in classical mathematics. Formally this is the case whenever
a proof requires the use of the law of excluded middle. But to understand why this
use is considered to be troublesome, it is useful to discuss an explicit Brouwerian
counterexample.14 Consider the following mathematical statement:
∀x ∈ R : x ≥ 0 or x ≤ 0. (8.30)
In classical mathematics this statement can be proven, but in constructive math-
ematics this is not the case. For the constructivist, a proof for (8.30) requires
providing a method that can be used to show for any given real number x whether
x ≥ 0 or x ≤ 0. That is, for every x one has to be able (in principle) to decide
which of the two disjuncts is true.
13Constructive mathematics is an approach in mathematics that rejects ‘non-constructive’ meth-
ods such as proof by contradiction, or unrestricted use of the axiom of choice. Intuitionistic math-
ematics is a sub-branch of constructive mathematics that strictly follows the methods of Brouwer.
A helpful introduction to these distinctions is provided by Iemhoff (2013).
14Brouwer presented his first so-called weak counterexample in 1908. In (Brouwer, 1929) he gave
an example of a number “floating around zero”, of which the example given here is a version. For
more on weak counterexamples see (Mandelkern, 1989; van Atten, 2011).
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An explicit example can be given to demonstrate that this is not possible in gen-
eral. A real number in Cauchy’s sense is an (equivalence class represented by an)
infinite sequence (q1, q2, q3, . . .) of rational numbers. This means that the construc-
tion of a real number is never really finished. Consequently, the rule that specifies
the real number need not be entirely definite either. It suffices if one has a rule
that allows one to construct the finite sequence (q1, q2, . . . , qn) for every n (and, of
course, it should satisfy the Cauchy-criterion). This allows, for example, for the
definition of the sum of two real numbers, which is done by point-wise summing the
elements of the two sequences, without requiring that the sequence is “finished”.
Now as an explicit example consider, for any natural number k ∈ N, the real
number xk defined by the sequence
(xk)n =
{
(−1)n
n+1 n ≤ k,
(−1)k
k+1 n > k.
(8.31)
Given the value of k, it is easy to decide whether xk ≤ 0 or xk ≥ 0. But instead of
taking a natural number, one may also let k depend on the development of another
mathematical program. Define k99 as the first place in the decimal expansion of pi
that is preceded by a sequence of 99 nines. The value of k99, and even the question
whether it exists or not, is an open problem in mathematics, possibly one that will
never be solved. Nevertheless, (8.31) still defines a Cauchy sequence, because for
every n ∈ N one can determine the value of (xk99)n simply by going through the
decimal expansion of pi up to point n. Consequently, xk99 is a real number for which
one cannot decide whether xk99 ≤ 0 or xk99 ≥ 0.
A possible response to this argument may be that, irrespective of our knowledge
about pi, there is a fact of the matter determining whether k99 exists and, if it does,
whether it is even or odd. Consequently, even if we do not know whether xk99 ≤ 0 or
xk99 ≥ 0, there is still some fact determining which one is the case. The assumption
that there are such facts is known as Platonism. Roughly speaking, this is the
mathematical equivalent of realism in philosophy of science, and similarly, it is not
accepted by everyone.15 Another response may be that (8.30) is simply true because
it follows from the axioms together with the laws of logic. These laws themselves
are then considered to be in no further need of justification: they simply form the
basis for mathematical truth (a view known as logicism). A third option, known
as formalism, is that (8.30) is true because the string of symbols that make up the
formula can be arrived at by using the agreed upon rules of symbol manipulations
that make up mathematics. The conundrum is then solved by deflating the notion
of mathematical truth.
But one need not dwell on the philosophy of mathematics to find an apprecia-
tion for constructive mathematics. Also if one accepts that perhaps in some way
15A classical argument against Platonism is given by Benacerraf (1973).
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statements like (8.30) are true, it is nevertheless the case that, epistemically, there
are mathematical facts that we do not have access to. From such a point of view,
while perhaps the statement “xk99 ≤ 0 or xk99 ≥ 0” may be considered to be true,
pragmatically, it also verges on being vacuous, since one cannot decide which of
the two options is the case. These kinds of mathematical statements may not be
the ones we are interested in. This more pragmatic motivation for constructive
mathematics has been colorfully defended by Bishop:
Mathematics belongs to man, not to God. We are not interested in
properties of the positive integers that have no descriptive meaning for
finite man. When a man proves a positive integer to exist, he should
show how to find it. If God has mathematics of his own that needs to
be done, let him do it himself. (Bishop, 1967, p. 2)
This should strike a chord with any physicist who found that not all mathematics
courses were as useful as (s)he hoped they would be. At some point the disap-
pointment kicks in when learning, for example, that a mathematical proof for the
existence of a solution to some integral doesn’t always provide the solution of said
integral, and it is the latter that is usually needed in practice. The reason is that
such proofs are often done by contradiction, and thus they do not point towards an
actual solution.
The use of intuitionistic logic in mathematics may thus be understood as a
consequence of adopting an epistemic view. To say that some statement is true is
to state that one has a proof for it: one knows it to be true. Similarly, to say that a
number with certain properties exists means that one has a construction by which
one knows which number has these properties.
In physics, more important than the aspect of knowing, is the aspect of ex-
periencing. The scientific analog of the mathematical epistemic view, then, is an
empirical one. To say that “the particle went through slit 1” is true, is to have the
scientific equivalent of a proof for this statement: the performance of a measurement
that shows that the particle went through slit 1. Measurement then plays the role
of a scientific equivalent of proof in mathematics. Hence, the use of intuitionistic
logic within physics, like its use within mathematics, may be given a pragmatic mo-
tivation. Such a pragmatic stance may be found in the words of Bohr (as quoted by
Petersen (1963, p. 12)): “It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out
how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature”, which is reminis-
cent of the words of Bishop. What is being denied is not the idea of an underlying
reality, but, rather, the idea that one should give a description of this reality. It
suffices to give a description of what we can experience. It is not surprising that
intuitionistic logic can play a helpful role in such a description.
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9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, in section 8.3, it was suggested that the peculiarity of ortho-
dox quantum logic (in particular, the failure of distributivity) may be a consequence
of the incompleteness of L(H) (in particular, of a failure of OQL2). However, it is
quite a non-trivial task to determine what precisely is missing. In section 8.3 the
assumption that projections represent conditional propositions suggested that there
may be elements in L(H) representing propositions, while the conjunction of these
propositions has no mathematical representative in L(H). In section 8.4, on the
other hand, it was suggested that, when adopting an intuitionistic perspective, dis-
junctions of experimental propositions can no longer be identified with projections
in general. But these suggestions alone are too sketchy to form the basis for the
mathematical work required, which is to embed L(H) into a propositional lattice
that is at least distributive, and, preferably, a Heyting algebra (i.e., the intuition-
istic equivalent of a Boolean algebra). Therefore, a formal approach is adopted in
this chapter to find such an embedding. The hope is, then, that afterwards the
result may also be found to be conceptually adequate.
In this chapter I work with the idea suggested in section 8.4 rather than with the
one suggested in section 8.3. Although the suggestion that projections correspond
to conditional statements is an interesting and promising idea, it is also a difficult
idea to work with. Apart from the fact that it motivates expanding L(H) to incor-
porate elements that correspond to conjunctions of conditionals (by the rejection of
(8.28c)), it also requires introducing elements that correspond to the antecedents
and consequents of the conditionals (unless one is willing to except conditionals
as atomic propositions). On top of that, it is also the case that, even outside the
context of quantum mechanics, intuitions concerning conditionals are a poor guide
for constructing formal theories for them (Edgington, 2014). In contrast, when
adopting an intuitionistic perspective, there is hope that one can stay quite close
to L(H). The perspective only motivates the introduction of new disjunctions. In
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fact, conjunctions may be seen to be quite satisfactory. To see this, consider two
projections such that P1 ∧ P2 = 0. If this is the case, then P1 and P2 either refer
to measurement outcomes that contradict each other (when [P1, P2] = 0), or they
refer to measurements that are considered to be incompatible (when [P1, P2] 6= 0).
In either case, there is no empirical fact that could be interpreted as a ‘proof’ for
P1 ∧P2 and so the identification with 0 is appropriate. Therefore, keeping the con-
junctions of L(H) seems a good assumption, at least on a first pass, to keep things
simple.
The method adopted in this chapter builds on the work of Coecke (2002). This
is a natural place to start, as his paper is entitled “quantum logic in intuitionis-
tic perspective”. Mathematically, it relies on the theory of injective hulls devel-
oped by Bruns and Lakser (1970). This provides a formal method of embedding
meet-semilattices into Heyting algebras, where the embedding is given by a meet-
homomorphism (i.e., a map that does preserve meets and the partial order, but
that doesn’t necessarily preserve joins). Section 9.2 is devoted to explaining this
method when applied to L(H). The result is an embedding of L(H) into a Heyting
algebra DI(L(H)) that doesn’t preserve joins. Thus disjunctions of experimental
propositions are no longer identified with projections.
It turns out that the obtained Heyting algebra is in fact Boolean. The result
then doesn’t square well with the motivation drawn from section 8.4. There, the
idea that disjunctions do not correspond to elements of L(H) was related to a
rejection of the law of excluded middle. But this law does hold in DI(L(H)). In
section 9.3 a proposal is made to relieve this tension. The orthocomplement of L(H)
is transformed into a new negation on DI(L(H)), which behaves intuitionistically.
With this operation in place it is showed that DI(L(H)) can be turned into a so-
called weak Heyting algebra. The chapter ends in section 9.4 with a conceptual
reflection on the obtained results. It is concluded that, although the weak Heyting
algebra has promising and interesting features, a conceptual understanding of the
structure requires more work. In section 11.4 then, after developing an empiricist
quantum logic in chapter 10, a new connection is made with this weak Heyting
algebra.
9.2 Bruns-Lakser completion
The main formal slice of this section relies on work by Coecke (2002). It there-
fore deserves to be pointed out that his approach and motivation are somewhat
different from the one adopted here. In his paper, Coecke works in the tradition
of the Geneva-Brussels school of quantum logic (Jauch and Piron, 1969; Piron,
1976; Aerts, 1982; Moore, 1999). In this approach, elements of L(H) are viewed
as (testable) properties. They correspond to particular experiments for which the
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possible outcomes are 0 and 1, dubbed yes-no questions. For example, when a
measurement of P ∈ L(H) yields the outcome 0 this is identified with the system
not having the property P . Thus ‘property’ is given an operational rather than a
metaphysical meaning here. There is also a role for conjunctions in this framework.
The property P1 ∧ P2 corresponds to the experiment where an arbitrary choice is
made between the two experiments P1 and P2, and then taking the outcome of that
experiment as the value for P1 ∧ P2.
In the view of Coecke (2002), the elements of L(H) identify with propositions
about these properties. But, in the light of Birkhoff and von Neumann’s ques-
tion (see page 128) he recognizes that disjunctions of such propositions need not
correspond to properties. The program can then be summed up as follows:
if we want to describe a physical system by a “language” that is closed
under all disjunctions of properties, we formally need to introduce those
additional propositions that express disjunctions of properties and that
do not correspond to a property in the property lattice. (Coecke, 2002,
pp. 419–420)
As no assumptions are made on the precise meaning of the propositions in L(H),
the extension of the lattice takes an abstract route. In such an approach restraint
is a useful guide. The idea is to add just enough disjunctions of propositions in
L(H) to make the new lattice a Heyting algebra. The formal approach adopted to
establish this uses the theory of injective hulls of meet-semilattices as developed by
Bruns and Lakser (1970).1 This requires the introduction of some terminology.
Definition 9.1. A meet-semilattice L is called injective if for every pair of meet-
semilattices M1,M2 with M1 a sub-meet-semilattice of M2 and every homomor-
phism φ : M1 → L there exists an extension φ : M2 → L. That is, for every
M1,M2, φ there exists a homomorphism φ that makes the diagram
M1
M2
L
φ
φ
(9.1)
commute.
1Within the context of quantum logic, the Bruns-Lakser completion has also been studied by
Marsden (2010) and Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters (2012). In these works the construction is
compared to methods within topos-theoretical approaches to quantum theories. Since topos theory
plays virtually no role in this dissertation, it is hard to relate these results to the present discussion.
One caveat deserves to be mentioned though: in the next chapter a Heyting algebra is constructed
that also occurs in the topos-theoretical framework discussed by Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters
(ibid.). However, this fact seems to be somewhat coincidental.
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The interest in injective meet-semilattices stems from the fact that these objects
turn out to be complete Heyting algebras. More precisely, one can show that for
an injective meet-semilattice arbitrary meets and joins always exist and that they
satisfy the relation
a ∧
∨
b∈M
b =
∨
b∈M
(a ∧ b) (9.2)
for all a and M . This relation allows the definition of the relative pseudo-comple-
ment a → b := ∨ {c | c ∧ a ≤ b}. Conversely, one can show that every complete
Heyting algebra is an injective meet-semilattice (Bruns and Lakser, 1970).
The upshot is that instead of looking for the smallest complete Heyting algebra
that embeds a given meet-semilattice (L(H) in our case), one can look for the
smallest injective meet-semilattice. This notion is captured by the concept of an
injective hull of a meet-semilattice L. An injective meet-semilattice H is an injective
hull of the meet-semilattice L if there exists an injective homomorphism φ : L→ H
and if for any other injective meet-semilattice H ′ that satisfies this criterion there
is also an embedding of H into H ′. In the form of a diagram one thus has:
H
H ′
L
φ
φ′
(9.3)
The injective hull of L may be shown to be unique up to isomorphism.2 So what is
needed now is a helpful characterization of injective hulls of meet-semilattices. This
was also given by Bruns and Lakser, using the following terminology.
Definition 9.2. Let L be a meet-semilattice. A subset A ⊂ L is called admissible
if
∨
a∈A a exists and for every b ∈ L the join
∨
a∈A(b ∧ a) exists as well and equals
b ∧∨a∈A a. A non-empty subset I of L is called an ideal if
∀a ∈ I, ∀b ∈ L : if b ≤ a, then b ∈ I. (9.4)
An ideal I is called distributive if
∨
a∈A ∈ I for every admissible set A ⊂ I.
Now let DI(L) denote the set of distributive ideals in a meet-semilattice L. Set-
inclusion turns this into a partial ordered set. Furthermore, it is easy to see that
the intersection of two distributive ideals is again a distributive ideal, thus DI(L)
is a meet-semilattice. Bruns and Lakser proved the following result.
Theorem 9.1. For every meet-semilattice L every injective hull H is isomorphic
to DI(L).
2Injective hulls are usually defined as maximal essential extensions. But that terminology is
irrelevant for the present discussion. For details see (Coecke, 2002, p. 421).
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The embedding i : L→ DI(L) is given by assigning to each element a ∈ L the
corresponding down set
i(a) := ↓ a = {b ∈ L | b ≤ a} . (9.5)
The reader may check that this is indeed a meet-homomorphism. However, generally
it does not preserve joins even if L has joins. In fact, one then has that
↓ a1 ∨ ↓ a2 ≤ ↓(a1 ∨ a2). (9.6)
When equality fails the element ↓ a1 ∨ ↓ a2 may be viewed as the introduced dis-
junction that does not correspond to any element of L.
Example 9.1. Consider the non-distributive lattice known as N5 given by the
Hasse diagram
⊥
a
b
c
>
Distributivity can be seen to fail because
(a ∨ b) ∧ c = > ∧ c = c 6= a = a ∨ ⊥ = (a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ c). (9.7)
The set of ideals is given by
I(N5) = {↓⊥, ↓ a, ↓ b, ↓ c, ↓>, I1 := {⊥, a, b}, I2 := {⊥, a, b, c}} . (9.8)
The subsets A of I1 for which
∨
A /∈ I1 are {a, b} and {⊥, a, b}. Since both aren’t
admissible it follows that I1 is distributive. The ideal I2 on the other hand isn’t
distributive. The subset {b, c} of I2 is admissible since
(x ∧ b) ∨ (x ∧ c) = x = x ∧ (b ∨ c) (9.9)
for all x ∈ N5. But
∨{b, c} /∈ I2. The injective hull of N5 can then be represented
by the Hasse diagram
↓⊥
↓ a ↓ b
↓ c
↓>
I1
4
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As noted before, DI(L) is an injective meet-semilattice and may therefore be
understood as a complete Heyting algebra. Turning then to the case of L(H), the
new disjunctions are obtained by switching to DI(L(H)). But perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, it turns out in this case that DI(L(H)) is not a proper Heyting algebra,
but is in fact Boolean. Specifically, one has the following theorem.
Theorem 9.2. The lattices DI(L(H)) and P(L1(H)) are isomorphic (as complete
bounded lattices).
Here P(L1(H)) denotes the power set of the 1-dimensional projections, which is
clearly a Boolean algebra. The theorem is a special case of an example in (Coecke,
2002, p. 423). A direct proof of this version is given in (Hermens, 2013b, §2). Here
I will not go into the details of the proof, but instead illustrate what is going on
conceptually.
The result may be considered surprising against the background of the motiva-
tion for expanding the lattice L(H) on the basis of Popper’s analysis (see section
8.4). What was found unsatisfactory there, was the idea that in L(H) the join of P
and P⊥ is identified with a tautology even though there exist projections P ′ that
are incompatible with both P and P⊥. The new disjunctions in DI(L(H)) were
supposed to turn this around. That is, the idea was that the disjunction of P and
P⊥ would no longer correspond to a tautology by rejecting the law of excluded
middle. But now we find that the law of excluded middle does hold here. So what
has happened?
The answer to this question is that the introduction of a new disjunction forced
the introduction of a new negation. This deserves to be spelled out. The negation
in DI(L(H)) is defined as ¬I := I → {0}. This negation is much weaker than the
orthocomplement in quantum logic, because one has
↓P⊥ ≤ ¬↓P, ∀P ∈ L(H) (9.10)
with equality if and only if P = 0 or P = 1.
This of course doesn’t show yet how the negation on DI(L(H)) obeys the law of
excluded middle. This is better understood by looking at P(L1(H)). In this lattice
it is obvious that negation satisfies the law of excluded middle. How this stands in
relation to DI(L(H)) is best seen by explicitly defining the maps that connect the
lattices. The isomorphism f from P(L1(H)) to DI(L(H)) is defined as
f(∆) := {P ∈ L(H) | ↓P ∩ L1(H) ⊂ ∆} , (9.11)
and its inverse is given by
f−1(I) = I ∩ L1(H) =
⋃
P∈I
(↓P ∩ L1(H)) . (9.12)
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The existence of an isomorphism implies that there is also an embedding r of L(H)
into P(L1(H)) such that r = f−1 ◦ i. That is, there is a function r that makes the
diagram
L(H) DI(L(H))
P(L1(H))
i
r ∼
f
(9.13)
commute. One can show that this function is given by
r(P ) := ↓P ∩ L1(H). (9.14)
As the equivalent of i, the function r also obeys
r(P⊥) ≤ (r(P ))c , (9.15)
with equality if and only if P = 0 or P = 1. In fact, when equality doesn’t hold,
there is a huge gap between the two. Let P ′ ∈ L1(H) be any projection that doesn’t
commute with P ∈ L(H). Then P ′ is neither an element of r(P ) nor of r(P⊥). Or,
equivalently, P ′ ∈ (r(P ))c ∩ (r(P⊥))c. Thus while P ′ is incompatible with both P
and P⊥, this does not lead to a violation of the law of excluded middle because now
P ′ has become compatible with both the negation of P and the negation of P⊥. It
is not entirely clear though what to make of this.
Thus, in going from L(H) to DI(L(H)) not only the joins have changed, but
also the orthocomplement no longer identifies with negation. In fact, the whole
operation of orthocomplementation seems to have been lost. This is somewhat
dissatisfying for an operation that was thought to be relevant for reasoning about
experimental propositions. In the next section I show that this operation can be
re-introduced on DI(L(H)) and can be used to turn the lattice into a weak Heyting
algebra that is no longer Boolean.
9.3 An intuitionistic perspective
The objective of this section is to investigate how far one can get with introducing
a new operation on DI(L(H)) that behaves as the orthocomplement does on L(H).
The motivation is that with the introduction of such an operation one may find an
intuitionistic-like structure that fits with the original motivation for constructing
DI(L(H)). As in the previous section, the method used is rather formal. As such,
philosophical considerations play no fundamental role. It is only after the the formal
work has been done that the results can be subjected to philosophical reflections.
This is done in section 9.4.
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The goal is to introduce and then investigate a unary operation ∼: DI(L(H))→
DI(L(H)) that mimics the orthocomplement on L(H). That is, the operation is
required to satisfy
∼ ↓P = ↓P⊥ ∀P ∈ L(H). (9.16)
The introduction of ∼ turns out to be quite straightforward when turning attention
to P(L1(H)). Note that
r(P⊥) =
{
P ′ ∈ L1(H)
∣∣ P ′P = 0} . (9.17)
This suggests the definition
∼ ∆ := {P ′ ∈ L1(H) ∣∣ P ′P = 0 ∀P ∈ ∆} . (9.18)
It is easy to check that ∼ r(P ) = r(P⊥) for all P ∈ L(H), i.e., that (9.16) is
satisfied. Let us then call ∼ the pseudo-negation on P(L1(H)).
The pseudo-negation has many properties that are considered typical for the
negation in intuitionistic logic. For example, the equalities
∆∨ ∼ ∆ = >, (9.19a)
∼ ∆∨ ∼∼ ∆ = > (9.19b)
are satisfied if and only if ∆ = ⊥ or ∆ = >. On the other hand,
∼∼ (∆∨ ∼ ∆) = > (9.20)
holds for all ∆. Of the De Morgan laws, only
∼ ∆1∧ ∼ ∆2 =∼ (∆1 ∨∆2) (9.21)
holds for all ∆1,∆2, while the other law only holds in one direction:
∼ ∆1∨ ∼ ∆2 ≤∼ (∆1 ∧∆2), (9.22)
for all ∆1,∆2.
The pseudo-negation also provides a link between the join on L(H) and the join
on P(L1(H)). For any subset K ⊂ L(H), one has
∼∼
( ∨
P∈K
r(P )
)
= r
( ∨
P∈K
P
)
. (9.23)
This is reminiscent of the Go¨del-Gentzen double-negation translation of classical
logic into intuitionistic logic (Go¨del, 1933; Gentzen, 1936). This translation uses
the fact that, of every formula that may be proven in classical logic, the double
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negation can be proven in intuitionistic logic. Similarly, (9.23) can be seen to state
that, to translate the join in L(H) into P(L1(H)), one can’t just take the joins in
P(L1(H)) of each of the terms in the join translated individually using r. Instead,
one has to take the double-negation in P(L1(H)) after this operation. So one may
think of the join in L(H) to be more classical-like, and the join in P(L1(H)) to be
more intuitionistic-like.
These results strengthen the idea that ∼ introduces an intuitionistic negation.
On the other hand, it is also clear that it cannot really be an intuitionistic negation.
This is because the negation is always defined in terms of the relative pseudo-
complement (¬x := x → ⊥), which is unique if it exists. And for P(L1(H)) this
just gives the complement. So if ∼ is to be the pseudo-complement on a Heyting
algebra, this algebra, if it exists, has to be an extension of P(L1(H)). But instead
of searching for such an extension, one may wonder to what extent P(L1(H)) is
‘almost’ a Heyting algebra. That is, is it possible to introduce an implication →
that is ‘almost’ a relative pseudo-complement and satisfies
∼ ∆ = ∆→ ⊥ (9.24)
for all ∆? An appropriate formalism for investigating this question is that of weak
Heyting algebras as introduced by Celani and Jansana (2005).
Definition 9.3. A weak Heyting algebra (L,∨,∧,→) is a bounded distributive
lattice with an implication relation that satisfies for all a, b, c ∈ L
(i) a→ a = >,
(ii) a→ (b ∧ c) = (a→ b) ∧ (a→ c),
(iii) (a ∨ b)→ c = (a→ c) ∧ (b→ c),
(iv) (a→ b) ∧ (b→ c) ≤ a→ c.
This implication relation may be shown to have the following properties (proofs
can be found in (ibid.)):
(a) If a ≤ b, then for all c: c→ a ≤ c→ b and b→ c ≤ a→ c.
(b) If a ≤ b, then a→ b = >.
(c) For all a, b, c : (a→ b) ∧ (a→ c) ≤ a→ (b ∨ c).
These properties provide a useful guide for determining what an implication
relation on P(L1(H)) must look like if it is to satisfy (9.24). For ease of notation,
let P denote the singleton set {P} for P ∈ L1(H). As a special case of (b), note
that whenever P ∈ ∆
P → ∆ = >. (9.25)
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On the other hand, when P /∈ ∆ one has
P → ∆ (i)= (P → ∆) ∧ (P → P ) (ii)= P → ⊥ (9.24)= ∼ P . (9.26)
These two cases can be combined in a single relation using (9.20):
P → ∆ =∼∼ (∼ P ∨ (P ∧∆)) = {> P ∈ ∆,∼ P P /∈ ∆. (9.27)
Finally, if one assumes that (iii) also holds for arbitrary joins and meets, one finds
that the implication relation should satisfy
∆1 → ∆2 =
 ∨
P∈∆1
P
→ ∆1 = ∧
P∈∆1
(
P → ∆2
)
=
∧
P∈∆1
∼∼ (∼ P ∨ (P ∧∆2)) = ∧
P∈∆1\∆2
∼ P
(9.28)
for all ∆1,∆2 ∈ P(L1(H)), where the empty meet is identified with >. The next
theorem show that this implication relation indeed turns P(L1(H)) into a weak
Heyting algebra that satisfies (9.24).
Theorem 9.3. The map (∆1,∆2) 7→ ∆1 → ∆2, defined by
∆1 → ∆2 :=
∧
P∈∆1\∆2
∼ P , (9.29)
turns P(L1(H)) into a weak Heyting algebra and satisfies (9.24).
Proof. All that is required is to show that (i)-(iv) and (9.24) are satisfied. The first
one is trivial, and the others follow by writing out. For (ii):
∆1 → (∆2 ∧∆3) =
∧{∼ P ∣∣ P ∈ ∆1\(∆2 ∧∆3)}
=
 ∧
P∈∆1\∆2
∼ P
 ∧
 ∧
P∈∆1\∆3
∼ P

= (∆1 → ∆2) ∧ (∆1 → ∆3) .
(9.30)
For (iii):
(∆1 ∨∆2)→ ∆3 =
∧{∼ P ∣∣ P ∈ (∆1 ∨∆2)\∆3} = ∧
P∈∆1\∆3,
P∈∆2\∆3
∼ P
=
 ∧
P∈∆1\∆3
∼ P
 ∧
 ∧
P∈∆2\∆3
∼ P

= (∆1 → ∆3) ∧ (∆2 → ∆3) .
(9.31)
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For (iv):
(∆1 → ∆2) ∧ (∆2 → ∆3) =
 ∧
P∈∆1\∆2
∼ P
 ∧
 ∧
P∈∆2\∆3
∼ P

=
∧
P∈∆1\∆2,
P∈∆2\∆3
∼ P ≤
∧
P∈∆1\∆3
∼ P
=∆1 → ∆3.
(9.32)
And finally (9.24):
∆→ ⊥ =
∧
P∈∆
∼ P =∼ ∆. (9.33)
With the above considerations that led up to the definition of the implication
relation, it almost follows that the weak Heyting algebra is uniquely defined by
the pseudo-negation ∼. The only additional assumption was that (iii) holds for
arbitrary joins and meets. This assumption is not crucial though. In fact, for
Boolean lattices, if a pseudo-negation arises from a weak Heyting algebra structure,
then this structure is unique. Specifically, one has the following theorem:
Theorem 9.4. Let (L,∨,∧) be a bounded Boolean lattice and suppose both → and
→′ turn it into a weak Heyting algebra. If
a→ ⊥ = a→′ ⊥ (9.34)
for all a ∈ L, then →=→′.
Proof. As noted by Celani and Jansana (2005), for bounded Boolean lattices there is
a bijective correspondence between weak Heyting algebras (L,∨,∧,→) and normal
modal algebras (L,∨,∧,c ,♦). Specifically, every weak Heyting algebra is turned
into a normal modal algebra with the definition
♦a := (> → ac)c, (9.35)
where c denotes the complement. The converse mapping is given by a1 → a2 :=
(♦(a1 ∧ ac2))c.
Now let → and →′ be two implication relations that turn (L,∨,∧) into a weak
Heyting algebra, and let ♦ and ♦′ be their corresponding modal operations. Because
a→ ⊥ = a→′ ⊥ for all a ∈ L, it follows that
(♦a)c = (♦(a ∧ ⊥c))c = a→ ⊥ = a→′ ⊥ = (♦′(a ∧ ⊥c))c = (♦′a)c. (9.36)
Thus ♦ = ♦′ and consequently →=→′.
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Incidentally, this proof shows that apart from a completion of L(H) to a Heyting
algebra (that is in fact Boolean), the Bruns-Lakser construction together with the
introduction of the implication (9.29), also gives rise to a completion to a normal
modal algebra. These latter kind of completions for orthodox quantum logic have
also been studied by Kramer (2014). The normal modal algebra obtained here,
however, does not appear to be related in a clear way to the constructions studied
by Kramer (ibid.).
9.4 Evaluation
In the previous two sections I followed a formal approach to expand the orthodox
quantum logic L(H) to obtain a structure for which the label ‘logic’ is more ap-
propriate. Specifically, while it was suggested that the elements of L(H) do refer
to propositions, the lattice operations do not refer to logical connectives. With the
transition to the lattice P(L1(H)) a plenitude of new operations have been intro-
duced that may be candidates for logical connectives. Whether they can function
as such depends on which propositions the elements of L(H) were supposed to ex-
press. In the construction of P(L1(H)) though, nothing was assumed about this.
The benefit of this formal approach was that we could rely on a clean mathematical
method to make the expansion as minimal as possible. The downside is that we are
left with the question of interpretation. Bell’s warning appears to be apt here:
Now it is precisely in cleaning up intuitive ideas for mathematics that
one is likely to throw out the baby with the bathwater. (Bell, 1990, p.
106)
Have we really thrown out the baby with the bathwater? This depends on the goal,
with regard to which there is good news and bad news. Since the bad news leads
to a new research task, let me start with the good news.
Perhaps the most straightforward interpretation of P(L1(H)) arises from the
identification of 1-dimensional projections and rays, together with a realist inter-
pretation of rays as representing the states of quantum systems. A set ∆ ⊂ L1(H)
then refers to the proposition that the state corresponds to one of the 1-dimensional
projections in the set ∆. They are therefore propositions about the properties of a
system. There is then a clear sense in which the elements of ∆ ⊂ L1(H) arising from
L(H) may be called ‘testable’ properties in line with the Geneva-Brussels interpre-
tation, although the term falsifiable may be more apt: a single measurement can
suffice to show that the proposition r(P ) for some P ∈ L(H) does not hold, namely,
when a measurement of P yields the outcome 0. The complement of r(P ) then
corresponds to the proposition that the system does not have the property r(P ),
while ∼ r(P ) denotes the weakest falsifiable proposition that implies the negation
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of r(P ). The modal operation introduced in the proof of Theorem 9.4 also suits
this interpretation. Generally, this operation is given by
♦∆ = (> → ∆c)c =
( ∧
P∈∆
∼ P
)c
= (∼ ∆)c. (9.37)
In particular, ♦r(P ) corresponds to all states for which it is possible that a mea-
surement of P yields the value 1.
What I used implicitly in this analysis is the Born rule. For example, the sense of
‘possibility’ can be understood as meaning ‘non-zero probability’. This means that
on the given interpretation, the propositions in P(L1(H)) reflect statements about
probabilities. But this is in conflict with the initial motivation for constructing this
lattice. The hope was that the elements of P(L1(H)) could refer to measurements
and their outcomes: that they would correspond to propositions to which one can
assign probabilities, not propositions about probabilities. This does of course not
mean that one can’t define probability functions on P(L1(H)). It just means that
these probabilities do not in any obvious way refer to probabilities of measurement
outcomes. Rather, they would be probabilities about probabilities.
The mixing up of probabilities of propositions and propositions about probabili-
ties may be a trait that occurs due to the double role of the Hilbert space in quantum
mechanics. The Hilbert space both makes up the domain of quantum probability
functions (its closed linear subspaces), and the probability functions themselves (as
rays). Then it appears that somewhere along the way when searching for a propo-
sitional lattice to clear up this domain role, we switched to the function role. It is
my contention that the source of this mixing may be traced back to the assump-
tions OQL1 and OQL2 on page 123. Experimental propositions were introduced as
subsets of observation spaces, and before even spelling out what these propositions
were supposed to express, they were identified with closed linear subspaces. As a
consequence, when interpreting P(L1(H)) as a lattice of experimental propositions
that expands L(H), one now has a dual task of finding out what the correct formu-
lation of these propositions is in natural language, and why it is justified to identify
them with closed linear subspaces.
It does not follow from these considerations that the obtained weak Heyting al-
gebra has no conceptual role to play for quantum probability. In fact, as a natural
distributive extension of L(H), and given the importance of L(H) for the formu-
lation of quantum probability, it seems that there should be a conceptual role for
P(L1(H)). It just is not clear at this point what its role can or should be. To
avoid guess work, it is better to head back to the drawing board. It is time to let
go of the work of Birkhoff and von Neumann, and re-invent quantum logic. What
kind of propositions does one require to form the domain of quantum probability
functions? How do these propositions generate a fitting propositional lattice? And
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how does the end result relate to the lattices L(H) and P(L1(H))? This project is
taken up in the next two chapters. As one says in Dutch: this tale will have a little
tail. Specifically, the weak Heyting algebra will re-enter the discussion in section
11.4.
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The ongoing program is to obtain a reformulation of quantum probability in which
the mathematical symbols have a clear physical meaning. In section 8.1 I explained
that the main work is to be done on the domain L(H) of quantum probability func-
tions. The aim is to replace this lattice with a lattice of experimental propositions
in which the lattice operations correspond to logical connectives. In the previous
two chapters this program was followed by attempting to directly interpret the do-
main L(H) as a lattice of propositions and possibly expand it on the basis of this
interpretation. In the previous chapter this task has only been partially completed.
A proper expansion of L(H) had been obtained and it was argued that a clear
physical interpretation for this lattice is available. However, the given interpreta-
tion was found to be unfitting for the ongoing program. Instead of dwelling on the
possibility of different interpretations, the strategy will be reversed in this chapter.
Here I start with propositions that already have an empirical interpretation, but
are not yet tied together in a lattice. The goal is to build from these propositions
a new quantum logic that is suitable to form a domain of quantum probability
functions. To be sure, this is an unorthodox project, and that is why it requires an
entire chapter to formulate this new logic. Furthermore, to keep things as simple
as possible, attention is restricted to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces throughout
this chapter and the next one.
If the new quantum logic is to be part of a new formulation of quantum proba-
bility, it has to relate to the Born postulate, as well as respect the non-probabilistic
predictions of quantum mechanics. A basic set of elementary experimental propo-
sitions that can play this role is introduced in section 10.1. But for such a set to
become a logic, it has to be given a lattice structure that ideally is such that meets
and joins can be interpreted as conjunctions and disjunctions. A lattice structure is
imposed on the set of elementary experimental propositions by quantum mechanics.
This structure is scrutinized in section 10.2. It is argued that this lattice is not rich
enough to incorporate disjunctions of elementary experimental proposition. Thus,
an extension is required, which is constructed in section 10.3. The obtained lat-
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tice forms a Heyting algebra of experimental propositions. In the final section this
intuitionistic quantum logic is extended one last time to obtain a Boolean algebra
of experimental propositions. The motivation for this final step is somewhat more
pragmatic: when it comes to evaluating possible probability functions, Boolean al-
gebras are a more familiar domain than Heyting algebras. With the new empiricist
quantum logic that is obtained in this chapter, we will be well prepared to undertake
a new investigation of quantum probability in chapter 11.
10.1 Elementary experimental propositions
The aim is to find a lattice of propositions that can provide a formal conceptual-
ization of quantum probability. What these propositions should be is open, but a
reasonable minimal requirement is that they should play a role in formulating the
Born rule. A logical first place to look for inspiration then is the Born postulate
itself, as introduced in chapter 3.
BoP (Born Postulate) If the observable A is associated with the self-adjoint
operator A, and ψ is the state of the system, then the probability to find a
value in ∆ ⊂ σ(A) upon a measurement of A is given by the Born rule
Pψ(A ∈ ∆) = 〈ψ, µA(∆)ψ〉〈ψ,ψ〉 = Tr (PψµA(∆)) . (10.1)
Alternatively, if the state is given by the density operator ρ, the probability
is given by
Pρ(A ∈ ∆) = Tr (ρµA(∆)) . (10.2)
When trying to formalize the Born postulate in such a way that it connects to
a lattice of propositions, there is one first obstacle that cannot be overcome in a
non-controversial way: the postulate makes use of two conditionals. One is obvious
because it starts with the word “if”, and one more subtle (and troublesome) issued
by the use of the word “upon”. The reason to flag this use is that there is not
much agreement on what the correct formal theory of conditionals is, or even on the
possibility of a correct theory. A wide variety of problems emerge in the development
of such theories. So much so that it led Ha´jek (2012b, p. 146) to conclude that “it’s
enough to make a philosopher turn to something easier, like solving the mind-body
problem or the problem of free will.” But delving into the vast amount of literature
on conditionals also isn’t likely to be very helpful for the present discussion. Though
there is little agreement in this literature, many of the participants in the discussion
presuppose possible world semantics, which is set against a Boolean background.
However, the logical background is precisely what we are trying to shape here.
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I have to be somewhat heuristic, then, in assessing the Born postulate. A
useful start is to evaluate some short paraphrases of the postulate. Because I am
interested specifically in the domain of quantum probability functions, the focus is
on the specification of measurements and their outcomes. The state of the system
specifies the probability function itself, rather than its domain. For this reason,
the specification of the state is implicitly held constant in the background in the
following three paraphrases:
BR1 If a measurement of A is performed, then the probability that the result lies
in ∆ equals Tr(PψµA(∆)).
BR2 The probability that, if a measurement of A is performed, then the result lies
in ∆, equals Tr(PψµA(∆)).
BR3 The probability that a measurement outcome lies in ∆ given that a measure-
ment of A is performed equals Tr(PψµA(∆)).
The first is a conditional statement in which probability occurs as a primitive
term. Although formalization in this direction could be possible (e.g. with the use
of probability logics (Demey, Kooi, and Sack, 2014)) such a project has little hope
of fostering insight in quantum probability. The result would be a logic containing
probabilistic propositions, and does not construct a domain for quantum probability
functions. This is reminiscent of the situation at the end of the previous chapter.
The second paraphrase concerns the probability of a conditional, and the third is a
conditional probability. Generally, these are considered to be distinct things. This
is because equating the two is known to lead to difficulties (see (Ha´jek, 2015) and
references therein). So there is a real choice concerning which one to pursue.
The lazy option is to go for the easiest formulation: BR3. But a more important
reason for this choice is that conditionals are not atomic propositions. Moreover,
their formulation requires the introduction of at least all of the propositions that
are also required when going for option BR3. While explaining this, I can already
make some first steps towards the introduction of experimental propositions. There
are two kinds of propositions that are useful to have:
MA =ˆ “A measurement of A is performed”,
MA(∆) =ˆ “A is measured and the outcome lies in ∆”.
(10.3)
These will be termed the elementary experimental propositions. It may be consid-
ered to be somewhat unsatisfactory to regard the second of these as elementary,
since it is a conjunction. On the other hand, it is cumbersome, if not meaningless,
to introduce propositions about measurement outcomes that do not presuppose the
performance of a measurement. As long as “measurement” occurs as a primitive
term, there seems to be no way around having such conjunctions as primitives as
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well. With the introduction of these propositions, both options BR2 and BR3 can
be formulated as equations:
BR2 Pψ(MA →MA(∆)) = Tr(PψµA(∆)),
BR3 Pψ(MA(∆)|MA) = Tr(PψµA(∆)).
(10.4)
Note that the left-hand sides of these equations are not well-defined mathemat-
ically (yet). The task now is to formulate a logic in which at least the propositions
(10.3) are incorporated. This is obviously not a trivial task, and this entire chapter
is devoted to it. But it will be done in small steps, and the first step is to couple
these propositions to the formalism of quantum mechanics. This requires a classi-
fication of possible measurements and their outcomes. These are specified by the
observable and value postulate.
OP (Observable Postulate) Every observable A for the system S is associated
with a self-adjoint operator A acting on H.
VaP (Value Postulate) For an observable A associated with the self-adjoint
operator A via OP, the set of values of possible measurement outcomes is
given by the spectrum σ(A) of A.
These ingredients can hardly be called assumptions, as they are part and parcel
of quantum mechanics.1 The next ingredient is a real assumption, though:
NC (Non-Contexuality) Every self-adjoint operator is associated with at most
one observable.
Although this assumption is controversial in the context of the possibility of hidden
variables, here it is more reasonable. It is an assumption of modesty. There is
nothing in quantum mechanics that indicates that the set of observables should be
more complex than the set of mathematical objects that represent them. Why then
should we not try to see if it is also sufficient for present purposes? Secondly, to go
beyond NC would similarly require assumptions about what the set of observables
should then be. No clear motivation for such assumptions can be given at this
point.2
1One may object that this characterization doesn’t take into account the option to consider
POVMs to represent observables. This is a fair point. My response at the moment is that I believe
that the conceptual gain going from PVMs to POVMs is minimal. It would then seem masochistic
to make the situation more complicated than it already is.
2It deserves to be noted that adopting NC does not imply incompatibility with contextual hidden
variable models. As discussed in section 6.3, these can also be viewed as models that violate Value
Definiteness (VD) instead of NC. Contextual hidden variable models then aren’t ruled out here
because VD is not assumed.
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With these assumptions in place, the totality of all elementary experimental
propositions can be given a set-theoretic structure. The benefit of NC for this
formulation is that we no longer have to be careful to distinguish observables from
operators. Thus I now switch the notation of (10.3) to MA and MA(∆). The set of
elementary experimental propositions is now
Eep(H) := {MA |A ∈ Osa(H)} ∪
{
MA(∆)
∣∣∣ A∈Osa(H),∆⊂σ(A) } . (10.5)
One may wonder whether the set of elementary experimental propositions should
not also incorporate propositions of the form “the state of the system is ψ”. How-
ever, assessing the extent to which this precisely is an experimental proposition is
not something that can be done in a completely uncontroversial way. The main role
of the quantum state is to determine probabilities for outcomes of measurements,
and probabilities aren’t the kinds of things that are easily and unambiguously em-
pirically accessible.3 Finally, as noted above, these kinds of propositions are not
likely to play a part in the language that specifies the domain of quantum proba-
bility functions. Therefore, there is no reason to incorporate them in the empiricist
quantum logic to be developed.
The next step is to impose more structure on the set of elementary experimen-
tal propositions. This is done by incorporating assumptions about the way these
propositions logically relate to each other. The first is an idealization of the idea
that measurements have outcomes.
IEA (Idealized Experimenter Assumption) Every experiment has an out-
come: for every A, MA(∅) denotes a contradiction, and MA(σ(A)) is logically
equivalent to MA.
IEA introduces an equivalence relation on Eep(H). Explicitly, this relation is
given by the rules
MA1(∅)
IEA∼ MA2(∅) ∀A1, A2,
MA(σ(A))
IEA∼ MA ∀A,
(10.6)
and for all other cases equivalence holds if and only if equality holds. The resulting
set of equivalence classes is
Eep(H)/IEA∼ =
{
MA(∆)
∣∣∣ A∈Osa(H),∅(∆⊂σ(A)} ∪ {⊥}, (10.7)
3Probabilistic statements are usually associated with observable relative frequencies. However,
mismatches between probabilities and observed relative frequencies are allowed though ‘unlikely’
when they are large. It is not clear then in which sense observations of relative frequencies can
be viewed as observations of probabilities. This issue concerning the empirical investigation of
probabilities was emphasized by Popper (1959, §66). What the best way is to cope with this issue
depends on ones interpretation of probability and philosophy of statistics (Gillies, 1990; Ha´jek,
2012a; Romeijn, 2014).
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where ⊥ denotes the equivalence class {MA(∅) |A ∈ Osa(H)}.
There are also less trivial relations between elementary experimental proposi-
tions. Indeed, quantum mechanics would be a rather dull theory if it didn’t pose any
structure on the experimental propositions. The relations can be used to impose a
preorder. The precise preorder of course depends on which relations are assumed.
A trivial relation is that for any A and ∆1 ⊂ ∆2 ⊂ σ(A) the proposition MA(∆1)
implies the proposition MA(∆2). But there are also relations among propositions
concerning distinct observables and these are less trivial. A common assumption
about joint measurements is the following.
EFR (Experimental Functional Relations) For every finite set of observables
{A1, . . . ,An} for which a joint measurement is possible, and for every real-
valued Borel function f that satisfies f(A1, . . . , An) = 1 (where A1, . . . , An
are the corresponding self-adjoint operators), the outcomes a1, . . . , an of a
joint measurement satisfy f(a1, . . . , an) = 1.
EFR is an experimentally testable assumption that is taken to hold in quantum
mechanics. The validity of this assumption is often extrapolated to cases where the
observables are not jointly measured. Instead of directly measuring some observable,
often another observable is measured and some suitable function is then applied
to the outcome to obtain the outcome for the first observable. For example, if
one is interested in the kinetic energy of a particle, it also suffices to measure its
momentum, square the outcome, and rescale in accordance with the mass of the
particle. Thus one may say that a measurement of the momentum of a particle
also counts as a measurement of its kinetic energy. More generally, the following
assumption seems legitimate.
LMR (Law-Measurement Relation) If A1 and A2 are two observables that can
be jointly measured, and if f is a function such that for every joint measure-
ment of A1 and A2 the outcomes a1 and a2 satisfy a1 = f(a2) (f represents
a law), then a measurement of A2 alone also counts as a measurement of A1
with outcome f(a2).
The assumption LMR imposes a preorder on Eep(H)/IEA∼ . Specifically, in terms
of elementary experimental propositions, LMR has the following implications: for
any pair of observables A1, A2 for which there is a function f such that A2 = f(A1),
and for any subset ∆1 ⊂ σ(A1), the proposition MA1(∆1) implies the proposition
MA2(f(∆1)). This notion of implication gives rise to the following preorder on
Eep(H)/IEA∼ :
MA1(∆1) ≤MA2(∆2) iff ∃f s.t. A2 = f(A1),∆2 ⊃ f(∆1),
⊥ ≤MA(∆) ∀MA(∆).
(10.8)
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This preorder introduces the equivalence relation
MA1(∆1)
LMR∼ MA2(∆2) iff MA1(∆1) ≤MA2(∆2) and MA2(∆2) ≤MA1(∆1). (10.9)
This is the case if and only if there are functions f and g such that
(A2,∆2) = (f(A1), f(∆1)) and (A1,∆1) = (g(A2), g(∆2)). (10.10)
Now, making use of the algebraic language, this in turn holds if and only if
Alg(A1) = Alg(A2) and µA1(∆1) = µA2(∆2), (10.11)
where Alg(A) denotes the Abelian von Neumann algebra generated by A.4 Now
let A denote the set of all Abelian von Neumann algebras. The set of equivalence
classes is then given by
EEP (H) := {(A, P ) | A ∈ A,0 6= P ∈ L(A)} ∪ {⊥}, (10.12)
i.e., EEP (H) ' (Eep(H)/IEA∼ )/LMR∼ .5 Explicitly, the map that takes elements of
Eep(H) to their representation is given by
MA 7→
(
Alg(A),1
)
,
MA(∆) 7→
{(
Alg(A), µA(∆)
)
if µA(∆) 6= 0,
⊥ otherwise,
(10.13)
The preorder on Eep(H)/IEA∼ automatically becomes a partial order on EEP (H). This
partial order is given by
(A1, P1) ≤ (A2, P2) iff A1 ⊃ A2 and P1 ≤ P2,
⊥ ≤ (A, P ) ∀(A, P ). (10.14)
The partially ordered set EEP (H) will play an important role throughout the
remainder of this dissertation. Although formally every element (A, P ) is an equiva-
lence class of elementary experimental propositions, I will sometimes abuse language
and refer to it as if it coincides with a particular element of this class. Specifically,
(A, P ) will sometimes be understood as the proposition “A is measured and the
4Note that this is well-defined because it follows from the assumption thatH is finite-dimensional
that A is bounded. Furthermore, this assumption ensures that there is a bijective correspondence
between subsets ∆ of the spectrum of A and the projection operators µA(∆).
5Equivalently, elements of EEP(H) may be viewed as pairs (R,P ) where R is a resolution of the
identity and P is a sum of projections in some subset of R. This may be a more fitting formulation
if one wishes to generalize these results to include POVMs. Resolutions of the identity would then
be replaced by sequences of positive operators that sum to the identity.
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outcome lies in ∆”. Furthermore, to make some of the mathematical derivations
run smoother a particular notation is adopted. Although pairs of the form (A,0) are
formally not elements of EEP (H), they will be used to denote the bottom element
⊥, i.e.,
(A, 0) := ⊥ ∀A ∈ A. (10.15)
Thus there are many ways to denote the same element ⊥.
10.2 Lattice of elementary experimental propositions
In the previous section it was shown that the elementary experimental propositions
for a system described by a Hilbert space H can be faithfully characterized by the
partial ordered set EEP (H). As the title of this section suggests, this partial order
also turns the set into a lattice: every pair of elements has a meet and a join. But
just as with orthodox quantum logic, one has to take care when attempting to attach
meaning to these operations. It is not obvious that they correspond to conjunctions
and disjunctions of the elementary experimental propositions. In this section these
lattice operations are scrutinized. There are some interesting properties, but in the
end it is concluded that the join does not express a disjunction in all cases. In the
next section these observations will be used to expand EEP (H) to a proper quantum
logic of experimental propositions.
By making use of the notation introduced at the end of the previous section the
meet on EEP (H) can be expressed as
(A1, P1) ∧ (A2, P2) =
{(
Alg(A1,A2), P1 ∧ P2
)
if Alg(A1,A2) ∈ A,
⊥ otherwise. (10.16)
The operation P1 ∧ P2 here denotes the meet on L(H). Thus, whenever P1 ∧ P2 =
0, the meet in (10.16) corresponds to ⊥. This meet gives a good representation
of conjunction, but seeing this requires some argumentation. Suppose MA1(∆1)
and MA2(∆2) are two experimental propositions whose representations correspond
to (A1, P1) and (A2, P2) respectively. The conjunction of these two propositions
can be paraphrased as “A1 and A2 are measured and the outcomes lie in ∆1 and
∆2 respectively.” Assuming that such a joint measurement is possible only if the
operators commute,6 this proposition corresponds to a contradiction whenever the
two operators do not commute. This in turn is the case if and only if the algebra
Alg(A1,A2) is not Abelian. Thus the meet (10.16) does correspond to a conjunction
whenever the propositions concern incompatible measurements, because in that case
(A1, P1) ∧ (A2, P2) = ⊥.
6This assumption follows from the conjunction of WCoP and CCoP from chapter 6.
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When the operators A1 and A2 do commute, the algebra Alg(A1,A2) can be
seen as the representation of an observable A3 whose measurement counts as a
measurement of both A1 and A2 (according to LMR). Conversely, a joint measure-
ment of A1 and A2 counts as a measurement of A3. That is, Alg(A1, A2) = Alg(A3)
if and only if there exist functions f1, f2, f3 such that f1(A3) = A1, f2(A3) = A2 and
f3(A1, A2) = A3. In short, if a joint measurement of observables associated with the
algebras A1 and A2 is possible, then it corresponds to a measurement of some ob-
servable associated with the algebra Alg(A1,A2). Thus with respect to the specifica-
tion of such measurements the meet again behaves as a conjunction. What is left to
check is that the meet also behaves correctly with respect to the specification of mea-
surement outcomes. That this is indeed the case can be seen by considering again
three observables A1, A2, A3 as above. The conjunction of MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2)
precisely corresponds to the proposition MA3(∆3) if ∆3 = f
−1
1 (∆1)∩f−12 (∆2), which
is the case if and only if µA3(∆3) = µA1(∆1) ∧ µA2(∆2) = P1 ∧ P2.
The meet on EEP (H) thus neatly coincides with what one expects for conjunc-
tions of elementary experimental propositions. For the join, however, the situation
is a lot more complicated. As a first step I restrict attention to equivalent measure-
ments, i.e., A1 = A2. In this case the join actually behaves quite decently. One
then has that
(A, P1) ∨ (A, P2) = (A, P1 ∨ P2). (10.17)
Correspondingly, the disjunction of MA(∆1) and MA(∆2) paraphrases neatly to
MA(∆1 ∪∆2).
The situation becomes more difficult when considering distinct measurements.
In general, the join is given by
(A1, P1) ∨ (A2, P2) =
(
A1 ∩ A2,
∧
{P ∈ L(A1 ∩ A2) | P1 ∨ P2 ≤ P}
)
. (10.18)
This is not a very insightful equation, and so it is better to look at a specific example.
Consider two self-adjoint operators A1, A2 and their corresponding algebras A1,A2.
Call these two operators (and their corresponding algebras) totally incompatible7
when A1 ∩ A2 = C 1. For such a pair of operators one has
(A1,1) ∨ (A2,1) = (C 1,1). (10.19)
The right-hand side of this equation is the top element of EEP (H). This means
that, if the join is interpreted as a disjunction, the proposition “A1 is measured or
A2 is measured” is identified with a tautology. But of course one can consider many
occasions when a measurement of neither A1 nor A2 is performed. Thus the join is
unsatisfactory as a representation of disjunction.
7This definition is related to the notion of totally incompatible frames as used in chapter 7: two
Abelian algebras are totally incompatible if and only if they are subalgebras of algebras generated
by totally incompatible frames.
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This example can further be used to demonstrate that EEP (H) is not distribu-
tive. Considered a third algebra A3 that is totally incompatible with both A1 and
A2. Then
(A3, 1) ∧ ((A1,1) ∨ (A2,1)) = (A3, 1) 6= ⊥
= ((A3, 1) ∧ (A1, 1)) ∨ ((A3, 1) ∧ (A2, 1)) . (10.20)
So, much like orthodox quantum logic, the lattice EEP (H) does not provide a logic
that fits well with natural language. There are no elements in EEP (H) that provide
good candidates for disjunctions of elementary experimental propositions. These
have to be added manually, which is done in the next section.
10.3 Intuitionistic quantum logic
The present situation is reminiscent of that in the beginning of chapter 9. We
have a lattice of experimental propositions that isn’t rich enough to also express
disjunctions of these propositions. The key difference is that now we are working
with an interpretation of these propositions in natural language, which will be the
guide to expanding the lattice. So while it may be tempting to apply the theory of
Bruns and Lakser (1970) to EEP (H), this is not what will be done here. The reason
for this is that although this method is guaranteed to provide a Heyting algebra,8
it is conceptually unclear what this method would establish. Indeed, there is no
obvious interpretation of a distributive ideal in EEP (H). That being said, it is of
course possible to construct the injective hull of EEP (H) and the reader interested
in what this construction amounts to may consult (Hermens, 2014, p. 59).
The appropriate completion of EEP (H) is obtained almost immediately by for-
mulating clearly what is desired. That is, specifying what precisely is meant with
an expansion comes almost confusingly close to providing a proof of its existence.
Thus it is required to carefully articulate what in fact is desired, as well as what
has to be shown to achieve it. Let me start with setting out some demands. What
is required in the end is the following:9
(i) A distributive lattice (IL(H),,g,uprise),
(ii) An injective map iIL : EEP (H)→ IL(H) that is a meet-semilattice homomor-
phism.
Injectivity of iIL warrants that IL(H) is a proper extension of EEP (H), and the
homomorphism assumption warrants that the meets in EEP (H) (which can properly
8In fact, it will be a Boolean algebra since EEP(H) is atomistic.
9(Spoiler alert!) As the defense in section 8.4 makes clear, it would not be surprising to find that
intuitionistic logic can play a role in an empiricist approach to quantum mechanics. The lattice
IL(H) will in fact turn out to be a proper Heyting algebra, hence its name.
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be understood as conjunctions) are preserved. Distributivity is a necessary condition
for the demand that g and uprise can be interpreted as disjunction and conjunction.
Because EEP (H) itself is not distributive, this implies that in general the equation10
iIL ((A1, P1) ∨ (A2, P2)) = iIL (A1, P1)g iIL (A2, P2) , (10.21)
will not hold. But for the special cases where A1 = A2 it was found that the join
in EEP (H) does express a disjunction. So for these special cases iIL is required to
preserve joins. That is, it is required that
iIL ((A, P1) ∨ (A, P2)) = iIL (A, P1)g iIL (A, P2) . (10.22)
It deserves to be emphasized that these are just desiderata and that, for example,
(10.22) is still meaningless at the moment because neither iIL nor g has been de-
fined yet. But these constraints will form the basis for the construction of IL(H).
Afterwards, when iIL and (IL(H),,g,uprise) have been defined, it has to be shown
that they satisfy the desiderata.
The next important ingredient makes use of the functions S(A,P ) : A → L(H)
that, for fixed (A, P ), are defined as11
S(A,P )(A′) :=
{
P if A ⊂ A′,
0 otherwise.
(10.23)
It has the property that
(A′, S(A,P )(A′)) ≤ (A, P ) for all A′ ∈ A, and equality
holds in the case A′ = A. These functions then allows us to rewrite every element
(A, P ) ∈ EEP (H) as an infinite join over all Abelian algebras. Specifically, in
EEP (H) the relation
(A, P ) =
 ∨
A′∈A,
A⊂A′
(A′, P )
 ∨
 ∨
A′∈A,
A6⊂A′
(A′,0)
 = ∨
A′∈A
(A′, S(A,P )(A′)) (10.24)
holds for all (A, P ). By combining these observations one obtains
iIL (A, P ) = iIL
(A, S(A,P )(A)) ≤ j
A′∈A
iIL
(A′, S(A,P )(A′))
≤ iIL
( ∨
A′∈A
(A′, S(A,P )(A′))
)
= iIL (A, P ) .
(10.25)
10For notational clarity I write iIL (A, P ) instead of iIL ((A, P )) when there is no risk for confusion.
11Here, and in the remainder of this chapter, A′ does not denote the commutant of A. The
prime is merely used as a notational convenience to avoid fiddling with subscripts.
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This implies that the inequalities should actually be equalities. In particular
iIL (A, P ) =
j
A′∈A
iIL
(A′, S(A,P )(A′)) . (10.26)
Thus from the condition that iIL preserves the order alone the constraint (10.26)
is obtained. Combining this with the condition (10.22), one can now obtain an
expression for joins of elementary experimental propositions in IL(H):
iIL (A1, P1)g iIL (A2, P2)
=
( j
A′∈A
iIL
(A′, S(A1,P1)(A′))
)
g
( j
A′′∈A
iIL
(A′′, S(A2,P2)(A′′))
)
=
j
A′∈A
(
iIL
(A′, S(A1,P1)(A′))g iIL (A′, S(A2,P2)(A′))
)
=
j
A′∈A
iIL
(
A′, S(A1,P1)(A′) ∨ S(A2,P2)(A′)
)
.
(10.27)
The crucial thing to note is that both iIL (A, P ) and iIL (A1, P1)g iIL (A2, P2) have
now been characterized by a function S : A → L(H). The first is characterized by
the function S(A,P ) and the second by the function defined by the action
S(A1,P1,A2,P2)(A) := S(A1,P1)(A) ∨ S(A2,P2)(A) ∀A ∈ A, (10.28)
where the join on the right-hand side is the one from L(H). This gives the inspiration
to think of IL(H) as a set of functions S : A → L(H) where the embedding iIL is
given by
iIL (A, P ) := S(A,P ). (10.29)
The final details are given by the following theorem and its proof.
Theorem 10.1. Formally adding disjunctions to the collection of elementary ex-
perimental propositions while respecting (10.22) leads to the complete distributive
lattice
IL(H) :=
{
S : A→ L(H)
∣∣∣ S(A)∈L(A),S(A1)≤S(A2) whenever A1⊂A2} (10.30)
with partial order defined as
S1  S2 iff S1(A) ≤ S2(A)∀A ∈ A, (10.31)
giving rise to the join and meet
(S1 g S2) (A) =S1(A) ∨ S2(A),
(S1 uprise S2) (A) =S1(A) ∧ S2(A).
(10.32)
The injective map iIL : EEP (H) → IL(H) given by (10.29) is a meet-semilattice
homomorphism.
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Proof. The fact that IL(H) is a complete distributive lattice follows from the fact
that L(A) is a complete distributive lattice for every A ∈ A. The details of this
observation are left to the reader.
The map iIL is injective since S(A1,P1) = S(A2,P2) if and only if (A1, P1) =
(A2, P2). To see that it preserves the partial order consider (A1, P1) ≤ (A2, P2),
then for every A ∈ A
S(A1,P1)(A) =
{
P1 ≤ P2 = S(A2,P2)(A) A1 ⊂ A,
0 ≤ S(A2,P2)(A) A1 6⊂ A.
(10.33)
Furthermore, iIL respects meets because
k
i∈I
S(Ai,Pi)(A) =
{∧
i∈I Pi if Ai ⊂ A ∀i ∈ I,
0 otherwise
= S∧
i∈I(Ai,Pi)(A). (10.34)
The fact that the join respects (10.22) is basically a consequence of the con-
struction of IL(H). Explicitly, this now follows because for every A′ ∈ A(
S(A,P1) g S(A,P2)
)
(A′) = S(A,P1)(A′) ∨ S(A,P2)(A′) = S(A,P1∨P2)(A′). (10.35)
Finally, it needs to be shown that IL(H) contains nothing more than disjunc-
tions and conjunctions of elementary experimental propositions. This is shown by
proving that every S ∈ IL(H) can be written as a join of elementary experimental
propositions. Specifically, one has
S =
j
A∈A
S(A,S(A)). (10.36)
To see this, first note that
S(A,S(A))(A′) =
{
S(A) A ⊂ A′,
0 A 6⊂ A′. (10.37)
Now for any A′ ∈ A(j
A∈A
S(A,S(A))
)
(A′) =
∨
A∈A
S(A,S(A))(A′) =
∨
A∈A,
A⊂A′
S(A), (10.38)
Because S(A) ≤ S(A′) whenever A ⊂ A′ (this follows from the definition of IL(H)),
the final join in (10.38) is actually equal to S(A′). This proves (10.36).
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The lattice IL(H) now consists of all possible disjunctions and conjunctions of
elementary experimental propositions. This means that it is rich enough to allow
a formulation of the Born rule of the type of option BR3 in (10.4), and allows the
investigation of rules for a probability calculus. In fact, in chapter 11 it will become
apparent that for a certain class of probability functions that may be defined on the
lattice, this class is rich enough to model all quantum probability functions. But
the philosophical investigation of this result of course runs much smoother when
one has a better physical understanding of IL(H). The remainder of this chapter is
devoted to obtaining this understanding.
The first occurrence of the lattice IL(H) in the literature that I know of is in the
work of Caspers et al. (2009) and a further investigation of this logic was performed
by Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters (2012). It is quite remarkable and reassuring
that these authors arrived at the same logic by following an entirely different route,
namely, a topos-theoretical reformulation of quantum mechanics. For me, this is
useful as it provides a more sturdy mathematical basis. It was already noted by
Caspers et al. (2009) that the lattice is turned into a Heyting algebra by obtaining
the relative pseudo-complement in the usual way:
S1 → S2 :=
j
{S ∈ IL(H) ; S ∧ S1 ≤ S2} . (10.39)
Furthermore, negation is introduced by ¬S := S → ⊥, where the bottom element
is given by
⊥(A) = 0 ∀A ∈ A, (10.40)
thus obtaining an intuitionistic logic for reasoning with experimental propositions.
The logic IL(H) is a proper Heyting algebra and even is radically non-classical: the
law of excluded middle only holds for the top and bottom element. This is easily
checked by observing that S(C 1) = 1 if and only if S = >, where the top element
is given by
>(A) = 1 ∀A ∈ A. (10.41)
It then follows that S ∨ ¬S = > if and only if either S = > or ¬S = >. The
interpretation of negation will be discussed later on in this section.
On a more philosophical level it is harder to make a comparison with this earlier
occurrence of IL(H). Because a purely formal route is followed, Caspers et al. (ibid.)
find themselves in a situation that is reminiscent of the one I encountered at the end
of chapter 9. Indeed, although it was claimed that IL(H) is “the correct quantum
logic” (ibid., p. 741), the physical motivation for this claim remained obscure. Also
in (Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters, 2012) the logic is “proposed” (postulated?)
rather than derived, and the interpretation remained vague:12
12The notation of symbols has been altered to coincide with the present discussion.
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we regard each S ∈ IL(H) as a single proposition as far as logical struc-
ture is concerned; physically, S breaks down into a family {S(A)}A∈A.
This could either mean that one invents a question for each context A
separately (compatible with the monotonicity in (10.30)), or that one
constructs such a family from a single proposition [projection operator]
in the sense of von Neumann. (Heunen, Landsman, and Spitters, 2012,
pp. 725–726)
The idea to view S as a family of propositions is linked to Bohr’s ideas concerning
the necessity for a specification of (classical) experimental contexts for unambiguous
communication. However, for this link to work, another ingredient of Bohr’s ideas
is also mandatory: the demand for ordinary language. This requires that either S
itself, or each of the elements S(A) in the family can be given a translation into
natural language. No such translation is provided. But what I find most confusing is
that the suggestion for such a translation appears to presuppose orthodox quantum
logic. After all, {S(A)}A∈A is a family of projection operators, and each term in
the family is supposed to be a proposition. In my view this approach turns the
arrow of explanation in the wrong direction. One motivation for me to develop a
new quantum logic came from an inability to interpret orthodox quantum logic.
This logic that was found to be confusing and problematic. What’s more, Heunen,
Landsman, and Spitters (ibid.) appear to agree (at least in part) with this view as
they speak of “the lure of [orthodox] quantum logic”. It is strange then to see that
precisely this logic is invoked to attempt an interpretation of IL(H).
It deserves to be noted that the program of the topos-theoretical reformulation
of quantum mechanics doesn’t stand or fall with their reading of IL(H). Nor is it
clear whether this logic is as important to this program as the two cited papers could
lead one to believe. But the critique of their interpretation is useful for posing a
contrast with the one adopted here. In my own interpretation of IL(H), each element
S is a disjunction rather than a family of elementary experimental propositions.
Moreover, this is not just a disjunction over the projections {S(A)}A∈A, but over
the pairs {(A, S(A))}A∈A. In fact, von Neumann’s idea to consider projections as
representations of experimental propositions independently of the specification of
experimental contexts seems to me precisely the deviation from Bohr’s ideas that
leads to the mess of orthodox quantum logic. It is only when considering a pair
(A, P ) that one can attach unambiguous meaning to the projection operator.13
This interpretation thus poses much weight on the requirement to specify a
measurement. This observation can be used to understand the strong non-classical
13This subconscious forgetting about he measurement context is ubiquitous in quantum logic and
occurs even among the greater thinkers in the field. As an example, consider the work of Hughes
(1982) who takes great care to introduce experimental propositions as pairs (A,∆) requiring both
the specification of the observable and the outcome set, and then without blinking identifies this
with the projection µA(∆), as if there were no loss in this translation.
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behavior of IL(H). The logic is entirely built up from propositions about performed
measurements. The negation of MA(∆) is identified with other propositions about
measurements that exclude the possibility of MA(∆). Specifically,
¬S(A,P ) =
j{
S(A′,P ′)
∣∣ [A′,A] 6= 0 or P ′ ∧ P = 0} . (10.42)
The propositions in this disjunction are either of the form MA′ for some A
′ that
is incompatible with A, or they are compatible with MA(∆
′) with ∆′ ∩ ∆ = ∅
(i.e., the measurement outcomes are incompatible). But all these propositions leave
open the option of no experiment having been performed. An unexcluded middle
thus presents itself as the proposition ¬MA=“A is not measured”, which does not
correspond to any element of IL(H). An explicit example illustrates these points
further.
Example 10.1. Consider a spin-12 particle and restrict attention to two possible
measurements, namely, its spin along the x-axis and around the z-axis. The sub-
lattice of relevant projection operators and the partially ordered set of relevant
algebras are given by the Hasse diagrams
0
P+x P
−
x P
−
z P
+
z
1
and
C 1
Ax Az
(10.43)
where σx =
1
2P
+
x − 12P−x , σz = 12P+z − 12P−z and Ax := Alg(σx) and Az := Alg(σz).
The function S(Ax,P+x ) represents the proposition expressing that σx is measured
and the spin is found to be in the up-direction. One now has
¬S(Ax,P+x ) = S(Ax,P−x ) g S(Az ,1). (10.44)
Explicitly, the actions of these functions are given by the following table.
C 1 Ax Az
S(Ax,P+x ) 0 P
+
x 0
S(Ax,P−x ) 0 P
−
x 0
S(Az ,1) 0 0 1
¬S(Ax,P+x ) 0 P−x 1
(10.45)
The function ¬S(Ax,P+x ) expresses that either σx has been measured and the spin
was found to be in the down-direction, or σz was measured. Both these options of
course imply that S(Ax,P+x ) is not true, but both also imply that some measurement
has in fact been performed. 4
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I suggested in (Hermens, 2013a, §2) that, by incorporating propositions that
explicitly mention that a particular measurement is not performed, one could ob-
tain a classical logic. The motivation for not doing it there was that “many more
propositions would have to be added to make the logic classical and most of them
are rather dull.” This is certainly true. I have never met a physicist enthusiasti-
cally telling everyone that no measurement has been performed. But in the current
situation developing such a logic may actually be beneficial, as I explain below.
The hope is that in the end a quantum logic is constructed that can be used
to obtain a better physical understanding of the formalism of quantum probability.
Ideally, the situation would be that one has a general conception of what probability
functions on a propositional lattice are, independently of quantum mechanics. One
could then motivate what a probability function on IL(H) should look like, and then
compare it to the Born rule. A derivation of the Born rule would then follow from
philosophical considerations that select out the quantum probability functions from
all possible probability functions. Perhaps by a rationality argument, or perhaps
just simply because every probability function on IL(H) already satisfies the Born
rule, or perhaps with the aid of an additional metaphysical assumption. In any case,
one first has to know what a probability function on IL(H) is. Now, although there
have been attempts to characterize probability functions for intuitionistic logic,14
a clear, easily acceptable, and widely accepted set of axioms for such functions on
Heyting algebras is not available. When it comes to Boolean algebras, on the other
hand, much more theoretical background is available and there is more agreement on
what probability functions are. Then, if the incorporation of a few dull propositions
leads to a Boolean algebra, this entire body of knowledge is at our disposal. This
is enough reason to expand IL(H), which is done in the next section.
10.4 Classical quantum logic
As suggested in the previous section, the Heyting algebra IL(H) can be turned into
a Boolean algebra CL(H) by adding the propositions ¬MA. One way to do this is
to go back to the beginning of this chapter and start anew with expanding the set
of elementary experimental propositions, now including these negations. Such an
approach was roughly followed in (Hermens, 2014). But this requires taking some
steps that are only justified in retrospect after CL(H) has been defined. Here I
follow a different route that I think is conceptually more appealing.15 The idea is
to stay close to the lattice IL(H) and tweak it until the desired result obtains. That
is, I start with the functions S ∈ IL(H) (whose interpretation should now clear),
14See (Van Fraassen, 1981; Morgan and Leblanc, 1983a,b; Roeper and Leblanc, 1999; Weather-
son, 2003).
15It may be interesting to note that the two routes also lead to distinct formulations of CL(H).
The fact that the two are actually equivalent is shown by Theorem 11.1.
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and then tweak these functions till they may be taken to represent negations. This
implies that the obtained lattice CL(H) will properly contain IL(H), and the task
is to find out what constraints a function S : A → L(H) should satisfy in order to
count as an element of CL(H).
A good starting point is to consider the constraints that define the set IL(H).
The requirement of monotonicity is that A1 ⊂ A2 implies S(A1) ≤ S(A2). In the
proof of Theorem 10.1 this feature arises from the demand that all propositions in
IL(H) should be obtained by forming disjunctions and conjunctions of elementary
experimental propositions. Because the elementary experimental propositions al-
ready satisfy monotonicity, this feature is carried over to all other propositions. But
what is the conceptual meaning of monotonicity for these elementary experimental
propositions?
The answer to this question is found by taking a closer look at the functions
that represent elementary experimental propositions. Consider an elementary ex-
perimental proposition MA(∆) and its representative S(A,P ). This representative
satisfies
S(A,P ) =
j
A′∈A,
A⊂A′
S(A′,P ). (10.46)
This embodies the idea that the proposition that A is measured does not exclude
the proposition that an observable A′ is measured for which there exists an f such
that A = f(A′). Now consider the special case where P = 1. If one reads S(A,1)
explicitly as a disjunction, it paraphrases to “A is measured or some more fine-
grained measurement is performed.” But when also allowing propositions that refer
to the not-performing of measurements, it should also be possible to formulate
propositions of the form16
M !A(∆) =ˆ
“A is measured and the outcome lies in ∆,
and no finer grained measurement is performed”.
(10.47)
This proposition effectively cancels out all disjuncts in (10.46) except for the one
concerning A. If there is to be a function S : A → L(H) that can represent this
proposition, then the natural candidate is the function S!(A,P ) : A → L(H) defined
by
S!(A,P )(A′) =
{
P A′ = A,
0 A′ 6= A, (10.48)
where again A = Alg(A) and P = µA(∆).
Note that the function S!(A,P ) is not an element of IL(H) precisely because it
does not obey the monotonicity condition. The simplest suggestion one can then
16The use of the exclamation mark is a reference to its similar use in “∃!” meaning “there exists
a unique”. Here too the exclamation mark singles out one specific observable.
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make for CL(H) is to just drop the monotonicity assumption. That is, I propose
the lattice
CL(H) := {S : A→ L(H) | S(A) ∈ L(A)} , (10.49)
with partial order precisely the one of IL(H):
S1  S2 iff S1(A) ≤ S2(A)∀A ∈ A. (10.50)
I shall now demonstrate that this proposal is actually spot on.
It is not hard to see that the meet and join on CL(H) are again given by the
equations
(S1 g S2) (A) =S1(A) ∨ S2(A),
(S1 uprise S2) (A) =S1(A) ∧ S2(A).
(10.51)
Consequently, IL(H) is a sublattice of CL(H). This shows the formal compatibility
of elements of IL(H) with the newly added functions. But it is of course also
required that the earlier interpretation of these elements is compatible with the
interpretation of the new elements. This is not entirely trivial. The two subsets
IL(H) and
{
S!(A,P )
∣∣∣ (A, P ) ∈ EEP (H)} have independently been given a translation
in natural language, the first using the rules from (10.3) and the second with the
rule (10.47). Furthermore, the meet and join are required to be read as conjunction
and disjunction respectively, and this implies that the elements of the sublattice
generated by
{
S!(A,P )
∣∣∣ (A, P ) ∈ EEP (H)} also have been given an interpretation
using (10.47). In short, there are many elements of CL(H) that have been given a
double interpretation, and it needs to be shown that these just refer to paraphrases
in natural language.
It turns out that showing consistency of the two interpretations is a lot easier
than it sounds, especially once one knows which steps to take. The first step is
noticing that the new interpretation (10.47) amounts to a translation into nat-
ural language of all elements of CL(H). That is, the sublattice generated by{
S!(A,P )
∣∣∣ (A, P ) ∈ EEP (H)} is in fact CL(H) itself. This is because for every
S ∈ CL(H) one has
S =
j
A∈A
S!(A,S(A)). (10.52)
Consequently, every element of IL(H) has been given an interpretation by (10.47).
To show that this interpretation is consistent with the one of the previous sections,
it suffices to restrict attention to the elementary experimental propositions corre-
sponding to the functions of the form S(A,P ). This is because IL(H) is the sublattice
generated by the set
{
S(A,P )
∣∣ (A, P ) ∈ EEP (H)}. But for these elementary exper-
imental propositions compatibility of the two interpretations follows immediately
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from the fact that
S(A,P ) =
j
A′∈A,
A⊂A′
S!(A′,P ) ∀(A, P ) ∈ EEP (H). (10.53)
The IL(H)-interpretation of the left-hand side is just the proposition MA(∆). This
can be paraphrased as “some measurement that is at least as fine-grained as A is
performed and the outcome is given by ∆.” This in turn can be rewritten as a
disjunction over all measurements A′ that are at least as fine-grained as A like in
(10.46). It follows from this that exactly one of these A′ is measured and no other
one. So one of the propositions represented by S!(A′,P ) must be the case. Since it
is not specified which of these A′ is the case, one must take the disjunction over all
possibilities. This then gives the right-hand side of (10.53).
Thus far it has only been established that IL(H) has been expanded so as to also
incorporate propositions of the form (10.47). The new lattice of propositions CL(H)
is closed under conjunctions and disjunctions, but I haven’t said anything yet about
negations. So what still has to be established is that CL(H) has complements, that
these complements can be understood as expressing negations and that the lattice
is in fact Boolean. The first and third task are quite easy to establish. The unary
operation S 7→ Sc defined by
Sc(A) := (S(A))⊥ ∀A ∈ A. (10.54)
satisfies
S g Sc = >, S uprise Sc = ⊥ (10.55)
for all S ∈ CL(H) and thus turns the lattice into a Boolean algebra. So what is
left to show is that this complement is consistent with the use of negations of the
natural language interpretation of CL(H).
To understand the complement on CL(H) it is good to start with a simple
case. The first thing to check is that the complement of a proposition MA can be
paraphrased as “A has not been measured”. The proposition MA is represented by
the function S(A,1) and its complement satisfies
Sc(A,1)(A′) =
{
0 A ⊂ A′,
1 A 6⊂ A′ =

0 A ⊂ A′,
1 A′ ( A,
1 [A,A′] 6= 0,
(10.56)
where [A,A′] 6= 0 indicates that the two algebras are generated by non-commuting
observables. This implies that
Sc(A,1) =
 j
A′∈A,
A′(A
S!(A′,P )
g
 j
A′′∈A,
[A′′,A] 6=0
S(A′′,P )
 . (10.57)
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The right-hand side can be read as “either a measurement is performed that is
compatible with A, but that is strictly coarser, or a measurement is performed that
is incompatible with a measurement of A.” The intended reading of the left-hand
side is “A is not measured”. Clearly the reading of the right-hand side implies the
reading of the left-hand side. The converse is not entirely trivial though. At first
sight one option appears to be missing on the right-hand side, namely, the case
where no measurement is performed at all. The idea is, however, that this case
has been included as ‘the coarsest possible measurement’: S!(C 1,1). A measurement
of the observable 1 necessarily yields the value 1 (remember IEA). It is a trivial
measurement. Then S!(C 1,1) expresses that no non-trivial measurement is performed.
The only thing then left to argue for is that a trivial measurement is not really a
measurement at all. Indeed, since the outcome is fixed, one doesn’t have to do
anything to obtain the it. The experimenter just needs to think of the number 1
and the deed is done.
Thus far it has been established that Sc(A,1) is a good representation of ¬MA.
For the next step, consider an arbitrary elementary experimental proposition. In
this case one has
Sc(A,P ) = S
c
(A,1) g S(A,P⊥). (10.58)
The right-hand side indicates the possible scenarios that either no measurement of
A is performed at all, or that a measurement is performed whose outcome is in ∆c
instead of ∆. This is again consistent with the intended meaning of the left-hand
side. For arbitrary S ∈ IL(H), consistency follows from the previous cases together
with the use of de Morgan’s laws as
Sc =
(j
A∈A
S(A,S(A))
)c
=
k
A∈A
Sc(A,S(A)). (10.59)
This establishes that the complement can indeed be interpreted as a negation.
It should be clear that CL(H) incorporates all propositions from IL(H) as well
as all negations of these propositions, and is closed under forming disjunctions,
conjunctions and negations. As a final point, one may wonder whether it is also the
smallest expansion that establishes this. After all, the starting ingredient was that
CL(H) also incorporates all the propositions of the form M !A(∆). One can wonder
if these would also have been part of the Boolean algebra if instead we had started
with incorporating all propositions of the form ¬MA(∆) instead. The answer to
this question is yes, and for the proof one only has to observe that
S!(A,P ) = S(A,P ) uprise
 k
A′∈A,
A(A′
Sc(A′,P )
 . (10.60)
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This establishes that every proposition of the form M !A(∆) can be written as a
conjunction of propositions of the forms MA(∆) and ¬MA(∆). Thus by introducing
(classical) negations to IL(H) one automatically introduces the propositions of the
form M !A(∆) as well.
It may be clear that, although IL(H) is a sub-lattice of CL(H), it is not a sub-
Heyting algebra. In particular, for any S ∈ IL(H), the equation
¬S = Sc (10.61)
holds if and only if S = > or S = ⊥. This is seen by noting that in all other
cases Sc /∈ IL(H). Indeed, suppose S ∈ IL(H) and S /∈ {⊥,>}, then S(C 1) = 0
and so Sc(C1) = 1. Because S 6= ⊥, there is some A such that S(A) = P 6=
0. Consequently, Sc(A) = P⊥ 6= 1, which shows that Sc does not satisfy the
monotonicity requirement. Intuitively, the complement in CL(H) is weaker than the
one in IL(H). The complement ¬S lists all possible measurements and outcomes
that ensure a conflict with S, while Sc in addition lists the options of not performing
measurements. An example illustrates this point further.
Example 10.2. Consider again the spin-12 particle from Example 10.1 with the
two possible measurements σx =
1
2P
+
x − 12P−x , σz = 12P+z − 12P−z . The function
S(Ax,P+x ) represents the proposition expressing that σx is measured and the spin is
found to be in the up-direction. The complement and the pseudo-complement for
this proposition are listed in the following table:
C 1 Ax Az
S(Ax,P+x ) 0 P
+
x 0
¬S(Ax,P+x ) 0 P−x 1
Sc
(Ax,P+x ) 1 P
−
x 1
(10.62)
This shows that
Sc
(Ax,P+x ) = ¬S(Ax,P+x ) g S
!
(C 1,1), (10.63)
where S!(C 1,1) again expresses the proposition that no measurement is performed.
4
With the construction of CL(H) we now have a classical quantum logic that is
fit to express all experimental propositions one finds in quantum mechanics. This
in itself may be considered a remarkable achievement, since one sometimes finds
slogans expressing the incompatibility of classical logic with quantum mechanics.17
It may be seen to be an explicit vindication of Bohr’s claim that “all departures
17Feynman’s “logical tightrope” may be considered such an example. On the other hand, I
haven’t come across any thorough defense for this alleged incompatibility.
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from common language and ordinary logic are entirely avoided by reserving the word
“phenomenon” solely for reference to unambiguously communicable information,
in the account of which the word “measurement” is used in its plain meaning of
standardized comparison” (1958). Apart from that, the construction of CL(H) also
shows that quantum mechanics without probabilities already provides a non-trivial
structure for experimental propositions. In the next chapter, then, I introduce
probability functions acting on these propositions. It is shown that the structure is
rich enough to incorporate all quantum probability functions, but also allows other
probability functions. I end with an investigation of further constraints that may
be used to single out the Born rule.
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In this chapter the new quantum logic developed in the previous chapter is used to
give a reformulation of quantum probability. In section 11.1 the logic is first refor-
mulated so as to obtain a measurable space: the common structure for formalisms
of probability. In section 11.2 the theory of conditional probability spaces is used
to demonstrate that quantum probability functions can be modeled as conditional
probability functions on the Boolean algebra
CL(H) = {S : A→ L(H) | S(A) ∈ L(A)} . (11.1)
This means that this quantum logic provides a physical interpretation of the domain
of quantum probability functions as experimental propositions.
But apart from a proper empirical reformulation of the formalism of quantum
probability one could hope for more. In section 11.2 it is shown that not every con-
ditional probability function on CL(H) gives rise to a quantum probability function.
It would be interesting to see if there is a conceptual reason why quantum proba-
bility functions play a privileged role. In section 11.3 it is shown that the quantum
probability functions precisely coincide with the so-called non-contextual probabil-
ity functions. This characterization of quantum probability functions is common in
the literature and in the remainder of the section I discuss three possible motiva-
tions for the importance of non-contextuality from the perspectives of Everettian
quantum mechanics, Bub & Pitowsky’s information-theoretical interpretation, and
Quantum Bayesianism, respectively. None of these motivations are found to be
entirely satisfactory though. In the final section I develop a new approach to char-
acterizing the Born rule that focuses less on the importance of non-contextuality.
Formally, this new approach delivers what it promises, but there are also some
philosophical wrinkles in the carpet that will be highlighted. The chapter ends with
a short selective afterthought on the accomplishments of part III in section 11.5.
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11.1 Preparing for probabilities
Classical probability functions are often defined as functions acting on a Boolean
algebra. Also, with CL(H) we now have a Boolean algebra of propositions for
quantum experiments. It then seems straightforward to put one and one together
and investigate what probability functions on CL(H) look like. But a little more
patience goes a long way and it is useful to first do a bit more research on CL(H)
itself.
In many expositions of probability, the Boolean algebra that is the domain of
the probability functions is an algebra of subsets of some set. The classical quantum
logic CL(H), on the other hand, is not of this kind. This is nothing to be frowned
upon, as this is no indication that an underlying set would be ‘missing’ in some
sense. After all, it follows from Stone’s theorem that such an underlying set always
exists. But although it may be tempting to use this theorem to construct this set,
it is useful to take a less abstract approach. There is a ‘natural’ underlying set ΩH
for CL(H), yet Stone’s theorem is not the way to find it. This is not to say that
the result obtained by Stone’s method (which is the set of all ultrafilters on CL(H)
endowed with the Stone topology) is not susceptible to interpretation, but just that
such an interpretation doesn’t arise naturally.
The construction of a particular underlying set for CL(H) can be motivated by
looking at the atoms in CL(H). These are the maximally informative propositions
in the lattice, and they are given by the set of functions
CLa(H) :=
{
S!(A,P ) ∈ CL(H)
∣∣∣ P ∈ La(A)} . (11.2)
Remember that S!(A,P ) is given by
S!(A,P )(A′) =
{
P A = A′,
0 otherwise,
(11.3)
and expresses the proposition that A is measured (with A = Alg(A)) and an out-
come in ∆ is obtained (with P = µA(∆)) and that no finer grained measurement
is performed. Furthermore, La(A) denotes the set of atoms in L(A) and so the
projections in La(A) correspond to the most precise possible specifications of mea-
surement outcomes. When H is finite-dimensional, these atoms can be used to
formulate any proposition in CL(H) (i.e., the lattice is atomistic). This follows from
the fact that (10.52) establishes that every element in CL(H) can be written as a
disjunction of propositions of the form S!(A,P ), while these in turn can be written as
disjunctions of elements in CLa(H). Specifically, for every proposition of the form
S!(A,P ) one has
S!(A,P ) =
j{
S!(A,P ′) ∈ CLa(H)
∣∣∣ P ′ ≤ P} . (11.4)
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The set of atoms CLa(H) may be seen to be characterized by the set
ΩH := {(A, P ) ∈ EEP (H) | P ∈ La(A)} , (11.5)
where EEP (H) is given by (10.12). The set ΩH may be taken to be the underlying
set for CLa(H):1
Theorem 11.1. Let H be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space and let FH := P(ΩH)
be the Boolean algebra of all subsets of ΩH, where this set is given by (11.5). Then
FH and CL(H) are isomorphic as Boolean algebras.
Proof. The proof consists of showing that
f : CL(H)→ FH, f(S) := {(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ S(A)} (11.6)
is an isomorphism of Boolean algebras.
First note that
f(⊥) = {(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ 0} = ∅,
f(>) = {(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ 1} = ΩH.
(11.7)
The fact that the map respects arbitrary joins and meets is shown by focusing on
the Boolean lattices L(A).
f
(j
i∈I
Si
)
=
⋃
A∈A
{
(A, P ) ∈ ΩH
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤
(j
i∈I
Si
)
(A)
}
=
⋃
A∈A
{
(A, P ) ∈ ΩH
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤∨
i∈I
Si(A)
}
=
⋃
A∈A
⋃
i∈I
{(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ Si(A)}
=
⋃
i∈I
⋃
A∈A
{(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ Si(A)} =
⋃
i∈I
f(Si).
(11.8)
1Note that ΩH corresponds to the set of principal ultrafilters on CL(H). This would be the same
result as provided by Stone’s theorem if there are no free ultrafilters on CL(H). I do not know,
however, if such ultrafilters exist.
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f
(k
i∈I
Si
)
=
⋃
A∈A
{
(A, P ) ∈ ΩH
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤
(k
i∈I
Si
)
(A)
}
=
⋃
A∈A
{
(A, P ) ∈ ΩH
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤∧
i∈I
Si(A)
}
=
⋃
A∈A
⋂
i∈I
{(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ Si(A)}
=
⋂
i∈I
⋃
A∈A
{(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ Si(A)} =
⋂
i∈I
f(Si).
(11.9)
Thus f is a homomorphism.
To see that f is a bijection I prove that the function
g : FH → CL(H), (g(∆))(A) :=
∨
{P ∈ La(A) | (A, P ) ∈ ∆} (11.10)
provides an inverse for f . For any S ∈ CL(H) and ∆ ⊂ ΩH one has
(g(f(S))) (A) =
∨
{P ∈ La(A) | (A, P ) ∈ f(S)}
=
∨
{P ∈ La(A) | P ≤ S(A)} = S(A),
(11.11)
And conversely,
f(g(∆)) = {(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | P ≤ (g(∆))(A)}
=
{
(A, P ) ∈ ΩH
∣∣∣ P ≤∨ {P ∈ La(A) | (A, P ) ∈ ∆}}
= {(A, P ) ∈ ΩH | (A, P ) ∈ ∆} = ∆.
(11.12)
This theorem establishes that CL(H) can be identified with the measurable space
(ΩH,FH). Now one could evaluate all probability measures on this space. But doing
so is quite unsatisfactory. These probability measures in general don’t do justice
to how quantum mechanics is applied or, more generally, how one reasons about
measurements and their outcomes in any scientific theory. This is most effectively
illustrated by an example.
Consider the element (C 1,1) ∈ ΩH. The corresponding singleton set is identified
with the element S!(C1,1) ∈ CL(H). This element represents the proposition that no
measurement is performed (see the discussion on page 167). A possible probability
measure is the one that assigns probability one to this proposition, and probability
zero to all the other elements of ΩH. Clearly this probability function cannot
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be used to assign probabilities to measurement outcomes for any of the possible
measurements, since it is not possible to condition on a set of measure zero.
Probability functions of this kind are unsatisfactory even for the hardened in-
strumentalist. Although one may adhere to the idea that “unperformed experiments
have no result” (Peres, 1978), a central idea in science is that, if these experiments
were to be performed, they would have an outcome. Although one may reject the
idea that these outcomes have a definite value when the experiment is not per-
formed, it is a lot more radical to deny the possibility of assigning probabilities to
the possible outcomes. When, for example, one thinks of probabilities as degrees of
belief for a rational agent, it is perfectly natural that these are also defined for mea-
surements that aren’t performed. After all, one can contemplate what would happen
if a measurement were to be performed. But also when one thinks of probabilities
as propensities or dispositions that are properties of a system, it is perfectly natural
to assume that these properties exist also for unperformed measurements precisely
because these properties are dispositional. In each of these cases the existence of
non-trivial conditional probabilities is presupposed and these aren’t provided by
many of the possible probability measures on (ΩH,FH).
A way to get around these difficulties is to take conditional probability as prim-
itive. On such an approach a probability distribution over possible measurement
outcomes for each possible measurement is well-defined. Therefore, such a frame-
work is adopted in the next section.
11.2 Recovering quantum probability
The idea that conditional probability is prior to regular probability is not uncommon
in the philosophy of probability. For a defense of this view one may consult the work
of Ha´jek (2003). Noticeably, he even presents quantum mechanics as an example of a
theory in which conditional probability is primitive (p. 305): “Quantum mechanics
apparently tells us that certain chances, conditional on free acts, are defined, and it
even purports to tell us their values.” Although it is easy to more or less understand
what he means with this, it deserves to be noted that his construal of quantum
probability does not reflect the way it is usually formulated. Quantum probability
functions are usually defined as one-placed functions, and this is a tradition I have
followed throughout this dissertation. To be sure, the paraphrasing of the Born
postulate as a postulate on conditional probabilities I gave in section 10.1 is a
natural one. But it does not pose in itself a mathematical formalism of conditional
probability for quantum mechanics. Nor am I familiar with such formalizations
other than the one given in this section. If this formulation catches on, then Ha´jek’s
argument will have a more solid foundation, although one would still have to do
some work to justify his presupposition that quantum probabilities are chances.
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The distinction between conditional and unconditional probability is mostly
debated within the philosophy of probability. It is somewhat unfortunate that this
leads to the two options as somehow being opposing views; a defense of conditional
probability is often posed as a critique of unconditional probability, as if there were
something fundamentally wrong with the standard axioms of probability in which
Kolmogorov defines conditional probability in terms of unconditional probabilities.
But when a mathematician defines x in terms of y, this almost never should be
taken to imply that one concept is more fundamental than the other. With respect
to this issue it deserves to be noted that Kolmogorov (1963) in a later text explicitly
starts with a notion of probability that only makes sense conditional on an assumed
set of conditions. He then arrives at the axioms he is famous for by keeping the set
of conditions fixed. That being said, one of course still needs a formal definition of
conditional probability that also works when the conditions have probability zero.
Such a definition of conditional probability spaces was first given by Re´nyi (1955).2
Definition 11.1. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space and let C ⊂ F\{∅} be a
non-empty set. Then (Ω,F , C,P) is called a conditional probability space (CPS) if
P : F × C → [0, 1] satisfies
(i) for every C ∈ C the function A 7→ P(A|C) is a probability measure on (Ω,F),
(ii) for all A,B,C ∈ F with C,B ∩ C ∈ C
P(A ∩B|C) = P(A|B ∩ C)P(B|C). (11.13)
The set C is called the set of conditions. If this set is closed under finite unions the
space is called an additive CPS and if C = F\{∅} it is called a full CPS.
I take it that this definition is relatively uncontroversial so I shall adopt it for
my investigation without defending it. In the previous section, the quantum logic
CL(H) was related to the measurable space (ΩH,FH). Although I adopt this space
to evaluate possible conditional probability spaces, I shall refer to FH as if it were
identical (and not just isomorphic) to CL(H). This means that the elements of FH
are being thought of both as functions on A and as subsets of ΩH. As a modest
set of conditions for quantum mechanics, it is appropriate to take the propositions
that express that a measurement of the observable A is performed. These are the
elements of the form
SA := S(A,1), A ∈ A (11.14)
2Independently, Popper (1959, A *ii-*v) gave a similar axiomatization of conditional probability.
For this reason, conditional probability spaces are also often called Re´nyi-Popper spaces.
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where A is the algebra generated by the operator A that is associated with the
observable A. Remember that this function was defined by the rule
SA(A′) :=
{
1 if A′ ⊂ A,
0 if A′ 6⊂ A. (11.15)
Then the set of conditions is taken to be
CQM := {SA | A ∈ A} . (11.16)
With this set of conditions, every CPS (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) provides a distribution
over the outcomes for each possible measurement. To see this, let A ∈ A represent
a possible measurement and let {P1, . . . , Pn} be any set of pairwise orthogonal
projections in L(A) that sum to the identity. Then
P
(
S(A,P1)
∣∣SA)+ . . .+ P (S(A,Pn)∣∣SA) = 1. (11.17)
Joint measurements are also incorporated in this formulation whenever they are
measurements of observables that are jointly measurable, since
SA1 ∧ SA2 =
{
SAlg(A1,A2) if Alg(A1,A2) ∈ A,
⊥ otherwise. (11.18)
One may have the intuition that it would be more satisfactory to consider full
CPSs for (ΩH,FH). After all, what is the use of taking conditional probability as
primitive if not all propositions can be used as conditions? The fact is that I do not
know at the moment if there exists a full CPS for (ΩH,FH). It can be shown, though,
that in some cases a CPS (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) can be extended to an additive CPS (for
a proof see (Hermens, 2014, pp. 61–62)). On the other hand, I am not sure what the
advantage is of also allowing propositions like “A is measured, or no measurement
at all is performed” as a condition. What is conceptually advantageous, is that we
now have a plausible framework that introduces probabilities in quantum mechanics
as a natural ingredient rather than as a brute postulate. What I mean is that, given
the logic CL(H), it is a natural step to introduce functions that assign probabilities
to its propositions. This may be contrasted to the orthodox quantum logic L(H) for
which the introduction of probability functions is less natural because it is unclear
how to interpret its elements as propositions (see also chapter 8). The domain
of ordinary quantum probability functions is the lattice of projection operators,
and the only motivation for calling these operators “events” seems to be the Born
postulate itself. These abstract events have now been replaced by a clear Boolean
algebra of experimental propositions. It is now time to connect the two formalisms
of quantum probability.
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Definition 11.2. Let (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) be a CPS. Then P is said to be a Born
measure if there exists a density operator ρ such that for all A ∈ A and P ∈ L(A)
P
(
S(A,P )
∣∣SA) = Tr(ρP ). (11.19)
It is easy to see that there is a CPS (ΩH,FH, CQM,Pρ) for every density operator
ρ such that Pρ is a Born measure that reproduces the Born rule for ρ, namely,
Pρ (S|SA) := Tr(ρS(A)). (11.20)
This equation can be understood as follows. Remember that every function S ∈
CL(H) can be understood as expressing a disjunction over possible measurements
because,
S =
j
A∈A
S!(A,S(A)) (11.21)
holds for every S with the right-hand side defined by (10.48). The condition SA
now specifies which of the measurements in the disjunction is in fact performed.
The set of possible outcomes for this measurement specified by S is represented by
the projection S(A) since
S(A) =
( j
A′∈A
S!(A′,S(A′))
)
(A) =
∨
A′∈A
S!(A′,S(A′))(A) = S!(A,S(A))(A). (11.22)
Thus the class of CPSs (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) is at least as big as that of all quantum
probability functions. This means that every quantum probability space can be
reformulated as a conditional probability space in which it is at least conceptually
clear what the elements in the domain of the function represent. The probability
functions introduced as CPSs can unambiguously be seen as assigning probabilities
to outcomes of measurements conditioned on the performing of said measurement.
It deserves to be noted that this formalism has been achieved by adopting a purely
empiricist investigation of the formalism of quantum mechanics. No additional
metaphysical assumptions such as the existence of hidden variables were introduced.
The conceptual underpinning of quantum probability provided may be seen to be
independent of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the sense that it would
fit with any interpretation that accepts the empirical reading of quantum mechanics
adopted here.
Although this is already a very attractive result, it is worth investigating whether
one can’t obtain even more. The formulation of quantum probability as CPSs also
allows many probability functions that are not Born measures. As an example,
consider two distinct density operators ρ1, ρ2 such that ρ1 is not a multiple of the
unit operator and define a probability function Pρ1,ρ2 by the rule
Pρ1,ρ2(S|SA) :=
{
Pρ1(S|SA) ρ1 ∈ A,
Pρ2(S|SA) ρ1 /∈ A.
(11.23)
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This probability function acts as the quantum probability function Pρ2 in almost
all cases except for measurement contexts that imply that a measurement of ρ1
(now understood as an observable) is performed. In those cases the probability is
calculated using the Born rule for the case that ρ1 is the state. The constraint that
ρ1 6= λ1 ensures that there are cases for which ρ1 /∈ A and so Pρ1,ρ2 is not a Born
measure.
It would be great if one could have a conceptual characterization of the special
role of probability functions that follow the Born rule. The remainder of this chapter
is devoted to investigating some attempts at finding such a characterization.
11.3 Non-contextuality and the Born rule
From the perspective of hidden variable interpretations it is commonly accepted
that quantum mechanics is a contextual theory.3 Somewhat counter-intuitively, at
the level of probability distributions, quantum mechanics is non-contextual. The
Born rule itself is non-contextual in the sense that probabilities are calculated using
only the projection operator that specifies the measurement outcome, rather than
the complete resolution of the identity specified by the measured observable. This
was even taken as a guide to the formal definition of a quantum probability space in
chapter 4. The fact has also been used to argue that quantum mechanics itself is non-
contextual (Mermin, 1993, p. 811). In connection with more general frameworks of
probability it was recognized already by Barnum et al. (2000) that non-contextuality
is an important ingredient for singling out the quantum probability functions from
all possible probability functions. These considerations can be made precise within
the framework of the CPSs of the previous section. First off, a definition of non-
contextual probability functions is required.
Definition 11.3. Let (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) be a CPS, then P is called a non-contextual
probability function if for all A1,A2 ∈ A and all P ∈ L(A1) ∩ L(A2)
P
(
S(A1,P )
∣∣SA1) = P (S(A2,P )∣∣SA2) . (11.24)
The non-contextuality constraint for probability functions can be viewed as a
generalization of the constraint of parameter independence adopted in derivations
of Bell-type inequalities (Jarrett, 1984; Shimony, 1990). This constraint states
that the probability of the outcome of a measurement is not allowed to depend on
which measurement is performed at a space-like separated location. It is obtained
from (11.24) by setting A1 = Alg(AA,AB) and A2 = Alg(AA,A′B) where AA rep-
resents the measurement selected at one location, and AB and A′B represent two
3The only caveat is the finite precision loophole (see part II).
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measurements that may be selected at a space-like separated location and letting
P ∈ L(AA).
The following theorem shows that the Born measures make up all the non-
contextual probability functions.
Theorem 11.2. Let (ΩH,FH, CQM,P) be a CPS with dim(H) > 2. Then P is a
Born measure if and only if P is non-contextual.
Proof. If P is a Born measure, then non-contextuality follows because, for all
A1,A2 ∈ A and all P ∈ L(A1) ∩ L(A2),
P
(
S(A1,P )
∣∣SA1) = Tr(ρP ) = P (S(A2,P )∣∣SA2) . (11.25)
The converse is slightly less trivial. Suppose P is a non-contextual probability
function. Let L1(H) denote the set of 1-dimensional projections and define the
function λ : L1(H)→ R as
λ(P ) := P
(
S(Alg(P ),P )
∣∣∣SAlg(P )) . (11.26)
This defines a frame function. To see this let (Pi)i∈I be a frame. Then∑
i∈I
λ(Pi) =
∑
i∈I
P
(
S(Alg(Pi),Pi)
∣∣∣SAlg(Pi))
=
∑
i∈I
P
(
S(Alg({Pi | i∈I}),Pi)
∣∣∣SAlg({Pi | i∈I})) = 1 (11.27)
According to Gleason’s lemma (section 4.2) there exists a density operator ρ such
that λ(P ) = Tr(ρP ) for all P ∈ L1(H). Consequently,
P
(
S(A,P )
∣∣SA) = P(S(Alg(P ),P )∣∣∣SAlg(P )) = λ(P ) = Tr(ρP ), (11.28)
for all A ∈ A and P ∈ L(A).
This theorem gives a short and sharp characterization of the Born measures
on CL(H). Conceptually, this brings us a step forward to understanding whether
the Born rule should be adopted as a separate postulate in quantum mechanics,
or whether it can be derived from more basic assumptions. The rule can now be
seen to follow from any motivation of non-contextuality. This is not to say that
non-contextuality is easily motivated, but at least the task has been reduced to
showing why a certain constraint on probability functions should hold. Perhaps one
can identify it as a rationality constraint, or motivate it by adopting a more meta-
physically grounded story. The remainder of this section is devoted to a discussion
of some of the motivations that exist in the literature.
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As noted before, the concept of non-contextuality as applied to probability func-
tions (instead of hidden variables) is not new. The first explicit occurrence of the
idea that I know of is in the paper by Barnum et al. (2000). In a similar fashion they
argue that this assumption (together with Gleason’s theorem) is enough to derive
the Born rule. They appear to be slightly more optimistic about the importance of
this result than I am, as they conclude their paper with the statement that “It is
hard to imagine a cleaner derivation of the probability rule than this.” So whereas
I see Theorem 11.2 as an important midway station to deriving the Born rule, the
authors envision themselves to already be at the finish line.
This discrepancy likely stems from a disagreement concerning the plausibility
of the non-contextuality assumption. In their own words, if a probability function
is non-contextual, it “means that the probabilities are consistent with the Hilbert-
space structure of the observables” (p. 1181). But I do not really know what to
make of this. Apparently there is some sense in which the probability function
(11.20) is consistent while (11.23) isn’t, even though both are completely specified
in terms of the Hilbert-space structure of observables. But which sense this should
be is not found in the paper of Barnum et al. (ibid.). Somewhat ironically, the con-
fusion may be cleared by adopting the approach of the very paper that the authors
were criticizing: Deutsch’s decision theoretical approach in Everettian quantum
mechanics (Deutsch, 1999).
11.3.1 Everettian Quantum Mechanics
Connecting the present discussion to Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) re-
quires a bit more background. In this interpretation the state postulate is inter-
preted metaphysically. That is, the wave function is a complete representation of the
actual state of the universe. This state always evolves according to the Schro¨dinger
equation. The occurrence of actual measurement outcomes is explained by inter-
preting the corresponding terms in the superposition state as equally real. These
terms are taken to correspond to parallel ‘classical’ worlds that emerge as a conse-
quence of a decoherence process.
The precise details of this interpretation are not important here. What is impor-
tant to note is that EQM claims to solve the measurement problem by arguing that
in some sense all possible measurement outcomes obtain. This is often taken to lead
to the problem of probability. The question is how to make sense of probabilities for
different outcomes when all outcomes occur. When outcomes are assigned different
probabilities, does this then mean that one occurs more than the other, or is more
real?
Note that this problem is not the one I am concerned with here (why the Born
rule?), but is much broader. However, the solution to the problem proposed by
Deutsch, which was further developed by Wallace (2003 ; 2007 ; 2010 ; 2012), solves
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both problems at the same time. The starting point of the solution is to decouple
probability from the ontology of the Everettian universe, and instead attach it to
the decisions made by rational agents within such a universe. The benefit of this
approach is that, although at the fundamental level EQM proposes a deterministic
universe that is completely described by the quantum state, rational agents live at
the emergent level of semi-classical branches. It is argued that on such branches a
rational agent can use decision theory just as if the universe were non-branching.4
This decision-theoretical turn (if it works) can be used to introduce probability
into any branching universe. But the Everettian rational agent not only believes that
the universe branches, but also that this occurs according to the laws of quantum
mechanics. Deutsch and Wallace demonstrate that if a rational agent uses this
knowledge to inform her decisions, she will act in accordance with the Born rule.
In fact, if she knows the wave function pertaining to her branch, she will use this
particular quantum state in the Born rule. This demonstration of course requires
assumptions. The interesting thing to note for the present discussion is that non-
contextuality is not among these assumptions, but is instead derived. The important
distinction with the idea of Barnum et al. (2000), is that for the Everettian there is
a metaphysical picture available that can be used to give meaning to a probability
function being “consistent with the Hilbert-space structure”. The Everettian can
resort to the state postulate of quantum mechanics: there is a particular state of
affairs which can inform a rational agent. This idea is adopted explicitly by Wallace
(2010) by introducing the following rationality requirement.
StaS (State Supervenience) An agent’s preferences between acts depend only
on what physical state they actually leave his branch in.
Thus the only thing available for an agent to specify her preferences are the weights
of the branches associated with the possible outcomes of an act, which are given by
the Born rule. This is (of course) not the only rationality constraint that is needed
to obtain the Born rule in EQM. But it is the one that lies behind non-contextuality,
in the sense that violations of non-contextuality (such as (11.23)) specifically violate
this constraint (Wallace, 2012, §5.8.8).
StaS seems natural enough in any interpretation of quantum mechanics in which
the quantum state is assumed to give a complete ontological description. But what
seems natural is not necessarily what is right, and from the point of view of decision
theory StaS looks a lot less natural. It is not a kind of rationality constraint one
usually finds. It may seem rational on some everyday use of the idea of ‘rational’, but
4What I am glossing over here is the fact that the branches in EQM are emergent structures.
Thus there isn’t really a spin-up branch and a spin-down branch in the case of a spin-measurements.
Rather, these things are a bit woolly. So it is not entirely clear what kind of things an agent is
deciding about in a universe that is governed by the quantum state. For a critical investigation
the reader may consult the work of Kent (2010 ; 2014).
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in decision theory one requires more. For a constraint to be a rationality constraint,
it is often required that violating it has negative consequences (such as a sure loss
on a bet). But it is not clear how an agent in an Everettian universe would be worse
off when she violates StaS. This point is conceded by Deutsch, who opts for a wider
understanding of rationality dubbed “scientific rationality”, where your opinions
should only depend on the actual state of affairs (Saunders et al., 2010, p. 403).
But it seems to me that this only transforms the problem to motivating scientific
rationality.
All in all though, EQM comes a long way in deriving the Born rule. But the
way this is done does not excel in metaphysical parsimony. The most important
assumptions used (that have played no role thus far in this part of the dissertation)
are the state postulate together with an ontological interpretation of the quantum
state. On top of this, an emerging structure of parallel worlds is assumed.5 And
of course there is the assumption of scientific rationality. Could these assumptions
be necessary for the Born rule? Or are there other ways to flesh out the appeal to
Hilbert-space structure invoked by Barnum et al. (2000)?
There are two main candidates for interpretations of quantum mechanics in
which quantum states, in so far as they play a role, are given an epistemic interpre-
tation. These are the quantum Bayesian approach (QBism) developed by Caves,
Fuchs, and Schack (2002), (see also (Fuchs, 2010; Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack, 2013)
for introductory approaches) and the information-theoretical interpretation of Bub
and Pitowsky (2010) (see also (Bub, 2007 ; 2011b)). The main distinction between
these two programs when focusing only on probability in quantum mechanics, is
that the first adopts a subjective (personalist) Bayesian interpretation, whereas the
second adopts an objective Bayesian interpretation. Typical for Bayesian interpre-
tations of probability is that they are well accustomed to defending or deriving also
the formalism of probability. In this case, a derivation of the Born rule would seem
to be desirable. I shall now discuss these two options one at a time.
11.3.2 Bub & Pitowsky
In the pioneering work in Bayesian interpretations of quantum probability, non-
contextuality is more or less taken to be a natural assumption. It is motivated by
an appeal to the structure of the quantum formalism. This is the case in (Barnum
et al., 2000), but also in the work of Pitowsky (2003). In his paper he attempts
to give a derivation of the Born rule by making use of Dutch book arguments and
rationality constraints. One of the rules (RULE 2) looks much like an instance of
(11.24). It is admitted that the rule is not a rationality constraint. Instead, it
is argued that “an agent who violates RULE 2 is failing to grasp the logic of the
5Although Everettians would argue that this structure is actually derived from the formalism
of quantum mechanics.
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gamble and wrongly assumes that she is playing a different game” (p. 400). The
“logic of the gamble” refers to the claim that even though the contexts SA1 and
SA2 are distinct, the propositions S(A1,P ) and S(A2,P ) refer to the same event. In
other words, the correct logic is given by the lattice of projection operators L(H).
However, as seen in section 8.2, this lattice can be understood as a consequence of
the Born postulate. To avoid circularity one thus needs a motivation independent of
the Born postulate to argue that projection operators deserve to be called “events”.
But as the investigation of quantum logic in chapters 8 and 9 shows, finding such a
motivation is no trivial matter.
A similar approach is found in the more recent work of Bub (2011b). Here
the lattice of projections is also posited as being the non-classical event space for
quantum mechanics. Why it has this form, or what is precisely meant by events is
left unspecified. But a bit more is said about the interpretation of this structure.
Specifically (p. 231): “the geometric structure of Hilbert space imposes objective
probabilistic or information-theoretic constraints on correlations between events,
just as in special relativity the geometric structure of Minkowski space imposes
spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events.” This gives some more insight in
why two events MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2) that satisfy µA1(∆1) = µA2(∆2) should be
identified with each other. It is not that they actually signify the same event per se,
but rather there is an objective probabilistic constraint on the correlation between
these two events. There is some rule ‘out there’ that compels agents to assign the
same credence to these two events.
It is hard to see this constraint as anything other than an invocation of the Born
rule. A derivation of the Born rule postulating such a constraint again verges on
circularity. But perhaps such a derivation isn’t really what Bub is after. His goal
rather appears to be to obtain an objective (or intersubjective) Bayesian interpre-
tation of quantum probability. On such a view, two rational agents in a quantum
world need not only both obey the Born rule, but they should also use the same
density operator when both have the same information available. Thus there has to
be some objective fact that makes one probability function more appropriate than
the other. For this purpose, Bub makes an appeal to a Humean notion of chance
to obtain a re-interpretation of Gleason’s theorem:
Rather, in the sense of Lewis’s Principal Principle, Gleason’s Theorem
relates an objective feature of the world, the non-classical structure of
objective chances, to the credence function of a rational agent. [. . . ] On
this analysis, the quantum state does not have an ontological signifi-
cance analogous to the ontological significance of an extremal classical
state as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the occurrence and non-
occurrence of events, i.e. as a representation of physical reality. Rather,
the quantum state is a credence function, a book-keeping device for
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keeping track of probabilities. (ibid., p. 255)
The non-contextual aspect of the Born rule then isn’t deeply fundamental, meta-
physically speaking. Adopting Lewis’s best system analysis (Loewer, 2004), it is
nothing but the best description of how events hang together. It is then a con-
tingent fact that in this description the events MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2) are treated
identically, rather than a metaphysical necessity.
In this kind of interpretation, it is no longer fitting to ask for a derivation of
the Born rule in strictly quantum mechanical terms. Instead, the problem has been
shifted to a more general metaphysical issue, namely, the fleshing out of Lewis’s best
system analysis of physical laws. Thereby, the subject has shifted far outside the
scope of this dissertation. Possibly, Bub’s account of quantum probability could
work well.6 But without a fully worked out Lewisian account of the quantum
formalism, it doesn’t bring us much closer to an understanding of the Born rule in
the present discussion. It is time, then, to turn attention to QBism.
11.3.3 QBism
The starting point of QBism is a personalist Bayesian interpretation of quantum
probabilities. Quantum states are nothing more than reflections of the epistemic
states of agents. But as an interpretation of quantum mechanics it adopts many
more ingredients. For example, probability-1 statements are also said to have no
other meaning than the reflection of credences. When a rational agent assigns
probability one to a particular measurement outcome (e.g. by adopting a pure
state), this does not refer to some fact in the world embodying that a measurement
would in fact yield this outcome. There may not even be such facts. The world
described by the QBist is indeterministic (Fuchs, 2010, p. 8) and possibly, at least
on a certain level, lawless (Fuchs, 2014, p. 205).
Understandably, this interpretation is unattractive to many. But the high level
of subjectivity it attributes to the formalism of quantum mechanics is also a cause
for suspicion. For example, it casts doubt on the question whether quantum me-
chanics has any explanatory power left (Timpson, 2013, §10.2), or whether it re-
duces to a collection of predictions of a rational agent who just found it convenient
to write them down using the Hilbert space formalism. Perhaps QBism takes its
subjective view too far and thereby looses the merits of a subjective interpretation
of quantum probability. Bacciagaluppi (2014), for example, wonders whether such
an interpretation of probability wouldn’t work better within other approaches to
quantum mechanics that adopt a firmer ontology for quantum systems.
6That is not to say that the information-theoretic interpretation is without any problems. I
just haven’t discussed those. But see for example (Timpson, 2010) for a critical assessment of
the program of Bub and Pitowsky, and (Timpson, 2013) for problems with information theoretical
interpretations more generally.
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Be that as it may, it is precisely the highly subjective aspect of QBism that has
been put to work in justifying the Born rule. In several communications in (Fuchs,
2002b) (in particular between Caves and Fuchs) the question of the possibility of
contextual probability functions in QBism was discussed. The emerging view is I
think best explained in (Fuchs, 2002a, §4.1). The starting point is to note that
the observable postulate does not dictate which operator is to be assigned to which
observable. According to the QBist even this choice is subjective. The idea is
now that the assignment of degrees of belief to the outcomes of experiments goes
hand in hand with the attribution of operators to these experiments. When the
agent assigns equal probabilities to two events MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2) in all possible
scenarios (notice that no operator is specified in the description of these events),
then she will choose corresponding operators A1 and A2 such that these two events
are identified with the same projection operator. The arrow of explanation is turned
around, so to speak: two events are not ascribed the same probability because they
are associated with the same projection, but they are associated with the same
projection because they are given identical probabilities. As Fuchs (2002b, p. 20)
concludes: “By this point of view, noncontextuality is a tautology–it is built in from
the start. Asking why we have it is a waste of time.”
Although it is indeed trivial that one obtains non-contextuality in this way, the
argument is problematic. If one takes this line of reasoning further, the whole use of
the theory of quantum mechanics occurs as a subjective choice. There is no obvious
objective reason for a rational agent to adopt it. The only way the agent could obtain
the theory is as a consequence of Bayesian conditionalization together with some
further rule for updating. Such a further rule is required because conditionalization
alone does not result in the stable identity of credences in distinct events. As long
as the two events MA1(∆1) and MA2(∆2) have not been identified with each other,
it is in general possible that future updates will lead to distinct probabilities for the
events. So to introduce the equivalence of two events one needs a separate formal
rule.
By making non-contextuality a tautology, the problem has just shifted up a
notch. The question is no longer why a rational agent using quantum mechan-
ics would assign non-contextual credences, but rather why a rational agent doing
physics would use quantum mechanics in the first place. One would expect that
an agent using quantum mechanics to describe (quantum) experiments would be
better off in some sense than an agent using the outcomes of the local lottery to
make predictions. Surely quantum mechanics describes some structure that is ob-
jectively relevant for the experiments? And wouldn’t a rational agent be better off
when taking this structure into consideration? The Qbist agrees. As Fuchs (ibid.,
p. 5) notes: “The one of us that ignores the structure of the world will be bitten by
it!” But precisely what this structure is, and what kind of bite is considered here
is unclear.
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There is a parallel between the adherence to quantum structure by the QBist
and the use of StaS in EQM. Both take it that it is in some sense better to respect
it than not. Furthermore, in both cases it is unclear precisely what the penalty is
for ignoring it. But there is also an important distinction. Much of the structure
of quantum mechanics has been incorporated into the logic CL(H). It dictates that
an agent betting on the outcome of a spin measurement on a spin-12 particle should
bet on one of the outcomes in {−12 , 12}. There is a clear penalty for not complying:
one will simply lose the bet. This is true in EQM irrespective of whether one adopts
StaS, but is not evident according to the QBist. After all, there is no fact of the
matter about the outcome of the experiment.
What is odd about QBism is that by making non-contextuality (and the Born
rule) tautologous, it throws away much of the objectivity of the Hilbert space struc-
ture. So much so, that one may wonder whether non-contextuality is really such
a valuable thing to save. Why is it so important to use a density operator to
set my credences for a measurement outcome when there is no fact of the matter
concerning the correct self-adjoint operator to determine the possible measurement
outcomes? Personally, I’d prefer to take CL(H) as expressing the objectively correct
structure of a particular system without being able to derive the Born rule, rather
than reducing CL(H) to a subjective choice just in order to have the Born rule.
This sentiment may even be taken up a notch. Why is it so important to re-
cover the Born rule? How important is the rule for the descriptive and explanatory
power for quantum mechanics? How many experiments actually distinguish between
non-contextual and contextual probability assignments? These are all interesting
questions to which I have no good answer. But in any case, an agent adopting a
contextual probability function is coherent within each possible experimental con-
text. The difficulty of accepting StaS as a rationality constraint indicates precisely
that there is no obvious penalty for violating non-contextuality. Contextual proba-
bility functions may then be just fine for a subjective Bayesian, and it is not clear
to me why QBists make such an effort to reject them. The broader lesson, I think,
is that any argument that establishes that there is no objective sense in which us-
ing one quantum state rather than another is better (which is what the QBists
claim), also establishes that no contextual probability function is worse than some
non-contextual probability function (which is what the QBists deny).
The subjective Bayesian in quantum mechanics then could be satisfied with
using any conditional probability function on CL(H). The objective Bayesian (as
well as the Everettian), on the other hand, is looking for much more than satisfaction
of the Born rule, namely, the aim is to single out a unique quantum state. Once
this state has been obtained, the Born rule drops out as a bonus. Thus either, on
the subjective view, violating the Born rule is not problematic, or, on the objective
view, it is ruled out as a consequence of some motivation for the objectivity of
quantum states. These considerations indicate that failing to find a derivation
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of the Born rule in an interpretation-neutral setting need not be problematic. It
may be necessary that at some point interpretation-laden steps have to be made.
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see from an empiricist point of view what
it means to adopt a Born measure instead of an arbitrary probability function. In
the next section, then, I investigate some new attempts to characterize the Born
measures on CL(H).
11.4 Logico-empirical characterization of the Born rule
In the previous section I have been looking at possible derivations of the Born rule
without much success. There is no shame in this. As noted by Landsman (2009,
p. 69): “no generally accepted derivation of the Born rule has been given to date”.
However, as indicated at the end of the previous section, it also isn’t clear how
important it is to have a separate derivation of the Born rule. It may just be a sub-
problem concerning the metaphysical status of quantum states and their associated
probabilities. The specific trace-rule then would just drop out as a byproduct in a
solution of that problem.
Nevertheless, there is the intuition that the Born measures on CL(H) should play
a special role. It is therefore interesting to see how these measures can be character-
ized. Theorem 11.2 established a connection with non-contextuality. However, the
concept of non-contextuality didn’t appear to be very illuminating in the context of
CL(H). In this section, then, I investigate two entirely different possible characteri-
zations. The first one is found to be unsuccessful, but the second is more promising
and does lead to a particular characterization of the Born rule. However, since some
technical steps are involved in obtaining this characterization, the precise physical
significance of the characterization has to be the topic of future work.
11.4.1 Continuity
The first idea reverts to the discussion of the Kochen-Specker theorem in part
II. Thus far, Theorem 7.4 is the closest I got to a derivation of the Born rule
from conceptually motivated assumptions. But although non-contextuality at the
level of hidden variables was presupposed in chapter 7, this alone turned out to be
insufficient to derive the Born rule for the MKC models. Instead, the key assumption
used in Theorem 7.4 was a continuity assumption. It is tempting then to believe
that the Born measures on CL(H) can be characterized in a similar way. However,
I argue in this section that the prospects for such a characterization are grim.
Specifically, I construct an example of a probability measure that is not a Born
measure, but that does appear to satisfy some proper continuity assumptions.
The motivation to use a continuity assumption stems from the idea that the norm
on the set of self-adjoint operators is relevant at the level of actual experimental
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setups. Whenever ‖A1 − A2‖ is small enough, experimental setups that measure
A1 or A2 will become practically indiscernible and the events MA1(∆) and MA2(∆)
will resemble each other as well (assuming the spectra of the operators are fixed,
see also Theorem 7.2). When adopting a Bayesian interpretation of probability this
motivates the idea that credences for these events should resemble each other as
well, as a betting agent will not know with infinite precision which event she will be
betting on in practice. But on other interpretations of probability such a continuity
assumption seems natural as well.
It is not trivial to give a formal definition of what it means for a conditional
probability function on CL(H) to be continuous in this sense. A difficulty is that
the continuity criterion would have to apply simultaneously to the two arguments
of the probability function. After all, without such a constraint all probability
functions are discontinuous. For example, the probability of P(S(A,P )|SA) need not
be zero, but that of P(S(A,P )|SA′) is whenever A and A′ are incompatible, which
can be the case even when they are generated by operators A and A′ that are
close to each other. But irrespective of such details, there are strong reasons to
believe that a continuity assumption alone will not suffice. The argument is based
on the construction of a probability measure that poses as a counterexample. To
understand this counterexample, some considerations have to be made.
The concept of continuity should be such that all Born measures are continuous.
Thus, for every density operator ρ, the probability function Pρ defined by (11.20)
would be continuous. As the set of density operators is convex, for every λ ∈ [0, 1]
and all pairs of density operator ρ1, ρ2
λPρ1 +(1− λ)Pρ2 (11.29)
is again a continuous probability function (as it is again a Born measure).
One can create non-Born measures by, instead of taking λ to be fixed, taking it
to be a non-constant function on A taking values in [0, 1]. The probability function
Pρ1ρ2 of (11.23) can be seen to be of this form. Specifically, define the function λρ1
by
λρ1(A) =
{
1 ρ1 ∈ A,
0 ρ1 /∈ A.
(11.30)
Then
Pρ1ρ2(S|SA) = λρ1(A)Pρ1(S|SA) + (1− λρ1(A))Pρ2(S|SA). (11.31)
This is clearly not a Born measure. However, it is also a function that one wouldn’t
consider to be continuous because λρ1 is not continuous. Now one could suspect
that a continuity assumption would force the function λ to be constant, but this
seems idle hope. Let P ∈ L(H) and consider the function
λP (A) := sup
{
Tr(PP ′)
∣∣ P ′ ∈ L1(H) ∩ A′} , (11.32)
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where A′ denotes the commutant of A. A small change in A ensures a small change
in the set L1(H) ∩ A′. Specifically, consider operators A1, A2 with σ(A1) = σ(A2),
then, if ‖A1 − A2‖ is small, the differences in corresponding projections in the
resolutions of A1 and A2 are also small. A small change in A further ensures a
small change in λP (A) because the trace operation is continuous. The resulting
probability function given by
P(ρ1,ρ2,P )(S|SA) = λP (A)Pρ1(S|SA) + (1− λP (A))Pρ2(S|SA), (11.33)
however, is not a Born measure in general. The following example explicitly shows
this.
Example 11.1. Consider two orthonormal bases (x, y, z) and (x′, y′, z′) in C3 with
x′ = x, y′ = 12
√
2(y + z), z′ = 12
√
2(y − z). (11.34)
Let A1 = Alg(Px, Py, Pz) and A2 = Alg(Px′ , Py′ , Pz′) and take λP as in (11.32) with
P = Pz. Then
λPz(A1) = 1 and λPz(A2) = 12 . (11.35)
Now take ρ1 = Pz and ρ2 = Px. Then
P(Pz ,Px,Pz)
(
S(A1,Px)
∣∣SA1) = Tr(PxPz) = 0
6= 12 = 12 Tr(PxPz) + 12 Tr(PxPx) = P(Pz ,Px,Pz)
(
S(A2,Px)
∣∣SA2) . (11.36)
This is a violation of non-contextuality and so, by Theorem 11.2, the function
P(Pz ,Px,Pz) is not a Born measure. Nevertheless, it appears to be continuous as the
probabilities vary continuously as one makes small changes in the event and the
condition simultaneously. 4
This example suggests that a characterization of the Born rule cannot be given
in the form of a continuity criterion alone. Or, at least, it shows that the criterion
has to be rather non-trivial. Time, then, to try something totally different.
11.4.2 A logico-mathematical approach
If the Born rule is correct and a logico-empirical characterization for this rule is
possible, then the fact that probability functions on CL(H) generally are contextual
implies that in the derivation of this logic some important facts about quantum
mechanics may have been overlooked. It is hard to figure out what these facts are
when starting from scratch, but some clues may be found by backtracking. Suppose
the method used in this chapter and the previous one is right, can we then find what
is (conceptually) missing in the conditional probability spaces? An attempt will now
be made by adopting a more abstract mathematical perspective to connect what we
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already have (i.e., conditional probability functions on CL(H)) to what is desired:
a characterization of the Born measures that has a clear physical meaning.
There are two important observations that provide a starting point. First, the
Born rule implies that probability functions can be completely defined as functions
on L(H). Second, non-contextuality implies that not all aspects of the algebra
Alg(A) are relevant for the specification of the event MA(∆). It is now tempting to
immediately bring these two together: the event MA(∆) is completely specified by
the projection µA(∆) and this warrants that probabilities need only be assigned to
projections. Theorem 11.2 established that this is sufficient to characterize the Born
rule. At the level of empiricist quantum logic, it suggests that there is a natural
map from CL(H) to L(H). However, at this same level the two logics hardly seem
compatible, if only because L(H) is non-distributive. Instead, if non-contextuality
leads to an equivalence relation on CL(H) at all, then the resulting logic would be
more like the weak Heyting algebra P(L1(H)) of chapter 9. On the other hand,
probability functions on L(H) do not trivially extend to probability functions on
P(L1(H)). Consequently, there also isn’t an obvious way to relate the Born mea-
sures on CL(H) to probability functions on P(L1(H)). Thus, there is an obvious gap
between L(H) and CL(H), and there is the intuition that P(L1(H)) should provide
a midway point in this gap. But this intuition introduces the additional problem of
finding out what role there is for probabilities at the level of P(L1(H)).
There is no obvious philosophical starting point for resolving the sketchy issues
just raised. The proposal then is to take a more mathematical approach. Specifi-
cally, I propose to look for a map τ : CL(H)→ P(L1(H)) that satisfies the following
criteria:
(i) It respects the interpretation of the propositions in CL(H).
(ii) Provides an interpretation of all the elements of P(L1(H)) (τ is surjective).
(iii) Helps explain why it suffices to specify probabilities for elements of L(H), now
viewed as a subset of P(L1(H)).
(iv) Implies that these probabilities define a quantum probability function on
L(H).
In short, the map should encode similarities in CL(H) that may have been overlooked
in the derivation of this logic, but that are relevant for characterizing the Born rule.
Although I do not have a solid argument for what this map should be, I do
have a candidate for it. Furthermore, apart from a few caveats, the map may be
seen to satisfy the above desiderata. It is best introduced by first presenting a few
conceptual considerations. Take the proposition MA expressing that a measurement
of A is performed. Letting A = Alg(A), the corresponding element of CL(H) is SA.
If one had to identify an element of L(H) with this proposition, it would have to be
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1 or 0, as these are the only candidates that treat all projections in A on an equal
footing. This is of course unsatisfactory, as the conjunction of MA1 and MA2 for two
totally incompatible observables certainly isn’t a tautology, and the conjunction of
MA1 and MA2 for two compatible observables isn’t an obvious contradiction either.
The lattice P(L1(H)) has a structure that is much richer than L(H), and it
allows for a more satisfactory encoding of the propositions of the form SA. My
proposal is that τ identifies SA with the set ∆A := L1(H) ∩A′, where A′ indicates
the commutant of A. Thus ∆A consists of all 1-dimensional projection operators
that are compatible with A. As such, the set ∆A gives a good characterization of
the algebra A. In fact, A can be recovered from it because it is the commutant of
∆A. When the Hilbert space is finite-dimensional, ∆A can be rewritten as
∆A = L1(H) ∩ A′ =
⋃
P∈La(A)
(↓P ∩ L1(H)) . (11.37)
The intended reading is that each component ↓P in the union expresses that a
measurement of A is performed, and that the result is one specific eigenvalue a ∈
σ(A). This view is further justified by noting that, for every A with Alg(A) = A,
∆A =
⋃
a∈σ(A)
(↓µA({a}) ∩ L1(H)) . (11.38)
The next step is to associate S(A,P ) with
∆(A,P ) :=
⋃
P ′∈La(A),
P ′≤P
(↓P ′ ∩ L1(H)) . (11.39)
The intended reading is again that each component ↓P ′ in the union expresses that
a measurement of A is performed, and that the result is one specific eigenvalue a ∈
σ(A). However, the union now only runs over the eigenvalues that are compatible
with P , i.e., the eigenvalues that satisfy µA({a}) ≤ P . The proposal for completely
specifying the map τ is to make use of the identity
S =
j
A∈A
S(A,S(A)) (11.40)
on CL(H). The definition of τ then becomes
τ(S) :=
⋃
A∈A
⋃
P ′∈La(A),
P ′≤S(A)
(↓P ′ ∩ L1(H)) . (11.41)
The reader may check that indeed
τ
(
S(A,P )
)
= ∆(A,P ). (11.42)
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The way in which τ is defined indicates that condition (i) is met in so far as
this is possible. In the first step it was noted that SA can be recovered from the
set τ(SA), and the other steps were straight forward generalizations. The intended
reading of particular elements of P(L1(H)) should then remain the same as the
elements they originate from. Thus the intended reading of ∆(A,P ) still is that of
(an equivalence class of sentences like) “A is measured and the result lies in ∆”. On
this reading, the pseudo-negation on P(L1(H)) (as given in (9.18)) presents itself
as a useful logical connective, because
∼ ∆(A,P ) = ∆(Alg(P ),P⊥). (11.43)
This expresses a performance of the coarsest possible measurement with a result that
contradicts MA(∆). Even more interestingly, the associated implication relation
(9.28) has the property that
∆A → ∆(A,P ) = ↓P ∩ L1(H). (11.44)
Note that ↓P ∩L1(H) is precisely the translation of P ∈ L(H) into P(L1(H)) given
by (9.14). Thus precisely the elements of P(L1(H)) that correspond to projections
express propositions of the form MA → MA(∆), i.e., “if A is measured, then the
result lies in ∆”. Note that this is the reading of projection operators as suggested
in (8.24) in section 8.3.
Condition (iii) is then satisfied when one adopts the view that quantum proba-
bilities are ultimately probabilities of conditionals. This is a view that was already
presented in section 10.1 as one of the three paraphrases of the Born postulate. So
while up till now I have worked with the reading BR3, we here have a hint that
BR2 may be more suitable after all. An important distinction with earlier uses of
conditionals, though, is that now these conditionals are not taken as atomic propo-
sitions, but as composite ones. Consequently, the non-distributivity of L(H) can be
viewed as a result of selecting a particular subset from the set of all propositions,
namely, those corresponding to particular conditionals. The lattice P(L1(H)) then
explains why meets and joins in L(H) in general do not express conjunctions and
disjunctions for these propositions, but do so when the projections commute. This
is because in that case the antecedents of the two corresponding conditionals can
be considered to be compatible.
This same observation can be used to motivate that condition (iv) is met. A
collection of pairwise orthogonal projection operators can be seen to refer to a
collection of conditionals, all of which have the same measurement specified in the
antecedent, and for which the corresponding measurement outcomes are pairwise
incompatible. That is, a sequence P1, . . . , Pn of pairwise orthogonal projections
corresponds to a sequence of conditionals MA → MA(∆1), . . . ,MA → MA(∆1),
where ∆1, . . . ,∆n is a sequence of pairwise disjoint sets. This motivates that a
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probability function on L(H) (now understood as a set of (equivalence classes of)
conditionals) should satisfy
P
(∨
i∈I
Pi
)
=
∑
i∈I
P(Pi) (11.45)
for such a sequence. Gleason’s theorem then shows that P satisfies the Born rule.
This is the hand-waving success story. In short, if one can defend that τ pro-
vides a proper translation of CL(H), and that the implication relation on P(L1(H))
expresses a conditional, then one has a characterization of the Born measures on
CL(H). Specifically, the Born measures are the probability measures that respect
the translation of τ in the sense that they give rise to probabilities for the condi-
tionals in L(H) in an unambiguous way, i.e., the Born measures are precisely the
measures for which
P
(
τ(SA)→ τ(S(A,P ))
)
:= P
(
S(A,P )
∣∣SA) (11.46)
is well-defined.
But of course, the devil is in the details. Some of these details work out nicely.
For example, one can show that condition (ii) is also satisfied. But arguing that (i)
is indeed satisfied is more difficult, because it is a difficult matter to decide what
it means exactly to respect the interpretation of CL(H). This can all be seen from
the following theorem and some of its consequences.
Theorem 11.3. The map τ : CL(H) → P(L1(H)) given by (11.41) is a complete
surjective join-homomorphism. This property remains true when τ is restricted to
IL(H).
Proof. Let {Si | i ∈ I} be an arbitrary subset of CL(H). Then
τ
(j
i∈I
Si
)
=
⋃
A∈A
⋃
P∈La(A),
P≤(bi∈I Si)(A)
(↓P ∩ L1(H)) . (11.47)
The second disjunction can be rewritten as{
P ∈ La(A)
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤
(j
i∈I
Si
)
(A)
}
=
{
P ∈ La(A)
∣∣∣∣∣ P ≤∨
i∈I
Si(A)
}
=
⋃
i∈I
{P ∈ La(A) | P ≤ Si(A)} .
(11.48)
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Then
τ
(j
i∈I
Si
)
=
⋃
A∈A
⋃
i∈I
⋃
P∈La(A),
P≤Si(A)
(↓P ∩ L1(H)) =
⋃
i∈I
τ (Si) . (11.49)
This shows that τ is a complete join-homomorphism. To see that it is surjective
first note that for every P ∈ L1(H)
τ
(
S(Alg(P ),P )
)
= {P}. (11.50)
Surjectivity then follows because for any ∆ ⊂ L1(H)
τ
(j
P∈∆
S(Alg(P ),P )
)
= ∆. (11.51)
This theorem establishes that τ has some decent properties one would require of
a translation of CL(H) into P(L1(H)). However, while τ does preserve joins, it does
not preserve meets. Furthermore, τ is surjective, but not injective. In fact, failure
of injectivity already crept into the definition of τ in the second step. Although it
is possible to recover SA from the set ∆A = τ(SA), it is in general not possible to
recover S(A,P ) from the set ∆(A,P ) = τ(S(A,P )) because one doesn’t know which of
the P ′′ ∈ La(A) have been lost by the restriction P ′ ≤ P . Specifically, for any two
algebras A1,A2 with P ∈ L(A1) ∩ L(A2) one has{
P ′ ∈ La(A1)
∣∣ P ′ ≤ P} = {P ′ ∈ La(A2) ∣∣ P ′ ≤ P}
⇒ τ(S(A1,P )) = τ(S(A2,P )).
(11.52)
A demonstration of a failure of meet-preservation is obtained by considering A1 and
A2 as in Example 11.1. In this case,
S(A1,Px) uprise S(A2,Px) = ⊥, (11.53)
while on the other hand,
τ
(
S(A1,Px)
) ∩ τ (S(A2,Px)) = {Px} ∩ {Px} = {Px}. (11.54)
Incidentally, this example also displays that τ isn’t injective (even when restricted
to IL(H)).
The failure of injectivity was to be expected. After all, it is precisely such a
failure we were looking for to explain the special role of Born measures on IL(H)
(although one may wonder if injectivity fails in the ‘right’ way). More puzzling is
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the failure of meet-preservation. As a more general example of this failure note that,
whenever A1 and A2 are incompatible (i.e., Alg(A1,A2) is not Abelian), SA1upriseSA2 =
⊥, while ∆A1 ∩∆A2 generally does not identify with the empty set. The rationale
behind the first conjunction is that a joint measurement ofA1 andA2 is not possible.
To find a possible rationale behind the second it is useful to note that the intersection
satisfies
∆A1 ∩∆A2 = τ(S(A1,2,P1,2)), (11.55)
with
A1,2 = Alg ({P1 ∧ P2 | P1 ∈ La(A1), P2 ∈ La(A2)}) ,
P1,2 =
∨
{P1 ∧ P2 | P1 ∈ La(A1), P2 ∈ La(A2)} .
(11.56)
The algebra A1,2 is the largest Abelian algebra that is compatible both with A1
and A2. In a sense, it highlights what the two have in common. For example, if A1
and A2 are totally incompatible, then A1,2 = C 1 and P1,2 = 0.
This partial compatibility can be given meaning when considering consecutive
measurements instead of joint measurements. Implicitly, consecutive measurements
already played a role in defending the plausibility of LMR. A measurement of A1
also counts as a measurement of A2 = f(A1), not only because of the counterfactual
statement that “if both had been measured, then their outcomes would satisfy
a2 = f(a1)”, but also because of the indicative “if a measurement of A1 is directly
followed by a measurement of A2, then their outcomes satisfy a2 = f(a1)”. In fact,
it doesn’t matter in which order A1 and A2 are measured.
Empirical rules of this kind led von Neumann (1932, §III.3) to the introduction
of the projection postulate. But the importance of this postulate reaches beyond
consecutive measurements of compatible observables.7 For example, in the case
of the two algebras of Example 11.1, if the statement S(A1,Px) is true, then an
immediately consecutive measurement of A2 would make S(A2,Px) true. The algebra
A1,2 from (11.56) precisely characterizes what kind of implications a measurement
of A1 can have for the possible outcomes of a consecutive measurement of A2, and
vice versa.
This is all just fine, but it doesn’t really explain how one can think of S(A1,2,P1,2)
as expressing the conjunction of SA1 and SA2 . All that is made clear is that LMR
may have been applied too strictly in the construction of CL(H), in the sense that
when a measurement of A1 doesn’t imply a measurement of A2, this doesn’t mean
that the measurement of A1 has no implications whatsoever for the outcomes of a
future measurement of A2. Making this precise requires the introduction of a formal
notion of consecutive measurements. The projection postulate can then play a role
here.
7Although the postulate is formulated as dictating the change in the state of a system, and
thus presupposes the state postulate, I am here referring to particular non-probabilistic empirical
features encoded by this postulate.
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It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop a new quantum logic that
extends CL(H) to incorporate propositions of consecutive measurements. Neverthe-
less, some insight can be fostered by looking at the map τ . Consider an elementary
experimental proposition represented by the function S(A,P ). The starting point
in chapter 10 is that these propositions are the idealized kind of propositions that
encode relevant physical data. What are precisely the implications of such a propo-
sition? First of all, it can be paraphrased as the disjunction
S(A,P ) =
j
P ′∈La(A),
P ′≤P
S(A,P ′). (11.57)
When adopting the projection postulate, this implies that possible outcomes of
(immediate) future measurements are constrained by the probability-1 statements
implied by P ′ for one of the P ′ ∈ La(A) with P ′ ≤ P . However the remainder of the
algebra A is made up (i.e., the part specified by {P ′ ∈ La ∣∣ P ′ ≤ P⊥}) is irrelevant.
It is also precisely this part that is forgotten by τ as expressed by (11.52). In this
sense, τ may be viewed as extracting the information from the proposition S(A,P )
that is relevant for future predictions. But again, to check if this all pans out,
one has to make precise what the empirical quantum mechanical statements are
concerning time-ordered events. This is something for future work.
To recapitulate, the translation of CL(H) into P(L1(H)) provided by τ can be
used to give a characterization of the Born measures on CL(H). They are the mea-
sures for which (11.46) is well-defined. It has also been shown that these Born
measures then define a quantum probability function on L(H) by making use of
(11.44). The foundational importance of these results depends on whether one can
give a proper physical interpretation of τ . I have indicated that the failures of in-
jectivity and meet-preservation are in need of an explanation. This is not because
these failures themselves are necessarily problematic, but precisely because expla-
nations of these failures should foster an explanation for the special role of the Born
measures. My suggestion is that τ incorporates relevant dynamical aspects that
have to be taken into account when reasoning in quantum mechanics, which may
have been lost in the construction of CL(H). But there are of course other possibil-
ities. For one, it may be that τ just needs some tweaking. It is also possible that
an empiricist characterization of the Born rule just isn’t something to be had, and
perhaps the rule has to be accepted as a contingent fact rather than as something
that holds necessarily. At the moment, however, I do not have an argument in favor
of either of these directions.
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11.5 Afterthought
Unfortunately, the last two sections did not provide a proper ending for a success
story on quantum probability. But even without a proper characterization of the
Born rule I think a lot has been accomplished part III. On the basis of empiricist
considerations, a clear reformulation of quantum probability has been obtained.
Due to this empiricist approach the obtained formalism is compatible with most
interpretations of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, I think this formalism is most
helpful for those who stay close to an empiricist stance, such as variations on the
Copenhagen interpretation. It can be helpful, for example, in defending these views
against the charges that they are vague or obscure. It shows that one doesn’t
require a hand-waving interpretation of L(H) as something like a non-distributive
event space to make sense of quantum probability. Neither does one need a story
that is disjoint from the formalism to make fuzzy qualifications about what can
and cannot be said in quantum mechanics. To elaborate on the point I’m trying to
make, a sketchy attempt at an unlikely synthesis of the views of Bohr and Bell may
be useful. Let me start with Bell.
Bell is well-known for his criticism of Copenhagen-like interpretations and ‘stan-
dard textbook explanations’ of quantum mechanics. Part (and possibly the basis)
of his complaint is that these presentations of the theory do not provide a clear
foundation for the theory. Or, in his own words, do they not provide “an exact
formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics” (Bell, 1990, p. 33). Bell
elaborates that by an exact formulation he means that “the theory should be fully
formulated in mathematical terms”. The usual formalism does not meet this crite-
rion. To be sure, quantum mechanics does have a solid mathematical foundation
in Hilbert space theory. But the theory is not entirely formulated in these terms.
The Born postulate provides an example. It combines the mathematical formalism
with pre-theoretical concepts such as ‘observable’ and ‘measurement’ to obtain an
empirical statement from quantum mechanics. These pre-theoretical concepts do
not have a solid foundation in the mathematical formalism of the theory. To the
extent that they are linked to the mathematical formalism, it is not entirely clear
that their mathematical role fits well with the natural language interpretation of
these concepts. The difficulty with interpreting the orthodox quantum logic dis-
cussed in chapter 8 illustrates this. Consequently, the precise role and meaning of
these concepts within the context of quantum mechanics remains ambiguous.
The ambiguity of concepts like ‘measurement’ infects the whole of quantum me-
chanics, turning it into an ambiguous theory: it just isn’t clear what the theory
really is about. Bell advocates the view that ambiguity is best avoided by remov-
ing the pre-theoretical concepts from the theory. Rather, these concepts should be
derivable from the theory. A measurement, for example, should be a physical dy-
namical process that can be given meaning using the mathematical formalism of the
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theory. The formalism of von Neumann does not, and possibly cannot, provide such
a dynamical account of measurements. This is, after all, the core of the measure-
ment problem. A new formalism then seems to be required, and Bell proposes that
Bohmian mechanics or the GRW collapse-theory are more promising candidates for
an exact formulation of quantum mechanics.
To a large extent I am sympathetic to the criticisms of Bell. But I hesitate to
accept that the only way to make quantum mechanics less ambiguous is by replacing
it with a theory in which the notion of measurement is given a dynamical physical
meaning. In essence, demanding such a replacement is a plea for an ontology for
the theory, or, to use Bell’s terminology, for a theory of (local) beables. The point
where my view drifts apart from Bell’s can be illustrated on the basis of the following
quote.
When one forgets the role of the apparatus, as the word ‘measurement’
makes all too likely, one despairs of ordinary logic – hence ‘quantum
logic’. When one remembers the role of the apparatus, ordinary logic is
just fine. (ibid., p. 34)
As I argued in chapter 8, orthodox quantum logic provides an ambiguous formalism
for correct reasoning within the context of quantum mechanics, and I agree with
Bell that this ambiguity can be seen as a consequence of a reckless use of the concept
of measurement. But providing a physical basis for this concept is only one way
to prevent sloppy uses of it. Another way is the one I adopted: to reformulate
quantum logic in such a way that the concept of measurement is taken seriously,
even if it is still a primitive term. Indeed, the results of chapter 10 show that also
on this approach ordinary logic is just fine.
There are of course other motivations (apart from avoiding unambiguity) for a
physical account of measurement processes. One may simply hold the view that a
(fundamental) physical theory should provide an ontology, and that it is the task of
such a theory to describe what is really going on in the world instead of restricting
attention to how we perceive the world. But that seems to me a much stronger
demand than “an exact formulation” of a physical theory.
Now let me turn to Bohr. This is now only a small step. Above I related
Bell’s demand for an exact formulation of quantum mechanics to a demand for
a formulation of quantum mechanics that is unambiguous with respect to what
the theory has to say. A similar demand for an unambiguous formulation can be
found in the writings of Bohr. But now this demand is used as part of a defense
of the usual formulation of quantum mechanics, in which a strict separation occurs
between the mathematical formalism and the description of actual experiments to
which the formalism is applied. Specifically, the quantum-mechanical description is
reserved for the system under investigation, while the apparatus used to perform a
measurement on the system is given a classical description:
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Just the requirement that it be possible to communicate experimen-
tal findings in an unambiguous manner implies that the experimental
arrangement and the results of observation must be expressed in the
common language adapted to our orientation in the environment. Thus,
the description of quantum phenomena requires a distinction in principle
between the objects under investigation and the measuring apparatus
by means of which the experimental conditions are defined. (Bohr, 1963,
p. 78)
The reformulation of quantum probability developed in this part of the disserta-
tion can be seen to respect the demand that experimental findings are communicable
in common language. This was in fact one of the guiding ideas for the construc-
tion of the logics in chapter 10. But what is new is that this logic makes a clear
connection with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. The demand
for the use of common language thus doesn’t imply a strict separation from the
Hilbert space formalism. There is of course still a distinction between the kinds
of descriptions used for the system and the apparatus. This is necessarily so when
‘measurement’ is used as a primitive concept. But everything is now embedded in
a single mathematical framework.
Now it may be seen that there is a synthesis of the views of Bell and Bohr in
the following sense. The obtained reformulation of quantum probability adheres
both to Bell’s demand for an exact formulation and to Bohr’s demand for the
possibility of unambiguous communication of experimental findings. The synthesis
can be illustrated further by returning to the discussion of non-contextuality in
section 6.3. The assumption of non-contextuality for hidden variables resulted in
the impossibility of defining hidden variable states as truth valuation functions
on the set of projection operators. Bell (1966, p. 447) famously criticized this
assumption of non-contextuality by quoting Bohr. Indeed, Bohr emphasized that
no experimental finding can be unambiguously defined without a specification of the
experimental context. This criterion can be used both against a non-contextuality
assumption for hidden variables, as well as against orthodox quantum logic.
My reformulation of quantum probability respects the need for specifications
of measurement contexts. In the underlying logic there is explicit attention for
the specification of measurement contexts, and probability functions are explicitly
introduced as two-placed functions that require both a measurement context (as a
condition) and a specification of possible outcomes within this context. By being
explicitly contextual, my reformulation leaves open the possibility of an underlying
hidden variable theory. Thus by staying relatively close to the ideas of Bohr, the
obtained framework of quantum probability is also compatible with the ideas of Bell.
In which of these two directions (Bohr or Bell) one wants to go depends on what
one expects/demands of a physical theory. Currently, I am still undecided with
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respect to this issue. But in either case one can benefit from the disambiguation of
the formalism of quantum probability provided here.
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Mathematical background
The purpose of this appendix is to give a short overview of the main mathematical
definitions and theorems that play a role in this dissertation. This text is not
self-contained and does not pretend to give a thorough introduction. Instead, this
appendix is meant to help the reader who is somewhat familiar with the mathematics
used, but does not have all the relevant details immediately available in his/her
mind. Instead then of having to look up the details in a separate book, I hope the
reader can find what he/she is looking for here. The advice then is to not read this
appendix from beginning to end. Instead, the index of the dissertation is a useful
guide to points of interest in the appendix.
The theorems discussed here are presented without proof. Most of them can
be found in the books by Burris and Sankappanavar (2012) (for lattice theory)
and Conway (1990) (for Hilbert space theory). These books also provide thorough
introductions to these subjects. The theory of modal algebras is less standard, and
was first introduced by Lemmon (1966). For more on operator theory the books of
Kadison and Ringrose (1986) are classics.
A.1 Basic algebraic structures
Much of mathematics can be viewed as part of set theory. Different areas of math-
ematics then differ in their focus on particular kinds of structures on sets. For
example, group theory focuses on sets on which a multiplication rule is defined.
Topology focuses on sets with particular kinds of sets of subsets. It is this kind of
perspective on mathematics that sets a useful common ground for the main fields
of mathematics used in this dissertation: Hilbert space theory and lattice theory.
In this section I give the basic definitions that establish this common ground.
The structure on sets considered here is that of operations. A unary operation
on a set X is a map from X to itself. A binary operation on X is a map from X×X
to X. And so on for higher orders. A set with one or more operations is called an
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algebraic structure.
A.1.1 Structures with a single operation
Definition A.1. A semigroup G is a pair (X,+) with X a set and + a binary oper-
ation (x1, x2) 7→ x1 +x2 (often called addition or multiplication) that is associative,
i.e.,
(x1 + x2) + x3 = x1 + (x2 + x3) ∀x1, x2, x3 ∈ X. (A.1)
If X in addition has a unit element, i.e., an element 0X such that
x+ 0X = 0X + x = x ∀x ∈ X, (A.2)
then G is called a monoid. If for every x ∈ X there is an element, denoted −x, such
that
x+ (−x) = (−x) + x = 0X , (A.3)
then G is called a group. The element −x is called the inverse of x. If
x1 + x2 = x2 + x1 ∀x1, x2 ∈ X (A.4)
then the operation is called commutative and G is called an Abelian group.
Often, when the binary operation is called multiplication, the operation is denoted
·, the unit element is denoted 1X , and the inverse is denoted x−1
Definition A.2. A semilattice (S,∧) is a semigroup for which the operation ∧
(usually called the meet or join) is commutative and idempotent, i.e.,
∀s ∈ S : s ∧ s = s. (A.5)
If in addition S has a unit element (i.e., (S,∧) is a monoid), then the semilattice is
called bounded. This element is usually denoted >.
When the binary operation is called a join it is usually denoted ∨. In this case the
unit element is denoted ⊥.
Example A.1. Consider the set of two elements {0, 1}. The only possible binary
operations that turn the set into a monoid are given by
+ 0 1 × 0 1 ∧ 0 1 ∨ 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
(A.6)
The first two operations are the only operations that turn the set into a group. The
last two operations are the only operations that turn the set into a semilattice. The
operations + and × are identical up to a relabeling of the elements of the set. The
same holds for ∧ and ∨. 4
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Example A.2. Each of the number systems Z,Q,R,C is an Abelian group with
respect to addition, with 0 the unit element. With respect to multiplication each
of these sets is a monoid with unit element 1, and Q,R,C are groups. The number
system N is a monoid with respect to addition and multiplication. Each of these
sets is turned into a semilattice by setting x1 ∧ x2 := min(x1, x2) or x1 ∨ x2 :=
max(x1, x2). 4
As these examples illustrate, often more than one binary operation is given on
a set. Several important definitions particularly refer to how some of these binary
operations relate to each other.
A.1.2 Structures with multiple operations
Definition A.3. Apseudo-ring R is a triplet (X,+, ·) with X a set and + and ·
two binary operations (called addition and multiplication) such that (X,+) is an
Abelian group and (X, ·) is a semigroup. The multiplication is further required to
distribute over addition:
x1 · (x2 + x3) = (x1 · x2) + (x1 · x3)
(x1 + x2) · x3 = (x1 · x3) + (x2 · x3)
(A.7)
If (X, ·) is a monoid, then the structure is called a ring . If the multiplication is
commutative, R is called a commutative ring and if the multiplication is idempotent
then R is called a Boolean ring. If R is a commutative ring and (X\{0X}, ·) is a
group then the algebraic structure is called a field.
Lemma A.1. If R is a Boolean ring, then R is a commutative ring that satisfies
∀x ∈ R : x+ x = 0. (A.8)
Commutativity can be seen to follow from considering that (x1 +x2)
2 = x1 +x2
and (A.8) from the identity (x+ x)2 = x+ x.
Definition A.4. A lattice is a triplet (L,∧,∨) with two binary operations such that
(L,∧) and (L,∨) are semilattices. The operations are further required to satisfy
the absorption laws
a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a (A.9)
for all a, b ∈ L. If the operations further satisfy
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) (A.10)
for all a, b, c ∈ L, then the lattice is called distributive. The lattice is called bounded
when both (L,∧) and (L,∨) are bounded semilattices.
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Example A.3. Consider again the set of two elements {0, 1} with binary operations
as given in (A.6). Then ({0, 1},+,∨) is a field that is also a Boolean ring, and
({0, 1},∧,∨) is a bounded distributive lattice. 4
Example A.4. The sets Q,R,C with addition and multiplication defined in the
usual way are fields. The set of natural numbers with meet and join as defined in
Example A.2 is a distributive lattice that is not bounded. 4
Example A.5. Let R be a Boolean ring. Then it follows from Lemma A.1 that
the definitions
x1 ∧ x2 := x1x2,
x1 ∨ x2 := x1 + x2 + x1x2
(A.11)
turn R into a distributive lattice. 4
Apart from algebraic structures on their own, relations between them are at
least as important.
Definition A.5. Let X1, X2 be two algebraic structures of the same kind. Then a
homomorphism from X1 to X2 is a map h : X1 → X2 that respects all operations
on the structures. If the map is bijective, then it is called an isomorphism. The
collection of all homomorphisms from X1 to X2 is denoted Hom(X1, X2).
Example A.6. Consider the two semilattices S1 = ({0, 1},∧) and S2 = ({0, 1},∨)
of Example A.1. Then the map h : S1 → S2 given by h(0) := 1, h(1) := 0 is an
isomorphism of semilattices since for all a, b ∈ S1: h(a ∧ b) = a ∨ b. 4
A.1.3 Linear Algebra
Definition A.6. A vector space V over a field F is an Abelian group (V,+) together
with an operation F × V → V , (λ, v) 7→ λv called scalar multiplication that is
compatible with the addition on V in the sense that for all λ1, λ2 ∈ F and v1, v2 ∈ V
λ1(λ2v1) = (λ1 · λ2)v1, 1v1 = v1,
λ1(v1 + v2) = λ1v1 + λ1v2, (λ1 + λ2)v1 = λ1v1 + λ2v1.
(A.12)
Example A.7. For every field F , the set Fn = {(f1, . . . , fn) | fi ∈ F for all i} is
turned into a vector space over F by defining
(f1, . . . , fn) + (f
′
1, . . . , f
′
n) := (f1 + f
′
1, . . . , fn + f
′
n),
f(f1, . . . , fn) := (f · f1, . . . , f · fn).
(A.13)
4
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Definition A.7. Let V be a vector space over a field F and let {vi | i ∈ I} be a set
of vectors in V . Then the linear span of this set is defined as
span({vi | i ∈ I}) :=
{
λ1vi1 + . . .+ λnvin
∣∣∣ λ1,...,λn∈F,i1,...,in∈I, n∈N} . (A.14)
If span({vi | i ∈ I}) = V then {vi | i ∈ I} is called a complete set of vectors. If in
addition span({vi | i ∈ I\{j}}) 6= V for every j ∈ I, then {vi | i ∈ I} is called a
basis.
Example A.8. Let Fn be as in Example A.7. Then the set
{(f11 , . . . , f1n), . . . , (fn1 , . . . , fnn )}, (A.15)
with f ij = δij , is a basis for F
n. 4
Lemma A.2. Let V be a vector space over a field F . If both {v1, . . . , vn} and
{v′1, . . . , v′m} are bases, then n = m. The number n is called the dimension of V .
Definition A.8. A map f : V1 → V2 between two vector spaces V1, V2 over F is
called linear if
f(λ1v1 + λ2v2) = λ1f(v1) + λ2f(v2) (A.16)
for all v1, v2 ∈ V1 and λ1, λ2 ∈ F . If V1 = V2 the map is called an operator , and its
action is often denoted as Av with A the operator and v ∈ V1. If V2 = F the map
is called a functional. When F = C a map is called anti-linear if
f(λ1v1 + λ2v2) = λ1f(v1) + λ2f(v2) (A.17)
for all v1, v2 ∈ V1 and λ1, λ2 ∈ C, where x denotes the complex conjugate of x.
Example A.9. Let V and W be two vector spaces over the same field F . Then
the set Hom(V,W ) of linear maps between V and W is itself turned into a vector
space over F with the rules
(f1 + f2)(v) := f1(v) + f2(v),
(λf)(v) := λf(v).
(A.18)
When V = W a multiplication rule is also introduced with
(f1f2)v := f1(f2(v)). (A.19)
This turns Hom(V, V ) into a monoid with the unit element given by the unit op-
erator 1 which acts as 1 v = v for all v. Generally, it will not be a group as not
all operators will have an inverse. Neither will it be commutative, and in fact the
commutator defined as
[f1, f2](v) := (f1f2)(v)− (f2f1)(v) (A.20)
will be a useful operation. 4
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Definition A.9. Let V be a vector space over a field F . A map B : V × V → F is
called a bilinear form when for every v ∈ V the maps v′ 7→ B(v′, v) and v′ 7→ B(v, v′)
are functionals. When F = C a map B : V ×V → C is called a sesquilinear form if it
is linear with respect to one argument, and antilinear with respect to the other. An
inner product is a bilinear or sesquilinear form that satisfies B(v1, v2) = B(v2, v1)
for all v1, v2 and B(v, v) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if v = 0.
Example A.10. If dim(V ) = n and dim(W ) = m then dim(Hom(V,W )) = nm.
This can be seen by noting that every linear map f can be represented by a matrix
Af by choosing to bases v1, . . . , vn and w1, . . . , wn and setting
Afij := 〈wi, f(vj)〉. (A.21)
4
A.2 Hilbert space theory
Hilbert space theory can be seen as a combination of linear algebra with analysis.
Thus apart from the algebraic structure of vector spaces, also the notion of a norm
is required to meaningfully address questions of convergence.
Definition A.10. A norm on a vector space V over C (or some subfield thereof)
is a map from V to the positive reals denoted v 7→ ‖v‖ that satisfies
(i) ‖λv‖ = |λ|‖v‖,
(ii) ‖v1 + v2‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖,
(iii) ‖v‖ = 0 if and only if v = 0.
A sequence (vn)n∈N is said to converge to a vector v ∈ V with respect to the norm
‖.‖ if for every  > 0 there exists an N ∈ N such that ‖vn − v‖ <  for all n ≥ N .
The sequence is called a Cauchy sequence if for every  > 0 there exists an N ∈ N
such that ‖vn − vm‖ <  for all n,m ≥ N .
Definition A.11. A Banach space is a vector space X with a norm ‖.‖ with respect
to which every Cauchy sequence converges. A Hilbert space is a vector space H with
an inner product 〈., .〉 such that with respect to the norm generated by the inner
product ‖ψ‖ := √〈ψ,ψ〉 it is a Banach space. The space is called separable if it has
a countable basis {ψn | n ∈ N}.
Sometimes Hilbert spaces are explicitly defined as vector spaces over R or C.
Here I follow that tradition by implicitly assuming this to be the case unless stated
otherwise.
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Example A.11. The paradigm example of a separable Hilbert space is that asso-
ciated with a single quantum particle in one dimension1:
H = L2(R) :=
{
ψ : R→ C
∣∣∣∣ ∫ ∞−∞ |ψ(x)|2dx <∞
}
. (A.22)
The inner product is given by
〈ψ, φ〉 :=
∫ ∞
∞
ψ(x)φ(x)dx. (A.23)
4
While a subspace of a vector space is itself again a vector space, a subspace of
a Hilbert space is not always itself a Hilbert space. The characterizing distinction
is given by the following definition.
Definition A.12. A linear subspace K ⊂ H is called closed if for every sequence
(ψn)n∈N in K for which ψ = limn→∞ ψn exists in H, ψ ∈ K.
It follows from this definition that a linear subspace is closed if and only if it is
itself a Hilbert space. Thus closed linear subspaces are the ‘natural’ subspaces to
look at when doing Hilbert space theory. In the finite-dimensional case every linear
subspace can be shown to be closed, but in the separable case this does not hold.
Example A.12. Consider the Hilbert space of all square-integrable functions on
the interval [0, 1], i.e.,
H = L2([0, 1]) =
{
ψ : [0, 1]→ C
∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
|ψ(x)|2dx exists
}
(A.24)
with inner product
〈ψ1, ψ2〉 :=
∫ 1
0
ψ1(x)ψ2(x)dx. (A.25)
Then the set of all polynomials of finite order
K =
{
ψ ∈ H
∣∣∣ ψ(x)=a0+a1x+···+anxn,n<∞, ai∈C } (A.26)
is a linear subspace, but not closed. For example, the sequence (ψn)n∈N ψn(x) =∑n
k=0
1
k!x
k converges to ψ(x) = ex which is not an element of K. 4
1Actually one should take the set of equivalence classes here. That is, if L2(R) denotes the set
of all square (Lebesgue-)integrable complex functions on R, then an equivalence relation is defined
by ψ ∼ φ iff ∫∞−∞ |ψ(x)− φ(x)|dx = 0. Then L2(R) denotes the set of all equivalence classes. The
reason for this detour is that (A.23) does not define an inner product on L2(R). Specifically, on
L2(R) the equality ∫∞−∞ |ψ(x)|dx = 0 does not imply ψ = 0.
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The norm on a Hilbert space can also be used to introduce a norm on the set
of operators and functionals.
Definition A.13. LetH be a Hilbert space and letO(H) denote the set of operators
on H. The operator norm on O(H) is defined as
‖A‖ := sup {‖Aψ‖ | ‖ψ‖ ≤ 1} . (A.27)
An operator is called bounded if ‖A‖ <∞. A bounded operator A is called positive
if 〈ψ,Aψ〉 ≥ 0 for all ψ ∈ H. The set of all bounded operators is denoted B(H) and
the set of all positive operators is denoted B+(H).
Let Hom(H, F ) be the set of all functionals on H. The standard norm on this
set is defined as
‖f‖ := sup {|f(ψ)| | ‖ψ‖ ≤ 1} . (A.28)
A functional is called bounded if there exists a positive constant c ∈ R such that
|f(ψ)| ≤ c‖ψ‖ ∀ψ ∈ H. (A.29)
The set of all bounded linear functionals on H is denoted H∗ and is called the dual
space.
Theorem A.1 (Riesz representation theorem). For every bounded functional f on
a Hilbert space H there exists a unique ψf ∈ H such that
f(ψ) = 〈ψf , ψ〉 ∀ψ ∈ H. (A.30)
For every bounded sesquilinear form B : H×H → C there exists a bounded operator
A on H such that
B(ψ1, ψ2) = 〈Aψ1, ψ2〉 ∀ψ1, ψ2 ∈ H. (A.31)
For interesting unbounded operators it is often required to restrict the domain
to a proper subset of the entire Hilbert space. For example, let H = L2(R) and
consider the position operator X defined by the action
(Xψ)(x) := xψ(x), (A.32)
then in general Xψ is not a square-integrable function. Instead, one restricts at-
tention to the domain
D(X) =
{
ψ ∈ L2(R) ∣∣Xψ ∈ L2(R)} . (A.33)
One may show that this domain lies dense in H. In fact, only operators with dense
domain will be considered here.
The additional structure of the inner product allows for the introduction of
special kinds of operators.
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Definition A.14. The adjoint A∗ of an operator A with domain D(A) is the unique
operator such that
〈A∗ψ, φ〉 = 〈ψ,Aφ〉 (A.34)
for all φ ∈ D(A) and ψ ∈ D(A∗) with
D(A∗) = {φ ∈ H |D(A) 3 ψ 7→ 〈φ,Aψ〉 is a bounded functional} . (A.35)
When A = A∗ (and thus D(A) = D(A∗)) the operator is called self-adjoint operator
and when AA∗ = A∗A the operator is called normal. A normal operator that
satisfies AA∗ = 1 is called unitary. The set of all self-adjoint operators on H is
denoted Osa(H), and the set of all bounded self-adjoint operators Bsa(H). When a
self-adjoint operator is idempotent, i.e., A = A2, it is called a projection operator
or simply projection. The set of all projection operators is denoted L(H). Two
projection operators P1 and P2 are called compatible if they commute (i.e., [P1, P2] =
0). If in addition P1P2ψ = 0 for all ψ they are called orthogonal.
Example A.13. Let H be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. If MA is the matrix
associated with A (with respect to some basis), then the matrix MA∗ associated
with A∗ satisfies
MA∗ = MA
T
, (A.36)
where MA
T
the transposed complex conjugate of MA, i.e., (MA∗)ij = (MA)ji. 4
Example A.14. Trivial examples of projections are the zero operator 0 (taking
every vector to the zero vector) and the unit operator 1 (taking every vector to
itself). A more interesting example is the projection on the line spanned by a
non-zero vector ψ:
Pψφ :=
〈ψ, φ〉
〈ψ,ψ〉ψ. (A.37)
4
Constructing more interesting examples is easy once the following lemma is
recognized.
Lemma A.3. For any projection operator P the orthocomplement
P⊥ := 1−P (A.38)
is again a projection operator. For any pair of projection operators P1, P2
P1P2 and P1 + P2 − P1P2 (A.39)
are again projection operators if and only if P1 and P2 are compatible.
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The example (A.37) also indicates where the name ‘projection’ comes from;
a projection operator projects a vector on a linear subspace. In fact, one can
unambiguously switch between talking about projection operators and closed linear
subspaces, which is the content of the following theorem.
Theorem A.2. Let H be a Hilbert space, then a subset K ⊂ H is a closed linear
subspace if and only if there exists a projection operator P ∈ L(H) such that
K = PH := {Pψ | ψ ∈ H} . (A.40)
Furthermore, this projection operator is unique.
Accordingly, a projection P is called n-dimensional just in case PH is an n-
dimensional subspace.
Definition A.15. For an operator A the spectrum is defined as the set
σ(A) := {a ∈ F |A− a 1 is not invertible} . (A.41)
A special subset are the eigenvalues given by
{a ∈ F | ∃ non-zero ψ ∈ H s.t. Aψ = aψ} . (A.42)
A non-zero vector for which there exists an a ∈ F such that Aψ = aψ is called an
eigenvector of A for the value a.
Lemma A.4. If H is finite-dimensional then for every operator A the spectrum
coincides with the set of eigenvalues.
Definition A.16. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space and H a Hilbert space. A
positive operator valued measure (POVM) is a map µ : F → B+(H) that satisfies
(i) µ(Ω) = 1,
(ii) µ (
⋃∞
i=1 ∆i) =
∑∞
i=1 µ (∆i)
for every countable collection {∆i ; i ∈ N} of mutually disjoint measurable sets. If
the co-domain is L(H) ⊂ B+(H) then the map is called a projection valued measure
(PVM).
Projection valued measures can be used to introduce a particularly useful gen-
eralized notion of integration where the value of the integral is an operator on the
Hilbert space instead of a complex number. The construction will be helpful in
defining the function of an operator.
Consider a PVM µ on (R,F) with F the standard Borel-σ-algebra. For every
pair of vectors ψ, φ ∈ H define µψ,φ : F → C as
µψ,φ(∆) := 〈ψ, µ(∆)φ〉. (A.43)
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One may check that for every pair (ψ, φ) this is a complex Borel measure. Now let
B(R) denote the set of bounded Borel functions. For every f ∈ B(R) the map
H×H 3 (ψ, φ) 7→ [ψ, φ]µ,f :=
∫
f(x)dµψ,φ(x) (A.44)
is a bounded sesquilinear form, where the integral is well-defined because µψ,φ is
a Borel measure. According to Riesz’ representation theorem then there exists an
operator Aµ,f ∈ B(H) such that
[ψ, φ]µ,f = 〈Aµ,fψ, φ〉 ∀ψ, φ ∈ H. (A.45)
The map f 7→ Aµ,f is now taken as the definition for the integral
Aµ,f =:
∫
f(x)dµ(x). (A.46)
Theorem A.3 (Spectral theorem). Let A be a self-adjoint operator on a Hilbert
space H, then there exists a unique PVM µA on the spectrum σ(A) of A such that
A =
∫
σ(A)
adµA(a). (A.47)
If the spectrum is discrete this can be written as
A =
∑
a∈σ(A)
aµA({a}). (A.48)
This theorem shows that for a bounded self-adjoint operator A the map B(R) 3
f 7→ f(A) with
f(A) :=
∫
σ(A)
f(a)dµA(a) (A.49)
is well-defined. This is the so-called Borel functional calculus. If the spectrum is
discrete this definition can be written as
f(A) :=
∑
a∈σ(A)
f(a)µA({a}). (A.50)
Consequently, σ(f(A)) = {f(a) | a ∈ σ(A)}.
The following definition defines the trace operation which plays a crucial role in
the formulation of the Born rule.
Definition A.17. Let H be a Hilbert space with orthonormal basis (ei)i∈I . An
operator A ∈ B(H) is said to of trace class if∑
i∈I
〈ei, |A|ei〉 <∞. (A.51)
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The set of all trace class operators is denoted T (H). For every T ∈ T (H) and every
orthonormal basis (ei)i∈I the sum
Tr(T ) :=
∑
i∈I
〈ei, T ei〉 (A.52)
converges and is independent of the choice of the basis. The outcome Tr(T ) is called
the trace of T .
The trace operation has several elegant properties that are useful.
Lemma A.5. Let T ∈ T (H) and A ∈ B(H), then both AT and TA are trace class
operators for which the following relations hold
(i) Tr(AT ) = Tr(TA),
(ii) |Tr(AT )| ≤ ‖A‖Tr(|T |).
The following lemma establishes a property of polynomials of operators that is
used in the proof of Theorem 7.2.
Lemma A.6. Let A ∈ B(H) and p be a polynomial. Then for every  > 0 there
exists a δ > 0 such that
‖p(A)− p(A′)‖ <  (A.53)
for all A′ ∈ B(H) with ‖A−A′‖ < δ.
Proof. First consider the case where pn(x) := x
n. For n = 1 the assertion is trivial
(choose δ = ). Now suppose it is true for all pm with m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then it also
holds for pn+1. This is shown using the estimate
‖pn+1(A)− pn+1(A′)‖ =‖An+1 −A′n+1‖
=‖(An −A′n)(A′ −A) +An(A−A′) + (An −A′n)A‖
≤‖An −A′n‖‖A′ −A‖+ ‖An‖‖A−A′‖
+ ‖An −A′n‖‖A‖.
(A.54)
Because the lemma holds for p1 one can choose δ1 such that
‖A−A′‖ < min
(√

3 ,

3‖An‖
)
(A.55)
and because the lemma holds for pn one can choose δn such that
‖An −A′n‖ < min
(√

3 ,

3‖A‖
)
. (A.56)
Then with the choice δ = min(δ1, δn) each of the three terms in (A.54) becomes
smaller than /3. This proves that the lemma also holds for pn+1.
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Now consider the general case where p(x) := a0 + a1x+ . . .+ anx
n. Then
‖p(A)− p(A′)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
m=1
am(A
m −A′m)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n∑
m=1
|am|
∥∥Am −A′m∥∥ . (A.57)
Now set a := max(|a1|, . . . , |an|). For every m ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a δm such
that ‖Am − A′m‖ < n|a| . Choosing δ = min(δ1, . . . , δn) ensures that every term in
the sum in (A.57) is smaller than n and so the total sum is smaller than . This
completes the proof.
Definition A.18. An algebra is a vector space C with a multiplication operation
C × C 3 (A,B) 7→ AB ∈ C such that C is turned into a ring2 and for all scalars λ
and A,B ∈ C:
λ(AB) = (λA)B = A(λB). (A.58)
The algebra is called Abelian if AB = BA for all A,B ∈ C. A Banach algebra is an
algebra C with a norm ‖.‖ that turns C into a Banach space and such that
‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖B‖ ∀A,B ∈ C. (A.59)
An algebra is called a *-algebra if it is a vector space over the complex numbers
and has a map C 3 A 7→ A∗ ∈ C such that for all A,B ∈ C and λ ∈ C
(i) (A∗)∗ = A;
(ii) (AB)∗ = B∗A∗;
(iii) (λA+B)∗ = λA∗ +B∗.
A *-algebra that is also a Banach algebra and satisfies
‖A∗A‖ = ‖A∗‖‖A‖ = ‖A‖2 (A.60)
for all A ∈ C is called a C*-algebra.
Example A.15. The generic example of a C*-algebra is the set of all bounded
operators B(H) on a Hilbert space H with the norm given by (A.27) and the *-
operation is taking the adjoint. The subset
C 1 := {λ 1 | λ ∈ C} (A.61)
2I adopt the convention that a ring is assumed to have a unit element w.r.t. multiplication.
That is, there is an element 1 such that 1A = A1 = A for all A ∈ C. Although this is often done
in ring theory, the reader may be warned that in most of the work on *-algebras this convention
is usually not made. If the reader has a background in this kind of work, (s)he is advised to read
“unital algebra” whenever I write “algebra”.
215
A Mathematical background
is an Abelian C*-(sub)algebra. In the special case that H = Cn, B(H) coincides
with Mn(C). 4
Example A.16. The set T (H) of all trace class operators on a Hilbert space H is
a *-algebra. Let (ei)i∈I be an orthonormal basis for H, then the norm
‖A‖1 :=
∑
i∈I
〈ei, |A|ei〉 (A.62)
turns T (H) into a Banach algebra. 4
Definition A.19. Let S be any subset of B(H), then the commutant of S is
S ′ := {A ∈ B(H) | [A,S] = 0∀S ∈ S} . (A.63)
A C*-subalgebra A of B(H) is called a von Neumann algebra if it is equal to its
double commutant, i.e., A = (A′)′ =: A′′. For a set S ⊂ B(H) the smallest von
Neumann algebra containing S is denoted Alg(S).
Example A.17. Suppose H = C2 and let P be a projection operator on H. Then
Alg({P}) =
{
λ1P + λ2P
⊥
∣∣∣ λ1, λ2 ∈ C} . (A.64)
If P = 0 or P = 1, this algebra is isomorphic to C. In other cases it is isomorphic
(as a vector space) to C2. It may be shown that every C*-subalgebra of M2(C) is
of this form. 4
A C*-algebra that is a subalgebra of B(H) for some Hilbert space is called a
concrete C*-algebra. This indicates that these examples are really the paradigm
examples. And in line with this paradigm, it is not surprising that much of the
terminology for operators on a Hilbert space can be carried over to elements of a
*-algebra.
Definition A.20. Let C be a *-algebra. An element A ∈ C is called self-adjoint
if A = A∗ and a projection if in addition A = A2. The element is called invertible
if there is an A−1 ∈ C such that A−1A = AA−1 = 1. The spectrum σ(A) of A is
the set of all complex numbers λ for which A− λ 1 is not invertible. A self-adjoint
element A is called positive (denoted A ≥ 0) if σ(A) ⊂ [0,∞).
Definition A.21. Let C be a *-algebra, then a functional φ : C → C is called
positive if φ(A) ≥ 0 for all A ≥ 0. The functional is called a state if it is positive
and φ(1) = 1. A functional is called multiplicative if for all A1, A2 ∈ C φ(A1A2) =
φ(A1)φ(A2).
Definition A.22. A state φ on a von Neumann algebra C is called normal if for
any monotone increasing net of operators {Ai} the net {φ(Ai)} converges to φ(A)
with A the least upper bound of {Ai}.
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A.3 Lattice theory
In section A.1 lattices have been defined as a particular kind of algebraic structures.
Here, a different approach is used, which starts with the notion of a relation on a
set.
Definition A.23. A relation R on a set X is a subset R of X ×X. Whenever an
element (x1, x2) ∈ X × X is an element of R this is indicated with the notation
x1Rx2. A relation is called
-) reflexive if ∀x ∈ X: xRx,
-) irreflexive if @x ∈ X such that xRx,
-) transitive if ∀x1, x2, x3 ∈ X: if x1Rx2 and x2Rx3, then x1Rx3,
-) symmetric if ∀x1, x2 ∈ X: if x1Rx2, then x2Rx1,
-) antisymmetric if ∀x1, x2 ∈ X: if x1Rx2 and x2Rx1, then x1 = x2.
If a relation is both reflexive and transitive it is called a preorder and one often
writes ≤ instead of R. If the preorder is also antisymmetric it is called a partial
order. If a preorder is symmetric it is called an equivalence relation and one often
writes ∼ or = instead of R.
Example A.18. Let N be the natural numbers then
n ∼ m iff n+m is even (A.65)
is an equivalence relation. The usual order given by
n ≤ m iff ∃k ∈ N s.t. n+ k = m (A.66)
turns N into a partial ordered set. A less trivial example is the relation
n ≤ m iff ∃k ∈ N\{0} s.t. nk = m. (A.67)
4
Example A.19. Let (S,∧) be a semilattice. Then
s1 ≤ s2 iff s1 ∧ s2 = s1 (A.68)
is a partial order. 4
This example indicates that partial ordered sets form the backbone of lattice
theory, as meets give rise to partial orders. Conversely, partial orders may give rise
to meets as established by the following definition.
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Definition A.24. Let (X,≤) be a partial ordered set. Two elements x1, x2 ∈ X
are said to have an upper bound if there exists an element x3 ∈ X such that x1 ≤ x3
and x2 ≤ x3. If the orders are reversed x3 is called a lower bound. A partial ordered
set in which all pairs have an upper bound is called a directed set. A partial ordered
set (X,≤) is said to have meets if for all x1, x2 ∈ X there is an element in X denoted
x1 ∧ x2 that is a lower bound and satisfies
∀x ∈ X : if x ≤ x1 and x ≤ x2, then x ≤ x1 ∧ x2. (A.69)
The partial ordered set is said to have joins if for all x1, x2 ∈ X there is an element
in X denoted x1 ∨ x2 that is an upper bound and satisfies
∀x ∈ X : if x1 ≤ x and x2 ≤ x, then x1 ∨ x2 ≤ x. (A.70)
A partial ordered set that has both joins and meets is called a lattice. A lattice is
called bounded if it has elements >,⊥ (called top and bottom) that satisfy
∀x ∈ X : ⊥ ≤ x ≤ >. (A.71)
One may show that if a partial ordered set has joins and meets, that these are
uniquely determined by the partial order. Further, one can show that a partial
ordered set that has meets or joins is a semilattice in the sense of Definition A.2.
And if the it has both joins and meets then it is also a lattice in the sense of
Definition A.4. To obtain a lattice structure on a given set, one may thus first look
for a partial order. The following definition and theorem show how one obtains a
partial ordered set from a preordered set.
Definition A.25. If (X,∼) is a set with an equivalence relation, then for every
x ∈ X
[x] :=
{
x′ ∈ X ∣∣ x ∼ x′} (A.72)
is called the equivalence class of x. An element of [x] is called a representative of
the class [x].
Theorem A.4. If (X,∼) is a set with an equivalence relation, then {[x] | x ∈ X}
is a partition of X. For every preordered set (X,≤) the relation
x1 ∼ x2 iff x1 ≤ x2 and x2 ≤ x1 (A.73)
is an equivalence relation. The preorder on X gives rise to a partial order on
{[x] | x ∈ X} via
[x1] ≤ [x2] iff x1 ≤ x2. (A.74)
218
Lattice theory A.3
Example A.20. Define the equivalence relation on N as
n ∼ m iff n+m is even. (A.75)
Then [1] is the set of all odd numbers and [2] is the set of all even numbers. 4
Definition A.26. Let (X,≤) be a partial ordered set with least element ⊥. An
element a 6= ⊥ is called an atom if for every x ∈ X it follows from ⊥ ≤ x ≤ a that
either x = ⊥ or x = a. The set X is called atomic if for every x ∈ X with x 6= ⊥
there exists an atom a such that a ≤ x. The set is called atomistic if every x 6= ⊥
is equal to the join of all the atoms below it.
Example A.21. Let X be a set and (P(X),≤) the lattice of subsets of X with
partial order given by set inclusion. The atoms are the singleton sets. Since ∆ =⋃
x∈∆{x} for every ∆ ∈ P(X) the lattice is atomistic. 4
Example A.22. Consider the set of natural numbers without zero and with the
partial order given by
n ≤ m iff m− n ∈ N and m
n
∈ N. (A.76)
The bottom element is 1 and the atoms are given by the prime numbers. The set is
atomic, but not atomistic. As a counterexample note that the atoms below 12 are
2 and 3, but that 2 ∨ 3 = 6. 4
Lattices can be further qualified in terms of additional operations that may be
defined on them and how these operations relate to each other.
Definition A.27. A unary operation a 7→ ac on a bounded lattice (L,≤,∧,∨,⊥,>)
is called a complement if it satisfies
∀a ∈ L : a ∧ ac = ⊥, a ∨ ac = >. (A.77)
In that case L is called a complemented lattice. A Boolean algebra is a distributive
complemented lattice. A modal algebra is a Boolean algebra with a unary operation
a 7→ ♦a that satisfies
∀a, b ∈ L : ♦(a ∨ b) = ♦a ∨ ♦b. (A.78)
If in addition
♦⊥ = ⊥, (A.79)
then the lattice is called a normal modal algebra. A binary operation (a, b) 7→ a→ b
is called a relative pseudo-complement if it satisfies
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(i) a ∧ (a→ b) ≤ b,
(ii) for all c such that a ∧ c ≤ b: c ≤ a→ b.
A Heyting algebra is a bounded lattice with a relative pseudo-complement. On a
Heyting algebra the unary operation
¬a := a→ ⊥ (A.80)
is called the pseudo-complement.
Example A.23. Let R be a Boolean ring. Then the lattice operations defined in
Example A.5 turn R into a Boolean algebra with the complement given by
xc := 1 + x. (A.81)
Conversely, every Boolean algebra (B,∧,∨,c ,⊥,>) is turned into a Boolean ring
with the definitions
a+ b := (a ∧ bc) ∨ (ac ∧ b),
ab := a ∧ b. (A.82)
4
Example A.24. The standard example of a non-distributive lattice is that of the
projection operators on a Hilbert space H with the partial order given by
P1 ≤ P2 iff P1H ⊂ P2H. (A.83)
A non-standard example is obtained by defining the partial order on N\{0} as
n ≤ m iff
{
m− n ∈ N and gcd(n,m) > 1 or
n = 1
(A.84)
where gcd denotes the greatest common divisor. An example of the failure of
distributivity is
(2 ∨ 3) ∧ 4 = 6 ∧ 4 = 4 6= 2 = 2 ∨ 1 = (2 ∧ 4) ∨ (3 ∧ 4). (A.85)
4
Example A.25. Consider the following three Hasse diagrams.
⊥ ⊥ ⊥
a a ab b b
>
> >
a ∨ b a ∨ b
c
a ∨ c c ∨ b
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The first and last define a Boolean algebra, while the one in the middle is only a
Heyting algebra. In the first b is the complement of a and in the second b is the
pseudo-complement of a. That a∨ b and > are not the same element in the second
can be seen as an example of the failure of the law of excluded middle. The third
may be thought of as a classical interpretation of the second. The element c then
represents the ‘third option’. 4
Example A.26. Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space, i.e., a set Ω with F a collection
of subsets of Ω that satisfies
(i) Ω ∈ F ,
(ii) if ∆ ∈ F , then Ω\∆ ∈ F ,
(iii) if ∆n ∈ F for all n ∈ N, then
⋃
n∈N ∆n ∈ F .
Then F is a Boolean algebra with the partial order given by set inclusion. 4
Example A.27. Let (X, τ) be a topological space, i.e., a set X with τ a collection
of subsets of X that satisfies
(i) X ∈ τ and ∅ ∈ τ ,
(ii) if U1, U2 ∈ τ , then U1 ∩ U2 ∈ τ ,
(iii) if Ui ∈ τ for all i ∈ I, then
⋃
i∈I Ui ∈ τ .
Then τ is a bounded lattice with the partial order given by set inclusion. The
operation
U1 → U2 := int(U c1 ∪ U2) (A.86)
is a relative pseudo-complement that turns τ into a Heyting algebra. The fact that
in general U∪ ∈ (U c) 6= X represents the idea that the law of excluded middle does
not hold in general. 4
A collection of subsets of some set that is closed under intersection, unions and
complements is the prototype of a Boolean algebra. It was shown by Stone (1936)
that every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a Boolean algebra of this form. The
final part of this appendix is devoted to explaining the construction behind this
result. To identify a Boolean algebra with an algebra of subsets, one first has to
find these sets. The starting point is the set of ultrafilters on the algebra.
Definition A.28. An ultrafilter U on a Boolean algebra B is a subset of B such
that
(i) > ∈ U ,
(ii) if a1 ≤ a2 and a1 ∈ U , then a2 ∈ U ,
(iii) if a1, a2 ∈ U , then a1 ∧ a2 ∈ U ,
(iv) for every a ∈ either a ∈ U or ac ∈ U .
An ultrafilter U on B is called a principal ultrafilter if there is an atom a ∈ B such
that U is given by the up set of a, i.e.,
U = ↑ a := {a′ ∈ B ∣∣ a ≤ a′} . (A.87)
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An ultrafilter U is called a free ultrafilter if it is not a principal ultrafilter. The set
of all ultrafilters on B is denoted S(B).
The set S(B) is turned into a topological space by the introduction of the so-
called Stone topology. This is the topology generated by the basis
∆a := {U ∈ S(B) | a ∈ U} (A.88)
for a ∈ B. The topological space S(B) is called the Stone space. One can show
that the set {∆a ⊂ S(B) | a ∈ B} precisely is the set of sets that are both open and
closed. Furthermore, the following lemma holds.
Lemma A.7. Let B be a Boolean algebra and S(B) its associated Stone space.
Then the map B 3 a 7→ ∆a ⊂ S(B) satisfies
∆a1∨a2 = ∆a1 ∪∆a2 ,
∆a1∧a2 = ∆a1 ∩∆a2 ,
∆ac = ∆
c
a,
(A.89)
for all a, a1, a2 ∈ B.
This lemma thus establishes that the map a 7→ ∆a is a homomorphism. Stone’s
theorem now states that it is in fact an isomorphism. The technical culprit is to
show that the map is injective. And this actually requires the Boolean prime ideal
theorem (or something equivalent to it).
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I. Kansen: interpretatie en formalisme
Van alle wiskunde die we in ons dagelijks leven tegenkomen is, na de rekenkunde,
de kansrekening waarschijnlijk de meest voorkomende. Daarbij kan men bijvoor-
beeld denken aan kansspelen zoals loterijen, casinospelen en de WK-pool, maar ook
aan verzekeringen, pensioenfondsen en aandelenkoersen. Ook is het tegenwoordig
gebruikelijk dat bij het weerbericht kansen op zon en regen in getal worden ge-
noemd. Behalve in de meteorologie, speelt kanstheorie ook een grote rol in andere
wetenschappelijke theoriee¨n zoals de genetica of de statistische thermodynamica.
Verder is het gebruik van statistiek niet meer weg te denken bij de toetsing van
wetenschappelijke theoriee¨n.
Hoewel het kansbegrip veelvuldig voorkomt, is het bepalen van wat kansen zijn
een lastige filosofische aangelegenheid. Hierbij doel ik niet op de vraag naar het
bepalen van de waarde van een kans (wat is de kans dat een munt op kop terecht
komt wanneer deze opgeworpen wordt?), maar de betekenis van het woord “kans”
zelf (wat wordt er bedoeld met de uitspraak dat de kans op kop een half is?).
Een reden hiervoor is dat kansen zelf niet eenduidig waarneembaar zijn. In het
weerbericht kan men bijvoorbeeld stellen dat er morgen 90% kans op regen is, maar
deze uitspraak wordt niet weerlegd als het in feite droog blijft. Immers, daar was
ook 10% kans op.
Mede door deze onmogelijkheid om een directe empirische betekenis aan het
kansbegrip te geven, is er een breed scala aan interpretaties. Een belangrijk onder-
scheid in interpretaties is of kansuitspraken alleen betekenis hebben in de context
van een reeks vergelijkbare gebeurtenissen, of dat ze ook van toepassing zijn op
eenmalige gebeurtenissen. In het eerste geval gaat de bewering dat een munt kans
een half heeft om op kop te landen, over het (eventueel hypothetische) geval dat
deze munt heel vaak (potentieel oneindig vaak) opgeworpen word. De bewering
impliceert dan dat in (ongeveer) de helft van de gevallen de munt op kop land. Vol-
gens frequentisten is dit de betekenis van kans: een kans is de relatieve frequentie
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waarmee iets gebeurt. Er bestaan verschillende stromingen van deze interpretatie
die op verschillende manieren de gegeven definitie precies proberen te maken. Ee´n
van de stromingen die voortvloeit uit het frequentisme is de geneigdheidsinterpre-
tatie. Volgens deze interpretatie zijn de relatieve frequenties enkel een manifestatie
van kansen. Een munt heeft dan een kans om op kop te landen onafhankelijk of
deze daadwerkelijk opgeworpen word. Ook in het geval van een enkele muntworp
is het kansbegrip dan betekenisvol. Kansen zijn dan dispositionele eigenschappen
(d.w.z, eigenschappen die een bepaalde geneigdheid uitdrukken) vergelijkbaar met
dat breekbaarheid een eigenschap van een glas is ook als deze nooit zou breken.
De genoemde interpretaties hebben de eigenschap dat ze kansen plaatsen in de
wereld. Volgens het frequentisme zijn het eigenschappen van een reeks gebeurte-
nissen en volgens de geneigdheidsinterpretatie zijn het eigenschappen van systemen
zelf. Hiertegenover staan variaties van de Bayesiaanse interpretatie waarin kansuit-
spraken worden gekoppeld aan de overtuigingen van de persoon die de uitspraak
doet. In deze context worden kansen ook wel graden van geloof genoemd: een kwan-
tificering van de mate waarin men overtuigd is van de waarheid van een bepaalde
uitspraak. Wanneer iemand de zin “morgen is er 90% kans op regen” uitspreekt,
betekent dit dat deze persoon er veel vertrouwen in heeft dat het morgen gaat re-
genen, maar er zijn dan niet per se implicaties voor de feitelijke condities van het
weer. Of die implicaties er zijn of niet hangt er van af hoe de persoon in kwestie aan
zijn of haar vertrouwen is gekomen, bijvoorbeeld door het doen van meteorologisch
onderzoek, of door het kijken in een glazen bol.3
Naast de genoemde interpretaties zijn er natuurlijk nog verscheidene anderen.
Voor de verschillende voorkomens van kansen (in kansspelen, in wetenschappelijke
theoriee¨n) kunnen verschillende interpretaties beter of juist slechter passen. Er is
echter e´e´n ding wat al deze kansbegrippen en hun toepassingen met elkaar verbindt:
de kanstheorie. Of men nu kansen wilt berekenen voor de paardenrennen, voor het
bepalen van de verzekeringspremie, of voor de luchtvochtigheid voor het komende
uur, de rekenregels zijn (zeker sinds de axiomatisering van Kolmogorov uit 1933)
steeds hetzelfde.
Op de toepasbaarheid van de axioma’s van Kolmogorov (ook wel de klassieke
kanstheorie genoemd) bestaat een eigenaardige uitzondering: de quantummecha-
nica. Deze theorie heeft zelfs geleid tot de ontwikkeling van een aparte kanstheorie:
de quantumkanstheorie. Hier dient men met enige verwondering bij stil te staan.
Door de eeuwen heen is de ontwikkeling van de wiskundige theorie van kansen hand
in hand gegaan met interpretationele overwegingen. Hoe deze theorie er ook uit zou
3In eerste instantie lijkt het misschien vreemd om de mate van geloof te verbinden aan getallen.
Deze stap wordt vaak onderbouwd door een koppeling met (potentieel) gedrag van mensen te
maken. De persoon die stelt dat er morgen 90% kans op regen is zou dan bijvoorbeeld bereid
zijn om maximaal 90 cent te betalen voor een lot dat recht geeft op 1 euro wanneer het morgen
daadwerkelijk regent en waardeloos is wanneer het droog blijft.
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komen te zien, ze zou compatibel moeten zijn met de intu¨ıties die we over kansen
hebben. De quantummechanica aan de andere kant, is voor een geheel andere reden
ontwikkeld, namelijk, voor de correcte beschrijving van het gedrag van atomaire
deeltjes. Het zou nog een redelijke tijd duren na Born’s introductie van kansen in
de theorie in 1926 voordat duidelijk werd dat deze kansen niet op dezelfde manier
samenhangen als de kansen in de klassieke kanstheorie.
De situatie leidt tot interessante vragen. Zijn de eerder genoemde interpretaties
ook toepasbaar voor de kansen in de quantummechanica? Of vereist een nieuw
formalisme een nieuw kansbegrip? Kunnen verschillende kanstheoriee¨n zinvol naast
elkaar bestaan? Deze vragen zijn alleen betekenisvol wanneer duidelijk is in welke
zin de quantumkanstheorie een nieuwe kanstheorie is. Wiskundig is dit een heldere
opgave: men onderzoekt dan de verschillen in definities van klassieke en quantum-
kansruimten, en hun mogelijke instanties. In dit proefschrift ligt de nadruk meer
op de conceptuele verschillen. Met name de vraag wat het betekent om de quan-
tumkanstheorie te gebruiken voor de beschrijving van kansen komt aan bod.
Om dit onderzoek in goede banen te leiden is het eerste deel van het proefschrift
volledig gewijd aan het in kaart brengen van de nodige achtergrondkennis. Er wordt
een weg bewandeld van de introductie van kansen in de quantummechanica naar
de axiomatisatie van de theorie door von Neumann in 1932. Het formalisme van
de quantumkanstheorie wordt gerelateerd aan de axioma’s van de quantummecha-
nica, en enkele zinvolle karakteriseringen van quantumkansruimtes worden gegeven.
Ook wordt een formulering van de quantumkanstheorie gepresenteerd waarbinnen
de klassieke kanstheorie zich voordoet als een speciaal geval. Dit betekent dat
de quantumkanstheorie opgevat kan worden als een generalisatie van de klassieke
kanstheorie in plaats van als een rivaal. Het materiaal gepresenteerd in deel I is dus
veelal niet nieuw en de rest van deze samenvatting gaat daarom over de delen II en
III.
II. Klassieke representaties van de quantumkanstheorie
Een onderzoeking van de quantumkanstheorie kan niet geschieden zonder aandacht
te besteden aan de grondslagen van haar belangrijkste toepassing: de quantum-
mechanica. Het succes van deze theorie vormt immers een belangrijke rechtvaar-
diging voor het idee dat het formalisme van de quantumkanstheorie een serieuze
kandidaat is voor een kanstheorie. Maar tegelijkertijd betekent dit ook dat deze
rechtvaardiging gevoelig is voor problemen in de grondslagen van de quantumme-
chanica. Wanneer fundamentele problemen leiden tot een herformulering van de
quantummechanica kan dit gepaard gaan met een herformulering van de quantum-
kanstheorie.
Het zou zomaar het geval kunnen zijn dat eigenaardige aspecten van het forma-
lisme van de quantumkanstheorie een artefact zijn van een ongelukkige formulering
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van de quantummechanica. In het bijzonder kan men hierbij denken aan de vraag
of de quantummechanica volledig is. Sinds de ontwikkeling van de theorie zijn
er argumenten naar voren gebracht (in eerste instantie met name door Einstein
en Schro¨dinger) die verdedigen dat de beschrijving die deze theorie geeft wel cor-
rect kan zijn, maar niet volledig. Het bekendste voorbeeld is waarschijnlijk de kat
van Schro¨dinger. Schro¨dinger beargumenteerde dat als we de quantummechanica
beschouwen als een volledige universele theorie (dat wil zeggen, geldig voor alle
fysische systemen) we moeten accepteren dat de onbepaaldheid van eigenschappen
van microscopische systemen (in het algemeen legt bijvoorbeeld de toestand van
een electron niet vast waar dit electron zich bevind) overslaat op eigenschappen
van macroscopische systemen. De quantummechanica zou dan toelaten dat een kat
niet altijd levend of dood is, maar zich soms in een zogenaamde superpositie van
deze twee eigenschappen kan bevinden. Schro¨dinger beschouwde deze conclusie als
absurd en concludeerde daarom dat er een vollediger theorie moet bestaan die wel
ten allen tijden bepaald dat een kat levend of dood is.
Theoriee¨n die een vollediger beschrijving geven dan de quantummechanica staan
bekend als verborgen variabelen theoriee¨n. De terminologie slaat op het idee dat
een dergelijke theorie variabelen dient te introduceren die alle eigenschappen van
systemen vastleggen. Omdat de quantummechanica zelf deze variabelen niet kent,
zijn ze vanuit dat oogpunt verborgen. Dit betekent dus niet dat de variabelen nood-
zakelijk niet vatbaar zijn voor empirische onderzoekingen. Sterker, in de bekendste
verborgen variabelen theorie, de Bohmiaanse mechanica, zijn de verborgen varia-
belen de positie-coo¨rdinaten van alle deeltjes en zijn het precies deze variabelen die
worden waargenomen bij een positie-meting.
Het construeren van een verborgen variabelen theorie is niet bepaald een triviale
activiteit en er bestaan allerlei resultaten die restricties leggen op zulke theoriee¨n.
Deze resultaten staan bekend als zogenaamde ‘no-go stellingen’ voor verborgen va-
riabelen. De achterliggende gedachte is dat de restricties niet acceptabel zijn vanuit
fysisch of filosofisch oogpunt. Uiteraard is niet iedereen het eens met deze lezing
en er wordt nog voldoende gewerkt aan verborgen variabelen theoriee¨n. De inte-
resse voor deze stellingen in dit proefschrift komt niet zozeer voort uit de vraag
of verborgen variabelen mogelijk zijn, maar uit de vraag van de noodzaak van een
quantumkanstheorie. De relevantie van deze stellingen voor deze vraag berust op
het feit dat er wiskundig een sterke overeenkomst is tussen de mogelijkheid van een
verborgen variabelen theorie en de mogelijkheid om een klassieke representatie van
een quantumkansruimte te formuleren.
Deze overeenkomst wordt ge¨ıllustreerd door het schema in Figuur S.1. Het be-
staan van een verborgen variabelen theorie impliceert dat ieder quantummechanisch
systeem evengoed beschreven kan worden door een verborgen variabelen systeem.
De probabilistische aspecten van dit systeem kunnen op hun beurt beschreven wor-
den met behulp van een klassieke kansruimte. Dit is een gevolg van de wiskundige
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structuur die men doorgaans oplegt aan verborgen variabelen theoriee¨n. Aan de
andere kant kunnen de probabilistische eigenschappen van een quantummechanisch
systeem beschreven worden met behulp van een quantumkansruimte. Omdat men
eist dat de empirische voorspellingen van beide theoriee¨n (quantummechanica en de
verborgen variabelen theorie) met elkaar in overeenstemming zijn, geeft de klassieke
kansruimte een representatie van de quantumkansruimte.
Quantummechanisch
systeem
Verborgen
variabelen systeem
Quantumkansruimte Klassieke kansruimte
Figuur S.1: Schematische weergave van de relatie tussen een quantumechanische en ver-
borgen variabelen beschrijving van een systeem en hun onderliggende kanstheoriee¨n.
De mogelijkheid van verborgen variabelen theoriee¨n schetst een beeld dat precies
het tegenovergestelde is van wat we eerder zagen, namelijk, dat de quantumkansthe-
orie een speciaal geval is van de klassieke kanstheorie. De situatie, hoewel in eerste
instantie mogelijk verwarrend, is niet strijdig. Als analogie voor de dubbele verta-
ling kan men denken aan vierkanten en cirkels. Het is mogelijk om ieder vierkant
binnen een cirkel te plaatsen en het is ook mogelijk om het omgekeerde te doen,
maar dat zorgt er natuurlijk niet voor dat cirkels en vierkanten hetzelfde zijn.
De interessantere vraag is of men een klassieke representatie kan construeren
die ook inzicht geeft in het waarom van het formalisme van de quantumkansruimte.
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden wordt in dit proefschrift de aandacht gevestigd
op de stelling van Kochen en Specker uit 1967. In vergelijking met andere no-go
stellingen legt deze stelling een grote nadruk op de wiskundige structuur van de
quantummechanica en maakt ze nauwelijks gebruik van additionele metafysische
aannames zoals localiteitsaannames. De strekking van de stelling is goed uit te leg-
gen aan de hand van wat voorbeelden. Beschouw een experiment waarbij bepaald
wordt of een gegeven bal blauw of rood is. De mogelijke uitkomsten van dit ex-
periment zijn schematisch weergegeven in Figuur S.2a. Hierin geeft R de uitkomst
“rood” aan en B de uitkomst “blauw”. De symbolen ⊥ en > representeren respec-
tievelijk een onmogelijke uitkomst (bijvoorbeeld “rood en blauw tegelijkertijd”) en
een triviale uitkomst (bijvoorbeeld “rood of blauw”). Een lijn tussen twee blokken
geeft aan dat de onderste van de twee de bovenste impliceert.
In zowel de klassieke als de quantumkansrekening vormt het diagram in Figuur
S.2a de totale collectie van gebeurtenissen waaraan men kansen toekent. Het ver-
schil tussen de twee kanstheoriee¨n komt pas naar voren wanneer het over meer dan
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⊥
R B
>
(a)
⊥
R B + -
>
(b)
Figuur S.2: Schematische weergave van de tralies van gebeurtenissen voor twee quan-
tumkansruimtes. Links voor een ruimte voor e´e´n mogelijk experiment met twee mogelijke
uitkomsten, en rechts voor een ruimte voor twee mogelijke experimenten met ieder twee
mogelijke uitkomsten.
e´e´n mogelijk experiment gaat. Beschouw daarom nu de situatie waarin we kunnen
kiezen tussen twee experimenten. De eerste is dezelfde als voorheen, en bij het
tweede experiment kunnen we bepalen of er een plus of een min op de bal staat.
In de quantumkanstheorie kan zo’n situatie beschreven worden met behulp van het
diagram in Figuur S.2b. Dit diagram is beknopt in het specificeren van gebeur-
tenissen: alleen de gebeurtenissen die zich daadwerkelijk kunnen voordoen in een
experiment zijn gespecificeerd. Het is verkregen door twee versies van het eerste
diagram aan elkaar te plakken door de gebeurtenissen “rood of blauw” en “plus of
min” met elkaar te identificeren en de gebeurtenissen “rood en blauw” en “plus en
min” met elkaar te identificeren.
In de klassieke kansrekening wordt meer verlangd van een specificatie. Ook
volledige karakteriseringen van de bal dienen opgenomen te worden. In dit geval
betekent dat bijvoorbeeld dat, wanneer alleen gekeken wordt naar de kleur van de
bal, we aannemen dat er ook dan wel een plus, dan wel een min op de bal staat.
Deze aanname is onafhankelijk van de vraag of het mogelijk is om experimenteel
vast te stellen dat een bal voldoet aan e´e´n van de vier criteria “rood en plus”, “rood
en min”, “blauw en min” of “blauw en plus”. Voor klassieke representaties dienen
dus mogelijke gebeurtenissen te worden gepostuleerd waarvan niet op voorhand
duidelijk is of die experimenteel geverifieerd kunnen worden. In het huidige geval
zou een klassieke representatie er uit zien zoals in Figuur S.3. In dit diagram kan
bijvoorbeeld R ge¨ınterpreteerd worden als een afkorting voor “rood met een plus of
rood met een min”. Verder is dan bijvoorbeeld X1 een afkorting voor “rood met
een plus of blauw met een min” en X2 een afkorting voor “rood met een min of
blauw met een plus”.
Het is op voorhand niet duidelijk of een representatie zoals in Figuur S.3 met de
gegeven interpretatie altijd mogelijk is voor een gegeven quantumkansruimte. Het
voorbeeld geeft aan dat in het geval van twee mogelijke experimenten met ieder
twee mogelijke meetuitkomsten het mogelijk is om een klassieke representatie van
een quantumkansruimte te construeren. De stelling van Kochen en Specker laat
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⊥
R en + R en - B en - B en +
R X1
-
+
X2 B
R of - R of + B of + B of -
R of B of + of -
Figuur S.3: Schematische weergave van de tralie van gebeurtenissen voor een klassieke
kansruimte voor twee mogelijke experimenten met ieder twee mogelijke meetuitkomsten.
Formeel is dit hetzelfde tralie als voor een enkel experiment met vier mogelijke meetuit-
komsten.
echter zien dat wanneer we kijken naar experimenten met drie of meer mogelijke
meetuitkomsten het in het algemeen niet meer mogelijk is om een klassieke represen-
tatie te construeren. Een cruciale aanname daarbij is dat in sommige gevallen twee
uitkomsten van verschillende experimenten als dezelfde gebeurtenis gezien worden.
Deze aanname is gebaseerd op het feit dat in de quantumkanstheorie in deze geval-
len de twee gebeurtenissen dezelfde wiskundige representatie hebben. Maar vanuit
een klassiek oogpunt mist deze aanname rechtvaardiging.
In hoofdstuk 6 onderscheid ik twee manieren waarop deze aanname weerlegd kan
worden. De eerste is welbekend en werd reeds door Bell in 1966 voorgedragen. Deze
optie accepteert dat de wiskundige representatie die gebruikt wordt in de quantum-
kanstheorie correct is, maar stelt dat deze onvolledig is. Een volledige representatie
zou ook de meetcontext (het gekozen experiment) moeten weergeven. Verborgen
variabelen theoriee¨n die deze optie volgen worden dan ook wel contextueel genoemd.
De tweede optie is gebaseerd op het werk van Meyer, Kent en Clifton rond het jaar
2000. Volgens deze optie is de gebruikte wiskundige representatie niet altijd correct,
maar slechts correct bij benadering. Twee verschillende gebeurtenissen hebben dan
nooit precies dezelfde wiskundige representatie.
In beide opties is het resultaat dat gebeurtenissen die in eerste instantie met
elkaar ge¨ıdentificeerd werden nu onderscheiden worden. In de hoofdstukken 6 en
7 laat ik expliciet zien dat beide opties de mogelijkheid geven tot het construeren
van klassieke representaties (hoewel deze mogelijkheden bekend zijn, zijn expliciete
constructies niet zo bekend). Echter, in beide gevallen hebben de klassieke repre-
sentaties weinig verklarende kracht voor de quantumkanstheorie. Het probleem is
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dat in allebei de gevallen er nieuwe kansfuncties ge¨ıntroduceerd worden die geen te-
genhanger hebben in de quantumkanstheorie: de quantumkansfuncties vormen een
bijzondere deelverzameling van alle kansfuncties in de klassieke representatie.
In beide gevallen is het mogelijk om een karakterisering van de quantumkans-
functies in de klassieke representaties te geven. In de optie waarin meetcontexten
expliciet worden opgenomen is deze karakterisering relatief bekend: de quantum-
kansfuncties zijn precies diegenen die een bepaalde vorm van niet-contextualiteit
respecteren. Deze functies voldoen dus precies aan een eigenschap waarvan de
weerlegging de basis vormde voor de constructie van de representatie! In hoofdstuk
7 laat ik zien dat in de tweede optie zich een soortgelijke situatie voordoet. Ik bewijs
dat in dit geval de quantumkansfunctie precies die functies zijn die aan een bepaalde
continu¨ıteitseis voldoen. Met behulp van een resultaat van Appleby uit 2004 bear-
gumenteer ik vervolgens dat deze continu¨ıteitseis zelf niet gerespecteerd wordt in
de klassieke representatie op het beschrijvingsniveau van de gebeurtenissen.
In beide gevallen is het dus zo dat de karakterisering van de quantumkansfuncties
op gespannen voet staat met de aannames die gebruikt werden voor het construe-
ren van de klassieke representaties. Het accepteren van een voorkeurspositie voor
de quantumkansfuncties ondermijnt de aanname die het toeliet om de klassieke re-
presentatie u¨berhaupt te construeren. De conclusie is dat de quantumkanstheorie
niet goed begrepen kan worden vanuit een klassiek oogpunt. Er zijn dan twee op-
ties: of we moeten accepteren dat de quantumkanstheorie geen correcte volledige
beschrijving geeft van alle mogelijke kansfuncties voor een bepaald systeem, of we
moeten zoeken naar een andere manier om het formalisme van de quantumkans-
theorie te begrijpen. Deze laatste optie wordt onderzocht in het derde deel van het
proefschrift.
III. Quantumkanstheorie en de logica van de quantummechanica
Het doel van de onderzoekingen in het derde deel is om een beter begrip te krijgen
van het formalisme van de quantumkanstheorie. De methode die hiervoor wordt
gehanteerd is het maken van een conceptueel gefundeerde herformulering van het
formalisme. Het is hierbij natuurlijk van belang dat de herformulering de originele
formulering wel respecteert. Dit is nodig om er voor te zorgen dat de interpretatie
van de herformulering ook toepasbaar is op het origineel. Een obstakel in het opne-
men van deze eis is dat er weinig consensus is over waar de belangrijkste toepassing
van de quantumkanstheorie (de quantummechanica) over gaat. Verschillende in-
terpretaties van de quantummechanica suggereren verschillende herformuleringen
van de quantumkanstheorie. Dit probleem wordt in dit proefschrift omzeild door
de aandacht te richten op wat al deze interpretaties met elkaar gemeen hebben: de
empirische voorspellingen.
In de zoektocht naar een herformulering is het belangrijk om drie componenten
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van een kansfunctie te onderscheiden waarvan we ons kunnen afvragen waar die
precies aan moeten voldoen. Ten eerste is er het bereik van de functie: de mogelijke
waarden voor kansen. Het is redelijk onomstreden om hiervoor de getallen tussen
0 en 1 te kiezen. Ten tweede is er het domein van de functie: de dingen waaraan
we kansen toeschrijven. En ten slotte zijn er de rekenkundige regels waaraan de
functie dient te voldoen zoals de regel dat de som van kansen van elkaar uitsluitende
gebeurtenissen niet groter is dan 1.
De component onder beschouwing hier is het domein van kansfuncties. Het is
namelijk dit aspect waarin quantumkansfuncties het meest verschillen van hun klas-
sieke tegenhangers. In de klassieke kansrekening is het doorgaans mogelijk om de
wiskundige objecten in het domein (verzamelingen) op een eenduidige manier te
koppelen aan mogelijke gebeurtenissen in de wereld. De gebeurtenis bijvoorbeeld
dat een dobbelsteenworp resulteert in een even getal wordt gekoppeld aan de verza-
meling getallen {2, 4, 6}. Anderzijds kan de gebeurtenis ook ge¨ıdentificeerd worden
met een propositie, bijvoorbeeld, de propositie uitgedrukt door de zin “de worp van
de dobbelsteen resulteert in een even getal”. Uit proposities kunnen we nieuwe pro-
posities bouwen door ze aan elkaar te koppelen met de woorden “en” en “of”. Aan
de andere kant kan men verzamelingen met elkaar verenigingen of doorsnijden. Het
mooie van deze soorten bewerkingen is dat ze met elkaar in harmonie zijn. Bijvoor-
beeld, de zin “de worp van de dobbelsteen resulteert in een even getal en de worp
van de dobbelsteen resulteert in een getal kleiner dan vier” kan geherformuleerd
worden tot “de worp van de dobbelsteen resulteert in het getal twee”. Anderzijds
vinden we aan de kant van de verzamelingen dat
{2, 4, 6} ∩ {1, 2, 3} = {2}.
Meer algemeen kan men bewijzen dat het gebruik van deze verzamelingstheore-
tische structuur consistent is met de (klassieke) propositielogica. Het is dus mogelijk
om het domein van een klassieke kansfunctie te begrijpen als een verzameling propo-
sities die (onder andere) gesloten is onder het vormen van disjuncties en conjuncties
(samenstellingen met “en” en “of”). Dit geldt niet voor de quantumkanstheorie. Er
is wel een duidelijke regel over hoe gebeurtenissen ge¨ıdentificeerd dienen te worden
met projectie-operatoren (de wiskundige objecten in het domein van de quantum-
kansfunctie). Dit is noodzakelijk voor de theorie om toepasbaar te zijn. Maar de
connectie tussen projectie-operatoren en eventuele proposities is niet evident.
In hoofdstuk 8 beargumenteer ik dat, als we aannemen dat er een eenduidige
manier is om projectie-operatoren met proposities te identificeren, we gedwongen
zijn tot twee opties: ofwel de verzameling van proposities die geassocieerd worden
met wiskundige objecten is niet gesloten onder disjuncties en conjuncties, of ze
voldoen niet aan de klassieke propositielogica (als gevolg van de stelling van Kochen
en Specker). In het bijzonder worden we bij de laatste optie gedwongen tot het
accepteren van de orthodoxe quantumlogica L(H) als propositielogica. Deze optie
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beschouw ik als onacceptabel omdat ze strijdig is met het gebruik van de woorden
“en” en “of” in de alledaagse taal. In het bijzonder, de distributieregels
(A en B) of C = (A of C) en (B of C),
(A of B) en C = (A en C) of (B en C)
zijn niet geldig in de orthodoxe quantumlogica.
De eerste optie wordt onderzocht in hoofdstuk 9. Gebruikmakende van eerder
werk van Coecke uit 2002 wordt een uitbreiding DI(L(H)) van de orthodoxe quan-
tumlogica L(H) geconstrueerd waarin de distributieregels wel geldig zijn. Verder
worden er operaties ge¨ıntroduceerd die aanleiding geven tot twee mogelijke lezingen
van de uitbreiding. De eerste lezing geeft een klassieke propositielogica met een
modale operator. Deze logica kan een fysische interpretatie gegeven worden door
de elementen te identificeren met proposities over de mogelijke quantumtoestanden
waarin een fysisch systeem zich kan bevinden. Als een domein voor quantum-
kansfuncties is dit echter geen bevredigende interpretatie: quantumtoestanden zijn
namelijk zelf objecten die quantumkansfuncties specificeren. Hoewel het zinvol kan
zijn om kansen toe te kennen aan de mogelijke toestanden waarin een systeem zich
kan bevinden, geeft dit geen direct inzicht in de kansen voor meetuitkomsten van
mogelijke experimenten. De tweede lezing geeft een (bijna) intu¨ıtitionistische logica.
Echter, de interpretatie van proposities in deze logica blijft onduidelijk op dit punt.
In hoofdstuk 10 wordt de strategie omgegooid. In plaats van te zoeken naar mo-
gelijke uitbreidingen of andere herformuleringen van de orthodoxe quantumlogica
construeer ik een nieuwe quantumlogica aan de hand van enkele empirische regels
die opgelegd worden door de quantummechanica. De basis is een verzameling van
zogenaamde elementaire experimentele proposities die geacht worden noodzakelijk
te zijn voor het construeren van een domein voor quantumkansfuncties, namelijk,
proposities uitgedrukt door zinnen van de vorm “A is gemeten en de meetuitkomst
ligt in de verzameling ∆”. Deze proposities worden vervolgens wiskundige repre-
sentaties gegeven op basis van voorspellingen van de quantummechanica.4
Dezelfde quantummechanische voorspellingen worden gebuikt om de verzame-
ling van wiskundige representaties een partie¨le ordening te geven die van de verza-
meling een tralie maakt. Dit betekent dat er wiskundige operaties ge¨ıntroduceerd
worden (infimum en supremum) die in principe kandidaten zijn voor de connectie-
ven “en” en “of”. Een analyse van deze connectieven wijst uit dat het infimum
een goede kandidaat is voor de conjunctie, maar dat het supremum als kandidaat
voor disjunctie niet consistent is met de gegeven interpretatie. Wederom blijkt de
boosdoener het falen van distributiviteit. Gebruikmakende van interpretationele
4Specifiek, de bovengenoemde zin wordt ge¨ıdentificeerd met een paar (A, P ). Hier is A de
Abelse von Neumann algebra is die gegenereerd wordt door de zelf-geadjungeerde operator A geas-
socieerd met de observabele A en P is de projectie-operator µA(∆), waarbij µA de spectraalmaat
is behorende bij A.
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eisen voor disjunctie wordt het tralie dan uitgebreid tot een Heyting algebra IL(H)
(waarin distributiviteit automatisch wel geldt). Ten slotte wordt het tralie nog
uitgebreid tot een Booleaanse algebra CL(H) door het introduceren van proposities
uitgedrukt door zinnen van de vorm “A is niet gemeten”. De belangrijkste motivatie
voor deze laatste stap is een pragmatische: het is eenvoudiger (en minder contro-
versieel) om kansfuncties op Booleaanse algebra’s te introduceren dan op Heyting
algebra’s. Aan de andere kant, conceptueel lijkt er niet veel te veranderen aange-
zien IL(H) een sub-algebra is van CL(H). Kansfuncties gedefinie¨erd op de laatste
kunnen dus altijd gebruikt worden om een kansfunctie op de eerste te definie¨ren
door het domein in te perken.
In hoofdstuk 11 onderzoek ik de mogelijkheid om kansfuncties te introduceren op
de empiristische quantumlogica CL(H). Gebruikmakende van de theorie van condi-
tionele kansruimtes van Re´nyi en Popper laat ik zien dat iedere quantumkansfunctie
gerepresenteerd kan worden door een conditionele kansfunctie op CL(H). Hiermee
is een herformulering van de quantumkanstheorie bewerkstelligd waarin het domein
van de kansfuncties een heldere fysische interpretatie heeft: het zijn proposities over
mogelijke metingen en meetuitkomsten. Hoewel dit op zichzelf een mooi resultaat
is, kan men hopen op meer. De verzameling van alle conditionele kansfuncties op
CL(H) is groter dan de verzameling verkregen uit de quantumkansfuncties. Het
zou interessant zijn om een karakterisering van deze deelverzameling te hebben die
gebruikt kan worden om de voorkeursrol van quantumkansfuncties te begrijpen.
De situatie doet denken aan die van de klassieke representaties in deel II. Er
is echter een belangrijk verschil. In deel II bleken aannames die nodig zijn om
de voorkeursrol van quantumkansfuncties te begrijpen op gespannen voet te staan
met de aannames die nodig waren om de klassieke representaties te krijgen. In het
huidige geval zijn er geen sterke aannames die nodig waren voor de constructie van
CL(H). De situatie lijkt daarom juist omgedraaid te zijn: de toelaatbaarheid van
niet-quantumkansfuncties lijkt een gevolg van het over het hoofd zien van fysisch-
relevante aannames.
De moeilijkheid is om grip te krijgen op wat deze fysisch-relevante aannames
zouden kunnen zijn. Een belangrijke rol voor het vinden van deze aannames is
weggelegd voor het karakteriseren van de quantumkansfuncties. Ik laat zien dat de
quantumkansfuncties precies corresponderen met de conditionele kansfuncties die
aan een niet-contextualiteits-eis voldoen. Dit resultaat toont sterke gelijkenis met
een eerder resultaat van Barnum et al uit 2000. Niet-contextualiteit als eigenschap
van quantumkansfuncties is dus welbekend, en ik bespreek drie interpretaties van
de quantummechanica die een poging doen om het belang van niet-contextualiteit
te duiden, namelijk, Deutsch en Wallace’s versie van de vele werelden interpretatie,
de informatietheoretische interpretatie van Bub en Pitowsky en de quantum Bay-
esiaanse interpretatie van Caves, Fuchs en Schack. Mijn conclusie is dat geen van
de drie een bevredigende fundering voor een eis van niet-contextualiteit leveren.
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Samenvatting
In het laatste deel van hoofdstuk 11 ga ik op zoek naar een andere karakteri-
sering van de quantumkansfuncties. Deze wordt verkregen door een link te leggen
tussen CL(H) en de orthodoxe quantumlogica L(H). Deze link loopt via de bijna
intuitionistische quantumlogica DI(L(H)) die werd gevonden in hoofdstuk 9. De
elementen van DI(L(H)) worden nu ge¨ınterpreteerd als disjuncties en conjuncties
van (equivalentieklassen van) proposities van de vorm “als A gemeten wordt, dan
ligt de meetuitkomst in ∆”, waar het antecedent en het consequent opgevat kunnen
worden als elementaire experimentele proposities uit CL(H). De conditionele zin-
nen zelf komen precies overeen met de projectie-operatoren uit L(H), die nu worden
opgevat als elementen van DI(L(H)). De quantumkansfuncties zijn dan precies de
conditionele kansfuncties op CL(H) die op niet-ambigue wijze gebruikt kunnen wor-
den om kansen aan de conditionele zinnen toe te kennen. Wiskundig geeft dit een
degelijke karakterisering. Hoe goed deze vanuit een fysisch/filosofisch perspectief te
motiveren is hangt af van de degelijkheid van de gepostuleerde interpretatie van de
elementen van DI(L(H)). Dit is een punt voor toekomstig onderzoek.
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